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GENERALIZED NASH STABILITY OF VOTING SITUATIONS 
UNDER THE PLURALITY, NANSON AND BORDA FUNCTIONS
In recently published papers, Gibbard (1973) and 
Satterthwaite (1975) have proved that for any issue containing at 
least three alternatives and under any voting procedure which is 
decisive, resolute, non-imposed and non-dictatorial there will always 
exist at least one situation in which at least one individual can 
secure an outcome which he prefers by following a strategy which does 
not reflect his sincere preferences. In a similar vein, Pattanaik 
(1973-76) has shown that under very wide classes of voting procedures 
there will always exist at least one issue such that at least one 
sincere situation will not constitute an equilibrium or strict 
equilibrium and hence there will exist at least one individual or at 
least one coalition of individuals who can obtain an outcome which he 
(they) prefers by following a strategy which does not reflect his 
(their) sincere preferences.
In Pattanaik's terms, these results paint a bleak picture 
of the possibility of finding a voting procedure that is strategy- 
proof or strictly straLegy-proof. However, even if we know that a 
given voting procedure is not strategy-proof or is not strictly
strategy-proof, we do not know the probability of any given sincere 
situation being an equilibrium or strict equilibrium. If the probability 
of any given sincere situation being a strict equilibrium is relatively 
high then we might not be too disturbed by the negative thrust of the 
results established by Gibbard, Satterthwaite and Pattanaik. However, 
if the probability of any given sincere situation being an equilibrium 
is relatively low then we have every reason to be concerned. I will 
provide a partial answer to these and to other related questions.
I have adopted the structure developed by Pattanaik in 
Strategy and Group Choice (Pattanaik:1978). Within this structure, I 
have studied three non-binary voting procedures which I refer to as the 
Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions. I define the Plurality and Borda 
functions as finite ranking rules and I define the Nanson function as a 
method of exhaustive voting based on a finite ranking operator. Since 
these functions are not resolute, I have adopted the relatively strong 
behavioural assumption of maximin behaviour of individuals. Later in 
the analysis, I supplement the Plurality function with a tie-breaking 
device and employ a much weaker behavioural assumption. In general, I 
have assumed that the sincere and the expressed preferences of all 
individuals are strict orderings.
I have proved that a necessary condition for any situation to 
be a strict equilibrium under the Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions 
La that the choice set defined by each of those functions must be a sub­
set of the choice set defined by the Majority function for the corres­
ponding sincere situation; in the case of the Plurality function, the 
choice set must agree exactly with the choice set defined by the 
Majority function for the corresponding sincere situation.
I have established a set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for any given sincere situation to be a strict equilibrium under each of 
the Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions. From these results, I have 
deduced a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for any given sin­
cere situation to be an equilibrium under each of these functions. For 
the Plurality function only, I prove a number of results concerning the 
existence of equilibria which satisfy certain additional demands and I 
establish a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the set of 
strict equilibria corresponding to any given sincere situation to be 
non-empty.
I have utilized these results in a computer simulation of voting 
situations and I have determined the probability of the occurrence of the 
above phenomena. In the simulation, I have made the following assumptions 
(1) the issue consists of exactly three distinct elements, (2) the sincere 
as well as the expressed preferences of all individuals are strict order­
ings, (3) the distribution of individual preferences satisfies the equi- 
probability assumption and (4) the maximin assumption is satisfied. The 
simulation has been executed for numbers of voters ranging from 2 to 50.
I have established that the probability of any given sincere 
situation being an equilibrium under each of these functions is relatively 
high and increases as the number of voters increases. The probability 
of any given sincere situation being a strict equilibrium under the 
Plurality and Borda functions is relatively low and decreases as the 
number of voters increases; however, under the Nanson function, the 
probability is relatively high and appears to increase as the number 
of voters increases. The results are presented graphically.
CONTENTS
PREFACE 1
CLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS 4
1 INTRODUCTION 5
2 TUE ANALYSIS OF VOTING AS AN N-PERSON GAME 20
3 THE DEFINITION AND PROPERTIES OF THE 63
PLURALITY, NANSON AND BORDA FUNCTIONS
4 THE STABILITY OF SITUATIONS UNDER THE 98
PLURALITY FUNCTION
5 THE STABILITY OF SITUATIONS UNDER THE 179
NANSON FUNCTION
6 THE STABILITY OF SITUATIONS UNDER THE 229
BORDA FUNCTION
7 A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF VOTING SITUATIONS 259
8 CONCLUSION 358
REFERENCES 369
APPENDIX 1: ELECTION SIMULATION PROGRAM 373
APPENDIX 2: COMPARISON OF CHOICE SETS 387
APPENDIX 3: COMPARISON OF THE STABILITY OF 407
SITUATIONS
1PREFACE
My i n t e r e s t  i n  the  p rob lem  o f  s t r a t e g i c  m i s r e v e l a t i o n  o f  
p r e f e r e n c e s  by v o t e r s  began  when I  was a n a l y s i z i n g  d a t a  from a c r o s s  
s e c t i o n  sample o f  e l e c t o r s  t a k e n  d u r i n g  a b y - e l e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  
A u s t r a l i a n  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n  May, 1970. I t  a p p e a r e d  t h a t  
some e l e c t o r s  i n  t h a t  sample were m i s r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e i r  p r e f e r e n c e s  
i n  hope t h e r e b y  o f  o b t a i n i n g  an outcome which th e y  p r e f e r r e d .
I  was ,  a t  t h a t  t im e ,  an e m p i r i c a l l y  o r i e n t a t e d  p o l i t i c a l  
s c i e n t i s t  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  s t u d i e s  o f  e l e c t o r a l  b e h a v i o u r .  I had no 
knowledge o f  s o c i a l  c h o i c e  t h e o r y ,  l i t t l e  knowledge  o f  economics  
and no t r a i n i n g  i n  l o g i c .  However ,  I  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e  p rob lem  o f  
s t r a t e g i c  m i s r e v e l a t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  by v o t e r s  ou g h t  to  be the  
conc e rn  o f  any p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  the  s tu d y  o f  v o t i n g .  
A c c o r d in g l y ,  I  have t r i e d  to  remedy t h e  s h o r t c o m i n g s  i n  my knowledge 
and t r a i n i n g  which a r o s e  as  a b a r r i e r  to  my f u r t h e r  p r o g r e s s .  
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  I co u ld  f i n d  no one i n  A u s t r a l i a  w i t h  any knowledge 
o f  ( o r  i n t e r e s t  in )  game t h e o r e t i c  a p p r o a c h e s  to  the  s t u d y  o f  v o t i n g  
and,  w i t h o u t  g u idanc e  from any q u a r t e r ,  I found t h e  t a s k  I  had s e t  
m y se l f  to  be a lm o s t  i m p o s s i b l e .
2I n  May 1976, I  f i r s t  met P r a s a n t a  K. P a t t a n a i k  who had 
r e c e n t l y  a c c e p t e d  an a p p o in t m e n t  a t  La Trobe U n i v e r s i t y  i n  
Melbourne .  S in c e  t h a t  t im e  he has  been  a s o u r c e  o f  c o n s t a n t  h e l p  
and e n c o u ra g e m e n t .  I n  J a n u a r y  1977, I  was f o r t u n a t e  to  be a b l e  to 
r e a d  a p a r t i a l l y  c o m p le te d  d r a f t  o f  t h e  m a n u s c r i p t  o f  h i s  fo r t h c o m i n g  
book S t r a t e g y  and Group Choice and ,  s u b s e q u e n t l y ,  I  posed  t h e  
q u e s t i o n s  to which I  have s o u g h t  a p a r t i a l  answer i n  t h i s  t h e s i s .
My c o m p le te d  work i s  t e s t im o n y  to  the  i n s p i r a t i o n  and g u idanc e  I  
have r e c e i v e d  from him.
I  am g r a t e f u l  to  Manimay Sen g u p ta  o f  t h e  Depa r tm en t  o f  
Economics a t  La Trobe U n i v e r s i t y  and to  R ic h a rd  R o u t l e y  o f  the  
Depa r tm en t  o f  P h i l o s o p h y  i n  the  R e sea rch  School  o f  S o c i a l  S c i e n c e s  
a t  the A u s t r a l i a n  N a t i o n a l  U n i v e r s i t y  who have r e c e n t l y  r e a d  and 
commented upon p a r t i a l l y  com p le ted  d r a f t s  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s .  T h e i r  
a s s i s t a n c e  h a s  be e n  e x t r e m e l y  v a l u a b l e .
I have b e n e f i t t e d  from a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  which  
I  had w i t h  B r i a n  B a r ry  o f  t h e  Depa r tm en t  o f  P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e  o f  t h e  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Chicago d u r i n g  h i s  b r i e f  v i s i t  to  A u s t r a l i a  i n  August  
1977. I  have  a l s o  b e n e f i t t e d  from c o n s t r u c t i v e  c r i t i c i s m  o f  my 
p r e v i o u s  work by B r i a n  B a r r y ,  by Donald S to k e s  o f  the  Depa r tm en t  o f  
P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e  a t  P r i n c e t o n  U n i v e r s i t y ,  by Murray Kemp o f  the  
Depa r tm en t  o f  Economics a t  the  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  New South  Wales and by 
A.F.  Davies  o f  t h e  Depa r tm en t  o f  P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e  a t  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  
o f  M e lbourne .  T h e i r  comments have been  h e l p f u l  and e n c o u r a g i n g .
I  t h a n k  P h i l l i p  Temper ley  f o r  h i s  a s s i s t a n c e  w i t h  the  
w r i t i n g  o f  t h e  f i r s t  v e r s i o n  o f  my computer  s i m u l a t i o n  p rogram  i n  
Burroughs  Ex tended  A l g o l .  I  th an k  Murray Ray and B r i a n  P e a r c e  o f
3the Computer Services Unit of the Research School of Social Sciences 
at the Australian National University for their assistance in 
converting my program to the Simula language ,and in optimizing its 
performance. All members of the Computer Services Unit have been 
extremely helpful and cooperative at all times and I am greatly 
indebted to them.
I thank George Angelides, my former colleague at the 
Australian Electoral Office, for his valuable advice, his constant 
encouragement and his readiness to assist in any way possible.
Lastly, I express appreciation to Robert S. Parker,
Colin A. Hughes and other members of the Department of Political 
Science in the Research School of Social Sciences at the 
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51 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this thesis is to study the possibilities 
of strategic misrevelation of preferences by voters under three 
non-binary voting procedures which we will refer to as the Plurality, 
Nanson and Borda functions. We will analyze the problem within the 
purely ordinal framework of an N-person cooperative game without side- 
payments and in normalized form.
The possibility that, under some voting procedures, voters 
might be able to obtain an outcome which they prefer by following a 
strategy which does not reflect their sincere preferences has been 
known since at least the second century (Farquharson: 1969). However, 
it is only relatively recently that the problem has become the subject 
of logical inquiry.
One of the first modern writers to study the problem was 
Farquharson in his Ph.D. dissertation (1958) which was later published 
as a monograph (1969). Farquharson demonstrated that the theory of 
N-person cooperative games without side-payments could be recast in 
purely ordinal terms and he demonstrated that this structure could be 
interpreted as the procedure of voting.
6The Von Neumann and M o rg e n s t e r n  (1947) f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  
N -p e rs o n  game t h e o r y  r e q u i r e d  t h a t  u t i l i t y  was c a r d i n a l l y  m e a s u r a b l e ,  
c o m p l e t e l y  t r a n s f e r a b l e  be tw een  p l a y e r s ,  and c o n t i n u o u s l y  d i v i s i b l e .
The a b s e n c e  o f  any s a t i s f a c t o r y  n o t i o n  o f  s o l u t i o n  to  such  N -p e rs o n  
games s u b s e q u e n t l y  l e d  Nash (1951) to  d e v e lo p  h i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  ’non -  
c o o p e r a t i v e  g a m e s ' . Nash assumed t h a t  each  i n d i v i d u a l  was u n a b le  to  
communicate  o r  c o l l a b o r a t e  w i t h  o t h e r s  and hence  h i s  f o r m u l a t i o n  d i d  
n o t  r e q u i r e  the  a s su m p t io n  o f  i n t e r p e r s o n a l l y  comparab le  c a r d i n a l  
u t i l i t y .  F a r q u h a r s o n  (1955)  g e n e r a l i z e d  th e  Nash c o n c e p t  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  
to  a p p ly  to  N -p e rs o n  c o o p e r a t i v e  games w i t h o u t  s i d e - p a y m e n t s  and i n  
n o r m a l i z e d  form.  A s i m i l a r  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  was made i n d e p e n d e n t l y  by 
Shubik (1959) .
As F a r q u h a r s o n  r e m a r k s ,  h i s  a pp roach  s a c r i f i c e s  the  s t r i c t  
d e t e r m i n a c y  o f  tw o - p e r s o n  z e ro - s u m  games:  s i n c e  s t r a t e g i e s  c a n n o t  be
mixed,  t h e r e  can e x i s t  tw o - p e r s o n  z e ro - s u m  games w i t h o u t  s a d d l e  p o i n t s .  
However,  N -p e rs o n  game t h e o r y  i s  i n  a more s a t i s f a c t o r y  c o n d i t i o n :  
a l t h o u g h  n o t  e v e ry  N -p e rs o n  game need  p o s s e s s  a Nash e q u i l i b r i u m ,  the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c o a l i t i o n  f o r m a t i o n  does n o t  a lw ays  p r e v e n t  e v e r y  
N -p e rs o n  game from h a v i n g  a  d e t e r m i n a t e  s o l u t i o n  ( F a r q u h a r s o n : 1 9 6 9 : 7 2 ) .
F a r q u h a r s o n  p o s t u l a t e d  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a s e t  o f  N v o t e r s  and 
he assumed t h a t  each  v o t e r  had a s e t  o f  s t r a t e g i e s  and a b i n a r y  r e l a t i o n  
d e f i n e d  o f  the  s e t  o f  N - t u p l e s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  s t r a t e g i c s .  He d e f i n e d  a 
s i t u a t i o n  a s  an N - t u p l e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  s t r a t e g i e s  and he d e f i n e d  a 
v o t i n g  p r o c e d u r e  r o u g h l y  a s  a d e c i s i o n  f u n c t i o n  which a s s i g n e d  a s i n g l e  
e l e m e n t  o f  the  s e t  o f  outcomes  to e v e r y  s i t u a t i o n .  W i th in  t h i s  f rame­
work,  he s t u d i e d  a c l a s s  o f  b i n a r y  v o t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s .
7Farquharson demonstrated that under this class of voting 
procedures it would sometimes be possible for an individual voter or 
coalition of voters to adopt strategies which did not reflect their 
sincere preferences and thereby obtain an outcome which they preferred 
to the outcome which would have obtained had they adopted strategies 
which did reflect their sincere preferences. Farquharson subsequently 
explored the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and generalized 
Nash equilibria under this class of voting procedures.
Subsequently, Dummett and Farquharson (1961) extended this 
analysis to a class of voting procedures which they referred to as 
’majority games'. In the course of this analysis, they made the follow­
ing conjecture:
it seems unlikely that there is any voting procedure in 
which it can never be advantageous for any voter to vote 
’strategically’ i.e. non-sincerely.
(Dummett & Farquharson:1961:34)
A somewhat related conjecture was made by Vickery (1960).
He suggested that immunity to manipulation is equivalent to the
conjuction of two of Arrow’s conditions (the independence of irrelevant
alternatives and positive association). Gibbard (1973) proved a general
result on the manipulation of voting procedures 'roughly by confirming
Vickery's conjecture'. As Gibbard pointed out:
Arrow’s conditions are jointly inconsistent, and hence from 
Vickery's conjecture, it would follow that a scheme satisfy­
ing the remaining Arrow conditions is manipulable.
(Gibbard:1973:588)
Gibbard worked with a mathematical structure which he referred 
to as a game form (a game without utilities attached to the outcomes) 
which he claimed could be used to characterize every non-chance procedure
8by which individual choices of contingency plans for action determine
an outcome. He defined a voting scheme as a special case of a game
form in which a strategy is a profession of preferences. Gibbard
required that a game form (and hence a voting scheme) must assign an
outcome to every N-tuple of individual strategies. He argued as follows:
A voting scheme must assign an outcome to every preference 
n-tuple, not just to some. ... However people vote, 
something will happen. If some preference n-tuples lead 
to stalemate and inaction, then inaction is a possible 
outcome. If someone prefers inaction to the outcome he 
would secure with honest voting, and he can secure 
inaction by misrepresenting his preferences, the system is 
manipulable. Stalemate must be counted as an outcome, and 
so in discussing manipulability, we should consider a 
function which assigns a value to every preference n-tuple 
and not just to some.
(Gibbard:1973:592)
Gibbard also required that a game form (and hence a voting scheme) must
always assign an outcome which is a singleton. He argued as follows:
A voter misrepresents his preferences in order to secure 
a decision he prefers, and in the end only one alternative 
is chosen. In a non-chance decision-making system, it 
docs a voter no good to have an alternative he likes tie 
for winning place if some other alternative tied with it 
is actually chosen. To investigate manipulability, we 
must consider the entire system by which the choice is 
made, including the system for breaking any ties which 
may develop. That means considering a system which re­
sults in a single choice. Voting schemes and game forms, 
then, suit the present purpose; some Arrow constitutions 
do not.
(Gibbard:1973:592)
Gibbard defined a voting scheme to be manipulable if there 
exists at least one preference N-tuple in which at least one individual's 
sincere ordering of the available alternatives does not constitute a 
'dominant pure strategy'. lie proved that only a trivial game form 
could guarantee that, whatever the utilities of the players may be, each 
player will have a dominant pure strategy. It follows from this general 
result on game forms that every voting scheme with at least three
9possible outcomes is either dictatorial or manipulable.
Gibbard makes the following point in regard to the inter­
pretation of this result:
Note Lhat to call a voting scheme manipulable is not to 
say that, given the actual circumstances, someone really 
is in a position to manipulate it. It is merely to say 
that, given some possible circumstances, someone could 
manipulate it. A voting scheme is manipulable, then, 
unless its structure guarantees that no matter how each 
person votes, no one will ever be in a position to 
manipulate the scheme.
(Gibbard:1973:590)
An equivalent result to that of Gibbard was proved independ­
ently by Satterthwaite in his Ph.D. dissertation (1973) and his result 
was later published (1975). In Satterthwaitc’s terms, the result reads 
as follows: Every voting procedure with at least three possible outcomes
is strategy-proof if and only if it is dictatorial. Subsequently, we 
will refer to the result as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
A somewhat different approach to essentially the same problem 
has been explored by Pattanaik (1973-78). Pattanaik worked with the 
concept of a group decision function (GDF) which he defined roughly as a 
function which assigns a non-empty subset of alternatives (a choice set) 
to every situation and issue which belongs to its domain. Thus a GDF 
may not define a choice set for some situations and issues i.e. a GDF 
is not necessarily decisive. Further, for some situations and issues, 
a GDF may define a choice set which contains more than one element 
i.e. a GDF is not necessarily resolute. Thus his approach differs from 
that of Farquharson (1969), Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) all 
of whom argued that a voting procedure should assign a single element
as outcome for every N-tuple of individual strategies.
10
P a t t a n a i k  h a s  a rg u e d  a s  f o l l o w s :
F i r s t  n o t e  t h a t  most  group d e c i s i o n  f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  one can 
t h i n k  o f ,  a l l o w  f o r  t i e s .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  f r e q u e n t l y  the  
d e v i c e  o f  t h e  c h a i r m a n ' s  c a s t i n g  v o t e  i s  b u i l t  i n t o  the  
d e c i s i o n  making mechanism so as  to  b r e a k  t i e s .  However,  
i f  i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r i n g s  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a n t i s y m m e t r i c  
and i f  the  cha irman  h i m s e l f  i s  i n d i f f e r e n t  be tw een  the  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  unde r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  t hen  i n v o k i n g  the  
c h a i r m a n ' s  p r e f e r e n c e s  to b r e a k  the  t i e  does n o t  work.  I t  
may be a rg u e d  t h a t  p e r h a p s  t h e  p o i n t  i s  n o t  r e a l l y  w or th  
w o r r y i n g  a b o u t  v e ry  much s i n c e  unde r  most  d e c i s i o n  p r o c e d ­
u r e s  t i e s  can t a k e  p l a c e  o n l y  r a r e l y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h  a 
l a r g e  number o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .  T h i s  i s  n o t  a c o n v i n c i n g  
a rgum e n t .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  a t i e  may a r i s e  i n  one o u t  
o f  a thousand  s i t u a t i o n s .  But by f o r c i n g  r e s o l u t e n e s s  i n  
t h a t  s i n g l e  c a se  i t  may be p o s s i b l e  to  p ro v e  a r e s u l t  which 
i t  m igh t  be i m p o s s i b l e  to  p rove  o t h e r w i s e .  Many o f  the  
r e s u l t s  p roved  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on s t r a t e g i c  v o t i n g  show 
t h a t  c e r t a i n  phenomena can o c c u r  w i t h o u t  t e l l i n g  us the  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  such  o c c u r r e n c e .  In  such a c o n t e x t ,  t h e  
argument  t h a t  t i e s  a r e  r a r e  under  many GDFs when th e  number 
o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  i s  l a r g e ,  seems to  be an i n a d e q u a t e  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  r e s o l u t e n e s s  o r  weak r e s o l u t e n e s s .  In  any 
c a s e ,  when t h e  number o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  i s  s m a l l ,  t h e  l i k e l i ­
hood o f  a t i e  w i t h o u t  e v e ry  i n d i v i d u a l  b e i n g  i n d i f f e r e n t  
be tw een  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  seems to  be f a i r l y  h i g h  under  many 
GDFs. In  view o f  a l l  t h i s ,  i n  g e n e r a l  we do n o t  assume 
GDFs to  be r e s o l u t e  i n  t h i s  book though from a p u r e l y  t e c h ­
n i c a l  p o i n t  o f  view r e s o l u t e n e s s  i s  an e x t r e m e l y  c o n v e n i e n t  
p r o p e r t y .
( P a t t a n a i k : 1 9 7 8 : Chap t e r  3)
The re  i s  n o t h i n g  i n  P a t t a n a i k ' s  a p p ro a c h  which p r e v e n t s  the  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  GDF’ s which a r e  d e c i s i v e  and r e s o l u t e  and i t  can be 
a rg u e d  t h a t  i t  i s  f o r m a l l y  more g e n e r a l  to  a d m i t  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
a GDF may n o t  s a t i s f y  one o r  o t h e r  o r  b o th  o f  t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s .  However , 
a s  P a t t a n a i k  h a s  s u g g e s t e d ,  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  d e c i s i v e n e s s  and r e s o l u t e n e s s  
makes i t  p o s s i b l e  to  p rove  much s t r o n g e r  r e s u l t s  than  i s  p o s s i b l e  o t h e r ­
w i s e  ( P a t t a n a i k : 1 978 :Chap t e r  5 ) .
P a t t a n a i k  (1978)  u t i l i z e d  t h e  Nash c o n c ep t  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  and 
the  s u b s e q u e n t  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h i s  c o n c e p t  by F a r q u h a r s o n  and Shubik  
as  t h e  b a s i s  o f  h i s  c o n c e p t s  o f  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f n e s s  and s t r i c t  s t r a t e g y -
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p r o o f n e s s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  He d e f i n e d  a GDF to  be  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  i f  and 
o n l y  i f ,  f o r  e v e ry  p o s s i b l e  i s s u e ,  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  an 
e q u i l i b r i u m ;  he d e f i n e d  a GDF to  be  s t r i c t l y  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  i f  and o n ly  
i f ,  f o r  e v e r y  p o s s i b l e  i s s u e ,  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  a s t r i c t  
e q u i l i b r i u m .
P a t t a n a i k  (1978) a rg u e d  t h a t  h i s  c o n c e p t  o f  s t r i c t  s t r a t e g y -  
p r o o f n e s s  i s  an i m p o r t a n t  n o r m a t i v e  demand which  any GDF s h o u ld  s a t i s f y ,  
i f  t h a t  GDF i s  to be c o n s i d e r e d  as  e t h i c a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e .  lie d e m o n s t r a t e d  
t h a t  a l l  GDF's b e l o n g i n g  to  wide c l a s s e s  o f  GDF’ s do n o t  s a t i s f y  t h i s  
demand. Hence,  under  a l l  o f  t h e s e  GDF's,  t h e r e  w i l l  a lw ays  e x i s t  a t  
l e a s t  one i s s u e  such t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  n o t  be a 
s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  and t h u s  t h e r e  w i l l  e x i s t  a t  l e a s t  one c o a l i t i o n  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l s  who can o b t a i n  an outcome which  th e y  p r e f e r  by a d o p t i n g  a 
s t r a t e g y  which does n o t  r e f l e c t  t h e i r  s i n c e r e  p r e f e r e n c e s .
P a t t a n a i k  (1978) a l s o  p roved  t h a t  a l l  GDF's b e l o n g i n g  to  q u i t e  
wide c l a s s e s  o f  GDF's f a i l  to  s a t i s f y  the  much weake r  demand o f  s t r a t e g y -  
p r o o f n e s s .  Hence,  u n d e r  a l l  o f  t h e s e  GDF's, t h e r e  w i l l  a lw ays  e x i s t  a t  
l e a s t  one i s s u e  such t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  n o t  be an 
e q u i l i b r i u m  and t h u s  t h e r e  w i l l  e x i s t  an i n d i v i d u a l  who can o b t a i n  an 
outcome which he p r e f e r s  by a d o p t i n g  a s t r a t e g y  which  does  n o t  r e f l e c t  
h i s  s i n c e r e  p r e f e r e n c e s .
I n  s u b s e q u e n t  c h a p t e r s ,  we w i l l  d i s c u s s  the  r e s u l t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
by Gibbard  ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,  S a t t e r t h w a i t e  (1975) and P a t t a n a i k  (1973-78)  more 
p r e c i s e l y  and we w i l l  c l a r i f y  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  them. For  the  
p r e s e n t  we o b s e r v e  t h a t ,  i n  P a t t a n a i k ' s  t e r m s ,  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  p a i n t  a 
b l e a k  p i c t u r e  o f  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  f i n d i n g  a  GDF which i s  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f
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o r  s t r i c t l y  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f .  However,  even  i f  we know t h a t  a g i v e n  GDF 
i s  n o t  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  o r  s t r i c t l y  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f ,  we do n o t  know the  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any g iv e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  an e q u i l i b r i u m  or  
s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m .  I f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any g iv e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  
b e i n g  a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  t h e n  we m igh t  n o t  be too  
d i s t u r b e d  by th e  n e g a t i v e  t h r u s t  o f  t h e  above r e s u l t s .  However , i f  
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any g iv e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  an e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  
r e l a t i v e l y  low t h a n  we have e v e r y  r e a s o n  to  be c o n c e rn e d .  In  t h i s  
t h e s i s ,  I  w i l l  p r o v i d e  a p a r t i a l  answer  to  t h e s e  and to  o t h e r  r e l a t e d  
q u e s t i o n s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h r e e  s e l e c t e d  GDF's.
The GDF’ s which I  have s e l e c t e d  f o r  s t u d y  a r e  t h r e e  non­
b i n a r y  v o t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  which I  r e f e r  to  a s  the  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson 
and Borda f u n c t i o n s .  I  have  s e l e c t e d  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  as  i t  i s  
one o f  t h e  most  w i d e l y  used  v o t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  p a r l i a ­
m en ta ry  e l e c t i o n s .  B o r d a ’ s conc e rn  t h a t  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  p r o c e d u r e  may 
s e l e c t  the  ’wrong '  c a n d i d a t e  m igh t  be c o n s i d e r e d  as  one o f  the  s t a r t i n g  
p o i n t s  o f  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  s o c i a l  c h o ic e  ( B l a c k : 1 9 5 8 :1 5 6 ) .
I  have  s e l e c t e d  th e  Borda f u n c t i o n  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  p r o b a b l y  the  
most  w i d e l y  s t u d i e d  n o n - b i n a r y  v o t i n g  p r o c e d u r e .  I t  i s  t h e  most  w e l l  
known example o f  t h a t  c l a s s  o f  p r o c e d u r e s  s u g g e s t e d  by Borda (1781) under  
which marks a r e  a l l o c a t e d  to  a l t e r n a t i v e s  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  p o s i t i o n  
which they occupy In t h e  o r d e r i n g s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  v o t e r s .  The Borda 
f u n c t i o n  h a s  been c h a r a c t e r i z e d  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  by Smith (1975)  and by 
Young (1974 ) .
The Nanson f u n c t i o n  i s  a method o f  e x h a u s t i v e  v o t i n g  b a s e d  
on t h e  P l u r a l i t y  p r o c e d u r e .  I  have s e l e c t e d  i t  f o r  s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s .
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F i r s t l y ,  i t  i s  the  most  w i d e ly  used  v o t i n g  p r o c e d u r e  i n  
A u s t r a l i a .  The Nanson p r o c e d u r e  i s  u s u a l l y  r e f e r r e d  to  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y  
as  ’ p r e f e r e n t i a l  v o t i n g '  and was r e f e r r e d  to  by F a r q u h a r s o n  as  ’ t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  v o t e ’ ( F a r q u h a r s o n : 1 9 6 9 : 6 2 ) .  The a d o p t i o n  o f  t h i s  p r o c e d ­
u r e  f o r  u se  i n  A u s t r a l i a n  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  e l e c t i o n s  was l a r g e l y  due to  
t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  E . J .  Nanson a t  t h e  t u r n  o f  t h i s  c e n t u r y .  The p r o c e d u r e  
was f i r s t  d e t a i l e d  by Nanson i n  a p a p e r  e n t i t l e d  Methods o f  E l e c t i o n  
d e l i v e r e d  to  t h e  Royal  S o c i e t y  o f  V i c t o r i a  i n  1882 and hence  we r e f e r  
to  i t  a s  the  Nanson f u n c t i o n .
S e c o n d ly ,  one o f  the  p r i n c i p a l  a rgum en ts  which Nanson gave i n  
f a v o u r  o f  t h i s  p r o c e d u r e  i s  c e n t r a l  to  o u r  p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e .  He a rg u e d  
t h a t  e x i s t i n g  e l e c t o r a l  sy s te m s  i n  use  i n  A u s t r a l i a  ( f o r  exam p le ,  t h e  
P l u r a l i t y  p r o c e d u r e  and methods o f  b l o c k  v o t i n g )  d i d  n o t  p r o v i d e  a l l  
e l e c t o r s  w i t h  a s t r a t e g y  by which  th e y  co u ld  e x p r e s s  t h e i r  p r e f e r e n c e s  
s i n c e r e l y :
The e l e c t o r  i s  m uzz led .  He i s  n o t  a l l o w e d  to  s ay  a l l  
t h a t  he t h i n k s .  But  worse  t han  t h i s ,  he i s  compel led  
to  s a y  what  he does n o t  b e l i e v e ,  what  he knows to  be 
f a l s e .  Nay,  more,  he i s  i n  some c a s e s  com pe l led  to 
s t u l t i f y  h i m s e l f  by means o f  t h e  u n t r u t h s  he i s  made 
to  t e l l .
(N anson :1900)
Nanson a rgue d  t h a t  an a c c e p t a b l e  e l e c t o r a l  s y s te m  would be  one unde r  
which e v e r y  e l e c t o r  had  a s t r a t e g y  which  e n a b l e d  him to  e x p r e s s  h i s  
p r e f e r e n c e s  s i n c e r e l y  and unde r  which no e l e c t o r  had any i n c e n t i v e  to  
do o t h e r w i s e :
The e l e c t o r  must  be unmuzz led .  He must  be a l l o w e d ,  
he must  be e n c o u r a g e d ,  n a y ,  even i t  must  be made to  
h i s  i n t e r e s t  f o r  him to  t e l l  i n  h i s  v o t i n g  p a p e r  the  
t r u t h ,  t h e  whole t r u t h ,  and n o t h i n g  b u t  t h e  t r u t h .
(N a n s o n :1900)
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Nanson s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h i s  c ou ld  b e s t  be a c h i e v e d  as  f o l l o w s .
F i r s t l y ,  each  e l e c t o r  must  be  r e q u i r e d  t o  g iv e  a com p le te  r a n k i n g  o f  
t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  p r e s e n t e d  f o r  c h o ic e  (hence t h e  t e rm  ' p r e f e r e n t i a l  
v o t i n g ' ) .  S e c o n d ly ,  each e l e c t o r  must be r e q u i r e d  to  g i v e  h i s  comple te  
r a n k i n g  o f  the  a l t e r n a t i v e s  b e f o r e  any c o u n t i n g  i s  u n d e r t a k e n .  T h i r d l y ,  
t h e  s c r u t i n y  s h o u ld  be  a method o f  e x h a u s t i v e  v o t i n g  b a s e d  on th e  
P l u r a l i t y  r u l e  o r  t h e  Borda r u l e .
Nanson f a v o u r e d  th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  a method o f  e x h a u s t i v e  
v o t i n g  b a s e d  on t h e  Borda r u l e  (N anson :1882:211)  b u t  conceded  t h a t  a 
method o f  e x h a u s t i v e  v o t i n g  b a s ed  on the  P l u r a l i t y  r u l e  would have an 
a d v a n t a g e  i n  t h a t :
i t  i s  q u i t e  i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  an a s t u t e  e l e c t o r  to  g a in  
any a d v a n ta g e  f o r  a f a v o u r i t e  c a n d i d a t e  by p l a c i n g  a 
f o r m id a b l e  c o m p e t i t o r  a t  the  bo t to m  o f  the  l i s t .
( N a n s o n : 1882:208)
I t  can be a rg u e d  t h a t  Nanson was t h e  f i r s t  s o c i a l  c h o ic e  
t h e o r i s t  to  be s e r i o u s l y  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  the  p rob lem  o f  s t r a t e g i c  
m i s r e v e l a t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  by v o t e r s .  The p r o c e d u r e  he s u g g e s t e d  
d o e s  n o t  g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  i t  w i l l  a lw ays  be i n  t h e  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
e v e r y  v o t e r  t o  e x p r e s s  h i s  p r e f e r e n c e s  s i n c e r e l y  b u t ,  a s  we w i l l  
d e m o n s t r a t e ,  i t  comes much c l o s e r  to  s a t i s f y i n g  t h i s  i d e a l  t h a n  th e  
P l u r a l i t y  and Borda  p r o c e d u r e s .
Although  the  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and Borda f u n c t i o n s  a r e  a l l  
d e c i s i v e  GDF's they  a r e  n o t  r e s o l u t e  u n l e s s  they  a r e  s u p p le m e n te d  by 
some form o f  t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e .  O b v i o u s ly ,  the  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  any 
p a r t i c u l a r  t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v ic e  w i l l  l i m i t  the  g e n e r a l i t y  o f  o u r  r e s u l t s .  
F u r t h e r ,  the  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  a t i c - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e  has  p r e s e n t e d  some 
prob lem s  i n  i m p l e m e n ta t i o n  ( se e  l a t e r ) .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  I  have chosen  to
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work w i t h i n  the  framework dev e lo p e d  by P a t t a n a i k  i n  S t r a t e g y  and Group 
Choice  ( 1 9 7 8 ) .
W i th in  t h i s  f ramework,  I  have e s t a b l i s h e d  a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  
and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  to be an e q u i l i b r i u m  
o r  s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  each  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and Borda 
f u n c t i o n s .  S inc e  t h e s e  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  n o t  r e s o l u t e ,  I  have  a d o p te d  a 
r e l a t i v e l y  s t r o n g  b e h a v i o u r a l  a s s u m p t io n  which  I  r e f e r  to  as  t h e  maximin 
a s s u m p t io n  (which I  d e f i n e  f o r m a l l y  i n  C h a p te r  2 ) .  L a t e r  i n  the  a n a l y s i s ,  
I  have  sup p le m e n te d  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  w i t h  a t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e  and 
I  have employed a much weaker  b e h a v i o u r a l  a s s u m p t i o n .  In  g e n e r a l ,  I  have 
assumed t h a t  t h e  s i n c e r e  and th e  e x p r e s s e d  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  
a r e  s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g s .
I  have i n c o r p o r a t e d  th e  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  
r e f e r r e d  to  above i n  a computer  p rogram  d e s i g n e d  to  s i m u l a t e  v o t i n g  
s i t u a t i o n s  and examine t h e i r  s t a b i l i t y .  The s i m u l a t i o n  has  been  e x e c u t e d  
f o r  each v a l u e  o f  N = 2 ,  . . . ,  50.  I  have made t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a s s u m p t i o n s :  
(1) t h e  i s s u e  c o n s i s t s  o f  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  (2) t h e  s i n c e r e  
and t h e  e x p r e s s e d  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g s ,
(3) t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  e q u i p r o b a b i l -  
i t y  a s s u m p t io n  and (4) t h e  maximin a s s u m p t io n  i s  s a t i s f i e d .
O b v i o u s ly ,  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  any p a r t i c u l a r  a s s u m p t io n  a b o u t  t h e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  i s  somewhat a r b i t r a r y  b u t  t h e  e q u i -  
p r o b a b i l i t y  a s s u m p t io n  h a s  be e n  used  by a number o f  w r i t e r s  who have  
so u g h t  to  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  c y c l i c a l  m a j o r i t i e s .  A c r i t i c a l  
r e v i e w  o f  the  work o f  t h e s e  w r i t e r s  can be found i n  Sen ( 1 9 7 0 ) .  Some of
t h e s e  w r i t e r s  have made a n a l y t i c a l  a t t e m p t s  to  f i n d  a s im p l e  c l o s e d - f o r m
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e x p r e s s i o n  f o r  t h e  p a r a d o x  p r o b a b i l i t y ;  o t h e r s  have  used  computer  
e n u m e r a t i o n  r o u t i n e s  to  d e t e r m i n e  e x a c t  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  p a r a d o x  p r o b a b i l ­
i t y ;  and o t h e r s  have d e v e lo p e d  s i m u l a t i o n  e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  p a ra d o x  
p r o b a b i l i t y .
I  have chosen  the  t e c h n i q u e  o f  compute r  s i m u l a t i o n  b e c a u s e  
i t  e n a b l e s  t h e  s i m u l a t a n e o u s  e x p l o r a t i o n  o f  many d i f f e r e n t  b u t  c l o s e l y  
r e l a t e d  q u e s t i o n s .  F u r t h e r ,  by u t i l i z i n g  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  anonymi ty  
(which I  d e f i n e  p r e c i s e l y  i n  C h a p te r  3) I  h a v e ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  s i m u l a t e d  
e v e r y  p o s s i b l e  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  f o r  each  v a l u e  o f  N. I  w i l l  d i s c u s s  
t h i s  t e c h n i q u e  i n  d e t a i l  i n  C h a p te r  7 b u t  I  w i l l  make t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
o b s e r v a t i o n s  a t  t h i s  s t a g e .  F i r s t l y ,  by a d o p t i n g  t h i s  a p p r o a c h ,  I  
have  been  a b l e  to  d e t e r m i n e  e x a c t  v a l u e s  o f  the  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  the  
phenomena i n  which  I  am i n t e r e s t e d .  S e c o n d ly ,  by a d o p t i n g  t h i s  a p p r o a c h ,  
I  have  been  u n a b le  to  i d e n t i f y  any p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l  a s  cha i rm an  and 
t h i s  h a s  p r e v e n t e d  me from em p loy ing  t h e  most  commonly used  t i e - b r e a k i n g  
d e v i c e .
However , I  have  d e t e r m i n e d  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  each  o f  the 
P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and Borda f u n c t i o n s  d e f i n i n g  c h o ic e  s e t s  which c o n s i s t  
o f  (a) e x a c t l y  one e l e m e n t ,  (b) e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  and 
(c)  a l l  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  i n  the  i s s u e .  In  o r d e r  to  e x p l o r e  t h e  
co n s eq u e n c e s  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  a p p ro a c h  be tw e en  Gibbard  (1973)  and 
S a t t e r t h w a i t e  (1973 ,1975)  on one hand and P a t t a n a i k  (1973-78)  on the  
o t h e r ,  I have  i n t r o d u c e d  ( i n  r e s p e c t  o f  the  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  o n ly )  an 
u n s p e c i f i e d  t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e .  I  have a l s o  u t i l i z e d  t h e  d e v i c e  o f  
b r e a k i n g  t i e s  by r e f e r e n c e  to  a s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g  o f  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
which i s  f i x e d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n .  T h i s  d e v ic e  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  
as  the  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  a cha irm an  who does  n o t  v o t e  u n l e s s  a t i e  o c c u r s  -
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which is the case in Australian parliamentary elections. I will 
discuss the introduction of tie-breaking devices in greater detail 
in Chapter 4.
I conclude this introduction by outlining the structure of 
subsequent chapters.
In Chapter 2, The Analysis of Voting as an N-person Game,
I define an N-person game in normalized form and show that the procedure 
of voting may be analyzed within this structure. The approach I have 
adopted is essentially that of Pattanaik (1978). I subsequently define 
Pattanaik's concepts of strategy-proofness and strict strategy-proofness 
of GDF's and compare this normative demand with Gibbard’s concept of a 
non-manipulable voting scheme. I note the negative results which have 
been established with the aid of these concepts and suggest an explor­
ation of the significance of these results by examining the probability 
of any sincere situation being an equilibrium or strict equilibrium under 
several specific GDF’s. I conclude by considering the approach of 
Peleg (1978) and suggest a modification of this approach which I will 
also explore in subsequent chapters.
In Chapter 3, The Definition and Properties of the Plurality, 
Nanson and Borda Functions, I will introduce the concepts of a finite 
ranking operator (FRO), a simple finite ranking rule based on a finite 
ranking operator (SFRR), and a method of exhaustive voting based on a 
finite ranking operator. I will define the Plurality and Borda functions 
as finite ranking rules and the Nanson function as a method of exhaustive 
voting. I then define a number of properties of GDF's and discuss the 
Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions in terms of these properties. I
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c o n c l u d e  by f o r m a l l y  s t a t i n g  t h e  G i b b a r d - S a t t e r t h w a i t e  t h e o r e m  and 
two t h e o r e m s  o f  P a t t a n a i k  -  t h e  f i r s t  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  SFRR's and t h e  
s e c o n d  w i t h  m e th o d s  o f  e x h a u s t i v e  v o t i n g  b a s e d  on FRO 's .  I  d i s c u s s  
t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson  and B o rd a  
f u n c t i o n s .
I n  C h a p t e r  4 ,  The S t a b i l i t y  o f  S i t u a t i o n s  u n d e r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  
F u n c t i o n , I  p r o v e  t h a t  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  any s i t u a t i o n  to  b e  a 
s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  u n d e r  t h i s  CDF i s  t h a t  t h e  c h o i c e  s e t  d e f i n e d  by t h i s  
GDF m u s t  a g r e e  e x a c t l y  w i t h  t h e  c h o i c e  s e t  d e f i n e d  by t h e  M a j o r i t y  
f u n c t i o n  f o r  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n .  I  t h e n  e s t a b l i s h  a 
s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  an y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  to  
b e  a  s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  u n d e r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  From t h e s e  
r e s u l t s ,  I  d e d u c e  a  s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  an y  
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  t o  b e  an  e q u i l i b r i u m  u n d e r  t h i s  GDF. I  s u b s e q u e n t l y  
p r o v e  a  nu mber  o f  r e s u l t s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  e q u i l i b r i a  w h ich  
s a t i s f y  c e r t a i n  a d d i t i o n a l  dem ands  and I  e s t a b l i s h  a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  
and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  s e t  o f  s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i a  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
t o  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  t o  be  n o n - e m p t y .
I n  C h a p t e r  5 ,  The S t a b i l i t y  o f  S i t u a t i o n s  u n d e r  t h e  Nanson 
F u n c t i o n , I  p r o v e  t h a t  a  n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  an y  s i t u a t i o n  to  b e  an  
e q u i l i b r i u m  u n d e r  t h i s  GDF i s  t h a t  t h e  c h o i c e  s e t  d e f i n e d  by t h i s  GDF 
m us t  be  a  s u b s e t  o f  t h e  c h o i c e  s e t  d e f i n e d  by t h e  M a j o r i t y  f u n c t i o n  f o r  
t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n .  I  t h e n  e s t a b l i s h ,  f o r  any i s s u e  
c o n t a i n i n g  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and 
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  an y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  t o  be  a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  
u n d e r  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n .  From t h e s e  r e s u l t s ,  I  d e d u c e ,  f o r  any i s s u e  
c o n t a i n i n g  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  a  s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and
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s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  to  be an e q u i l i b r i u m  
u n d e r  t h i s  GDF. I  conc lu de  by p r o v i n g  a number o f  o t h e r  r e s u l t s  
c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  s i t u a t i o n s  unde r  t h i s  GDF.
In  Cha p te r  6,  The S t a b i l i t y  o f  S i t u a t i o n s  under  t h e  Borda 
F u n c t i o n , I  p rove  t h a t  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  any s i t u a t i o n  to be  a 
s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  under  t h i s  GDF i s  t h a t  t h e  c h o ic e  s e t  d e f i n e d  by t h i s  
GDF must  be a s u b s e t  o f  the  c h o ic e  s e t  d e f i n e d  by the  M a j o r i t y  f u n c t i o n  
f o r  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n .  I  t hen  e s t a b l i s h ,  f o r  any 
i s s u e  c o n t a i n i n g  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  
and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  to be a s t r i c t  e q u i ­
l i b r i u m  unde r  t h e  Borda f u n c t i o n .  From t h e s e  r e s u l t s  I  d e d u c e ,  f o r  any 
i s s u e  c o n t a i n i n g  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  
and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  to  be an e q u i l i b r i u m  
unde r  t h i s  GDF. I  c onc lude  by p r o v i n g  a number o f  o t h e r  r e s u l t s  c o n c e r n ­
i n g  th e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  s i t u a t i o n s  unde r  t h i s  GDF.
In  Cha p te r  7, A Computer S i m u l a t i o n  o f  V o t in g  S i t u a t i o n s , I  
p r e s e n t  and i n t e r p r e t  the  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  computer  s i m u l a t i o n .  Given the  
a s s u m p t io n s  on which t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  i s  b a s e d ,  I  have  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  an e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  
each  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and Borda f u n c t i o n s  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  and 
i n c r e a s e s  as  the  number o f  v o t e r s  i n c r e a s e s .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any 
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  u n d e r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  and 
Borda f u n c t i o n s  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  low and d e c r e a s e s  as  the number o f  v o t e r s  
i n c r e a s e s ;  however ,  under  the  Nanson f u n c t i o n ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  r e l ­
a t i v e l y  h i g h  and a p p e a r s  to i n c r e a s e  a s  the  number o f  v o t e r s  i n c r e a s e s .
I  c o nc lude  i n  Cha p te r  8.
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2 THE ANALYSIS OF VOTING AS AN N-PERSON CAME
The interpretation of voting as an N-person cooperative game 
without side payments and in normalized form was demonstrated by 
Farquharson (1958,1969). Related approaches have been developed 
by Wilson (1971,1972), Bloomfield (1971,1976), Gibbard (1973,1977),
Satterthwaite (1973,1975), Pattanaik (1973-78) and others. The approach 
we have adopted is essentially that of Pattanaik (1978).
We begin by defining an N-person game in normalized form and 
showing that the procedure of voting may be analyzed with this structure. 
We then discuss the information conditions which we will assume in our 
analysis. We proceed to define the Nash concept of equilibrium and 
the generalization of this concept by Farquharson (1955) and Shubik (1959) 
which we will refer to as strict equilibrium. We discuss these notions 
as solution concepts.
We define Pattanaik1s concepts of strategy-proofness and strict 
strategy-proofness of GDF's. We discuss the motivation for the introduc­
tion of these normative concepts and note a number of negative results 
which Pattanaik has established concerning the existence of GDF's 
satisfying strategy-proofness and strict strategy-proofness.
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We d e f i n e  G i b b a r d ' s  c o n c e p t  o f  a n o n - m a n i p u l a b l e  v o t i n g  scheme 
and compare t h i s  n o r m a t i v e  demand w i t h  P a t t a n a i k ' s  c o n c e p t  o f  a s t r a t e g y -  
p r o o f  GDF. We n o t e  t h e  fu n d am e n ta l  r e s u l t  p ro v ed  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  by 
G ibba rd  (1973) and S a t t e r t h w a i t e  ( 1 9 7 3 ,1 9 7 5 ) .  We d i s c u s s  the  r e s u l t s  
e s t a b l i s h e d  by P a z n e r  and Wesley ( 1 9 7 7 , 1 9 7 8 ) .  We then  s u g g e s t  an 
e x p l o r a t i o n  o f  the  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  the  n e g a t i v e  r e s u l t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by 
G ibbard  (1 9 7 3 ) ,  S a t t e r t h w a i t e  ( 1 9 7 3 ,1 9 7 5 ) ,  and P a t t a n a i k  (1973-78)  by 
e x a m in in g  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  an e q u i l i b r i u m  
o r  s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  s e v e r a l  s p e c i f i c  GDF's.
We c o nc lude  by c o n s i d e r i n g  the  a p p ro a c h  o f  P e l e g  (1978)  who 
a rg u e d  t h a t  t h e  ' n e x t  s t e p  i n  the  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  s t r a t e g i c  v o t i n g  i s  
to  lo o k  f o r  n o n - d i c t a t o r i a l  v o t i n g  schemes i n  which  th e  m a n i p u l a t i o n  
o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  by i n d i v i d u a l s ,  o r  by g roups  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  does n o t  
a f f e c t  t h e  f i n a l  s o c i a l  c h o i c e ' .  We s u g g e s t  a m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  P e l e g ' s  
a pp roa c h  which we w i l l  e x p l o r e  i n  s u b s e q u e n t  c h a p t e r s .
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The c o n c e p t  o f  an N -p e rs o n  Game i n  N orm al ized  Form
An N -p e rs o n  game i n  n o r m a l i z e d  form i s  a sy s tem :
< L , ft ^ » ^ 2 » • • • >  ^  i  * ^ 2  * * * * * ^
where
(1) L = {1,  2,  N} ( t h e  s e t  o f  p l a y e r s ) ;
(2) f o r  a l l  i  e L, ft_^  i s  a non-em pty  s e t  ( t h e  s e t  o f  
s t r a t e g i e s  a v a i l a b l e  to  p l a y e r  i ) ;
(3) f o r  a l l  i  e L, i  i s  a b i n a r y  r e l a t i o n  d e f i n e d  o v e r
ft = ft, x ft„ x . . . x ft„1 2  N
( t h e  b i n a r y  weak p r e f e r e n c e  r e l a t i o n  " a t  l e a s t  as  
good as"  o f  p l a y e r  i ) .
Hence,  an N -p e rs o n  game i n  n o r m a l i z e d  form i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
by t h e  p l a y e r s ,  t h e  s e t s  o f  s t r a t e g i e s  a v a i l a b l e  to  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
p l a y e r s ,  and t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  t h e  p l a y e r s  d e f i n e d  o v e r  t h e  N - t u p l e s  
o f  s t r a t e g i e s  c o n s t r u c t e d  by t a k i n g  one s t r a t e g y  from t h e  s e t  o f  
s t r a t e g i e s  a v a i l a b l e  to  ea ch  p l a y e r .
I t  i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  does n o t  r e f e r  t o  any
p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n  o r  any outcome.  I n t u i t i v e l y ,  t h e  p l a y e r s ’ p r e f e r e n c e s
w i l l  be d e f i n e d  o v e r  outcomes  b u t ,  s i n c e  t h e  outcome i s  d e t e r m i n e d  by
t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  a d o p te d  by t h e  p l a y e r s ,  any weak p r e f e r e n c e  r e l a t i o n
d e f i n e d  o v e r  outcomes  i n d u c e s  a weak p r e f e r e n c e  r e l a t i o n  d e f i n e d  ove r
t h e  s e t  o f  N - t u p l e s  o f  s t r a t e g i e s .  Hence ,  t h e  weak p r e f e r e n c e
r e l a t i o n s  have been d e f i n e d  o v e r  ft, x ft- x . . .  x ftXT. We f o l l o w  l  1 2 N
P a t t a n a i k  (1978)  as  opposed  to  F a r q u h a r s o n  (1969)  by n o t  a s sum ing  t h a t  
t h e  b i n a r y  r e l a t i o n  £ i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  c o n n e c t e d  o r  t r a n s i t i v e .  We n o t e  
t h a t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  c o m p l e t e l y  f r e e  o f  any n o t i o n  o f  c a r d i n a l  u t i l i t y  
ou r  a n a l y s i s  w i l l  be s t r i c t l y  i n  t e rm s  o f  o r d i n a l  p r e f e r e n c e s .
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The A n a l y s i s  o f  V o t ing  as  an N -Pe rson  Game
We now p r o c e e d  to  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  group d e c i s i o n  making by 
means o f  v o t i n g  may be a n a l y z e d  as  an N -pe rson  game i n  n o r m a l i z e d  
form.  F i r s t l y ,  we i n t e r p r e t  t h e  s e t  o f  p l a y e r s ,  L = {1 ,  2 ,  N}
as  t h e  s e t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  who p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  group d e c i s i o n  making 
p r o c e s s .  We assume t h a t  L i s  a f i n i t e  s e t  and t h a t  |L j £ 2. L e t  L,
L , e t c  d e n o te  s u b s e t s  o f  L which we w i l l  r e f e r  to  as  c o a l i t i o n s .
L e t  L d e n o te  t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  non-empty  s u b s e t s  o f  L i . e .  the  s e t  o f  
a l l  p o s s i b l e  c o a l i t i o n s  which  may form.
L e t  X be t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  c o n c e i v a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  which may 
be p r e s e n t e d  f o r  c h o i c e .  We assume t h a t  X i s  a f i n i t e  s e t  and t h a t  
j XI 5 3. I t  i s  p r o b a b l e  t h a t  n o t  a l l  t h e  e l e m e n t s  o f  X w i l l  be 
p h y s i c a l l y  o r  t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e  a t  any g iven  t im e .  L e t  X be 
t h e  s e t  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  O b v i o u s ly ,  X C X.
At any p a r t i c u l a r  t im e  i t  i s  p r o b a b l e  t h a t  o n ly  some o f  t h e  e l e m e n t s  
o f  X w i l l  a c t u a l l y  be p r e s e n t e d  f o r  c h o i c e .  We d e f i n e  t h e  i s s u e , A, 
as  t h e  s e t  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a c t u a l l y  p r e s e n t e d  f o r  c h o ic e  and we 
assume t h a t  A _C X. We w i l l  assume t h r o u g h o u t  ou r  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  t h e  
i s s u e  i s  g iv e n  and t h a t  A c o n t a i n s  a t  l e a s t  one e l e m e n t .  Le t  X be 
t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  non-em pty  s u b s e t s  o f  X i . e .  t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  p o s s i b l e  
i s s u e s  t h a t  m igh t  a r i s e .
We assume t h a t  e v e r y  i n d i v i d u a l  i  c L h a s  a b i n a r y  weak 
p r e f e r e n c e  r e l a t i o n  IL d e f i n e d  o v e r  X which r e p r e s e n t s  the  s i n c e r e  
p r e f e r e n c e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  i .  As F a rq u h a r s o n  (1969)  has  d e m o n s t r a t e d ,  
i t  may sometim es be a d v a n ta g e o u s  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  to  v o t e  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  
i . e .  n o t  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e i r  s i n c e r e  p r e f e r e n c e s .  L e t  t h e  b i n a r y
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weak preference relations R_, etc defined over X denote the 
preferences actually expressed by individual i.
We define the sincere strict preference relation and the 
sincere indifference relation I. as follows:l
xP^y iff xR^y and not yR^x 
xl_^ y iff xR^y and yR^x
Similarly, P^ and 1^ correspond to R^; P^ and correspond to R^.
Subsequently, we will refer to various properties of R^, R^ 
and other binary weak preference relations. We now define the 
following properties for any binary relation R defined over any set X:
R is reflexive over X iff for all x e X, xRx
R is connected over X iff for all distinct x, y e X, xRy or yRx
R is symmetric over X iff for all x, y e X, if xRy then yRx
R is asymmetric over X iff for all x, y e X, if xRy then not yRx 
R is antisymmetric (or strict) over X iff for all x, y e X, 
if xRy and yRx then x = y 
R is transitive over X iff for all x, y, z e X, 
if xRy and yRz then xRz
R is quasi-transitive over X iff for all x, y, z e X,
if (xRy and not yRx) and (yRz and not zRy) then (xRz and not zRx) 
R is an ordering over X iff R is reflexive, connected and transitive 
over X
We assume that the sincere weak preference relation of every 
individual as well as the weak preference relation expressed by every 
individual is an ordering over X. Since R^ and R^ are assumed to be
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orderings we will write: xP.y & yl.z & xP.z 1 ' 1 l
xP.y & yP.z & xP.zl i l
xl. y & yP . z & xP . zl i l
as xP.yl. zl l
as xP . yP . zl l
as xl.yP.z and so on.l l
Let II be the set of all possible orderings over X and let 
IIo be the set of all possible strict orderings over X. For all i e L, 
let be the set of preference orderings over X which individual i 
can express. Hence if X = {x, y, z} and we assume = II then:
S. = {xPiyPiz, xP^yl^z, x I ^ P ^ ,  y?±zP±x, y?±zl±x t yl±z?±x, 
zPixP±y, zP^xI^y, zT^xP^y, x P ^ P ^ ,  z?±y?±x f y?±xV±z, 
xliyliz}
Similarly, if X = {x, y, z} and we assume S_^  = IIq then:
S. = {xP.yP.z, xP.zP.y, yP.xP.z, yP.zP.x, zP.xP.y, zP.yP.x}l l i l i  i i  i i  l i  l i
We will interpret the assumption that = rig to mean that the sincere 
as well as the expressed preferences of individual i are constrained 
to be strict orderings.
Throughout our analysis we will be concerned with the effects 
of the strategies chosen by voters when the issue and the GDF are given. 
We assume that is the set of strategies available to individual i 
and hence provides the specific interpretation of figuring in 
our definition of an N-person game in normalized form.
Let S = S. x S0 x . . . x SX1. The elements of S will be 1 2  N
called situations and will be indicated by s, s’ etc. Hence, 
s = < R , R , ..., R^ > and s' = < R|, Rj| > . . . , R^ > • A situation 
s e S will be called sincere if and only if R^ = R^ for all i e L.
We will write s = < R^, R^, ..., R^ >. Hence situations are simply 
N-tuples of voting strategies - exactly one strategy for each i c L.
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N NLe t  II be t h e  N - f o l d  c a r t e s i a n  p r o d u c t  o f  II and l e t  IIq
be t h e  N - f o l d  c a r t e s i a n  p r o d u c t  o f  ITq . I f  we assume t h a t  S_^  = n f o r
Na l l  i  e L t h e n  S = II b u t  i f  we assume ( a s  we w i l l  i n  C h a p t e r s  4 ,  5
s Nand 6) t h a t  = IIg f o r  a l l  i  e L t h e n  S = n Q .
We have shown t h a t  i n  ou r  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  an N - p e r s o n  game i n  
n o r m a l i z e d  form t h e  s e t  o f  p l a y e r s ,  L, can be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  the  s e t  o f  
v o t e r s  and t h a t  t h e  s e t  o f  s t r a t e g i c s  a v a i l a b l e  to  the  i t h  p l a y e r ,  ß , 
can be i n t e r p r e t e d  as  S^, t h e  s e t  o f  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r i n g s  o v e r  X which 
can  be e x p r e s s e d  by th e  i t h  v o t e r .  We now p r o c e e d  to  c o n s i d e r  the  
p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  v o t e r s  o v e r  t h e  s e t  S o f  v o t i n g  s i t u a t i o n s  and to  show 
t h a t  t h e s e  p r e f e r e n c e s  o v e r  s i t u a t i o n s  p r o v i d e  t h e  s p e c i f i c  i n t e r p r e t a ­
t i o n  o f  t h e  b i n a r y  r e l a t i o n s  i n  ou r  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  an N - p e r s o n  game.
An i n d i v i d u a l  v o t e r ' s  p r e f e r e n c e s  o v e r  any p a i r  o f  v o t i n g  
s i t u a t i o n s  w i l l  o b v i o u s l y  depend on the  outcomes  o f  t h o s e  s i t u a t i o n s .  
Hence,  we must  now d e f i n e  a group d e c i s i o n  f u n c t i o n .
A group d e c i s i o n  f u n c t i o n  (GDF) i s  a f u n c t i o n  f  which  f o r  
e v e r y  ( s ,  A) b e l o n g i n g  to  some non-empty  s u b s e t  o f  (S x X) s p e c i f i e s  
e x a c t l y  one non -em pty  s u b s e t  o f  A.
We w i l l  r e f e r  to  f ( s ,  A) as  t h e  c h o ic e  s e t  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to  
s i t u a t i o n  s and i s s u e  A. The domain o f  f  w i l l  be  s y m b o l i z e d  by and 
f o r  any g i v e n  i s s u e  A, t h e  s e t  o f  s i t u a t i o n s  which b e l o n g  to  w i l l  
be s y m b o l i ze d  by S ^ .  Hence,  S  ^ = ( s  e S | ( s ,  A) e D^}.
We n o t e  t h a t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a GDF does  n o t  r e q u i r e  to  
be e q u a l  to  S x X. Hence we may f i n d  f o r  some s i t u a t i o n s  and some 
i s s u e s  t h a t  t h e  c h o ic e  s e t  f ( s ,  A) i s  n o t  d e f i n e d .  A w e l l  known 
example which  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  t h e  c l a s s i c  v o t i n g
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paradox. To demonstrate this it is necessary to introduce the 
Majority function.
Let Maj be the Majority function defined as follows:
For all s e S and for all A e X, (s, A) e Dw . iff:Maj
{x e AI for all y e A, |{i e L | xR^y} |  ^ |{i e L|yR x}|} =)= cj>
and if (s, A) e D^ , . then:Maj
Maj(s, A) = {x e A|for all y e A, |{i e LlxR^yll $ |{i £ L|yR^x}|} 






Let the GDF be Maj and let the issue A = {x, y, z} and
let the set of voters L = {1, 2, 3} and let s e S be a
situation such that xP^yP^z and yP^zP^x and zP^xP^y.
I{i £ LIxR^y}| > [{i e L[yR^ x}|
I {i £ L j yR_^z} I > I {i e L|zR y}|
I {i £ L|zR^x}| > J {i e L|xR_^z}|
A) £ and Maj(s, A) is not defined.
In practice, a deadlock may be resolved by such supplement­
ary rules as the adoption of the status quo (which may or may not 
belong to issue A) or by lottery.
We note that our definition of a GDF requires that if 
(s, A) e then f(s, A) is non-empty and hence f(s, A) always 
contains at least one element. We also note that our definition 
allows for f(s, A) to contain more than one element. The following 
example demonstrates this possibility.
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Example 2.2
L e t  t h e  GDF be Maj and l e t  t h e  i s s u e  A = {x, y ,  z} and 
l e t  t h e  s e t  o f  v o t e r s  L = {1, 2} and l e t  s be any 
s i t u a t i o n  such t h a t  xP^yP^z and yP^xP^z.
Hence,  | { i  e L |xR^y}|  = | { i  e L(yR_^x}|
and I {i  e L | yR^z} | > | {i  e L|zR_^y}|
and I {i  e L|xR_^z}| > | { i  e L|zR_^x}|
Hence ( s ,  A) e D^_. and M a j ( s ,  A) = {x, y} .
I n  p r a c t i c e ,  when a v o t i n g  p r o c e d u r e  y i e l d s  a t i e  be tw een  
s e v e r a l  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  t h e  t i e  may be b r o k e n  by such d e v i c e s  as  t h e  
c a s t i n g  v o t e  o f  a cha i rm a n .  However , f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  ou r  a n a l y s i s  
we w i l l  r e g a r d  t h e  outcome as  t h a t  s p e c i f i e d  by f  u n l e s s  we 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  s t a t e  t h a t  a t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e  w i l l  be u s e d .  O b v i o u s l y ,  
one can  d e f i n e  a GDF f  such t h a t  i f  ( s ,  A) e t h e n  f ( s ,  A) i s  
n e c e s s a r i l y  a s i n g l e t o n .  C o n s i d e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d e f i n i t i o n :
L e t  Smaj be  t h e  S t r i c t  m a j o r i t y  f u n c t i o n  d e f i n e d  as  f o l l o w s :
For  a l l  s e S and f o r  a l l  A e X, ( s ,  A) e D_ . i f f :Smaj
{x e A | f o r  a l l  y e (A -  {x}) , | {i  e L|xR_^y}| > | { i  e L|yR_^x}|} = <f>
and i f  ( s ,  A) e D„ . t h e n :Smaj
Smaj ( s ,  A) = {x e A | f o r  a l l  y e (A -  {x}) , [ {i  e L |xR ^y} |  > 
i { i  e L I y R ^ x } | }
O b v i o u s l y ,  i f  ( s ,  A) e Dg^ t h e n  S m a j ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n .
We have  d e f i n e d  a group d e c i s i o n  f u n c t i o n  and c o n s i d e r e d  
some o f  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n .  We now c o n s i d e r  how an 
i n d i v i d u a l  v o t e r  d e c i d e s  h i s  p r e f e r e n c e s  o v e r  v o t i n g  s i t u a t i o n s .
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We assume t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l  v o t e r ' s  p r e f e r e n c e s  ove r  any p a i r  o f  
s i t u a t i o n s  w i l l  depend on th e  outcomes o f  t h o s e  s i t u a t i o n s ;  t h e  
outcomes  i n  t u r n  depend on t h e  i s s u e  and t h e  GDF. Given t h e  i s s u e  
and th e  GDF, we assume t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l  v o t e r  w i l l  compare t h e  
outcomes  o f  any p a i r  o f  s i t u a t i o n s  by r e f e r e n c e  to  h i s  s i n c e r e  
i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r i n g  R^.
Given th e  i s s u e  A and th e  GDF f ,  we w i l l  assume t h a t  an
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  s i n c e r e  weak p r e f e r e n c e  r e l a t i o n  i n d u c e s  a weak
p r e f e r e n c e  r e l a t i o n  o v e r  S ( w i th  a s s o c i a t e d  s t r i c t  p r e f e r e n c e
r e l a t i o n  Q'*’- and i n d i f f e r e n c e  r e l a t i o n  We w i l l  c o n s i d e r  twoxAf Af
d i f f e r e n t  b e h a v i o u r a l  a s s u m p t i o n s .  Assumpt ion  2 .1  ( d e f i n e d  be low) 
i s  an e x t r e m e l y  m i ld  a s s u m p t io n  w h ich ,  g iv e n  th e  GDF f  and t h e  i s s u e  
A and th e  i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r i n g  R^, w i l l  y i e l d  an o r d e r i n g  o v e r  S 
unde r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  F i r s t l y ,  t h e  GDF f  must a lw ays  
d e f i n e  a c h o ic e  s e t  and s e c o n d l y ,  t h e  c h o ic e  s e t  must  a lw ays  be  a 
s i n g l e t o n .
Assumption  2 .1
Le t  A e X and l e t  f  be any GDF. For a l l  i  e L and f o r  a l l  s ,  s '  e S 
i f  f ( s ,  A) = fx]  and f ( s ' ,  A) = {y} then  ( s T ^ s *  i f f  xR^y) .
Given t h e  GDF f  and t h e  i s s u e  A, an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  s i n c e r e  
weak p r e f e r e n c e  r e l a t i o n  R. i n d u c e s ,  unde r  a s su m p t io n  2 . 1 ,  a weak 
p r e f e r e n c e  r e l a t i o n  o v e r  S i n  a n a t u r a l  way. We n o t e  two 
l i m i t a t i o n s .  F i r s t l y ,  g iv e n  th e  i s s u e  A, t h e  GDF f  may n o t  d e f i n e  
a c h o ic e  s e t  f o r  some s i t u a t i o n  and no i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  be a b l e  to  
compare such  a s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  any o t h e r  s i t u a t i o n  s im p ly  on t h e  b a s i s  
o f  a s s u m p t io n  2 . 1 .  S e c o n d ly ,  g iven  t h e  i s s u e  A, t h e  GDF may d e f i n e
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a c h o i c e  s e t  f o r  some s i t u a t i o n  s such t h a t  f ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  more
t h a n  one e l e m e n t  and no i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  be a b l e  to  compare such  a
s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  any o t h e r  s i t u a t i o n  s im p ly  on th e  b a s i s  o f  a s s u m p t io n
i
2 . 1 .  Hence,  g i v e n  a s s u m p t io n  2 . 1 ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n  T  ^ w i l l  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  be c o n n e c t e d  o v e r  S, o r  even  ove r  S ^ .
For  some s i t u a t i o n s  and i s s u e s ,  each  o f  t h e  GDF's which  we 
have  s e l e c t e d  f o r  s t u d y  w i l l  d e f i n e  a c h o ic e  s e t  which c o n t a i n s  more 
t h a n  one e le m e n t  and hence  no i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  be a b l e  to  compare
such  a  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  any o t h e r  s i t u a t i o n  s im p ly  on the  b a s i s  o f
a s s u m p t io n  2 . 1 .  I n  ou r  compute r  s i m u l a t i o n  ( C h a p te r  7) we r e q u i r e  
any i n d i v i d u a l  to  be a b l e  t o  compare any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s w i t h  any 
o t h e r  s i t u a t i o n  which  he ( o r  any c o a l i t i o n  o f  which he i s  a member) 
can c r e a t e  by f o l l o w i n g  a s t r a t e g y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h a t  which  was 
f o l l o w e d  i n  s .  Hence we r e q u i r e  t h e  r e l a t i o n  to  be c o n n e c t e d  o v e r
S,  o r  e l s e  we must  a c c e p t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  our  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  
s i t u a t i o n s  w i l l  be i n c o m p l e t e .
I  have c o n s i d e r e d  t h r e e  ways o f  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  p rob le m .  
F i r s t l y ,  one can i n t r o d u c e  an u n s p e c i f i e d  t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e  so 
t h a t  t h e  GDF unde r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  w i l l  a lw ays  d e f i n e  a c h o ic e  s e t  which  
i s  a  s i n g l e t o n .  However ,  w i t h o u t  s p e c i f y i n g  the  t i e - b r e a k i n g  
d e v i c e  ou r  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n s  w i l l  be i n c o m p l e t e .
S e c o n d ly ,  one can i n t r o d u c e  a p a r t i c u l a r  t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e  so t h a t  
t h e  GDF u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  w i l l  a lw ays  d e f i n e  a c h o ic e  s e t  which  
i s  a s i n g l e t o n  and so t h a t  the  e l e m e n t  chosen  i s  i d e n t i f i e d .  However,  
t h e  g e n e r a l i t y  o f  o u r  r e s u l t s  w i l l  th en  be l im L tc d  by th e  p a r t i c u l a r  
t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e  which we have c h o s en .  T h i r d l y ,  we can a d o p t  a 
s t r o n g e r  b e h a v i o u r a l  a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  w i l l  a l l o w  i n d i v i d u a l s  to
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compare s i t u a t i o n s  f o r  which  ( g iv e n  t h e  i s s u e )  t h e  GDF w i l l  d e f i n e  
a c h o ic e  s e t  c o n t a i n i n g  more t h a n  one e l e m e n t .  However ,  t h e  
g e n e r a l i t y  o f  ou r  r e s u l t s  w i l l  t h e n  be l i m i t e d  by the  p a r t i c u l a r  
b e h a v i o u r a l  a s s u m p t io n  which  we have c hosen .
I  do n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  any o f  t h e s e  s o l u t i o n s  i s  c o m p l e t e l y  
s a t i s f a c t o r y .  However , I  have  e x p l o r e d  a l l  t h r e e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  and ,  
as  w i l l  be shown i n  C h a p te r  7, the  r e s u l t s  o f  the  s i m u l a t i o n  v a ry  
l i t t l e  w i t h  the  p a r t i c u l a r  a pp roa c h  t a k e n .
We now i n t r o d u c e  a much s t r o n g e r  (and hence  l e s s  d e f e n s i b l e )  
b e h a v i o u r a l  a s su m p t io n  which  we w i l l  r e f e r  to  as  t h e  maximin assump­
t i o n .  I t  assumes t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  e x t r e m e l y  p e s s i m i s t i c  i n  
o u t l o o k .  However ,  unde r  t h i s  a s s u m p t io n  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  compare a 
much l a r g e r  r a n g e  o f  s i t u a t i o n s  th a n  i s  p o s s i b l e  unde r  a s su m p t io n  2 . 1 .
In  o r d e r  to  d e f i n e  t h e  maximin a s s u m p t io n  we i n t r o d u c e  the  
f o l l o w i n g  n o t a t i o n :
For  a l l  A e X and f o r  a l l  R e li, l e t :
min(A,  R) = (x  e A | f o r  a l l  y £ A, yRx)
M^(A, R) = min(A,  R) 
and f o r  a l l  i n t e g e r s  k (k > 1 ) ,
M ^A ,  R) = m in ( (A -  M ^A,  R) -  . . .  -  M ^ C A ,  R) ) , R)
Hence M^(A, R) r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  l o w e s t  i n d i f f e r e n c e  c l a s s  i n t o  which  
th e  i s s u e  A can be p a r t i t i o n e d  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  o r d e r i n g  R and 
l ^ A ,  R) r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  l o w e s t  b u t  one i n d i f f e r e n c e  c l a s s  and so on.
For e v e r y  i  e L and f o r  e v e r y  o r d e r i n g  R^ e S^, we d e f i n e  
a b i n a r y  r e l a t i o n  (>,  R ) ove r  X as  f o l l o w s :
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For a l l  A, A’ e X and f o r  a l l  i  e L and f o r  a l l  R. c S . ,  A(>, R . ) A ’l i  l
i f f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a p o s i t i v e  i n t e g e r  k such  t h a t  f o r  a l l  i n t e g e r s  
t  (k > t  > 0) ,
1. Mt (A, R^) and M (A’ , R ) a r e  b o t h  s i n g l e t o n s  and i f
M (A, R.)  = {x} and M ( A ' ,  R.)  = {y} then  x l . y  t  l  t  l  l
and 2. (a)  M^(A, R_^ ) and M^(A’ , R^) a r e  b o t h  s i n g l e t o n s  and
i f  M^(A, R^) = {x} and M^(A’ , R^) = {y } then  xP^y
(b) Mk (A, R  )  =)= 4. and M ^ A ' ,  R )  =  <j>.
We n o t e  t h a t  i f  R^ i s  n o t  a s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g  then  t h e  r e l a t i o n  
(>,  R ) i s  n o t  c o n n e c t e d  o v e r  X. For  exam ple ,  i f  f o r  some t  (k > t  > 0) 
i t  happens  t h a t  M^CA, R^) o r  M^CA', R_^ ) i s  n o t  a s i n g l e t o n  t h e n  the  
r e l a t i o n  (>,  R ) i s  n o t  d e f i n e d .
Assumption  2 .2  (o r  inaximin a s s u m p t io n )
L e t  A e X and l e t  f be any GDF. For  a l l  i  e L and f o r  a l l  s ,  s '  e S ^ ,
1. i f  f ( s ,  A) = f ( s ’ , A) t h e n  s J ^ s ’
and 2. i f  f ( s ,  A) (>,  R . ) f ( s ' ,  A) then  sQ^ s ’
We n o t e  t h a t  i f  R^ does n o t  s p e c i f y  a s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g  o v e r  t h e
a l t e r n a t i v e s  b e l o n g i n g  to  t h e  i s s u e  A t h e n ,  g iv en  a s su m p t io n  2 . 2 ,
i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n  may n o t  be c o n n e c t e d  o v e r  S
However , i f  we assume t h a t  = ITq f o r  a l l  i  e L then
t h e  r e l a t i o n  w i l l  .be an o r d e r i n g  o v e r  S We a l s o  n o t e  t h a t
ou r  d e f i n i t i o n  d i f f e r s  s l i g h t l y  f rom t h a t  o f  P a t t a n a i k  (1978)  i n  t h a t
i t  does  n o t  s p e c i f y  what  h a p p e n s  i f  M^CA, R^) =1= <j) and M^CA', R^) =}= <j)
and M ^A, R^) o r  M^CA', R.)  c o n t a i n s  more t han  one e l e m e n t .  However ,
i f  we assume = Jig f o r  a l l  i  e L th e n  t h e  two d e f i n i t i o n s  a r e  e q u i v a l e n t .
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Assumption  2 .2  r e q u i r e s  t h a t ,  g iv e n  t h e  GDF f  and t h e  i s s u e  
A, any i n d i v i d u a l  i  e L w i l l  compare any two s i t u a t i o n s  s ,  s '  e S  ^
a s  f o l l o w s :
1. I f  f ( s ,  A) = f ( s ' ,  A) t h e n  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  be
i n d i f f e r e n t  be tw een  t h e  two s i t u a t i o n s  i . e .  s J ^ s 'Af
2. I f  f ( s ,  A) =[= f ( s ' ,  A) t h e n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  compare 
t h e  minima of  f ( s ,  A) w i t h  t h e  minima o f  f ( s ' ,  A).
I f  e i t h e r  o f  t h e s e  two s e t s  does n o t  have a u n iq u e  
minimum then  a s s u m p t io n  2 .2  does  n o t  s p e c i f y  how t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  p r e f e r e n c e  o v e r  s i t u a t i o n s  s and s '  w i l l  
be  d e c i d e d .
3. I f  f ( s ,  A) =j= f ( s ' ,  A) and f ( s ,  A) has  a u n iq u e  
minimum, sa y  x and f ( s ' ,  A) has  a u n iq u e  minimum,
sa y  y and xP^y then  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  s t r i c t l y  p r e f e r
s i t u a t i o n  s to  s i t u a t i o n  s '  i . e .  s Q ^ s ' .Af
4. I f  f ( s ,  A) =}= f ( s ' ,  A) and f ( s ,  A) h a s  a un ique  
minimum, sa y  x and f ( s ' ,  A) has  a un ique  minimum, 
say  y and x l ^ y  then  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  compare t h e  
r e d u c e d  s e t s  ( f ( s ,  A) -  {x}) and ( f ( s ' ,  A) -  { y } ) .
5. I f  ( f ( s ,  A) -  {x}) i s  non-empty  and ( f ( s ' ,  A) -  {y })
i s  empty then  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  s t r i c t l y  p r e f e r
s i t u a t i o n  s to  s i t u a t i o n  s '  i . e .  s o f  . . s ' .Af
6. I f  ( f ( s ,  A) -  {x}) i s  non-empty  and ( f ( s ' , A) -  {y }) 
i s  non -em pty  then  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  examine t h e
minima o f  t h e s e  two r e d u c e d  s e t s .
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The individual will continue this process of successive reduction of 
the choice sets until his preference over situations s and sf is 
determined. If at any stage of successive reduction one or other of 
the two sets being compared does not have a unique minimum and if 
both sets are non-empty then assumption 2.2 does not specify how the 
individual will determine his preference over the two situations.
It is possible to argue that some of the preferences over 
pairs of situations determined on the basis of the maximin assumption 
are questionable. Consider the following example.
Example 2.3
Let X = {x, y, z} and suppose for some i e L, xP^yP^z.
In this example, the relation (>, R^) defines an ordering over X.
On the basis of the relation (>, R_) the seven possible non-empty 








Let the issue A = {x, y, z} and let the GDF be f. Suppose f(s, A) = {y} 
and f(s’, A) = {x, z} and f(s", A) = {x, y, z}.
Given the maximin assumption, sQ^s.' and s'Q^s" and sQ^s".
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Obviously, if one assumed that individuals determined their 
preferences over situations on the basis of the maximization of 
expected utility, the preferences over situations specified in 
example 2.3 could well be reversed. For a comparison of the two 
approaches the reader is referred to Pattanaik (1978).
Given either assumption 2.1 or 2.2, the relation defined
over S provides the specific interpretation of the relation defined 
over ft figuring in our definition of an N-person game in normalized 
form. We have thus shown that in our definition of an N-person game 
in normalized form the set of players, L, can be interpreted as the 
set of voters; that the set of strategies available to the ith player, 
ft^ , can be interpreted as S^, the set of preference orderings over X 
which can be expressed by the ith voter; and that the relations ;>^ 
defined over ft can be interpreted as the relations defined over S.
Given either assumption 2.1 or 2.2, the system:
< L; S j. S2> .... SN ; T*f, T^, .... T"f > 
is an N-person game in normalized form which represents the problem 
of decision making for a set of voters L given the issue A and the 
GDF f. Obviously, if A, f, or s changes then the relations
can change and we will have a new game with a different structure.
Throughout our analysis we assume that individuals can 
communicate with each other before choosing their voting strategies. 
We assume that individuals are free to form coalitions and enter into 
agreements with each other which specify appropriate strategies to 
be adopted by the members of any coalition which they form. We 
assume every possible coalition is free to form.
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I n f o r m a t i o n  C o n d i t i o n s
We now s t a t e  e x p l i c i t l y  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n d i t i o n s  which 
we assume in  ou r  a n a l y s i s .
F i r s t l y ,  we assume t h a t  e v e r y  i n d i v i d u a l  i  e L knows the  
GDF f which  i s  to  be used  and t h e  i s s u e  A from which the  c h o ic e  
i s  to be  made. S e c o n d ly ,  we assume t h a t  e v e r y  i n d i v i d u a l  i  e L 
knows the  s e t  o f  s t r a t e g i e s  S a v a i l a b l e  to  h i m s e l f  and th e  s e t  o f  
s t r a t e g i e s  S .  a v a i l a b l e  to  e v e r y  i n d i v i d u a l  j  e (L -  {i }) .
T h i r d l y ,  we assume t h a t  e v e r y  i n d i v i d u a l  i  e L knows h i s  own s i n c e r e
weak p r e f e r e n c e  r e l a t i o n  IF o v e r  X and th e  s i n c e r e  weak p r e f e r e n c e  
r e l a t i o n  IF. o v e r  X o f  e v e r y  i n d i v i d u a l  j  e (L -  { i} )  . L a s t l y ,  we 
assume t h a t  e v e r y  i n d i v i d u a l  i  e L knows h i s  own in d u ce d  weak 
p r e f e r e n c e  r e l a t i o n  o v e r  S and t h e  i n d u c e d  weak p r e f e r e n c e
r e l a t i o n  o v e r  S o f  e v e r y  i n d i v i d u a l  j  e (L -  { i } ) .
O b v i o u s ly ,  some o f  t h e s e  a s s u m p t io n s  a r e  more d e f e n s i b l e  
t h a n  o t h e r s .  For example ,  i t  seems f a i r l y  r e a s o n a b l e  to  assume t h a t  
e v e r y  i n d i v i d u a l  i  £ L knows t h e  GDF f ,  t h e  i s s u e  A, h i s  s i n c e r e  
weak p r e f e r e n c e  r e l a t i o n  IF o v e r  X and h i s  i nduce d  weak p r e f e r e n c e  
r e l a t i o n  o v e r  S. However , t h e r e  a r e  v e r y  many e m p i r i c a l  
s t u d i e s  o f  e l e c t o r a l  b e h a v i o u r  which would c a l l  i n t o  q u e s t i o n  even  
t h e s e  a p p a r e n t l y  m i ld  a s s u m p t i o n s .  Our r e m a in i n g  a s s u m p t io n s  a r e  
l e s s  r e a l i s t i c :  e v e r y  i n d i v i d u a l  i  e L w i l l  n o t  i n  g e n e r a l
know the  s i n c e r e  weak p r e f e r e n c e  r e l a t i o n  R. o f  e v e r y  i n d i v i d u a l  
j e  (L — { i } ) no r  t h e  i n d u c e d  weak p r e f e r e n c e  r e l a t i o n  o f
e v e r y  i n d i v i d u a l  j  e (L -  { i } ) .
It can be argued that our assumptions are most likely 
to be satisfied by voting which takes place in a small committee 
whose members are in close contact with each other. However, 
even when the number of voters is large (for example in parlia­
mentary elections) there are factors which combine to make our 
assumptions somewhat plausible. Firstly, the voters are often 
divided into a few predominant groups with voters in any one 
group tending to have similar opinions. Secondly, large scale 
elections often receive significant coverage in the mass media. 
Thirdly, such elections are usually held periodically and the 
set of alternatives presented for choice does not vary significant­
ly from one occasion Lo the next.
Despite these considerations, anyone who has ever 
interviewed a random sample of voters during a parliamentary 
election and surveyed their knowledge of the GDF, the issue and 
the preferences of other voters would find it difficult to 
accept our assumptions as completely realistic. However, the 
justification for making any set of assumptions is not the degree 
of realism which they reflect but rather the extent to which 
they enable us to construct and develop a body of theory which 
provides us with more insight into the real world than we 
previously possessed. Obviously, the more realistic we can make 
the assumptions the more insight the theory is likely to provide.
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The Nash-Farquharson-Shubik Concept of Equilibrium
We now define the game-theoretic concepts of equilibrium 
and strict equilibrium. The concept of equilibrium is adapted from 
that originally introduced by Nash (1951). The concept of strict 
equilibrium is adapted from subsequent generalizations of the 
Nash concept by Farquharson (1955 and 1969) and Shubik (1959).
Thus the concept of strict equilibrium corresponds to Farquharson's 
concept of an "equilibrium of order r" and to Shubik's concept of 
"k-stability".
Let A be any given issue and let f be any given GDF and 
let s be any given situation.
A threat to s is an ordered pair < L, s' > such that L e i  and 
s' e S and
1. for some i £ L, R! f R,
and 2. for all i e (L - L), R3
and 3. for all i e L, s'Q^As.Af
s is an equilibrium if and only if there does not exist any threat 
< L, s' > to s such that L is a singleton.
s is a strict equilibrium if and only if there does not exist any 
threat to s.
If s is an equilibrium we will say s is 1-stable.
If s is a strict equilibrium we will say s is k-stable.
The concept of equilibrium may be interpreted as follows. 
Given the issue A and the GDF f, a situation s is an equilibrium if 
and only if no single individual can create a situation s' which he
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prefers to situation s by following a strategy different from that 
which he followed in s while all other individuals continue to follow 
the same strategy as they followed in s. Given the issue A and the 
GDF f a situation s is a strict equilibrium if and only if no 
individual or coalition of individuals can create a situation s' 
which they all prefer to situation s simply by following strategies 
different from those which they followed in s while all individuals 
who do not belong to the coalition continue to follow the same 
strategies as they followed in s.
Since the relations vary with the issue, the GDF and
the sincere individual orderings, we must know the issue A, the GDF 
f and the sincere situation s before we can determine whether or not 
any given situation is an equilibrium or a strict equilibrium.
Given the issue A, the GDF f and the sincere situation s, let 
E^(A, f, s) be the set of all situations which constitute equilibria 
and let E(A, f, s) be the set of all situations which constitute 
strict equilbria. Obviously, E(A, f, s) E^(A, f, s) .
Given the issue A, the GDF f and the sincere situation s, 
it is possible that for some s e S we may find s t}; E^(A, f, s) and 
hence s  ^ E(A, f, s); alternatively, we may find that s e E^(A, f, s) 
and s ([ E(A, f, s) . Suppose for any given s e S we wish to determine 
whether or not s e E^(A, f, s). Given the issue A and the GDF f, the 
stability of situation s will be determined by reference to the 
sincere individual orderings as expressed in the given sincere 
situation s. Whenever the stability of a situation s is to be 
determined by reference to the sincere individual orderings expressed
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i n  some g iv e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  we w i l l  say  t h a t  s e S i s  a 
s i t u a t i o n  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to  s .
We i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  c o n c e p t s  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  and s t r i c t  
e q u i l i b r i u m  by means o f  the f o l l o w i n g  e xa m ples .
Example 2 .4
Le t  i s s u e  A = {x, y ,  z} and l e t  L =  {1, 2,  . . . »  7} and
l e t  s be any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  such  t h a t :
f o r  a l l  i  e {1,  2,  3},  xP^yP^z
f o r  a l l  i  e {4,  5} ,  yP^zP^x
f o r  a l l  i  £ {6,  7},  zP^yP^x
L e t  the  GDF f  be d e f i n e d  a s  f o l l o w s :  For  a l l  A e X and f o r  a l l
Ns e IIo and f o r  a l l  a e A, a e f ( s ,  A) i f  and o n ly  i f  f o r  a l l  
b £  (A -  { a } ) ,
I {i  £  Ll a P^ c  f o r  a l l  c e (A -  {a } ) } | $
I { i  £  L |bP ^ c  f o r  a l l  c £ (A -  { b } ) } |
In  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  t h e  c h o ic e  s e t  f ( s ,  A) c o n s i s t s  o f  a l l  t h o s e  e l e m e n t s  
i n  t h e  i s s u e  which r e c e i v e  t h e  l a r g e s t  number o f  f i r s t  p o s i t i o n s  i n  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r i n g s  d e f i n e d  o v e r  t h e  s u b s e t  A o f  X.
Given t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  f ( s ,  A) = {x}.
L e t  L = { i  e L|yP_^x}
Le t  s '  be any s i t u a t i o n  such t h a t :  f o r  a l l  i  £ L, yP^zP jx
f o r  a l l  k £ (L -  L ) ,
Given th e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ' ,  f ( s ' ,  A) = {y}.
Given a s s u m p t io n  2 . 1 ,  s ' Q^ f s f ° r  a l l  i  £ L and hence  < L, s '  > i s  a 
t h r e a t  to  s and s fj; E(A, f ,  s )  .
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L e t  L = { i  e L z P . y P . x )
1 l  l
• k
L e t  s :  be any s i t u a t i o n  such t h a t :  f o r  some i  e L , yP” zP” x
f o r  a l l  k e (L -  {i } ) ,  R” =
Given t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s " , f ( s " ,  A) = {x, y}.
Given a s s u m p t io n  2 . 2 ,  s " Q ^ s  and hence  < {i }, s" > i s  a t h r e a t  to  s 
and s £ E^(A,  f ,  s )  and t h e r e f o r e  s £ E(A, f ,  s ) . (We n o t e  t h a t  no 
i n d i v i d u a l  can compare s i t u a t i o n s  s and s"  s o l e l y  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  
a s s u m p t io n  2 .1  u n l e s s  we s u p p le m e n t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  GDF f  w i t h  
a t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e ) .
Hence,  g iv en  t h e  i s s u e  A and the  GDF f ,  i t  i s  q u i t e  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  e x i s t  a s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s such t h a t  s i s  n o t  a 
s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  o r  even  an e q u i l i b r i u m .  As P a t t a n a i k  (1978) 
h a s  a r g u e d ,  t h e  c a se  where s { E^(A,  f ,  s )  has  more s e r i o u s  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  than  t h e  c a se  where s e e \ a , f ,  s )  and s  ^ E(A, f ,  s ) . 
The fo rm er  s i t u a t i o n  can be d i s r u p t e d  by a s i n g l e  i n d i v i d u a l  w hereas  
the  l a t t e r  s i t u a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  a c o a l i t i o n  o f  two o r  more i n d i v i d u a l s  
t o  form b e f o r e  i t  can be d i s r u p t e d .  In  t h e o r y  one may assume t h a t  
e v e r y  p o t e n t i a l  c o a l i t i o n  i s  f r e e  to  form b u t  in  p r a c t i c e  t h e r e  may 
be s o c i a l  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  b a r r i e r s  to  c o a l i t i o n  f o r m a t i o n .
The p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t ,  g i v e n  t h e  i s s u e  A and t h e  GDF f ,  
t h e r e  may e x i s t  a s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s wh ich  i s  n o t  an e q u i l i b r i u m  o r  
s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  does  n o t  p r e c l u d e  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  some 
o t h e r  s e S c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to  s may be an e q u i l i b r i u m  o r  s t r i c t  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  The f o l l o w i n g  example i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y .
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Example 2.5
Let the GDF f be as defined in example 2.4. Let the issue
A = {x, y, z} and let L = {1, 2, ..., 7} and let s be any
sincere situation such that:
for all i e {1, 2, 3}, xP^yP^z
for all i e {4, 5}, yP^zP^x
for all i e {6. 7}. zP.yP.xl l
As in example 2.4 we have f(s, A) = {x} and given assumption 2.1 
or 2.2, s \ E(A, f, s).
Let s be any situation such that: for all i e {1, 2, 3}, yP_^ xP_^ z
for all k e {4, 5, 6, 7}, yP^zP^x 
Given the specification of situation s, f(s, A) = {y}.
Let s ’ be any situation such that for all i e L, yPlzP^x 
Given the specification of situation s', f(s', A) = {y}
Let s" be any situation such that for all i e L, yP'^ xP'^ z 
Given the specification of situation s", f(s", A) = {y}
It is easy to verify that, given assumption 2.2, s e E(A, f, s) and 
s' e E(A, f, s) and s" e E(A, f, s). In fact, if s e S is any 
situation such that for all i e L, yP^x and yP_^ z then f(s, A) = {y} 
and given assumption 2.2, s e E(A, f, s). (This can be seen by 
reference to the proof of theorem 4.9 in Chapter 4.)
It can be seen from example 2.5 that E(A, f, s) may contain 
more than one element and hence E^(A, f, s) may contain more than one 
clement. However, given the issue A and the GDF f, it is possible 
that some given sincere situation s will not be a strict equilibrium 
and that every other s c S corresponding to s will also fail to be a 
atrlcL equilibrium and hence E(A, f, s) will be empty. The following 
example illustrates this possibility.
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Example 2 .6
L e t  t h e  GDF f  be as  d e f i n e d  i n  example 2 . 4 .
L e t  = I I q f o r  a l l  i  e L. L e t  t h e  i s s u e  A = {x, y ,  z} 
and l e t  L = {1,  2 ,  3} and l e t  s be any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  
such  t h a t  xP^yP^z and yP^zP^x and zP^xP^y.
Given t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  f ( s ,  A) = {x,  y ,  z}.
L e t  s '  be any s i t u a t i o n  such  t h a t  xP^yPjz  and yP^zP^x and xP^zP^y.
Given t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ' ,  f ( s ’ , A) = {x}. Hence,
3 _
g iv e n  a s s u m p t io n  2 . 2 ,  s 'Q  f s and t h e r e f o r e  < {3}, s '  > i s  a t h r e a t  to  
s and s £ E^(A,  f ,  s )  and s £ E(A, f ,  s )  .
We now show t h a t ,  g iven  a s s u m p t io n  2 . 2 ,  E(A, f ,  s )  = . Le t  s £ S.
S in c e  N = 3 t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  f o u r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :
(a) f ( s ,  A) = {x} o r  (b) f ( s ,  A) = {y} o r
(c) f ( s ,  A) = {z} o r  (d) f ( s ,  A) = {x, y ,  z}.
(a) Suppose f ( s ,  A) = {x},. L e t  s " be any s i t u a t i o n  such
t h a t  xP'^yP'jz and zP^yP'^x and zP^xP'^y.
Given t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s " , f ( s " ,  A) = {z} 
Hence,  g iv e n  a s s u m p t io n  2 . 2 ,  s MQ ^ s  f o r  a l l  i  £ {2 ,  3} 
and t h e r e f o r e  < {2, 3},  s"  > i s  a t h r e a t  to  s and 
s { E(A, f , s )  .
(b) Suppose f ( s ,  A) = {y}. By r e a s o n i n g  d i r e c t l y  a n a lo g o u s  
to  t h a t  i n  (a)  i t  can be shown t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a 
t h r e a t  to  s and s ij: E(A, f ,  s )  .
(c)  Suppose f ( s ,  A) = {z}. By r e a s o n i n g  d i r e c t l y  a n a lo g o u s  
to t h a t  i n  (a)  i t  can be shown t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a 
t h r e a t  to  s and s { E(A, f ,  s ) .
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(d) Suppose f ( s ,  A) = {x, y ,  z } .  L e t  s be any s i t u a t i o n
such  t h a t  x P . y P . z  and xP„zP„y.1 1  3 3'
Given the  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  
f ( s ,  A) = {x}.  Hence,  g i v e n  a s s u m p t io n  2 . 2 ,  s Q ^ s  
f o r  a l l  i  e {1, 3} and t h e r e f o r e  < {1, 3}, s } i s  a 
t h r e a t  to  s and s { E(A, f , s ) .
S in c e  ( a ) ,  ( b ) , (c)  and (d) e x h a u s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  i t  f o l l o w s  
t h a t  E(A, f ,  s )  = <J).
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  unde r  some GDF's t h e r e  may e x i s t  
s i t u a t i o n s  and i s s u e s  such  t h a t  even  E^(A, f ,  s )  i s  empty.
P a t t a n a i k  (1978)  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  h i s  example 4 . 2 .
We summarize t h e s e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  as  f o l l o w s .  F i r s t l y ,  
t h e  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  i t s e l f  may o r  may n o t  b e l o n g  to  E'*'(A, f ,  s )  
o r  to  E(A, f ,  s )  . S e c o n d ly ,  E^"(A, f ,  s )  o r  E(A, f ,  s )  may c o n t a i n  
more t h a n  one e l e m e n t .  T h i r d l y ,  E^(A, f ,  s )  o r  E(A, f ,  s )  may be 
empty .  We a l s o  o b s e r v e  t h a t  i f  some s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s does n o t  
b e l o n g  to  S  ^ t h e n  we canno t  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  s e E ^ A ,  f ,  s )  o r  
s e E(A, f ,  s )  u n l e s s  we su p p le m e n t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the  GDF by s p e c i f y ­
i n g  what  happens  when ( s ,  A)  ^ D . F u r t h e r ,  even  i f  s b e lo n g s  to  S ^ ,  we 
c a n n o t  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  an o r d e r e d  p a i r ,  say  < L, s '  >, i s  a 
t h r e a t  to  s u n l e s s  s '  a l s o  b e l o n g s  t o  S ^ o r  u n l e s s  we supp lem en t  t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  GDF by s p e c i f y i n g  what  happens  when ( s ,  A) £ D^.
We now c o n s i d e r  some c o n d i t i o n s  which  some w r i t e r s  
( n o t a b l y  G ib b a rd ,  S a t t e r t h w a i t e  and P a t t a n a i k )  have  a rg u e d  s h o u ld  
be imposed on GDF's.  These  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  b a s e d  on the  n o t i o n s  o f  
e q u i l i b r i u m  and s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  d e f i n e d  above .
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The Concep ts  o f  S t r a t e g y - p r o o f n e s s  and S t r i c t  S t r a t e g y - p r o o f n e s s
P a t t a n a i k  (1978) has  a rg u e d  t h a t  i f  group d e c i s i o n  making 
by means of  voting i s  to be based onl y  on the sincere preferences of  
i n d i v i d u a l s  t h e n  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  to be imposed on any GDF i s  
t h a t ,  f o r  any g iv e n  i s s u e ,  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s h o u ld  be a s t r i c t  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  I f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  which i s  n o t  a 
s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  th e n  t h e r e  w i l l  e x i s t  a c o a l i t i o n  whose members 
can  o b t a i n  an  outcome which they  p r e f e r  by a d o p t i n g  n o n - s i n c e r e  
s t r a t e g i e s .  On the  o t h e r  hand ,  i f  t h e r e  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  p o l i t i c a l  
and s o c i a l  b a r r i e r s  to  c o a l i t i o n  f o r m a t i o n ,  th e n  we m ig h t  c o n s i d e r  
w eaken ing  ou r  demand on the  GDF to  r e q u i r e  t h a t ,  f o r  any g iv e n  i s s u e ,  
e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s h o u ld  be an e q u i l i b r i u m .  Th i s  p r o v i d e s  the 
m o t i v a t i o n  f o r  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  h i s  c o n c e p t s  o f  s t r i c t  s t r a t e g y -  
p r o o f n e s s  and s t r a t e g y - p r o o f n e s s  o f  a GDF. (The c o n c e p t  o f  
s t r a t e g y - p r o o f n e s s  i s  d e f i n e d  d i f f e r e n t l y  f rom S a t t e r t h w a i t e ' s c o n c e p t  
o f  t h e  same name.)
L e t  f  be t h e  GDF and l e t  A be any i s s u e ,  
f i s  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  f o r  i s s u e  A i f f  f o r  e v e ry  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  
s e (A, f , s ) ;
f  i s  s t r i c t l y  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  f o r  i s s u e  A i f f  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n  s ,  s e E(A, f ,  s ) ;
f i s  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  i f f  f o r  a l l  A e X, f  i s  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  f o r  
i s s u e  A;
f  i s  s t r i c t l y  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  i f f  f o r  a l l  A e X, f  i s  s t r i c t l y
s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  f o r  i s s u e  A.
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Hence a GDF i s  n o t  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  f o r  a g iv en  i s s u e  i f  
t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  which i s  n o t  an e q u i l i b r i u m .  
I n  example 2 .4  we have shown t h a t ,  g i v e n  a s s u m p t io n  2 . 2 ,  t h e  GDF 
d e f i n e d  i n  t h a t  example i s  n o t  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  f o r  t h e  i s s u e  
A = {x, y ,  z ) . F u r t h e r ,  s i n c e  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one i s s u e  such 
t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  n o t  an e q u i l i b r i u m ,  i t  f o l l o w s  
t h a t  t h e  GDF d e f i n e d  i n  example 2.4 i s  n o t  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f ,  g iv e n  
a s su m p t io n  2 . 2 .  O b v i o u s ly ,  i f  a GDF i s  n o t  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  t h e n  i t  
i s  n o t  s t r i c t l y  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f .
A GDF i s  n o t  s t r i c t l y  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  f o r  a g iv e n  i s s u e  i f  
t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  which i s  n o t  a s t r i c t  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  I n  example 2 .4  we have shown t h a t ,  g i v e n  a s s u m p t io n  2 . 1 ,  
t h e  GDF d e f i n e d  i n  t h a t  example i s  n o t  s t r i c t l y  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  f o r  
t h e  i s s u e  A = {x, y ,  z ) .  F u r t h e r ,  s i n c e  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one 
i s s u e  such  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  n o t  a s t r i c t  
e q u i l i b r i u m ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e  GDF d e f i n e d  i n  example 2 .4  i s  n o t  
s t r i c t l y  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f ,  g iv e n  a s s u m p t io n  2 .1 .
As P a t t a n a i k  (1978)  has  shown, a l l  GDF's which b e l o n g  to  
v e ry  wide c l a s s e s  o f  CDF’s f a i l  to  s a t i s f y  the demand o f  s t r i c t  
s t r a t e g y - p r o o f n e s s  -  i n c l u d i n g  the  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and Borda 
f u n c t i o n s  which  we w i l l  d e f i n e  i n  the  n e x t  c h a p t e r .
As Luce and R a i f f a  (1957:164)  have s u g g e s t e d ,  s o c i a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  may e f f e c t i v e l y  p r e v e n t  any group o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  
fo rm ing  a c o a l i t i o n .  I f  t h i s  i s  the  c a s e ,  we m igh t  c o n s i d e r  
w eaken ing  ou r  demand t h a t  t h e  GDF be s t r i c t l y  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  and 
r e q u i r e  i n s t e a d  t h a t  t h e  GDF be s t r a t e g y - p r o o f .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,
P a t t a n a i k  (1978)  has  shown t h a t  a l l  GDF's b e l o n g i n g  to  q u i t e  wide
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classes of GDF's do not satisfy the weaker requirement of 
strätegy-proofness.
We make the following observations. Suppose we are consider­
ing a GDF f which has a restricted domain. It may be possible to prove 
that f does not satisfy the property of strategy-proofness (or strict 
strategy-proofness) by choosing an issue A and a sincere situation s 
such that (s, A) £ and then showing that s £ E^(A, f, s). However, 
if we wish to show that f satisfies the property of strategy-proofness 
then we must supplement the definition of f by specifying what happens 
when (s, A) £ D . Otherwise, if (s, A) £ we cannot determine 
whether or not s e E^(A, f, s) on the basis of assumption 2.1 or 2.2.
We could consider weakening the definition of strategy-proofness to 
require only that, for every issue A, every sincere situation belonging 
to S should be an equilibrium. However, this does not solve the 
problem: we could not determine whether or not any ordered pair, say
< L, s’ >, was a threat to s if it happened that s' £ S  ^and hence 
we could not determine whether or not s e E^(A, f, s).
We now consider an alternative but related condition on GDF's 
which has been suggested by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975).
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The Concept of a Non-manipulable GDF
Other writers, notably Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975), 
have each formulated a condition on CDF’s which might be considered 
as necessary if we are to ensure that group decision making by 
means of voting should be based only on the sincere preferences of 
individuals. Although they have worked independently, both writers 
have formulated an equivalent condition on CDF's which differs, 
however, from the approach of Pattanaik.
As we discussed in Chapter 1, Gibbard (1973) and 
Satterthwaite (1975) were concerned with non-chance decision-making 
systems. Hence they are concerned with decision-making systems which 
always define an outcome and under which every outcome always consists 
of exactly one chosen alternative. Thus they would exclude from 
consideration a GDF which, for some situations and issues, defined 
a choice set containing two or more elements. They also exclude 
systems which Gibbard refers to as ’mixed decision schemes' under 
which ties are broken by lottery.
In Pattanaik's terms, Gibbard and Satterthwaite are concern­
ed with GDF's which satisfy the properties of decisiveness and resolut- 
ness (which we define formally in Chapter 3)., They employ a behavioural 
assumption equivalent to assumption 2.1. If the GDF is resolute and 
decisive then, given assumption 2.1, for any A e X and for any i e L, 
the relation T ^  will be an ordering over S.
The condition on GDF's which both writers suggest is a 
necessary requirement if we are to ensure that group decision making 
by means of voting depends only on the sincere preferences of
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i n d i v i d u a l s  i s  r e f e r r e d  to  as  ' n o n - m a n i p u l a b l e ' by Gibba rd  and as  
' s t r a t e g y - p r o o f '  by S a t t e r t h w a i t e . We w i l l  a d o p t  G i b b a r d ' s  
t e r m i n o l o g y  to  a v o id  c o n f u s i o n  w i t h  P a t t a n a i k ' s  c o n c e p t  o f  a 
' s t r a t e g y - p r o o f '  GDF. To d i s c u s s  the  a p p ro a c h  o f  Gibbard  and 
S a t t e r t h w a i t e  we i n t r o d u c e  th e  c o n c e p t s  o f  a c o n t i n g e n c y  f o r  
i n d i v i d u a l  k and o f  a dominan t  s t r a t e g y  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  k .  N e i t h e r  
o f  t h e s e  w r i t e r s  u s e s  t h e  te rm  ' c o n t i n g e n c y '  b u t  we have a d a p te d  
i t  f rom F a r q u h a r s o n  (1969) to  a i d  ou r  d i s c u s s i o n .
For  a l l  s e S and f o r  a l l  k e L, a c o n t i n g e n c y  f o r  
i n d i v i d u a l  k (s  i s  the  (N - l ) - t u p l e  o f  s t r a t e g i e s  cho s en  by a l l  
i  e (L -  ( k ) ) .
A c o n t i n g e n c y  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  k ,  s i s  t h e  s i n c e r e
c o n t i n g e n c y  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  k ( s  ) i f  and o n ly  i f  f o r  a l l
i  e (L -  { k } ) .
Hence a c o n t i n g e n c y  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  k i s  a s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
s t r a t e g i e s  o f  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  e x c e p t  k .  Once we have s p e c i f i e d  t h e  
c o n t i n g e n c y  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  k and th e  s t r a t e g y  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  k we 
have s p e c i f i e d  a p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n .  We w i l l  w r i t e  s = (R^, s_^)  
and s = (R^, s ) .
L e t  A be any i s s u e  and l e t  f  be any d e c i s i v e  and r e s o l u t e  
GDF. A s t r a t e g y  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  k ,  s ay  R, , i s  a dom inan t  s t r a t e g y
K.
f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  k i f  and o n l y  i f  f o r  a l l  c and f o r  a l l  c o n t i n ­
g e n c i e s  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  k ,
<V S- k )TA f (Rk> S- k }
Hence,  g i v e n  a d e c i s i v e  and r e s o l u t e  GDF f and the  i s s u e  A, a s t r a t e g y
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e is dominant for individual k if and only if for all contin­
gencies for individual k, s , the adoption of strategy leads to 
a situation which is at least as good as any other situation that 
could be created by the adoption of any other strategy open to 
individual k.
We now define the concept of a non-manipulable CDF.
Let A e X be any issue and let f be any resolute and 
decisive GDF. f is non-manipulable for issue A if and only if for 
all k e L, R^ is a dominant strategy. f is non-manipulable if and 
only if for all A e X, f is non-manipulable for issue A.
Hence a resolute and decisive GDF f is non-manipulable if and only 
if every individual’s sincere strategy is dominant. In other words, 
for any issue A and for any k e L and for all contingencies s and 
for all R^ e S^,
<V S-k)TAf(Rk ’ S-k)
It follows that if a GDF is non-manipulable there does not exist an 
individual k and a contingency s such that for some R^ e (S^ - (R^))
(Rk’ S-k)QAf(V  S-k)
Since the notion of a non-manipulable GDF has been defined 
differently from Pattanaik’s notion of a strategy-proof GDF, we will 
compare the two notions. We begin by observing that if the GDF is 
decisive and resolute and we place no restrictions on the sincere 
or expressed preferences of all individuals other than that S = II 
for all i g L then the two approaches are equivalent. Suppose, for
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example, that we have a decisive and resolute GDF f which is non- 
manipulable. Then for any given issue A and for any k e L and for 
all contingencies s ^ and for all e S^,
(V  “-k)TAf(V  H-k>
It follows that for all k e L and for every sincere contingency 
and for all R^  e Sj ,
-k
(Rk s- k }
and hence there does not exist an individual k e L and a sincere 
contingency s and a strategy e (S^ - {R^}) such that:
(Rk’ 5-k)QAf(V  5-k>
Hence there does not exist a threat, say < L, s' >, to any sincere 
situation s such that L is a singleton and thus every sincere 
situation is an equilibrium. It follows that if = n for all 
i e L and the GDF f is decisive, resolute and non-manipulable then 
f is strategy-proof.
Conversely, suppose we have a resolute and decisive GDF f 
which is strategy-proof. Then, for any given issue A, every sincere 
situation s is an equilibrium and hence there is no threat, say 
< L, s' > to s such that L is a singleton. Hence for every sincere 
situation s and for all k e L and for all R^ e S^,
<V S-k)TA£(Rk> 5-k>
If we place no restrictions on the sincere or expressed preferences 
of all individuals other than that = II for all i e L then it
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f o l l o w s  t h a t :  f o r  a l l  k e L and f o r  a l l  c o n t i n g e n c i e s  s and
K.
f o r  a l l  e S^,
- k )
Hence i f  S. =11 f o r  a l l  i  e L and i f  a GDF f i s  d e c i s i v e ,  r e s o l u t el
and s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  t h e n  f  i s  n o n - m a n i p u l a b l e .
The p r o p e r t i e s  o f  s t r a t c g y - p r o o f n e s s  and n o n - m a n i p u l a b i l i t y  
a r e  n o t  e q u i v a l e n t  i f  we p l a c e  any r e s t r i c t i o n  on th e  s i n c e r e  
p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  b u t  n o t  on t h e i r  e x p r e s s e d  p r e f e r e n c e s .  
Suppose ,  f o r  example ,  we assume t h a t  f o r  a l l  i  e L, R_^  i s  a s t r i c t  
o r d e r i n g  b u t  we p l a c e  no such  r e s t r i c t i o n  on t h e  e x p r e s s e d  p r e f e r ­
e n c e s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .  Under t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  a d e c i s i v e  and 
r e s o l u t e  GDF which i s  n o n - m a n i p u l a b l e  i s  a l s o  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  b u t  
t h e  c o n v e r s e  does n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  f o l l o w .  The r e a d e r  w i l l  r e c a l l  our  
c o n v e n t i o n  t h a t  i f  we assume S_^  = ITq f o r  a l l  i  e L then  we assume 
t h a t  t h e  s i n c e r e  and t h e  e x p r e s s e d  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  
a r e  c o n s t r a i n e d  to  be s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g s .
Assuming t h a t  = n f o r  a l l  i  e L, Gibbard  (1973)  and 
S a t  t e r t h w a i t e  ( 1975) have  p ro v ed  t h a t  e v e r y  d e c i s i v e  and r e s o l u t e  
GDF which s a t i s f i e s  some v e r y  m i ld  r e s t r i c t i o n s  ( d e f i n e d  i n  C h a p te r  3 
as  n o n - i m p o s i t i o n  and n o n - d i c t a t o r s h i p )  w i l l  be m a n i p u l a b l e  f o r  any 
i s s u e  A c o n t a i n i n g  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s .  Hence e v e r y  
such  GDF w i l l  v i o l a t e  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f n e s s  f o r  any such  i s s u e  A.
I t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  we w i l l  n o t  be a b l e  to  f i n d  an o t h e r w i s e  
a c c e p t a b l e  GDF which i s  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f ,  n o t  to  m en t io n  s t r i c t l y  
s t r a t e g y - p r o o f .  However , P a z n e r  and Wesley (1977)  have shown t h a t  i f
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the set of voters is infinite then 'there exists a coalitionally- 
cheatproof non-imposed and non-dictatorial SCF'. They have subsequently 
pointed out that 'the essentially non-constructive method of proof' 
which they have used does not make it possible 'to present any concrete 
example of such a cheatproof method of social choice' (Pazner & Wesley: 
1978:85).
When the set of voters is finite, we do not know, for any CDF 
f and for any given issue A, the probability of any given sincere 
situation being an equilibrium or strict equilibrium. If the probability 
of any given sincere situation being a strict equilibrium is relatively 
high then we might not be too disturbed by the negative thrust of the 
results established by Gibbard, Satterthwaite and Pattanaik. However, 
if the probability of any given sincere situation being an equilibrium 
is relatively low then we have every reason to be concerned.
It seems reasonable to suppose, for any GDF f and for any 
given issue A, that the probability of s c E^(A, f, s) would increase 
as the number of individuals increases. Pazner and Wesley (1977) have 
recently shown that 'when the number of voters is sufficiently large 
(but finite) the plurality rule is individually-cheatproof most of the 
time'. The problem with this approach is that we do not know how large 
is 'sufficiently large' nor how often is 'most of the time'.
It seems reasonable to suppose, for any GDF f and for any given 
issue A, that the probability of s e E(A, f, s) would decrease as the 
number of individuals increases. Pazner and Wesley (1977) have shown 
that 'under the plurality rule, most profiles are cheatproof for small 
coalitions' and they have argued that the probability of any given
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c o a l i t i o n  b e i n g  a b l e  to  pose  a t h r e a t  to any s i n c e r e  s i u t a i o n  i s  
r e l a t i v e l y  low. However , a s  t h e  number o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n c r e a s e s ,  
t h e  number o f  p o s s i b l e  c o a l i t i o n s  i n c r e a s e s  r a p i d l y .
In  s u b s e q u e n t  c h a p t e r s ,  we w i l l  e s t a b l i s h  a s e t  o f  
n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  any g iven  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  to  
be an e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  each  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and Borda 
f u n c t i o n s .  From t h e s e  r e s u l t s ,  we w i l l  deduce  a s e t  of  n e c e s s a r y  and 
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  any g i v e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  t o  be  an e q u i l i b ­
r ium  u n d e r  each  o f  t h e s e  f u n c t i o n s .  We w i l l  u t i l i z e  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  i n  a 
computer  s i m u l a t i o n  o f  v o t i n g  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  o r d e r  to  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  the  above phenomena.
I n  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n ,  I  have made t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a s s u m p t io n s  
(1) t h e  i s s u e  c o n s i s t s  o f  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  (2) t h e  
s i n c e r e  as  w e l l  as  the  e x p r e s s e d  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  
s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g s ,  (3) t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  
s a t i s f i e s  t h e  e q u i p r o b a b i l i t y  a s su m p t io n  and (4) t h e  maximin a s s u m p t io n  
i s  s a t i s f i e d .  The s i m u l a t i o n  has  been  e x e c u t e d  f o r  numbers  o f  v o t e r s  
r a n g i n g  from 2 to  50.
In  t h e  r e m a in d e r  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  we w i l l  c o n s i d e r  a n o t h e r  
a p p ro a c h  to  t h e  p rob lem  o f  s t r a t e g i c  m i s r e v e l a t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  by 
v o t e r s .  T h i s  a pproach  has  been  d e v e lo p e d  by P e l e g  (1978) and by 
D u t t a  and P a t t a n a i k  (1978 ) .
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The Concept of Exact and Strict Consistency
Peleg (1978) has suggested that if we cannot find an 
otherwise acceptable GDF which is strategy-proof then the next step 
in the investigation of strategic voting is to look for non- 
dictatorial voting schemes in which the manipulation of preferences 
by individuals, or by groups of individuals, does not affect the 
final social choice. This provides the motivation for the intro­
duction of his concept of exact consistency of a GDF and his 
concept of exact and strict consistency of a GDF. The following 
definitions are adapted from Peleg (1978).
A GDF f is exactly consistent for issue A if and only if 
there exists a function Y from (S x X) to S such that for every 
sincere situation s,
(1) Y(s, A) e E^(A, f, s) and
(2) f(Y(s, A), A) = f(S, A)
A GDF f is exactly consistent if and only if for all A e X, f is 
exactly consistent for issue A.
A GDF f is exactly and strictly consistent for issue A 
if and only if there exists a function Y from (S x X) to S such 
that for every sincere situation s,
(1) Y(s, A) e E(A, f, s) and
(2) f(Y(s, A), A) = f(s, A)
A GDF f is exactly and strictly consistent if and only if for all 
A e X, f is exactly and strictly consistent for issue A.
A GDF f which is exactly consistent may be interpreted as 
follows: for any given issue A and for every sincere situation s
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t h e r e  e x i s t s  an s e S c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to  s such  t h a t  s e E (A, f ,  s) 
and f ( s ,  A) = f ( s ,  A) . Hence,  even i f  t h e  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  n o t  
an e q u i l i b r i u m  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a n o t h e r  s i t u a t i o n  which  i s  an e q u i l i b r i u m  
and which  y i e l d s  t h e  same outcome,  g i v e n  t h e  GDF and i s s u e  A.
S i m i l a r l y ,  a GDF f which  i s  e x a c t l y  and s t r i c t l y
c o n s i s t e n t  may be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  f o l l o w s :  f o r  any g iv e n  i s s u e  A and
f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s t h e r e  e x i s t s  an s e S c o r r e s p o n d i n g
t o  s such  t h a t  s e E(A, f ,  s )  and f ( s ,  A) = f ( s ,  A). Hence,  even
i f  t h e  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s i s  n o t  a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  t h e r e  e x i s t s
strict
a n o t h e r  s i t u a t i o n  which i s  a^ e q u i l i b r i u m  and which y i e l d s  t h e  same 
ou tcom e,  g i v e n  t h e  GDF and i s s u e  A. I f  we w ish  to  show t h a t  a GDF f 
s a t i s f i e s  e i t h e r  o f  t h e  above p r o p e r t i e s  t hen  we r e q u i r e  t h a t  
D^ = (S x X) o r  e l s e  we must  su p p le m e n t  the  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  f  by s p e c i f y ­
i n g  what  happens  when ( s ,  A)  ^ D .
The c o n c e p t  o f  e x a c t  and s t r i c t  c o n s i s t e n c y  may seem to 
be a s u f f i c i e n c t  r e q u i r e m e n t  to  impose on a GDF to  e n s u r e  t h a t  
s t r a t e g i c  m i s r e v e l a t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  by i n d i v i d u a l s  o r  by 
c o a l i t i o n s  o f  two o r  more i n d i v i d u a l s  does  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  f i n a l  
s o c i a l  c h o i c e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  P a t t a n a i k  (1978)  h a s  p o i n t e d  ou t  
t h a t  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  e q u i l i b r i a  
t h e r e  may s t i l l  e x i s t  o t h e r  s i t u a t i o n s  such  as  s e S c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
to  s such t h a t  s e E(A, f ,  s )  and s 4 Y ( s ,  A) and f ( s ,  A) 4 f ( s ,  A) .  
Hence I  s u g g e s t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d e f i n i t i o n s :
A GDF f  i s  c o m p l e t e l y  c o n s i s t e n t  f o r  i s s u e  A i f  and o n l y  i f  
f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,
(1) E^(A, f ,  s )  4 <f> and
(2) f o r  a l l  s c E (A, f ,  s ) , f ( s ,  A) = f ( s ,  A)
57
A GDF f is completely consistent if and only if for all A e X, 
f is completely consistent for issue A.
A GDF f is completely and strictly consistent for issue A 
if and only if for every sincere situation s,
(1) E(A, f, s) 4  ^ and
(2) for all s e E(A, f, s), f(s, A) = f(s, A)
A GDF is completely and strictly consistent if and only if for all 
A e X, f is completely and strictly consistent for issue A.
A GDF f which is completely consistent may be interpreted 
as follows: for any given issue A and for every sincere situation s
the set of equilibria is non-empty and for every s e S corresponding 
to s, f(s, A) = f(s, A). The concept of complete and strict 
consistency may be interpreted in an analogous manner. If we wish to 
prove that a GDF f satisfies either of the above properties then we 
require that D^ = (S x X) or else we must supplement the definition of 
f to specify what happens when (s, A) D^ .
If we can find a GDF f which is completely and strictly 
consistent there would seem to be little objection to its use in 
group decision making. The difficulty is that there may not exist 
such a GDF. We note that a GDF which is strictly strategy-proof 
is not necessarily completely and strictly consistent, nor conversely. 
However, a GDF which is strictly strategy-proof is exactly and 
strictly consistent although the converse does not necessarily follow.
Pattanaik (1978) has suggested another possibility. Suppose 
we have a GDF, say f, which satisfies many desirable properties but 
f is not strategy-proof or strictly strategy-proof. Suppose we have
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another GDF, say f, which violates some very desirable properties 
but which does satisfy the following requirement: for all A e X
and for every sincere situation s there exists an s e S correspond­
ing to s such that s e E(A, f, s) and f (s , A) = f (s , A) . We may 
decide to adopt the GDF f on the basis that the end justifies the 
means. This provides the motivation for the introduction of the 
concept of exact f-consistency and the concept of exact and strict 
f-consistency. The following definitions are adapted from Pattanaik 
(1978).
Let f and f be two GDF's. The GDF f is exactly f-consistent 
for issue A if and only if there exists a function Y from (S x X) 
to S such that for every sincere situation s,
(1) Y(s, A) e E^(A, f, s) and
(2) f(Y(s, A), A) = f(i, A)
The GDF f is exactly f-consistent if and only if for all A e X, f 
is exactly f-consistent for issue A.
The GDF f is exactly and strictly f-consistent for issue A 
if and only if there exists a function Y from (S x X) to S such that 
for every sincere situation s,
(1) Y(s, A) e E(A, f, s) and
(2) f (Y(s, A), A) = f(s, A)
The GDF f is exactly and strictly f-consistent if and only if for 
all A e X, f is exactly and strictly f-consistent for issue A.
Suppose we have a desirable GDF f which is not strictly 
strategy-proof, and we can find a GDF f which is exactly and 
strictly f-consistent. We may still have reservations about accept-
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ing the GDF f: because of the possibility of a multiplicity of
equilibria there may exist other situations such as s e S corres­
ponding to s such that s e E(A, f, s) and s =j= Y(s, A) and 
f(s, A) =f f(s, A). Hence we extend our previous approach in a 
similar vein.
Let A e X be any issue and let f and f be two GDF’s. The 
GDF f is completely and strictly f-consistent for issue A if and 
only if for every sincere situation s,
(1) if (s, A) c D~ then E(A, f, s) =j= <J) and for all 
s e E(A, f, s), f(s, A) = f(s, A), 
and (2) if (s, A) £ then E(A, f, s) = 4>
A GDF f is completely and strictly f-consistent if and only if for 
all A £ X, f is completely and strictly f-consistent for issue A.
A GDF f which is completely and strictly f-consistent 
may be interpreted as follows: for any given issue A
and for any sincere situation s, if (s, A) belongs to the domain of 
f then there will exist at least one s e S corresponding to s such 
that s e E(A, f, s) and for all s £ E(A, f, s) we will have 
f(s, A) = f(s, A); and if (s, A) does not belong to the domain of 
f then E(A, f, s) will be empty. Hence if we wish to prove that a 
GDF f is completely and strictly f-consistent then we require that 
D^ = (S x X) or else we must specify what happens when (s, A) £ D^. 
However, we do not require D~ = (S x X).
Although we have not been able to find a desirable 
GDF f and another GDF f which is completely and strictly f-consistent, 
we have been able to find a desirable GDF f and another GDF f which 
satisfy a somewhat weaker property. We will refer to this weaker
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p r o p e r t y  as  C o n d o r c e t - c o n s i s t e n c y .
L e t  A e X be any i s s u e  and l e t  f  be any GDF. The GDF f  
i s  C ondorce t  c o n s i s t e n t  f o r  i s s u e  A i f  and on ly  i f  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n  s ,
(1) i f  ( s ,  A) e D . t hen  f o r  a l l  s e E(A, f ,  s ) ,
i  T Cl J
f  (s  , A) = Maj ( s ,  A)
and (2) i f  ( s ,  A) t|. D . then  E(A, f ,  s )  = <J>
i  i t l j
A GDF f  i s  Condorce t  c o n s i s t e n t  i f  and o n ly  i f  f o r  a l l  A e X, f  i s  
C ondorce t  c o n s i s t e n t  f o r  i s s u e  A.
O b v i o u s ly ,  Condorce t  c o n s i s t e n c y  i s  a weaker  p r o p e r t y  than
com ple te  and s t r i c t  M a j - c o n s i s t e n c y  s i n c e  we do n o t  r e q u i r e  t h a t
E(A, f ,  s )  i s  non-empty  whenever  ( s ,  A) e . .  However,  Condorce tMaj
c o n s i s t e n c y  does e n s u r e  t h a t  f o r  any g iv e n  i s s u e  A and f o r  any s i n c e r e
s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a s i t u a t i o n  s e S which i s  a s t r i c t
e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  f  t h e n  f ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A). Hence i f  we a c c e p t
t h a t  Maj i s  a d e s i r a b l e  GDF t h e n  a GDF f  which  i s  Condorce t  c o n s i s t e n t
h a s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a p p e a l  a l t h o u g h  the  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h i s  a p p e a l  may
v a r y  d e p e n d in g  on the  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  E(A, f ,  s )  =j= (j), g iven
t h a t  ( s ,  A) c D . .Maj
We w i l l  p rove  i n  C h a p te r  4 t h a t ,  g i v e n  th e  maximin 
a s s u m p t i o n ,  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f i e s  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  
C ondorce t  c o n s i s t e n c y .  We w i l l  a l s o  show t h a t ,  g iv e n  r e a s o n a b l e  
a s s u m p t io n s  a bou t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  
whenever  ( s ,  A) e D^  t h e r e  i s  a h i g h  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  s e t  o f  
s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i a  under  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  non-empty .
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G iven t h e  m axim in  a s s u m p t i o n ,  we w i l l  p r o v e  t h a t  t h e  Nanson 
an d  B o rd a  f u n c t i o n s  do n o t  s a t i s f y  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  C o n d o r c e t  
c o n s i s t e n c y  b u t  t h e y  do s a t i s f y  a  l e s s  d em an d in g  p r o p e r t y  w h ic h  we 
w i l l  r e f e r  t o  a s  weak C o n d o r c e t  c o n s i s t e n c y .
L e t  A e X be  an y  i s s u e  and l e t  f  be  any GDF. The GDF f  
i s  w e a k l y  C o n d o r c e t  c o n s i s t e n t  f o r  i s s u e  A i f  and o n l y  i f  f o r  e v e r y  
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,
(1)  i f  ( s ,  A) e D_, . t h e n  f o r  a l l  s e E(A,  f ,  s )  ,Maj
f  ( s , A) _C Maj ( s  , A)
an d  (2)  i f  ( s ,  A) £ D ^ _  t h e n  E(A,  f ,  s )  = <j)
A GDF f  i s  w e a k l y  C o n d o r c e t  c o n s i s t e n t  i f  and o n l y  i f  f o r  a l l  A e X, 
f  i s  w e a k l y  C o n d o r c e t  c o n s i s t e n t  f o r  i s s u e  A.
Hence t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  weak C o n d o r c e t  c o n s i s t e n c y  d i f f e r s  
f r o m  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  C o n d o r c e t  c o n s i s t e n c y  a s  f o l l o w s :  f o r  any
g i v e n  i s s u e  A and f o r  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a 
s i t u a t i o n  s e S w h i c h  i s  a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  u n d e r  f  t h e n  we demand 
f ( s ,  A) _C M a j ( s ,  A) b u t  we do n o t  demand t h a t  f ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A).
We w i l l  p r o v e  t h e  r e s u l t s  we h a v e  f o r e s h a d o w e d  above
i n  C h a p t e r s  4 ,  5 and 6.
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C h a p te r  Summary
I n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  we have d e f i n e d  an N -pe rson  game i n  n o r m a l i z e d  
form and shown t h a t  group d e c i s i o n  making by means o f  v o t i n g  may be 
a n a l y s i z e d  w i t h i n  t h i s  s t r u c t u r e .  We th e n  s p e c i f i e d  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
c o n d i t i o n s  which  we w i l l  assume t h r o u g h o u t  o u r  a n a l y s i s .  We d e f i n e d  t h e  
Nash c o n c e p t  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  and th e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h i s  c o n c e p t  by 
F a r q u h a r s o n  (1955)  and Shub ik  ( 1 959 ) .  We d i s c u s s e d  t h e s e  n o t i o n s  as  
s o l u t i o n  c o n c e p t s .
We d e f i n e d  P a t t a n a i k ' s  c o n c e p t s  o f  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f n e s s  and 
s t r i c t  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f n e s s  o f  GDF's and we n o t e d  t h a t  P a t t a n a i k  has  
p roved  a number o f  n e g a t i v e  r e s u l t s  c o n c e r n i n g  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  GDF's 
which  s a t i s f y  t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s .  We d e f i n e d  the  c o n c e p t  o f  a no n -  
m a n i p u l a b l e  GDF as  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t ,  w i t h i n  the  s t r u c t u r e  which  we have  
a d o p t e d ,  o f  G i b b a r d ' s  c o n c e p t  o f  a n o n - m a n i p u l a b l e  v o t i n g  scheme.  We 
compared t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  a n o n - m a n i p u l a b l e  GDF w i t h  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  a 
s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  GDF. We n o t e d  t h e  f u n d a m e n ta l  r e s u l t  p roved  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  
by G ibbard  (1973)  and S a t  t e r t h w a i t e  (1973 ,1 975)  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  n o n - m a n i p u l a b l e  GDF’ s .  We th e n  d i s c u s s e d  th e  r e s u l t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by 
P a z n e r  and Wesley (1 9 7 7 ,1 9 7 8 ) .
We fo re shadowed  an e x p l o r a t i o n  o f  the s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  
n e g a t i v e  r e s u l t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by Gibbard  (1 9 7 3 ) ,  S a t t e r t h w a i t e  (1973 ,1975)  
and P a t t a n a i k  (1973-78)  by e xam in ing  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  an e q u i l i b r i u m  o r  s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  t h r e e  s p e c i f i c  
GDF's -  the  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and Borda f u n c t i o n s .  We c o n c lu d e d  by d i s ­
c u s s i n g  the  a pp roach  o f  P e l e g  (1978) and s u g g e s t i n g  a m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  
t h i s  a p p ro a c h  which we w i l l  a l s o  e x p l o r e  i n  s u b s e q u e n t  c h a p t e r s .
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3 THE DEFINITION AND PROPERTIES OF THE PLURALITY, 
NANSON AND BORDA FUNCTIONS
In this chapter, we will define the Plurality, Nanson and 
Borda functions and discuss some of their properties. We will begin 
by introducing the concepts of a finite ranking operator (FRO) and 
of a simple finite ranking rule (SFRR) and we will proceed to define 
the Plurality and Borda functions as special cases of this general 
class of GDF’s. We will then introduce the concept of a method of 
exhaustive voting based on a finite ranking operator and define the 
Nanson function as a special case of this general class. Subsequently, 
we proceed to define a number of properties of GDF’s and to discuss 
the Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions in terms of these properties. 
In particular we will define decisiveness of GDF’s, binariness, weak 
binariness, independence of irrelevant alternatives, anonymity, neutral­
ity, monotonicity, strict mono tonicity, resoluteness, decisiveness 
and quasi-decisiveness of coalitions, non-dictatorship and non­
imposition. We conclude by stating the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 
and two theorems of Pattanaik - the first concerned with SFRR's and 
the second with methods of exhaustive voting based on FRO’s. We 
discuss the implications of these results for the Plurality, Nanson
and Borda functions.
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We begin by introducing some additional notation. Let A 
be any issue and let R be any binary relation defined over X. We 
define C(A, R) to be set {x e A|for all y e A, xRy}. Hence C(A, R) 
may be interpreted as the set of R greatest elements in A.
In other words C(A, R) consists of those elements of A which 
constitute the highest indifference class determined by the 
ordering R over the subset A of X.
We now define the concept of a finite ranking operator.
Our definition has been adapted from Pattanaik’s defintion of a 
Finite Ranking Operator by adding the additional restriction 
that each individual i e L has one and only one ballot.
A finite ranking operator (FRO) is a function g which for 
every (s, A) belonging to (S x X) specifies exactly one ordering R^ 
over A according to the following procedure:
(i) A set of real numbers t^ , t^ , •••» (which may
vary with the issue but which are invariant with 
respect to the individual orderings R^, R£, •••» R^ 
when the issue is given) is fixed such that for 
all h (1 <: h < | A | - 1) ,
ch * V n  and lf lAl > 1 then fci > cIAI •
(ii) For every ordering R defined over X and for all
x e A, a real number t^(R) is fixed such that:x
(a) t^ £ t^(R) > t^4I and, if R is a strict 1 x IAI
ordering,
t^(R) = t^ iff I{y c A|yRx and not xRy}| = k - 1.X K.
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(b) f o r  a l l  a ,  b e A, t ^ ( R )  ;> tf^(R) i f f  aRb
a  b
(c)  f o r  a l l  o r d e r i n g s  R' anc  R" d e f i n e d  o v e r  X
and f o r  a l l  o n e - t o - o n e  f u n c t i o n s  a f rom A to  A,
i f  f o r  a l l  a ,  b e A, aR 'b  i f f  o ( a ) R " o ( b )
th e n  f o r  a l l  y e A, t ^ ( R ' )  = t ^ ,  N (R")
y o (y)
( i i i )  For  a l l  x ,  y e A, xR y i f f
i  e L
t A(R.)  S w x i  y i  c L
We w i l l  w r i t e  R^ = g ( s ,  A). The c o n c e p t  o f  a f i n i t e  
r a n k i n g  o p e r a t o r  may be i n t e r p r e t e d  as  f o l l o w s :  For  any g i v e n
i s s u e  A and s i t u a t i o n  s ,  a f i n i t e  r a n k i n g  o p e r a t o r  s p e c i f i e s  the  
r a n k  numbers  to  be a s s i g n e d  (o r  marks to  be awarded)  to  an 
a l t e r n a t i v e  which  o c c u p i e s  the  f i r s t ,  s e c o n d ,  t h i r d  e t c .  p o s i t i o n  
i n  each  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  o r d e r i n g .  These r a n k  numbers  may v a r y  w i t h  
t h e  number o f  e l e m e n t s  i n  the  i s s u e  and w i l l  depend on t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
f i n i t e  r a n k i n g  o p e r a t o r  which i s  employed .  However , t h e  method o f  
a s s i g n i n g  r a n k  numbers must  meet  t h r e e  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  F i r s t l y ,  i n  
any g i v e n  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  o r d e r i n g ,  t h e  r a n k  number a s s i g n e d  t o  any 
g i v e n  a l t e r n a t i v e  must  be g r e a t e r  t h a n  o r  e q u a l  to  t h e  r a n k  number 
a s s i g n e d  to  each  a l t e r n a t i v e  which  o c c u p i e s  a lower  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h a t  
o r d e r i n g .  S e c o n d ly ,  f o r  any s t r i c t  i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r i n g ,  t h e  r an k  
number a s s i g n e d  to  the  a l t e r n a t i v e  which o c c u p i e s  the  f i r s t  p o s i t i o n  
i n  t h e  o r d e r i n g  must  be g r e a t e r  t h a n  th e  r an k  number a s s i g n e d  to  the  
a l t e r n a t i v e  which  o c c u p i e s  t h e  l a s t  p o s i t i o n  i n  the  o r d e r i n g .
T h i r d l y ,  i f  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  two i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r i n g s  R^ and R i s  
s i m i l a r  i n  t h a t  f o r  some p e r m u t a t i o n  o o f  the  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  the 
i s s u e  A, xR^y i f f  o ( x ) R ^ a ( y )  f o r  a l l  x ,  y c A then  the  r a n k  number
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assigned to any alternative x in the ordering must be the same
as the rank number assigned to alternative a (x) in the ordering R_. .
This third condition implies that if all individual orderings are
strict then the rank numbers assigned to alternatives occupying
corresponding positions in all individual orderings should be the
A A Asame. These are the numbers t^ , t^ , ... t|^ | specified by the
FRO g. It follows from the above discussion that
A A A , A A
tl i t2 i ... 1 t|A | and tl > tjA |.
Given the issue A, the situation s and the FRO g the
ordering R^ over A is determined by
i . . .  A A A1. assigning the rank numbers t^ , t^ , . .., 1A | t0
the appropriate alternatives in each individual 
ordering and
2. for each alternative in the issue, summing the 
rank numbers which it has been assigned in all 
individual orderings and
3. ranking all the alternatives in the issue A in 
descending order on the basis of the sum of the 
rank numbers which each alternative has received.
We make two further observations. Firstly, the FRO g is defined for 
all (s, A) belonging to (S x X) and hence the domain of g is equal to 
(S x X). Secondly, even if we assume that all individual orderings 
are strict, it does not necessarily follow that the ordering RA 
defined over the issue by the FRO g is a strict ordering.
We now define the concept of a simple finite ranking rule. 
Our definition is a special case of Pattanaik’s definition of a 
simple finite ranking rule (SFRR).
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A GDF f is a simple finite ranking rule (SFRR) if and only 
if there exists a finite ranking operator g such that for all (s, A) 
belonging to (S x X), if R^ = g(s, A) then f(s, A) = C(A, R>1{) .
We will say f is an SFRR based on the FRO g. A simple finite 
ranking rule f based on a finite ranking operator g may be interpreted 
as a GDF which for every possible issue and every possible situation 
determines a choice set consisting of the set of g greatest elements 
in the issue A. In other words, f(s, A) consists of the elements in 
the highest indifference class determined by the ordering R^ 
defined over A by the FRO g. We make two observations. Firstly, 
is equal to (S x X) and hence f(s, A) is always defined and f(s, A) 
is never empty. Secondly, since R)V is not necessarily a strict order­
ing it is possible that f(s, A) may contain more than one element.
We will now define the Plurality and Borda operators and we
subsequently define the Plurality and Borda functions as simple finite
ranking rules based on these operators. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, we
Nwill assume = n0 for all i e L and hence S = n0• Accordingly, we 
will define the Plurality and Borda operators and hence the 
Plurality and Borda functions only under this restriction.
The Plurality operator (plu) is an FRO such that for all
A e X and for all s e IIq , t^ = 1 and tf' = 0 for all k (1 < k <: | A| ) .1 K.
The Plurality function (Plu) is an SFRR based on the Plurality operator.
The Borda operator (bor) is an FRO such that for all A e X
and for all s c 11^ , t^ = | A| - k for all k (1 < k £ | A | ) .
The Borda function (Bor) is an SFRR based on the Borda operator.
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We i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  o p e r a t o r  and 
o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  example:
Example 3.1
L e t  t h e  i s s u e  A = (x ,  y ,  z)  and l e t  L = ( l ,  2, 12}
l e t  s be a s i t u a t i o n  such  t h a t :
f o r a l l i e u , 2 ) , x P . y P . z i  l
f o r a l l i e {3, A}, x P . z P . yl  l
f o r a l l i £ ( 5 , 6}, yP . xP . zl i
f o r a l l i £ {7, 8 ) , y P . zP . xl i
f o r a l l i £ {9, 10}, zP . xP . y l  l
f o r a l l i £ (11 , 12}, zP . yP . xl  l
I t  i s  e a s y  to  v e r i f y  t h a t  f o r  a l l  i  £ {1,  2, 3, 4}.,
t A(R. )  = 1 and t A(R. )  = t A(R.)  = 0 x i  y l  z l
and f o r  a l l  i  e {5, 6 ,  7, 8 ) ,
t A(R. )  = 1 and t A(R. )  = t A(R. )  = 0 y l  x i  z l
and f o r  a l l  i  e {9, 10, 11, 12},
t A(R. )  = 1 and t A(R.)  = t A(R.)  = 0 z l  x i  y l
I t  f o l l o w s  from th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  o p e r a t o r  t h a t :
w = E t A(R.)
X i T X 1£ L
A, ,
w = E t  (R . )
y i E L y 1
w = E t A(R. )
Z i T z  1£ L
Hence th e  o r d e r i n g  o v e r  A d e f i n e d  by the  P l u r a l i t y  o p e r a t o r ,
p l u ( s ,  A) = x l yy l t z .  S in c e  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  o p e r a t o r  d e f i n e s  on ly  one 
i n d i f f e r e n c e  c l a s s  o v e r  t h e  i s s u e  A i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  
d e f i n e s  a c h o ic e  s e t  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x, y ,  z}.
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We now show t h a t  i f  an  FRO i s  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  o p e r a t o r  t h e n  
f o r  a l l  A e X an d  f o r  a l l  s e Jig an d  f o r  a l l  x e A and f o r  a l l  i  e L, 
t A( R . )  = 1 i f f  x P . y  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  {x})
X I  1
t ^ ( R . )  = 0 i f f  f o r  some y e (A -  { x } ) ,  y P . x
X I  1
an d  f o r  a l l  x £ A,
w = £ t A( R . )  = j {i  £ L | x P . y  f o r  a l l  y £ (A -  {x } ) } |
X  • -- X  1  11 £ L
N
L e t  A £ X b e  an y  i s s u e  an d  l e t  s £ rig b e  any s i t u a t i o n .
S u p p o s e  f o r  some x £ A an d  f o r  some i  e L,
t x (Ri ) =
I t  f o l l o w s  f r o m  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  an  FRO t h a t :
t ^ ( Ri )  = i f f  I{y £ AIyP ±x } |  = k -  1 
I t  f o l l o w s  f r o m  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  o p e r a t o r  t h a t :
A
1 an d  t A
A
an d  h e n c e ,
t^CR^) = 1 i f f  I {y £ A j yP_^x} | = 0
t x (Ri ) = 0 i f f  I<y £ A | y P . x } I  ^ 1
Hence  i f  an  FRO i s  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  o p e r a t o r  t h e n  f o r  a l l  A £ X and  f o r  
N
a l l  s £ n 0 a n d  f o r  a l l  x £ A an d  f o r  a l l  i  £ L,
t ^ ( R . )  = 1 i f f  x P . y  f o r  a l l  y £ (A -  {x})X I  1
t ^ ( R . )  = 0 i f f  f o r  some y £ (A -  { x } ) , y P . x
X I  1
an d  f o r  a l l  x £ A,
w = E t ^ ( R . )  = [{ i  £ L | x P . y  f o r  a l l  y £ (A -  {x } ) } |
X  . -  X  1  11 £ L
Hence  i f  an  FRO i s  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  o p e r a t o r  t h e n  f o r  a l l  A c X and f o r
a l l  s e Ilg, i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an  x e A s u c h  t h a t  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  { x } ) ,
| { i  e l | xP^w f o r  a l l  w o ( A -  { x } ) } |  :>
I { i  £ LIyP^w f o r  a l l
t h e n  w $ w f o r  a l l  y e (A -  {x}) . x y
w £ (A -  {y } ) } I
70
Therefore, x is a member of the highest indifference class defined
over A by the Plurality operator and hence x e Plu(s, A).
Hence if there exists an x e A such that:
I{i e l |xP.w for all w e (A - {x})}| $ ^1 z
then it follows that for all y e (A - {x}),
I{i c L|xP^w for all w e (A - {x})}| £
I{i e L|yP^w for all w e (A - {y})}[ 
and hence y e Plu(s, A).
Similarly, if there exists an x e A such that for all y e (A - {x}),
I{i e L|xP .w for all w e (A - {x})}| >
I {i e L.|yP w for all w e (A - {y}) } |
then w > w for all y e (A - {x}). x y
Therefore, x is the only member of the highest indifference class 
defined over A by the Plurality operator and hence Plu(s, A) = {x}.
Hence if there exists an x e A such that:
I{i e l |xP^w for all w e  (A - {x})}| 
then it follows that Plu(s, A) = {x}.
In subsequent chapters we will utilize.1, these consequences 
of the definitions of the Plurality operator and the Plurality function. 
Since the arguments involved are extremely simple we will not accord 
these results the status of a lemma. Whenever we utilize any of 
these results we will simply state that it follows directly from the 
definition of the Plurality operator or the Plurality function.
We illustrate the definition of the Borda operator and of 
the Borda function with the following example.
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Example 3.2
Let the issue A = {x, y, z} and let L = {1, 2, 12}
and let s be a situation defined as in Example 3.1
Since the Borda operator specifies that:
t^ = |A| - 1, tk2 = |A| - 2, . . tjA |
it follows that if |A| = 3,
A _ A . A .
h  = 2> h  = S  = °-
It is easy to verify that for all i e (1, 2},
t^(R.) = 2 and t^(R.) = 1 and t^(R.) x i  y l z l
and for all i e (3, 4},
t^(R.) = 2 and t^(R.) = 1 and t^(R.) x i  z l y l
and for all i e {5, 6},
t^(R.) = 2 and t^CR.) = 1 and t^(R.) = 0 y l x i  z l
and so on for the other individual orderings. Hence the sum of the 
rank numbers assigned to each of the alternatives is as follows:
21{i e LIxP^yP^z}| + 2
+
2 I{i e L|yP.xP.z}| + 2
+




{i e LlxP.zP.y}1 l l
(i c LlzP.xP.y}1 l l
{i e LIyP^zP^x} 
{i e LIzP.yP.x}1 l l
{i £ LIzP.yP.x}1 l l
(i £ LIyP.zP.x}
+ I{i £ LIyP^xP^z}I 
= 12
+ I { i £ L I xP^yP^z} I
12
+ I{i £ LIxP^zP^y}I 
=  12
Therefore, w = w = w =12. x y z
Hence, gLven the situation s, the ordering defined over the issue A 
by the Borda operator, bor(s, A) = xl^yl^z. Since the Borda operator 
defines only one indifference class over the Issue A, it follows 
that the Borda function defines a choice set, Bor(s, A) = {x, y, z}.
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We now show that if an FRO is the Borda operator then
Nfor all A g X and for all s g Hq and for all x e A and for all 
i e L,
tx(‘Ri^  = Uy e AI xP±y) I
and for all x g A,
E l (R.) = E I{y g A|xP.y}|x . T 'x i' Tl e L l g L
Let A g X be any issue and let s e Hq be any situation.
Suppose for some i e L and for some x e A,
A , v A 
tx(Ri) = ck
It follows from the definition of an FRO that:
t^(R^) = t^ iff I {y e A|yP_^ x}| = k - 1.
Since we assume S^ = Üq for all i e L,
I {y g AI yP_^ x} I = I AI — 1 — I {y g A| xP_^ y} I
and hence,
k — 1=  |A| — 1 — I{y g A|xP.y}|
and hence,
I AI - k = I{y g A| xP y}|
It follows from the definition of the Borda operator that: 
t£ = |A| - k
and hence,
tx(Ri) = |{y e AIxP^y}I
Hence if an FRO is the Borda operator then for all A g X and for 
Nall s g I Io and for all x e A and for all i e L,
= |(y e A|xP y}|x i
and for all x e A,
w = E t (R ) = E I{y  g A|xP y}|.A  . _ A  -L , Xi e L l e L
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Before we define the Nanson function, we first introduce 
the concept of a method of exhaustive voting based on the finite 
ranking operator. We require some additional notation:
For every issue A and every ordering R^, let C^(A, R^) = C(A, Ryf) 
and for all integers k > 1, let
Ck(A, Ry<) = C( [A - C^A, R,v) - ... - Ck_ ^ (A, R>v) ], R*)
Obviously, (A, R^) , C^CA, R^) etc. are the indifference classes 
into which the issue A can be partitioned on the basis of ordering R>v.
gFor every issue A and for every FRO g, let A^ = A
A^ = A - Cm (A, g(s, A)) 
(where m is the total number of indifference classes into which A 
can be partitioned on the basis of the ordering g(s, A)) 
and for all integers k > 1, A^ = A^_^ - C ,(A®_^,
(where m ’ is the total number of indifference classes into which
cr crAk_^ can be partitioned on the basis of the ordering g(s, Aj^ _^ ))
gis defined only if A£_^ is non-empty.
We now define a method of exhaustive voting based on a 
finite ranking operator:
A GDF f is a method of exhaustive voting based on an FRO g 
iff for all (s, A) belonging to (S x X), there exists an integer 
k 5 0 such that f(s, A) = C(A^, g(s, A^)) = A^.
A method of exhaustive voting based on an FRO g may be 
interpreted as a GDF f which for every possible issue and every 
possible situation determines a choice set by the successive 
elimination of alternatives from the issue until only one indifference 
class remains. Initially, the FRO g generates a ranking Ry of all
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of the alternatives in the issue A. The alternative(s) in the lowest 
indifference class defined by the ordering are then eliminated 
from the issue and the FRO g is again used to generate a new ranking 
of the elements remaining in the issue. The alternative(s) in the 
lowest indifference class determined by this new ordering are then 
eliminated from the issue. The successive elimination of alternatives 
from the issue continues until the FRO g defines only one indifference 
class. The alternatives in this indifference class constitute the 
choice set f(s, A).
We now define the Nanson function as a method of exhaustive
voting based on the Plurality operator. We recall that the Plurality
Noperator was defined only under the restriction that S = IIq and hence 
the Nanson function will be defined only under this restriction.
The Nanson function (Nan) is a method of exhaustive voting 
based on the Plurality operator.
NIt follows from our definition that if we assume S = Tig
then D>7 is equal to (S x X) and therefore Nan(s, A) is always Nan
defined and Nan(s, A) is never empty.
We now explore some further implications of the definition.
We have shown earlier that if an FRO is the Plurality operator
Nthen for all A e X and for all s e ü g  and for all x e A and for all 
i e L ,
tA(R.) = 1 iff xP.y for all y e (A - {x})X I  1
tA(R.) = 0 iff for some y e (A - {x}), yP.x x i  i
and for all x z A,
w =  E tA(R.) =  I{i e LlxP.y for all y e (A - {x}) }| x . T x l 1 1 1l e L
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Similarly, we can show that for all integers k $ 0 and for all 
.pluX £
AP1U
t ^  (R^ ) = 1 iff xP^y for all y e (a£^U ~ (x})
c plutx (R^ ) = 0 iff for some y e (A£ - {x}), yP
and for all x e a|^U,cZ t ^  (R ) = I {i e L|xP^y for all y e (a|^U “ {x})}|
i e L
pluHence if, for some integer k $ 0 and for some x e Af ,
I{i e iJxP.w for all w c (A^^U - {x})}| = ^
then for all integers h £ k,
I {i £ LjxP^w for all w £ (A^11 " (x})}|  ^ ^
Hence for all integers h 5 k, alternative x will be a member of the
highest indifference class defined over by the Plurality operator.
Hence x e Nan(s, A). Similarly, if for some integer k £ 0 and some 
pluX £ A.
I{i £ L|xP^w for all w £ (a£"^ U - {x})}| >  ^
then for all integers h $ k,
I {i e L|xP^w for all w £ (aP^U - {x}) } | > ^
Ilencc for all integers h  ^k, alternative x will be the only member 
of the highest indifference class defined over aP^U by the Plurality 
operator. Hence Nan(s, A) = {x}.
In subsequent chapters we will utilize these consequences
of the definitions of the Plurality operator and the Nanson function.
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Since the arguments involved are extremely simple we will not accord 
these results the status of a lemma. Whenever we utilize any of these 
results we will simply state that it follows directly from the 
definition of the Plurality operator or the Nanson function.
We now illustrate the definition of the Nanson function by 
means of the following examples.
Example 3.3
Let the issue A = {x, y, z} and let L 
and let s be a situation such that: 
for all i e {1, 2}, 
for all i e {3, 4}, 
for all i e {5, 6}, 
for all i e {7, 8},
{1, 2, ..., 12}
xP .yP . zl l
xP .zP . y l i
yP .xP . z
yP . zP . x
" ^ l i
for all i e (9, 10}, zP^xP^y
for all i e (11, 12}, zP.yP.xl l
Hence the issue A and situation s are exactly as specified in 
Examples 3.1 and 3.2. As we have shown in Example 3.1, the 
ordering over A defined by the Plurality operator,
plu(s, A) = xl^yl^z. Since the Plurality operator defines only one 
indifference class over the issue A, it follows that the Nanson 
function defines a choice set Nan(s, A) = {x, y, z}.
We note that if Nan(s, A) contains three elements 
then N is a multiple of 3. Similarly, if Nan(s, A) contains two 
elements then N is a multiple of 2. However, neither of these 
conclusions necessarily holds for the Plurality function.
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Example 3.4
Let issue A = {x, y, z} and let L = {1, 2, ..., 9} 
and let s be a situation such that: 
for all i e {1, 2}, xP.zP.yl i
for all i e {3, 4, 5}, yP^ ,xP_^ z
for all i e {6, 7, 8}, zP^xP^y
for all i e {9}, zP.yP.xl l
The ordering defined over A by Plurality operator, plu(s, A) = 
zP^yP^x. The lowest indifference class defined by this ordering 
consists of the alternative x and hence A ^ U = {y, z}. The Plurality 
operator is then used to define an ordering over A ^ U and we have 
plu(s, {y, z}) = zP}l<y. The lowest indifference class defined by this 
ordering consists of the alternative y and hence A ^ 11 = {z}.
Hence CCA^ "*"11, plu(s, A ^ 11)) = A ^ 11 and therefore Nan(s, A) = {z}.
Example 3.5
Let the issue A = {x, y, z} and let L
and let s be a situation such that:
for all i £ U, 2, 3, 4, 5}, xP .yP . zl l
for all i £ {6, 7, 8, 9}, yP .xP . z l i
for all i £ {10, 11, 12}, zP.yP.xl
for all i £ {13}, zP .xP . yl l
{1, 2, 13}
It is easy to verify that the ordering defined over A by the 
Plurality operator, plu(s, A) = xP^yl^z. The lowest indifference 
class defined by this ordering consists of the alternatives y and z 
and therefore A ^ U = {x}. Hence,
C(A ^ U , plu(s, A ^ U)) = A ^ U = {x} and therefore Nan(s, A) = {x}.
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Example 3.6
Let issue A = {x, y, z} and let L = (1,
and let s be a situation such that:
for all i £ U, 2, .... 8), xP .yP . zl l
for all i £ {9, io, in, yP , xP . z
J l l
for all i £ {12, 13, ... , 17}, yP ,zP . x
J l l
for all i £ {18, 19, ... , 24}, zP , xP . yl l
It is easy to verify that the ordering over A defined by the Plurality 
operator, plu(s, A) = yP^xP^z. The lowest indifference class defined 
by this ordering consists of the alternative z which is thus 
eliminated from the issue. The Plurality operator is then used to 
define an ordering over the alternatives remaining in the issue and 
we have plu(s, {x, y}) = xP^y. The lowest indifference class defined 
by this ordering consists of the alternative y which is thus 
eliminated from the issue. Hence Nan(s, A) = {x}.
We have now defined the three GDF’s which we have selected 
for study. As we have noted earlier, our definition of a finite 
ranking operator has been adapted from Pattanaik's definition of a 
finite ranking operator by adding the additional restriction that 
each individual i e L has one and only one ballot. Hence FRO’s, 
as we have defined them, will always satisfy the property of 
anonymity (see later). Further, our definition of a simple finite 
ranking rule has been adapted from Pattanaik’s definition of a simple 
finite ranking rule (SFRR) by limiting the scope of the definition 
to those GDF’s which satisfy ananoymity. Hence the class of SFRR’s 
which we have defined is a subset of the more general class of SFRR’s 
discussed by Pattanaik (1978).
S i m i l a r l y ,  ou r  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a method o f  e x h a u s t i v e  v o t i n g  
b a s e d  on an FRO has  been  a d a p te d  from P a t t a n a i k ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  
same name by a d d in g  the  r e s t r i c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  FRO s h o u ld  s a t i s f y  
a nonym i ty .  Hence t h e  c l a s s  o f  GDF’ s d e f i n e d  by ou r  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
a method o f  e x h a u s t i v e  v o t i n g  b a s e d  on an FRO i s  a s u b s e t  o f  t h e  
more g e n e r a l  c l a s s  d e f i n e d  by P a t t a n a i k  ( 1 978 ) .
We now p r o c e e d  t o  d e f i n e  a number o f  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  
GDF's and to  d i s c u s s  t h e  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and Borda f u n c t i o n s  i n  
t e rm s  o f  t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s .  The p r o p e r t i e s  a r e  w e l l  known b u t  s i n c e  
we w i l l  u t i l i z e  them i n  s u b s e q u e n t  d i s c u s s i o n  we w i l l  d e f i n e  them 
p r e c i s e l y  h e r e .  We b e g i n  by d e f i n i n g  the  c o n c e p t  o f  d e c i s i v e n e s s  
o f  a  GDF.
L e t  A e X. A GDF f  s a t i s f i e s  d e c i s i v e n e s s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
of  A, D(A) , i f  and on ly  i f  f o r  a l l  s e S, ( s ,  A) e D^.
A GDF f  s a t i s f i e s  d e c i s i v e n e s s , D, i f  and o n l y  i f  f o r  a l l  
A e X, f  s a t i s f i e s  d e c i s i v e n e s s  f o r  i s s u e  A.
A GDF f  s a t i s f i e s  l i m i t e d  d e c i s i v e n e s s , LD, i f  and on ly  
i f  i t  s a t i s f i e s  D({x,  y})  f o r  a l l  x ,  y e X.
F o l lo w in g  P a t t a n a i k  (1978)  we w i l l  d e f i n e  a number o f  p r o ­
p e r t i e s  o f  GDF's i n  t h e  above manner ,  i . e .  we w i l l  d e f i n e  a p r o p e r t y  
s a y  a (A ) ,  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  a s p e c i f i c  i s s u e  A; i f  the  GDF s a t i s f i e s  
a(A) f o r  a l l  A e X t h e n  we w i l l  say  i t  s a t i s f i e s  a ;  i f  t h e  GDF 
s a t i s f i e s  a(A) w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  e v e ry  i s s u e  A c o n t a i n i n g  n o t  more 
t h a n  two e l e m e n t s  t h e n  we w i l l  say  t h a t  i t  s a t i s f i e s  l i m i t e d  a .
In  t h e  r e m a in d e r  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  whenever  we d e f i n e  a p r o p e r t y  a(A) 
we w i l l  om it  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  a and l i m i t e d  a .
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A GDF f which satisfies decisiveness with respect to a 
given issue A may be interpreted as a GDF which defines a non-empty 
choice set f(s, A) for all s e S. A GDF f which satisfies 
decisiveness may be interpreted as a GDF which defines a non-empty 
choice set for every situation and issue which may arise. Similarly, 
a GDF which satisfies limited decisiveness may be interpreted as 
a GDF which defines a non-empty choice set for every situation and 
every issue which contains not more than two elements.
The GDF Maj which we defined in Chapter 2 is an example 
of a GDF which satisfies limited decisiveness but not decisiveness.
As we have shown in example 2.1, if the issue A consists of three 
or more distinct elements then it is possible that (s, A) £ D^ .
We noted in Chapter 2 that if a GDF does not satisfy the property 
of decisiveness then the concepts of equilibrium and strict 
equilibrium will not be defined for some situations and issues.
This is the case with the two GDF's which we have defined as 
Maj and Smaj .
When we defined the PLurality, Nanson and Borda functions,
Nwe did so only under the restriction that S = Üq . If we assume 
NS = n0 (as we will do in Chapters 4, 5 and 6), the domain of each 
of these functions is equal to (S x X) and hence each of these 
functions is decisive.
In order to define the properties of binariness and weak 
binariness we introduce the concept of the base relation of a GDF.
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For any GDF f  and f o r  any s i t u a t i o n  s e S, t h e  b a s e  r e l a t i o n  
o f  f  i s  a b i n a r y  r e l a t i o n  d e f i n e d  o v e r  X as  f o l l o w s :  
f o r  a l l  x ,  y c X, xR^y i f f  x e f ( s ,  {x, y } ) .
The b a s e  r e l a t i o n  w i l l  o b v i o u s l y  v a r y  depend ing  on t h e  s i t u a t i o n
and t h e  GDF. The b a s e  r e l a t i o n s  o f  f  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to  s i t u a t i o n s
s ,  s ' ,  s e t c  w i l l  be i n d i c a t e d  by R^, R^, R^ e t c .  C o r r e s p o n d i n g  to
R.  we d e f i n e  two r e l a t i o n s  P r and I _ as  f o l l o w s :  f  f  f
f o r  a l l  x ,  y e X, xP^y i f f  xR^y and n o t  yR^x 
x l ^ y  i f f  xR^y and yR^x
S i m i l a r l y ,  we have  and 1^ c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to  R^ and so on .  We 
n o t e  t h a t  R^, R^ e t c  s h o u l d  n o t  be c o n fu s e d  w i t h  i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r i n g s  
-  we w i l l  n o t  d e n o te  an i n d i v i d u a l  by f  anywhere i n  t h i s  a n a l y s i s .
We a l s o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a GDF as  such  does  n o t  impose 
any r e s t r i c t i o n  on th e  b a s e  r e l a t i o n s  e g . t h e  b a s e  r e l a t i o n  of  Smaj 
i s  n o t  c o n n e c t e d  i n  some s i t u a t i o n s .
We now d e f i n e  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  b i n a r i n e s s  and weak 
b i n a r i n e s s :
A GDF f  s a t i s f i e s  b i n a r i n e s s  (B) i f  and o n l y  i f  f o r  a l l  
( s ,  A) b e l o n g i n g  to  (S x X ) , ( s ,  A) e D^ i f f  C(A, R^) i s  non-em pty  
and i f  C(A, R^) i s  non-empty  t h e n  f ( s ,  A) = C(A, R ^ ) .
A GDF f  s a t i s f i e s  weak b i n a r i n e s s  i f  and o n l y  i f  f o r  a l l  
( s ,  A) b e l o n g i n g  to  (S x X) , i f  C(A, R^) =J= (f) then  ( s ,  A) e D^ and 
f ( s , A) = C(A, Rf ) .
A GDF f  which  s a t i s f i e s  b i n a r i n e s s  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  as  
a GDF t h e  domain o f  which  i s  r e s t r i c t e d  to  t h o s e  s i t u a t i o n s  and
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issues for which the base relation of f, R,. defines an R.f f
greatest element(s) in the issue; and if such an element(s) exists 
then it (they) is defined as the choice set f(s, A). Similarly, 
a GDF f which satisfies weak binariness can be interpreted as a 
GDF the domain of which is not necessarily restricted to those 
situations and issues for which the base relation of f, R^ defines 
an R^ greatest element(s) in the issue; but if such an element(s) 
exists then it (they) is defined as the choice set f(s, A).
Obviously, a GDF which satisfies binariness will also satisfy weak 
binariness.
It follows directly from the definition of the Majority 
function and the Strict majority function that each of these functions 
is an example of a GDF which satisfies binariness. It is easy to 
verify by reference to the definitions of Plu, Nan, Bor and Maj that 
for all x, y e X,
x e Plu(s, (x, y}) iff |{i £ LlxP^y)! £ |{i e L|yP^x}|
x e Nan(s, {x, y}) iff |{i e L^P^y)! £ |{i e LlyP^xll
x e Bor(s, {x, y}) iff |{i £ LlxP^y}! £ |{i £ LlyP^x)!
x £ Maj(s, (x, y}) iff |{i £ LlxP^y}! £ |{i £ LlyP^x}!
Hence the base relations of the Plurality, Nanson, Borda and Majority 
functions are equivalent.
The following example is sufficient to show that the 
Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions violate weak binariness and 
hence they also violate binariness.
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Example 3.7
Let issue A = {x, y, z} and let L = {1, 2, 9}
and let s be a situation such that: 
for all i e {1, 2}, xP.zP.y
for all i e {3, 4, 5}, yP.xP.zl i
for all i e {6, 7, 8}, zP.xP.yl l
for all i e {9}, zP.yP.x.l l
It is easy to verify that:
C(A’ W  = C(A’ RNan) “ C(A> «Bor» = C(A> W  “ C(A’ W  = {x} 
and that,
Plu(s, A) = {z} and Nan(s, A) = {z} and Bor(s, A) = {x, z} and 
Maj(s, A) = {x} and Smaj(s, A) = {x}.
We now define the independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
The definition has been adapted by Pattanaik from Arrow’s condition of 
the same name to apply to group decision functions as opposed to 
relational collective choice rules.
Let A £ X. A GDF f satisfies independence of irrelevant 
alternatives with respect to A, IN(A), if and only if for all s, 
s’ e S^, if [for all x, y e A and for all i £ L, xR^y iff xR^y] 
then f(s, A) = f(s', A).
In the purely ordinal framework which we have adopted, a GDF 
which satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives may be 
interpreted as a GDF which, for any given issue, defines a choice set 
solely on the basis of individual rankings of alternatives which 
belong to that issue; individual rankings involving any alternative 
which does not belong to the given issue have no bearing on the
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determination of the choice set for that issue. The reader will recall
that our definition of an FRO specifies that the rank numbers 
A A At^, t^, t |/^| vary with the issue and with the particular
FRO under consideration but the rank numbers are invariant given the 
FRO and given the issue. Since the FRO defines an ordering over the 
issue solely on the basis of these rank numbers it follows that any 
SFRR based on an FRO or any method of exhaustive voting based on 
an FRO will satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Hence the Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions will satisfy this 
property.
The fact that the Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions 
satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives is extremely 
convenient for our purposes. Suppose, given the issue A and the 
GDF f, we wish to determine whether or not a particular situation 
constitutes an equilibrium or a strict equilibrium. If the GDF f 
satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives we need only 
be concerned with each individual's sincere and expressed preferences 
over alternatives in the issue A; we need not be concerned with 
individual preferences (sincere or expressed) involving any 
alternative belonging to (X - A). We will utilize this fact in 
subsequent chapters.
We now proceed to define the properties of anonymity and 
neutrality which require symmetry in the treatment of different 
individuals and different alternatives respectively. Obviously, 
both properties have strong appeal on the grounds of ethics and
convenience.
85
Le t  A e X and l e t  s and s '  be  any two s i t u a t i o n s  b e l o n g i n g  to  
S . A GDF f  s a t i s f i e s  anonymity  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  A, AN(A), i f  and o n ly  
i f  f o r  a l l  i ,  j  e L, i f  [ R^ = Rj and R = Rj and R^ = R^ f o r  a l l  
k e (L -  { i ,  j } ) 7  t h e n  f ( s ,  A) = f ( s ' ,  A).
A GDF which  s a t i s f i e s  anonymi ty  may be  i n t e r p r e t e d  as  a GDF 
which e n s u r e s  t h a t ,  f o r  any i s s u e  A, e v e r y  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  o r d e r i n g  c o u n t s  
e q u a l l y  i n  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  the  c h o ic e  s e t .  I f  a GDF f  s a t i s f i e s  
the  p r o p e r t y  o f  anonymi ty  and i f  any two s i t u a t i o n s  s and s '  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  
e x c e p t  t h a t  t h e  o r d e r i n g s  e x p r e s s e d  by any p a i r  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  have  been  
i n t e r c h a n g e d  t h e n  f o r  any i s s u e  A, f ( s ,  A) = f ( s ' ,  A).
We now d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  t h e  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and Borda f u n c ­
t i o n s  s a t i s f y  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  anonymi ty .  Le t  f  be any GDF which i s  an 
SFRR b a s e d  on an FRO g o r  which  i s  a method o f  e x h a u s t i v e  v o t i n g  b a s e d  
on an FRO g. Le t  A be  any i s s u e  and l e t  s and s '  be  any two s i t u a t i o n s  
b e l o n g i n g  to  such  t h a t  f o r  some i ,  j  e L, R^ = Rj and R^ = R^. and
f o r  a l l  k c (L -  { i ,  j } ) ,  R^ = R^. I t  f o l l o w s  from the  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
an FRO t h a t  f o r  a l l  x e A,
t A(R .)  = t A(R!)  and t A(R!) = t A(R.)
X I  X  J  X I  X  J
and f o r  a l l  x e A and f o r  a l l  k e (L -  {i , j } ) ,
t A(R.)  = t A(R,')
X  K. x k
For any x e A, l e t  w^ and w^ be the  sum o f  the  r a n k  numbers  a s s i g n e d  to  
x i n  s i t u a t i o n s  s and s '  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Then f o r  a l l  x e A, w = w' and
X X
hence  g ( s ,  A) = g ( s ' ,  A) .  O b v i o u s ly ,  a s i m i l a r  r e s u l t  w i l l  h o l d  f o r  
any A^ where k $ 0. I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  f ( s ,  A) = f ( s ' ,  A) .
Hence any SFRR b a s e d  on an FRO o r  any method o f  e x h a u s t i v e  
v o t i n g  b a s ed  on an FRO w i l l  s a t i s f y  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  anonymi ty .  Hence th e  
P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and Borda  f u n c t i o n s  s a t i s f y  t h i s  p r o p e r t y .
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We now d e f i n e  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  n e u t r a l i t y .
L e t  A e X and l e t  s and s ’ be any two s i t u a t i o n s  b e l o n g i n g  to
S i r . Le t  a be a o n e - t o - o n e  f u n c t i o n  from X to  X such  t h a t  f o r  a l l  i  e L 
Af
and f o r  a l l  x,  y e X, xR^y i f f  a ( x ) R | o ( y ) .  A GDF f  s a t i s f i e s  n e u t r a l i t y  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  to A, NT(A), i f  and o n l y  i f  f o r  a l l  x e A, x e f ( s ,  A) i f f  
a ( x )  e f ( s ' , a ( A ) ) .
A GDF which s a t i s f i e s  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  may be i n t e r ­
p r e t e d  as  a GDF w h ic h ,  f o r  any i s s u e  A, t r e a t s  a l l  o f  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
b e l o n g i n g  to  A on an e q u a l  b a s i s  when d e t e r m i n i n g  the  c h o ic e  s e t .  I f  a 
GDF f s a t i s f i e s  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  and i f  any two s i t u a t i o n s  s 
and s ’ a r e  i d e n t i c a l  e x c e p t  f o r  some p e r m u t a t i o n  a o f  the  l a b e l l i n g  o f  
t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r i n g s  then  f o r  any i s s u e  A and 
f o r  a l l  x e A, x e f ( s ,  A) i f f  o (x )  e f ( s ' ,  o ( A) ) .
P a t t a n a i k  ( 1 9 7 8 : Chap t e r  5) c l a i m s  i n  h i s  theorem  5 .1  t h a t  any 
SFRR s a t i s f i e s  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  n e u t r a l i t y .  He does n o t  o f f e r  a p r o o f  
o f  t h i s  theorem  and h i s  c l a i m  i s  n o t  c o r r e c t .  I f  we weaken the  d e f i n i ­
t i o n  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  by r e q u i r i n g  t h a t  o i s  a o n e - t o - o n e  f u n c t i o n  from 
A to A r a t h e r  t h a n  X to  X then  h i s  a s s e r t i o n  would h o l d .  As the 
d e f i n i t i o n  s t a n d s ,  we can c o n s t r u c t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o u n te r - e x a m p l e .
87
Example 3.8
Let X = {x, y, z, w} and let A = {x, y, z} and let L = {1, 2, . .., 6} 
Let a be a one to one function from X to X such that: 
a(x) = y, o(y) = z, a(z) = w and o(w) = x 
Hence, o(A) = {y, z, w}
Let s be any situation such that:
xP^yP^z and xP^zP^y and zP^xP^y and 
for all i e {4, 5, 6}, yP_^ xP_^ z.
Let g be an FRO such that t^ = 2, t^ = 1 and t^ = 0, and let f be 
an FRR based on g.
It is easy to verify that g(s, A) = xP^yP^z and hence f(s, A) = {x} 
Let s’ be any situation such that for all i e L and for all 
a, b z X, aR^b iff o(a)R^o(b)
Hence in situation s’,
yP^zPjW and yP^wP^z and wP^yP^z and 
for all i z {4, 5, 6}, zP_^ yP_^ w.
Since the issue has changed from A = {x, y, z} to a(A) = {y, z, w} 
let the FRO g specify the rank numbers for the issue a(A) as follows:
:°(A) = 1 and t°(A) = t°(A) 0 .
It is easy to verify that g(s', o(A)) = zP'I{yP^w and hence 
f(s\ o(A)) = (z).
Since x z f(s, A) and o(x) = y it follows that ö (x)  ^ f(s', o(A)) 
and hence the GDF f does not satisfy the property of neutrality.
The fact that the class of SFRR's defined by our definition 
is a subset of the class of SFRR’s defined by Pattanaik (1978) does 
not impair the validity of our counter-example. In earlier papers, 
Pattanaik (1974) employed less general definitions of his concept 
of an SFRR and has claimed that all GDF’s belonging to this class
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satisfy neutrality. However, there seems to be no condition in 
this earlier definition that would prevent us from constructing 
the same counter-example as we have presented above.
Obviously, the problem arises because we are free to 
define an FRO which specifies two different sets of rank numbers 
for any two distinct issues which contain the same number of elements. 
Obviously, by employing sucli a general definition of an FRO,
Pattanaik has been able to prove results which are more general 
than would be possible if he had worked with a more specific 
definition. However, the FRO which we have constructed in example 
3.8 does seem to be rather odd and it would seem that any GDF 
based on such an FRO would not appeal to very many people.
It is easy to verify that our definitions of the 
Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions are not open to this objection. 
If A, A’ f X arc any two distinct issues then it follows from the 
definition of the Plurality operator:
t^ = 1 and t^ = 0 for all k (1 < k $ |A|) and
t^ = 1 and tf = 0 for all k (1 <k<: I A ’ I) l k  1
Similarly, if A, A' e X are any two distinct issues then it follows
from the definition of the Borda operator that:
t^ =  IA I - k for all k (1 £ k <: | A [) and
t^ = I A ’I - k for all k (1 < k <: | A * j)
Hence, if A and A ’ contain exactly m elements then: 
t£ = tjy for all k (1 ,< k .< m)
Hence it is easy to verify that the Plurality, Nanson and Borda 
functions satisfy the property of neutrality.
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We now d e f i n e  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  m o n t o n i c i t y  and s t r i c t  
m o n o t o n i c i t y .
Le t  A c X. A C.DF f s a t i s f i e s  mono L o n i c i t y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to A, 
M(A) , i f  and o n l y  i f  f o r  a l l  s ,  s '  e and f o r  a l l  x e f ( s ,  A) , i f :
( i )  f o r  a l l  i  e L and f o r  a l l  y e X,
i f  x P .y  t h e n  x P 'y  and i f  x l , y  t hen  xRly i  i  i  i
and ( i i )  f o r  a l l  i  c L and f o r  a l l  a ,  b e (X -  { x } ) , 
aR.b i f f  aRjb
l  l
th e n  x c f ( s ’ , A ) .
Le t  A e X. A GDF f  s a t i s f i e s  s t r i c t  mono t o n i c i t y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
to  A, SM(A), i f  and o n ly  i f  f  s a t i s f i e s  m o n o t o n i c i t y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  A 
and f o r  a l l  s ,  s '  e S  ^ and f o r  a l l  x e f ( s ,  A), i f :
( i )  f o r  a l l  i  e L and f o r  a l l  y e X,
i f  xP .y  t h e n  xP!y and i f  x l . y  th e n  xR.'yl  i y l  l
and ( i i )  f o r  a l l  i  e L and f o r  a l l  a ,  b e (X -  {x} ) ,  
aR.b i f f  aRlbl  l
and ( i i i )  f o r  a l l  z e ( f ( s ,  A) -  {x}) t h e r e  e x i s t s  an i  e L
such t h a t  ( z P , x  and xRjz)  o r  ( z l . x  and xP jz )  i  l  l  i
t h e n  f ( s ’ , A) = {x} .
A GDF which s a t i s f i e s  m o n o t o n i c i t y  may be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  
a GDF which does n o t  r e s p o n d  n e g a t i v e l y  to  changes  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  
p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r i n g s .  I n d e e d ,  Sen has  used  t h e  te rm  ' n o n - n e g a t i v e  
r e s p o n s i v e n e s s '  to  r e f e r  to  t h e  c o u n t e r  p a r t  o f  t h i s  p r o p e r t y
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w i t h i n  t h e  framework o f  r e l a t i o n a l  c o l l e c t i v e  c h o ic e  r u l e s  
( S e n : 1 9 7 0 : 7 4 ) .  I f  a GDF f  s a t i s f i e s  m o n o t o n i c i t y  and ,  i f  any 
two s i t u a t i o n s  s and s '  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  e x c e p t  t h a t  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s '  
some a l t e r n a t i v e  x b e l o n g i n g  to  the  c h o ic e  s e t  f ( s ,  A) h a s  r i s e n  
v i s - a - v i s  some o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  y c X i n  a t  l e a s t  one i n d i v i d u a l  
o r d e r i n g ,  th e n  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  x a l s o  b e l o n g s  to  the  c h o ic e  s e t  
f ( s ’ , A) .  On e t h i c a l  g r o u n d s ,  i t  would seem v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
j u s t i f y  t h e  use  o f  a GDF which does  n o t  s a t i s f y  t h i s  p r o p e r t y .  
However,  as  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  example shows,  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n  does 
n o t  s a t i s f y  m o n o t o n i c i t y .
Example 3.9
Le t  i s s u e  A = (x ,  y ,  z} and l e t  L = {1, 2,  . . . ,  24} 
and l e t  s and s ? be any two s i t u a t i o n s  such t h a t :  
f o r  a l l  i e  ( 1 ,  2,  . . . ,  8}, x P . y P . z  and x P ’yP. 'z
l  i  l  i
f o r  a l l  i  e {9,  10, 11}, yP . xP . z and xP J yP ! zl i  l  i
f o r  a l l  i  e (12 ,  13, . . . ,  17}, y P . z P . x  and yP.’zP.'x
l i  l i
f o r  a l l  i  e {18,  19, . . . ,  24}, z P .x P .y  and zP.’x P ’y
l i  l i
The i s s u e  A and s i t u a t i o n  s c o r r e s p o n d  to  t h a t  d e f i n e d  i n  example 
3 .6  and a s  we have shown i n  t h a t  example N a n ( s ,  A) = {x}.
The p r e f e r e n c e s  o v e r  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  i s s u e  A e x p r e s s e d  by a l l  
i n d i v i d u a l s  in  s i t u a t i o n  s '  a r e  t h e  same as  t h o s e  e x p r e s s e d  by the  
i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s e x c e p t  t h a t  f o r  i  e {9,  10, 11} we 
have yP^x and xPjy . I t  i s  e a sy  to v e r i f y  t h a t  p l u ( s ’ , A) = xP’,czP^y 
and p l u  ( s ' , {x, z}) = zPj{x and hence  Nan ( s ' ,  A) = {z}.
Hence x c N a n ( s ,  A) and x t[ N a n ( s ' ,  A) and thus  the  Nanson f u n c t i o n  
does n o t  s a t i s f y  the p r o p e r t y  o f  m o n o t o n i c i t y .
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I t  would seem from example 3 .9  t h a t  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n  
v i o l a t e s  m o n o t o n i c i t y  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  a method o f  e x h a u s t i v e  v o t i n g  
and hence  th e  c h o ic e  s e t  depends  c r i t i c a l l y  on t h e  o r d e r  o f  
e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  f rom the  i s s u e .  T h i s  i s  n o t  a 
p rob lem  unde r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  and Borda f u n c t i o n s  and i t  i s  e a sy  to 
v e r i f y  t h a t  b o th  o f  t h e s e  GDF's s a t i s f y  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  m o n o t o n i c i t y .
A GDF which s a t i s f i e s  s t r i c t  m o n o t o n i c i t y  may be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a GDF which r e s p o n d s  p o s i t i v e l y  to  changes  in  
i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r e n c e s .  I n d e e d ,  Sen h a s  used t h e  t e rm  ' p o s i t i v e -  
r e s p o n s i v e n e s s '  to  r e f e r  to  the  c o u n t e r p a r t  o f  t h i s  p r o p e r t y  
w i t h i n  t h e  framework o f  r e l a t i o n a l  c o l l e c t i v e  c h o ic e  r u l e s  ( S e n : 1 9 7 0 : 7 2 ) .  
I f  a GDF f  s a t i s f i e s  s t r i c t  m o n o t o n i c i t y  and ,  i f  any two s i t u a t i o n s  
s and s '  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  e x c e p t  t h a t  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s '  some a l t e r n a t i v e  
x b e l o n g i n g  to  the  c h o ic e  s e t  f ( s ,  A) h a s  r i s e n  v i s - a - v i s  e v e ry  
o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  z b e l o n g i n g  to  ( f ( s ,  A) -  { x } ) , t h e n  i t  f o l l o w s  
t h a t  x i s  t h e  o n ly  e l e m e n t  b e l o n g i n g  to  f ( s ' ,  A).
As we have  shown i n  example 3 .9  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n  does 
n o t  s a t i s f y  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  m o n o t o n i c i t y  and hence  i t  does  n o t  
s a t i s f y  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  s t r i c t  m o n o t i c i t y .  A lthough t h e  P l u r a l i t y  
f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f i e s  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  m o n o t o n i c i t y  i t  does  n o t  
s a t i s f y  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  s t r i c t  m o n o t o n i c i t y  as  can be seen  
from the  f o l l o w i n g  example .
92
Example 3.10
Let the issue A = {x, y, z} and let L = {1, 2, 5}
and let s and s’ be any two situations such that: 
for all i e {1, 2}, xP.yP.z and xPjyPjzl i l i
for all i e {3, 4}, yP.xP.z and yP!xP.'z
J l l l i
for al l i e  {5}. zP.yP.x and zP.’xP.'yl i l i
In situation s the Plurality operator defines an ordering over 
the issue A, plu(s, A) = xl^yP^z and hence Plu(s, A) = (x, y).
The preferences over the alternatives in the issue A expressed by 
all individuals in situation s' are the same as those expressed by 
the individuals in situation s except that for individual 5 we have 
yP^x and xP^y.
In situation s' the Plurality operator defines an ordering over 
the issue A, plu(s’, A) = xlJ^yP^z and hence Plu(s', A) = {x, y}.
Hence x is not the only member of Plu(s', A) and therefore the 
Plurality function violates the property of strict monotonicity.
A GDF which violates strict monotonicity does not seem to be 
as open to ethical objections as a GDF which violates monotonicity.
Of the three GDF's which we have selected for study, the
Borda function is the only one which satisfies strict mono tonicity.
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We now d e f i n e  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  r e s o l u t e n e s s .
Le t  A e X. A GDF f  s a t i s f i e s  r e s o l u t e n e s s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  A, 
RS(A), i f  and on ly  i f  f o r  n i l  s c S f ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n .
A GDF which s a t i s f i e s  r e s o l u t e n e s s  may be i n t e r p r e t e d  as  
a GDF w h ic h ,  f o r  e v e r y  s i t u a t i o n  and i s s u e  which b e l o n g  to  i t s  domain,  
d e f i n e s  a c h o ic e  s e t  which i s  a lw ays  a s i n g l e t o n .  The S t r i c t  
m a j o r i t y  f u n c t i o n  which we d e f i n e d  i n  C h a p te r  2 i s  an example o f  a 
GDF which  s a t i f i e s  t h i s  p r o p e r t y .  As P a t t a n a i k  has  o b s e r v e d ,  
r e s o l u t e n e s s  i s  an e x t r e m e l y  r e s t r i c t i v e  p r o p e r t y  and most  group 
d e c i s i o n  f u n c t i o n s  do n o t  s a t i s f y  i t  ( P a t t a n a i k : 1 9 7 8 : C h a p t e r 3 ) . 
O b v i o u s l y ,  t h e  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and Borda f u n c t i o n s  which we d e f i n e d  
e a r l i e r  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  do n o t  s a t i s f y  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  r e s o l u t e n e s s .  
T h i s  can  be v e r i f i e d  e a s i l y  by r e f e r e n c e  to  examples  3 . 1 ,  3 .2  and 
3 . 3 .
We now d e f i n e  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  d e c i s i v e n e s s  and q u a s i ­
d e c i s i v e n e s s  o f  c o a l i t i o n s  o f  v o t e r s .  The p r o p e r t y  o f  d e c i s i v e n e s s  
o f  a  c o a l i t i o n  s h o u ld  n o t  be c o n fu s e d  w i t h  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  
d e c i s i v e n e s s  o f  a GDF.
Given the  GDF f  a c o a l i t i o n  L ’ e L i s  d e c i s i v e  i f  and o n l y
i f  f o r  a l l  A e X and f o r  a l l  s e S ._ and f o r  a l l  x e A, i f  f o r  a l lAf
i  c L ' ,  xPj,y f o r  a l l  y c (A -  {x }) t h e n  f ( s ,  A) = {x}.
Given the  GDF f a c o a l i t i o n  L'  e L i s  q u a s i - d e c i s i v e  i f  
and o n l y  i f  f o r  a l l  A e X and f o r  a l l  s e S  ^ and f o r  a l l  x e A, 
i f  f o r  a l l  i  e L ’ , x P .y  f o r  a l l  y c (A -  {x}) t h e n  x e f ( s ,  A).
94
Suppose ,  g iv e n  the  GDF f ,  a c o a l i t i o n  L '  i s  d e c i s i v e .  We 
can i n t e r p r e t  t h i s  a s  f o l l o w s :  f o r  any i s s u e  A and s i t u a t i o n  s such
t h a t  a l l  members o f  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  unan im ous ly  p r e f e r  a p a r t i c u l a r  
a l t e r n a t i v e  i n  A, s ay  x,  to  e v e r y  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  i n  A, i f  f ( s ,  A) 
i s  d e f i n e d  t h e n  f ( s ,  A) = {x}.
Suppose ,  g iv e n  the  GDF f ,  a c o a l i t i o n  L '  i s  q u a s i - d e c i s i v e . 
We can i n t e r p r e t  t h i s  as  f o l l o w s :  f o r  any i s s u e  A and s i t u a t i o n  s
such  t h a t  a l l  members o f  the  c o a l i t i o n  unan im ous ly  p r e f e r  a p a r t i c u l a r
a l t e r n a t i v e  i n  A, say  x,  to  e v e r y  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  i n  A, i f  f ( s ,  A) 
i s  d e f i n e d  t h e n  x e f ( s ,  A).
We have shown e a r l i e r  t h a t  i t  f o l l o w s  from t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  
o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  and Nanson f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  i f  f o r  any i s s u e  A and 
s i t u a t i o n  s t h e r e  e x i s t s  an x e A such  t h a t
I {i  e L|xP^w f o r  a l l  w c (A -  {x } ) } | > ^
then  P l u ( s ,  A) = (x )  and N a n ( s ,  A) = {x}. hence  any c o a l i t i o n  w i t h  
Nmore than  -  members i s  d e c i s i v e  unde r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  and 
unde r  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n .
We have a l s o  shown e a r l i e r  t h a t  i t  f o l l o w s  from th e  
d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  and Nanson f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  i f  f o r  any 
i s s u e  A and s i t u a t i o n  s t h e r e  e x i s t s  an x e A such  t h a t :
I {i  e L | xP w f o r  a l l  w c (A -  {x } ) } | $ ^
then x e P l u ( s ,  A) and x e N a n ( s ,  A). Hence any c o a l t i o n  w i t h  
Ne x a c t l y  ^ members i s  q u a s i - d e c i s i v e  unde r  the  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  
and under  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n .
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We now define the property of non-dictatorship.
Let A e X. A GDF f satisfies non-dictatorship with respect 
to A, ND(A), if and only if |A| = 1 or there does not exist i e L 
such that i is decisive with respect to A.
When a GDF f violates ND(A), we will say that f is dictatorial with 
respect to A . We note that if f violates non-dictatorship then some 
individual is decisive for some issue containing more than one 
element but not necessarily for every issue containing more than one 
element. Obviously, the PLurality, Nanson and Borda functions 
satisfy the property of non-dictatorship.
We now define the property of non-imposition.
Let A e X. A GDF f satisfies non-imposition with respect
to A, NI(A), if and only if for all x e A there exists an s e S
such that f(s, A) = {x}.
A GDF f which satisfies non-imposition may be interpreted as a GDF 
under which for any issue A and for every alternative x belonging 
to A there will exist at least one situation s e S such that x is 
the only member of f(s, A). Obviously, the Plurality, Nanson and
Borda functions satisfy this property. For any issue A and for any
x e A there will exist at least one s e S such that x will be the 
only member of the choice set: namely, any situation s e S such 
that for all i e L, xP^y for all y e (A - {x}).
Now we have defined the properties of decisiveness, 
resoluteness, non-dictatorship and non-imposition we can formally 
state the fundamental result which we will refer to as the
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G i b b a r d - S a t t e r t h w a i t e  theorem. I n  f a c t ,  we w i l l  s t a t e  P a t t a n a i k ' s  
a d a p t i o n  o f  t h i s  r e s u l t  to  t h e  framework which we have employed h e r e .
G l b b a r d - S a t t c r t h w a l t e  Theorem
Le t  A be any i s s u e  such  t h a t  |A| £ 3  and l e t  a s s u m p t io n  2 .1  
be f u l f i l l e d .  Suppose f o r  t h e  i s s u e  A t h e  GDF f  s a t i s f i e s  d e c i s i v e ­
n e s s ,  r e s o l u t e n e s s  and n o n - i m p o s i t i o n .  Then e i t h e r  f  i s  d i c t a t o r i a l  
f o r  t h e  i s s u e  A o r  f  i s  n o t  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  f o r  t h e  i s s u e  A.
As P a t t a n a i k  has  d e m o n s t r a t e d ,  t h e  theorem  i s  v a l i d  i f  we
assume S. = II f o r  a l l  i  e L and i t  i s  a l s o  v a l i d  i f  we assume S. = Iln.l  i  u
Hence i f  we su p p le m e n t  t h e  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson o r  Borda f u n c t i o n s  w i t h  a 
t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e  such  as  a cha irman  then  we know i m m e d ia te ly  t h a t ,  
g iv e n  a s s u p t i o n  2 . 1 ,  the  GDF chosen  w i l l  n o t  be s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  f o r  
any i s s u e  A such  t h a t  |A| £ 3.
Somewhat weaker  c o n c l u s i o n s  can be drawn from two theorems 
o f  P a t t a n a i k  which a r e  s t a t e d  below ( P a t t a n a i k : 1 9 7 8 : C h a p te r  5 ) .
P a t t a n a i k ’ s theo rem 5 .2
Given th e  maximin a s s u m p t io n ,  no SFRR s a t i s f i e s  s t r i c t  
s t r a t e g y - p r o o f n e s s .
P a t t a n a i k ’ s theo rem 5 .4
Given the maximLn a s s u m p t io n ,  no method o f  e x h a u s t i v e  
v o t i n g  ba sed  on an FRO i s  s t r i c t l y  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f .
From P a t t a n a i k ’s theo rem  5 . 2 ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  and Borda 
f u n c t i o n s  a r e  no t  s t r i c t l y  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  and from h i s  theorem 5 . 4 ,  
i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n  i s  n o t  s t r i c t l y  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f .
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Both of Pattanaik's theorems depend on the somewhat demanding 
assumption 2.2 rather than on the relatively mild assumption 2.1; 
both of his theorems assert the violation of strict strategy-proofness 
but not necessarily the violation of strategy-proofness; both 
theorems assert the violation of strict strategy-proofness for some 
issue A but not for every issue A such that | A| £ 3. On the other 
hand, Pattanaik has not assumed the very demanding property of 
resoluteness.
In subsequent chapters we will consider both approaches 
to the problem of strategic misrevelation of preferences by voters.
We will show that, within the parameters of our simulation, the 
probability of a sincere situation not being an equilibrium or strict 
equilibrium varies little with the approach taken.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have introduced the concepts of a 
finite ranking operator and of a simple finite ranking rule and we 
have defined the Plurality and Borda functions as simple finite 
ranking rules based on finite ranking operators. We defined a 
method of exhaustive voting based on a finite ranking operator and 
defined the Nanson function as a member of this class of GDF's. 
Subsequently, we have introduced a number of well known properties 
of GDF's and discussed the Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions in 
terms of these properties. We have concluded by reviewing the 
implications of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and of two theorems 
of Pattanaik in relation to the Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions.
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4 THE STABILITY OF SITUATIONS UNDER THE 
PLURALITY FUNCTION
I n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  we w i l l  s t u d y  th e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  s i t u a t i o n s
unde r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  We w i l l  assume t h r o u g h o u t  t h i s
Na n a l y s i s  t h a t  = JT0 f o r  a l l  i  e L and hence  S = n0 . Un le ss  we 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  s t a t e  o t h e r w i s e ,  i t  w i l l  be  assumed t h a t  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  
f o l l o w  th e  maximin r u l e  i . e .  a s s u m p t io n  2 .2  i s  s a t i s f i e d .
We b e g in  by p r o v i n g  ( th e o r e m  4 . 1 )  t h a t  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  
f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f i e s  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  Condorce t  c o n s i s t e n c y  which  we 
d e f i n e d  i n  C h a p te r  2. We then  e s t a b l i s h ,  f o r  any g iv e n  i s s u e  A, a 
s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  any g iv en  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n  to be a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  t h i s  CDF ( theo rem s  4 . 2 ,
4 .3  and 4 . 4 ) .  From t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  we deduce  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  and 
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  any g iv en  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  to be an 
e q u i l i b r i u m .  We then  p rove  t h a t  f o r  e v e r y  p o s s i b l e  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n  and e v e r y  p o s s i b l e  i s s u e  t h e  s e t  o f  e q u i l i b r i a  under  the 
P l u r a l i t y  GDF i s  non-em pty  ( th e o r e m  4 . 5 ) ;  and we e s t a b l i s h  a number 
o f  r e s u l t s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  e q u i l i b r i a  under  the  P l u r a l i t y  
f u n c t i o n  which s a t i s f y  c e r t a i n  a d d i t i o n a l  demands ( the o rem s  4 . 6 ,  4 . 7
and 4 . 8 ) .
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We p r o c e e d  to  e s t a b l i s h  a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n d i t i o n s  such  t h a t ,  f o r  any g iv e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  and any g iv e n  
i s s u e ,  t h e  s e t  o f  s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i a  unde r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  
w i l l  be non-empty  ( the o rem s  4 .9  to  4 . 1 2 ) .  We then  prove  a number 
o f  c o n d i t i o n s  which a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  any g iv en  
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  to  be a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  the  P l u r a l i t y  
f u n c t i o n .  We c o nc lude  by c o n s i d e r i n g  the  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  the  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  a t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e .
We b e g i n  by i n t r o d u c i n g  some a d d i t i o n a l  n o t a t i o n :
For any g iv e n  i s s u e  A and f o r  a l l  x e A l e t :
= ( i  e L l x P . y  f o r  a l l  y e (A - { x } ) }
Hence f o r  any g iv en  i s s u e  A, i s  t h e  s e t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  who 
s i n c e r e l y  p r e f e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  x to  e v e r y  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  i n  t h e
i s s u e .  Where t h e r e  i s  no a m b i g u i t y  a b o u t  t h e  i s s u e  we w i l l  w r i t e  
t AL as  L . x x
For  any g iv e n  i s s u e  A and f o r  a l l  i  c L and f o r  a l l  x e A l e t :
S^(x )  = (R. e S . I x P . y  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  {x})}
l  l  l 1 l
Hence f o r  any g iv e n  i s s u e  A, S^ (x )  i s  t h e  s e t  o f  s t r a t e g i e s  a v a i l a b l e  
to  i n d i v i d u a l  i  such  t h a t  a l t e r n a t i v e  x i s  r an k e d  above a l l  o f  the  
o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  the  i s s u e .  Where t h e r e  i s  no a m b ig u i ty  a b o u t  
the  i s s u e  A we w i l l  w r i t e  S^ (x )  as  S . ( x ) .
l  i
We now prove  theo rem  4 . 1 .  We have s t a t e d  the  theo rem  i n  
a form which w i l l  be u s e f u l  in  s u b s e q u e n t  p r o o f s .  I t  f o l l o w s  s im p ly  
from t i l l s  r e s u l t  t h a t  the  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  p r o p e r t y  
o f  Condorce t  c o n s i s t e n c y .
Theorem 4.1
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s and
for all s e S, if s e E(A, Plu, s) then (s, A) e D_, .Maj
and Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A).
Proof
Let A £ X and let s be any sincere situation.
Let s £ S be any situation.
We consider two mutually exclusive possibilities:
1. (i, A) I DMa.
2. (s, A) £ and Plu(s, A) =j= Maj(s, A).
We show in each case that s £ E(A, Plu, s).
1. Suppose (s, A) £ D .Maj
Since the Plurality function is decisive and Plu(s, A) is never 
empty, there exists at least one z c A such that z e Plu(s, A). 
Since (s, A) i| it follows from the definition of the Majority
function that there exists at least one x c (A - {z}) such that:
I {i e l IxP^z}! > I{i e L|zP x}|.
Let L = {i e l |xP.z }. Since S, = n0 for all i e L, |l | >
Let s’ be any situation such that: Ri e S.(x) for all i e Ll l
R^_ = R^ for all k £ (L - L). 
Given the specification of situation s',
I{i £ l |xP|w for all w £ (A - {x})}| >
If for some i e L, and for all y e (Plu(s, A) - {z}), yP^z then 
since xP^z it follows from the maximin assumption that s'O^ ppus* 
If for some i e L, zP^y for some y £ (Plu(s, A) - {z}) then since
xP^z it follows that xP^y and given the maximin assumption,
i i ~s'Q. s. Hence s'Q. s for all i e L and therefore < L, s’ > A,Plu A, Plu
is a threat to s and s { E(A, Plu, s).
2. Suppose (s, A) e D . and Plu(s, A) =}= Maj(s, A)Maj
By hypothesis, Plu(s, A) =f Maj(s, A) and it follows that one or 
other or both of the following must hold:
(a) For some z e A, z e Plu(s, A) and z £ Maj(s, A) 
or (b) For some z e A, z e Maj(s, A) and z £ Plu(s, A)
We consider each possibility in turn and show in each case that 
s tj: E(A, Plu, s) .
(a) Suppose for some z e A, z e Plu(s, A) and z £ Maj(s, A)
Since z £ Maj(s, A) it follows from the definition of the Majority 
function that there exists at least one x e (A - {z}) such that:
I {i e L|xP_^ z}| > I {i e l |zP_^ x }|.
Let L = {i c l IxP.z }.1 l
■ ~ I NSince S^ = Tig f°r aH  i e L, |L| >
Let s' be any situation such that: R! e S .(x) for all i c Ll i
R^ = R^ for all k e (L - L). 
Given the specification of situation s’,
I{i e L|xP^w for all w c (A - {x})}| >
By definition of the Plurality function, Plu(s’, A) = {x}.
By reasoning directly analogous to that in 1 it follows from the 
maximin assumption that s'Q^ p-^ us f°r all i e L and hence < L, s’ 
is a threat to s and therefore s ij: E(A, Plu, s).
(b) Suppose for some z e A, z e Maj(s, A) and z { Plu(s, A)
Let L = {i e L|zP_^ y for some y e Plu(s, A)}.
It follows that:
(L - L) = {i e L|for all y e Plu(s, A), ylRz}.
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If I(L - L)I > ^ then it follows from the definition of the Majority 
function that z £ Maj(s, A).
This is contrary to our hypothesis and hence |(L — L)| < ^ and
■ " , ntherefore |L| $ -. We consider the following exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive possibilities:
(ii) |L| = ij
We consider each possibility in turn and show that s tf E(A, Plu, s) .
(i) Suppose ILI > £
Let s' be any situation such that: R! e S.(z) for all i e Ll i
R^ = R^ for all k e (L - L). 
Given the specification of situation s',
I{i e L|zP^w for all w e (A - {z})}| >
By definition of the Plurality function, Plu(s', A) = {z}.
Given the maximin assumption, s’O^ p-^ us f°r all i e L and hence 
< L, s’ > is a threat to s and s tj: E(A, Plu, s) .
I ~ I N(ii) Suppose |L| = -
• ~ I NWe begin by showing that if |L| = - then 
L = {i e L|zP^y for all y e Plu(s, A)}.
Since, by definition, L = {i e L|zP^y for some y e PLu(s, A)} 
it follows that:
(L - L) = {1 c L|for all y c Plu(s, A), yP^z}.
By hypothesis, |L| =  ^ and hence |(L - L)| =
Suppose for some i e L and for some y e Plu(s, A), yP^z.
Since |(L — L)] = - it follows that:
I {i e L. I yP ^ z} | > ^ and z  ^ Maj(s, A).
T h i s  i s  c o n t r a r y  t o  o u r  h y p o t h e s i s  and h e n c e  i f  |L |  = ^ t h e n :
L = { i  e L | zP y f o r  a l l  y e P l u ( s ,  A)} .
L e t  s '  be  any s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t :  R J e S j ( z )  f o r  a l l  i  e L
= R^ f o r  a l l  k e (L -  L) 
G iven  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ' ,
I {i  e L | z P | y  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  { z } ) } | =
Given  th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  z e P l u ( s T, A).  
We c o n s i d e r  two e x h a u s t i v e  and m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s
F i r s t l y , s u p p o s e  P l u ( s ' , A) = { z } .
G iven  t h e  max im in  a s s u m p t i o n ,  s ' Q ^  p ^ u s f ° r  a l l  i  e L and h e n c e  
< L, s '  > i s  a t h r e a t  t o  s and s { E(A,  P l u ,  s ) .
S e c o n d l y , s u p p o s e  P l u ( s ’ , A) =j= { z } .
S i n c e  | { i  c L | z P ^ y  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  { z } ) } | = ^  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  
z e P l u ( s ’ , A) and t h e r e  can  be  a t  m o s t  o n e  o t h e r  member o f  
P l u ( s ' , A) i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  z ,  s a y  x f o r  some x c (A -  { z } ) .
Hence | { i  c l |xP!w f o r  a l l  w c (A -  {x } ) } | =
S i n c e  R^ = 
y c (A -  { z } ) ,
| { i  e L |yP ^w  f o r  a l l  w c (A -  {y } ) } | £
| { i  c L |yP^w f o r  a l l  w c (A —{y } ) } |
Hence i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t :
[ { i  e L |xP^w f o r  a l l  w c (A -  {x } ) } | £
j {i  c L | x P ’w f o r  a l l  w c (A -  {x } ) } |
an d  t h e r e f o r e :
I { i  e L |xP^w f o r  a l l  w c (A -  { x } ) } |  ^
Given t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  x c P l u ( s ,  A).
R^ f o r  a l l  k  e (L -  L) i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  f o r  a l l
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As we have shown earlier, if |L| = - then:
L = {i e L,|zP_^ y for all y e Plu(s, A)}
Hence for all i e L, zP^x. Thus in comparing situations s and s’ 
all i c L will compare x with each element of Plu(s, A).
If for some i e L, xP^y for some y e (Plu(s, A) - {x}) then given 
the maximin assumption, s’ p^us*
If for some i e L and for all y e (Plu(s, A) - {x}), yP^x then in
comparing situations s and s' such individuals will compare
(Plu(s, A) - {x}) with (Plu(s’, A) - {x}) i.e. they will compare
(Plu(s, A) - {x}) with {z}. As we have shown earlier,
L = {i e L|zP^y for all y e Plu(s, A)} and hence, given the
maximin assumption, s'Q^ " s.A, Plu
Thus for all i e L, s’Q^ s and therefore < L, s’ > is a threat toA,Plu
s and s { E(A, Plu, s) .
In 2(b), we have shown that if z e Maj(s, A) and z £ Plu(s, A) then 
(i) and (ii) exhaust the possibilities. We have shown in each case 
that s £ E(A, Plu, s) .
In 2, we have shown that if (s, A) e D . and Plu(s, A) Maj(s, A)Maj
then (a) and (b) exhaust the possibilities. In each case we have
shown that there exists a threat to s and s £ E(A, Plu, s).
In summary, we have shown in 1 that:
If (s, A) A D_, . then s A E(A, Plu, s)T Maj T
and we have shown in 2 that:
If (s, A) c D . and Plu(s, A) =(= Maj(s, A) then s £ E(A, Plu, s) .Maj
From 1 and 2 it follows that:
_  _ _
If s £ E(A.j Plu, s) then (s, A) e an<^  Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A).
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Hence for all A e X and for every sincere situation s and for all 
s e S, if s e E(A, Plu, s) then (s, A) £ and Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A).
* We observe that the premises have the following form:
From 1 we have vP -*■ vS 
From 2 we have P & ■> vs
with the obvious dictionary and our required conclusion therefore 
has the form:
S -> P & Q
Our conclusion follows from the premises in two-valued propositional 
logic with the following deduction:
1 vp -y VS Premise
2 P s vQ  -y vs Premise
3 P -y (r^ Q -* vs; from 2 by exportation
4 P -y (s -> 0) from 3 by contraposition
5 S -y p from 1 by contraposition
6 S ~y (S -> Q) from 4, 5 by transitivity
7 s -y Q from 6 by contraction
8 s -y P & o from 5, 7 by composition
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We now e s t a b l i s h ,  f o r  any g iv e n  i s s u e  A, a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  
and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  any g iv en  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  to  be a 
s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  under  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  We have shown i n  
C h a p te r  3 t h a t  i f  S_^  = IIq f o r  a l l  i  e L t h e n  P l u  i s  a d e c i s i v e  GDF 
and hence  f o r  any g iv e n  i s s u e  A and f o r  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  
P l u ( s ,  A) i s  a lw ays  d e f i n e d  and P l u ( s ,  A) i s  n e v e r  empty.  In  t heo rem  
4 .2  we c o n s i d e r  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  one 
e l e m e n t ;  i n  theorem  4 . 3  we c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o s s i b l i t y  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) 
c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ;  and i n  theo rem  4 . 4  we con­
s i d e r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  
e l e m e n t s .  ( In  f a c t ,  i n  t heo rem  4 . 4  we p r o v e  a more g e n e r a l  r e s u l t  
f o r  any s i t u a t i o n  s e S such t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more 
d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s . )  O b v i o u s ly ,  t h i s  e x h a u s t s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
and hence  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  theorems 4 . 2 ,  4 . 3  and 4 .4  we can d e t e r m i n e ,  
f o r  any g iven  i s s u e  A, a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  
f o r  any g iven  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  to  be  s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  under  t h e  
P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n .
We w i l l  u t i l i z e  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  computer  
s i m u l a t i o n  to  d e t e r m i n e ,  f o r  any i s s u e  A c o n t a i n i n g  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  
d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  any g iv e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  
w i l l  be a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n .
107
Theorem 4 . 2
For  a l l  A e X an d  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s s u c h  t h a t  
P l u ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n  s a y  x f o r  some x e A, s £ E(A, P l u ,  s )  
i f f  f o r  some y e (A -  { x } ) ,  | {i  e L | y P ^ x } |  5 |L | .
P r o o f :  S u f f i c i e n c y
L e t  A e X an d  l e t  s be  an y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s u ch  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) i s  a 
s i n g l e t o n ,  s a y  x f o r  some x e A.
L e t  y e (A -  {x}) s u c h  t h a t  | {i  e L | y P ^ x } |  > |L ^ |
L e t  L = { i  e L | y P ^ x } .
L e t  s ’ be  any s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t :  e S ^ ( y )  f o r  a l l  i  e L
f o r  a l l  k e (L -  L ) .
G iven  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ’ ,
{ i  e  L | y P | w  f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y }) } = { i  e L jyP^x}  U L^
= { i  e L | y P . x }
an d  s i n c e  L 0 L = d> i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  x
{ i  £ l IxP.’w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {x})}  = L 
1 1  x
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  | {i  e L|yP_^x}|  £ (L | an d  h e n c e  
I {i  £ L | y P | w  f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y } ) } | 5
I {i  £  l | xP | w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {x } ) } |
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x} a n d  h e n c e  i t  f o l l o w s  f rom  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  t h a t  f o r  a l l  z e (A -  { x } ) ,
I {i  £  L |xP^w f o r  a l l  w £  ( A -  {x } ) } | >
I {i  £ L [ zP w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  { z } ) } j 
G iven  th e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ’ , i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  f o r  a l l  
z e (A -  { y } ) ,
I {i  £ L Iz P  w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  { z } ) } | >
I {i  £ L | z P | w  f o r  a l l  w e (A -  { z } ) } |
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and hence for all z e (A - {x, y}),
I {i e L | xP w for all w e (A - {x}) } | ^
I{i e L|zP_!w for all w e (A - {z})}|
By hypothesis, |{i e L|yP^x}| $ |L ] and hence for all z e (A - {x, y}), 
I{i e L|yP^w for all w e (A - {y})}| >
I{i e l |zP!w for all w £ (A - {z})}|
Hence it follows from the definition of the Plurality function that 
Plu(s’, A) = {x, y} or Plu(s', A) = {y}.
In either case, given the maximin assumption, s'Q^ p-^ us f°r aH  i £ L 
and hence < L, s' > is a threat to s and s  ^E(A, Plu, s).
Necessity
Let A e X and let s be any sincere situation such that Plu(s, A) is a 
singleton say x for some x £ A.
Suppose s £ E(A, Plu, s) and hence there exists a threat, say < L, s' > 
to s. Obviously, Plu(s', A) =j= {x} and hence there exists at least one 
y e (A - {x}) such that y £ Plu(s', A).
Given the maximin assumption, L _C {i e L|yP_^x}.
Obviously, L fl = <j). Thus in any situation s’ that can be created
by members of L following strategies different from those which they
followed in s while all members of (L - L) continue to follow the same
strategies as in situation s,
{i e l IxPJw for all w £ (A - {x})} 0 L 1 l — x
and
{i £ L|yP|w for all w £ (A - {x})} _C {i c L|yP^x}
It follows from the definition of the Plurality function that if 
y e Plu(s', A) then:
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I {i  e L|yP_!w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y } )} |  $
I {i  £ L |x P |w  f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {x } ) } | 
and hence  | { i  e L | y P . x } |   ^ ]l |
l X
Hence f o r  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s such t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) 
i s  a s i n g l e t o n  say  x f o r  some x e A, s ff E(A, P l u ,  s)  i f f  f o r  some 
y e  ( A -  {x} ) ,  I{i  e L lyP^x} |   ^ |L | .
no
Theorem 4.3
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s such that 
Plu(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements say x 
and y for some x, y e A, s £ E(A, Plu, s) iff there exists 
at least one z £ (A - {x, y}) such that:
1. {i e L I zP^x & zP y} (j>
or 2. I {i e l |zP^x or zP_^ y} | > |{i e L|xP^y & yP^z} | and
I {i e L|zP_^x or zP^y}| > |{i e L|yP^x & xP_^ z} |
Proof: Sufficiency
Let A e X and let s be any sincere situation such that Plu(s, A) 
contains exactly two distinct elements say x and y for some x, y e A. 
We consider conditions 1 and 2 in turn and show in each case that 
there exists a threat to s and s £ E^(A, Plu, s).
1. Suppose for some z e (A - {x, y}) , {i e LjzP^x & zP_^ y} = <J>.
Since Plu(s, A) = {x, y} it follows from the definition of the
Plurality function that |l I > |l I and |l I > |l I and L = L . 
j x 1 z 1 1 y 1 1 z1 1 x ' y
Since S^ = Tig for all i e L and since {i £ l |zP^x & zP_^ y} 4 (f), 
it follows that one of the following conditions must hold:
(a) {i e L|zP^x & xP^y} 4 (J>
or (b) {i e L|zP^y & yP^x} 4 $
We consider each possibility in turn and show that in each case there 
exists a threat to s and s (| E^(A, Plu, s) .
(a) Suppose {i e L|zP_^x & xP^y} 4 $
Let L C {i e LlzP.x & xP.y}.
Let s' be any situation such that: E! i S.(x) for some i £ L1 L
R’ = R, for all k £ (L - (i)) k k
I l l
Given the specification of situation s',
I{i e L|xPjw for all w e (A - {x})}| = |l |^ + 1. 
and
I{i e L|yP|w for all w e (A - {y})}| = | |  
and
I{i g L|zP!w for all w g (A - {z})}I = IL I — 1. l z
By definition of the Plurality function, Plu(s', A) = {x}.
Since y e Plu(s, A) and xP^y then, given the maximin assumption,
s'Q* s and therefore < {i}, s' > is a threat to s and henceA,Plu
it follows that s £ E^(A, Plu, s).
(b) Suppose {i e L|zP_^y & yP.x} =1= <p 
Let L _C {i g L|zP^y & yP_^ x}.
Let s' be any situation such that: R! e S. (y) for some i e L
R^ = for all k e (L - {i}).
By reasoning directly analogous to that in (a), it is possible to 
show that Plu(s', A) = {y}.
Since x e Plu(s, A) and yP^x then, given the maximin assumption, 
s'Q^ p^us* Hence < {i}, s' > is a threat to s and s | E^(A, Plu, s).
Obviously, if for some z e (A - {x, y}), {i e L|zP^x & zP^y} = <J> 
then (a) and (b) exhaust the possibilities. We have shown in 
each case that s *}: E^(A, Plu, s) and hence s e E(A, Plu, s) .
2. Suppose for some z e (A - {x, y}),
I{i g L|zP^x or zP^y}I > j{i g L|xP^y & yP^z}| and
I{i g L|zP^x or zP^y}| > |{i g L|yP^x & xP^y)|
We consider two exhaustive and mutually exclusive possibilities:
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(a)  For  some z e (A -  {x,  y } ) ,  { i  e L | z P . x  & zP^y} =j= <J>
(b) For  a l l  z e (A -  {x, y } ) ,  { i  e L |z P ^ x  & zP^y} = <j>
We show i n  ea ch  c a s e  t h a t  s sj; E(A, P l u ,  s)  .
(a)  Suppose f o r  some z e (A -  {x, y}) , { i  e L |z P ^ x  & zP^y)  4 <t>‘
We have a l r e a d y  shown i n  1 above t h a t  i n  t h i s  c a se  s  ^ E(A, P l u ,  s ) .
(b) Suppose f o r  a l l  z e (A -  {x, y } ) ,  { i  e L | z f \  x & zP_^y} = <f>.
L e t  L = ( i  e L l z P . x  o r  z P .y } .
1 l  l
Let  s ’ be any s i t u a t i o n  such t h a t :  R! e S . ( z )  f o r  a l l  i  e L
l i
= Rk f o r  a l l  k e (L -  L ) .
Given t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ’ ,
{ i  e L l x P l y  & xP!z} = { i  e L l x P . y  & x P .z }  -  { i  e L l z P . x  o r  zP .y}
' l l  ' l l  1 l  l
= { i  e L l x P .y  & y P . z }
1 l  l
Given t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ' ,
{ i  e l | zP ! x & zP'.y} = { i  e L l z P . x  o r  zP .y}
1 l  i y 1 l  i y
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  | {i  e L | z P ^ x  o r  zP^y} | > | { i  c L |xP^y  & yP_^z} |
and t h u s :  | { i  e L | z P | x  & zP^y}|  > | { i  e L | x P | y  & xP^z} |
S i m i l a r l y ,  | { i  e L | z P ^ x  & zP^y}|  > | ( i  c L |yP^x  & yP^z} |
S i n c e ,  by h y p o t h e s i s ,  f o r  a l l  z e (A -  {x,  y } ) ,  ( i  e L |z P ^ x  & zP^y} = <f)
then  i t  f o l l o w s  from t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s '  t h a t  f o r  a l l  
u e (A -  ( x ,  y ,  z } ) ,
{i  e L|uP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {u }) } = <J>
Given the  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  P l u ( s ' ,  A) = {z}.
Given the  maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,  s ’o |  s f o r  a l l  i  e L and t h e r e f o r eA ,P lu
< L, s '  > i s  a t h r e a t  to s and s c E(A, P l u ,  s ) .
I f  c o n d i t i o n  2 h o l d s  t h e n  (a) and (b) e x h a u s t  the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
We have shown i n  each c a se  t h a t  s e[ E(A, P l u ,  s ) .
Proof: Necessity
Let A e X and let s be any sincere situation such that Plu(s, A) 
contains exactly two distinct elements, say x and y for some distinct 
x, y £ A.
We show that if s sj: E(A, Plu, s) then condition 1 or condition 2 
must be satisfied.
Suppose s sj; E(A, Plu, s) and hence there exists a threat, say < L, s' 
to s. Obviously, Plu(s', A) f {x, y}. We consider six exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive possibilities:
(a) Plu(s', A) = {x}
(b) Plu(s *, A) = {y}
(c) x I Plu(s' , A) and y sj: Plu(s’, A) and there exists
at least one z e (A - {x, y}) such that z e Plu(s’, A)
(d) x £ Plu(s’, A) and y £ Plu(s’, A) and there exists
at least one z e (A - {x, y}) such that z e Plu(s', A)
(e) x sj: Plu(s' , A) and y e Plu(s', A) and there exists
at least one z e (A - {x, y}) such that z £ Plu(s’, A)
(f) x £ Plu(s', A) and y £ Plu(s’, A) and there exists
at least one z £ (A - {x, y}) such that z e P1u (s ’, A) 
We consider each of these possibilities in turn and show that if 
s sj: E(A, Plu, s) then condition 1 or condition 2 must be satisfied.
(a) Suppose Plu(s’, A) = {x}.
Given the maximin assumption, L_C {i e L|xP^y}.
Obviously, L fl L = <j>. Thus in any situation s ’ that can be 
created by members of L following strategies different from 
those which they followed in situation s while all members of
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(L - L) continue to follow the same strategies as in s,
{i e L,|yP_!w for all w e (A - {y})} 0_
and since L U L = L, x
{i e l |xP|w for all w e (A - {x})} L
By definition of the Plurality function, if Plu(sT, A) = {x} then 
{i e l |xP_!w for all w e (A - {x})} >
I{i e L|yP|w for all w e (A - {y})}|
and hence
I{i e L|xP^w for all w e (A - {x})}| > |L^ |
Since Plu(s, A) = {x, y} it follows that IL I = IL I and hence 
ILI > |Lx |. Therefore, for some i e L and for some z e (A - {x, y}), 
zP . x & xP . y.l i/
Therefore if Plu(s', A) = {x} then {i e L|zP^x & zi\y) =f (j).
Hence condition 1 must be satisfied.
(b) Suppose Plu(s', A) = {y}
Given the maximin assumption, L _C {i e L|yP^x}.
Obviously, L fl L = <j>.
By reasoning directly analogous to that in (a) it can be shown
that ILI > |l I and hen'ce for some i e L and for some z e (A - {x, y}),y
zP^y & yP^x. Hence if Plu(s', A) = {y} then {i e L|zP^x & zP_^ y}  ^<j>. 
Hence condition 1 must be satisfied.
(c) Suppose x if Plu(s’ , A) and y if Plu(s', A) and there exists at 
least one z r (A - [x, y]) such that z r. P1u (h ', A).
If, for some i t: L, xP^y then, given the maximin assumption, 
s'Q^ j> j UH f f f for a-Lf w £ Plu(s’, A), wl’^ y.
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If, for some i e L, yP^x then, given the maximin assumption, 
s'Q^ s iff for all w e Plu(s’, A), wP.x.
Hence L _C {i e L,|for all w e Plu(s', A), wP^x or wP^y}.
By hypothesis, z e Plu(s', A) and hence L _C {i e l |zP^x or zP^y}. 
Obviously, L fl. {i e L|xP_^y & yP z} = <f>. Thus in any situation 
s' that can be created by members of L following strategies 
different from those which they followed in situation s while 
all members of (L - L) continue to follow the same strategies 
as in s:
{i e l |xP_!w for all w e (A - {x})} ^ {i e L|xP^y & yP^z}.
Similarly, since L 0 {i e L|yP^x & xP^z} = (j) it follows that in 
any such situation s’,
{i £ L|yP|w for all w e (A - {y}) } 0^ {i e LjyP^x & xP_^ z}
and since L U L = L, z
{i e l |zP^w for all w e (A - {z})} _C {i e L|zP^x or zP^y}
By hypothesis, x | Plu(s', A) and y { Plu(s’, A) and z e Plu(sf, A). 
Given the definition of the Plurality function,
]{i £ L|zP|w for all w e (A - {z}) } | >
I{i £ L|xP|w for all w e (A - {x})}|
and hence,
I{i £ LIzi\x or zP^y}j > |{i £ LjxP^y & yP^z}|
Similarly, |{i c l |zP^x or zP^y}| > |{i c L|yP^x & xP^z}|.
Hence condition 2 must be satisfied.
(d) Suppose x £ Plu(s' , A) and y Plu(s’, A) and there exists at 
least one z e (A - {x, y}) such that z e Plu(s', A).
If, for some i e L, xP.y then, given the maximin assumption, 
s'Q^ p]us iff for w e Plu(s’ , A), wP^y.
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I f ,  f o r  some i  £ L, yP^x t h e n ,  g i v e n  th e  maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,
s ’ Q^ .. s i f f  f o r  a l l  w £ ( P l u ( s ’ , A) -  { x } ) ,  wP.y.
Hence L _C {i  e L j f o r  a l l  w e ( P l u ( s ' ,  A) -  {x} ) ,  wP.y} .
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  z e P l u ( s ’ , A) and hence  L _C { i  e L |z P ^ y } .
O b v io u s ly ,  L H = <J>. Thus i n  any s i t u a t i o n  s '  t h a t  can be c r e a t e d
by members o f  L f o l l o w i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h o s e  which
they  f o l l o w e d  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s w h i l e  a l l  members o f  (L -  L) c o n t i n u e
to  f o l l o w  t h e  same s t r a t e g i e s  a s  i n  s ,
{ i  e L|yP_Jw f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y }) } L
and s i n c e  L U L = L, z
{ i  c l | zP%7 f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {z})} L.
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  y £ P l u ( s ' ,  A) and z e P l u ( s T, A) and hence  by 
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,
{ i  e L | z P |w  f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {z})}  >
I {i  £ L,|yP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y} )} |  
and hence  L > L .
y
S in c e  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x,  y} i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  | l I = | l ! and hence1 x 1 ' y 1
ILI > I l»x j • T h e r e f o r e ,  f o r  some i  e L, and f o r  some 
w e (A -  {x, y } ) ,  wP^x & wP^y.
T h e r e f o r e ,  f o r  some w £ (A -  {x,  y ) ) ,  { i  £ L|wP_^x & wP_^y} cf>.
Hence c o n d i t i o n  1 must  be s a t i s f i e d .
(e)  Suppose x P l u ( s ’ , A) and y e P l u ( s ' , A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t
l e a s t  one z e (A -  {x, y})  such  t h a t  z e P l u ( s ’ , A) .
I f ,  f o r  some i  e L, xP y t h e n ,  g i v e n  th e  maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,
s 'Q ^  T, , s i f f  f o r  a l l  w e ( P l u ( s ' ,  A) -  { y} ) ,  wP.x.A ,P lu  1
I f ,  f o r  some i  e L, yP^x t h e n ,  g iv e n  th e  maximin a s s u m p t io n ,
s 'Q ^  s i f f  f o r  a l l  w e P l u ( s f , A) , wP.x.A ,P lu  l
Hence L _C {i e L|for all w e (Plu(s', A) - {y}) , wP_^ x} .
By hypothesis, z e Plu(s', A) and hence L _C {i e l |zP^x }.
Obviously, L A = (j).
By reasoning directly analogous to that in (d) it can be shown
that ILI > IL I.y
Therefore, for some i e L, and for some w £ (A - {x, y}), wP^x and wP
Therefore, for some w e (A - {x, y}), {i e L|wP^x & wP^y } = 4>.
Hence condition 1 must be satisfied.
(f) Suppose x e Plu(s', A) and y e Plu(s', A) and there exists at 
least one z e (A - {x, y}) such that z e Plu(s', A).
Since x, y e Plu(s, A) and x, y e Plu(s’, A) then, given the 
maximin assumption, s' p^s iff f°r all w e (Plu(sf, A) - {x, y}), 
wP.x & wP.y.l l
Hence L _C {i £ L|for all w £ (Plu(s*, A) - {x, y}), wP^x & wP^y}.
By hypothesis, z £ Plu(s’, A) and thus L _C {i £ L|zP^x & zP^y}.
Therefore {i e LlzP.x & zP.y} = d>.
1 l l
Hence condition 1 must be satisfied.
Obviously, if there exists a threat < L, s' > to s, then 
(a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) exhaust the possibilities.
We have shown in each case that if there is a threat to s and 




For  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s and f o r  a l l  
s e S, i f  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  
then  s fj: E^(A, P l u ,  s)  .
P r o o f
Le t  A e X and l e t  s be any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n .  Le t  s e S be any s i t u a t i o n  
such  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s .
Suppose,  f o r  some x ,  y ,  z c A, t h a t  x,  y ,  z e P l u ( s ,  A).
S inc e  S^ = ITq f o r  a l l  i  e L then  a l l  members o f  L must  r a n k  x,  y and z 
a c c o r d i n g  to  one o f  t h e  s i x  p o s s i b l e  s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g s  o f  {x, y ,  z} .  
Suppose f o r  some i  e L, xP^y and yP_^z.
O b v i o u s ly ,  e i t h e r  1. R e S^(x)
o r  2.  ^ S^(x)
We show i n  e i t h e r  c a s e  t h a t  s fj: E^(A, P l u ,  s)  .
1. Suppose R^ e S ^ ( x ) .
Le t  s ’ be any s i t u a t i o n  such  t h a t :  R^ e S^(y)
R^ = R^ f o r  a l l  k e (L -  { i} )
Given the  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ’ ,
I { i  e L|yP^w f o r  a l l  w c (A -  {y } ) } | =
I {i  c L|yP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y })} | 4- 1 
and f o r  a l l  u e (A -  {y} ) ,
I {i  c L |uPlw f o r  a l l  w c (A -  {u }) } | <:
I l L I LI ill’ f o r  a l l  w i, (A -  ( u ) ) j |
S in c e  y e P l u ( s ,  A) i t  f o l l o w s  from the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the  P l u r a l i t y  
f u n c t i o n ,  t h a t  f o r  a l l  u c (A -  {y ] ) ,
I {i  e LIyP w f o r  a l l  w c  (A -  {y )) } | ^
I {i  e LIuP^w f o r  a l l  w e ( A -  {u 1)}[
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Hence for all u £ (A - {y}),
I{i £ L|yP^w for all w e (A - {y})}| >
!{i e LIuP!w for all w e (A- {u})}l
Given the definition of the Plurality function, Plu(s', A) = {y}.
—  xSince z e Plu(s, A) and yP.z it follows that s'Q s and hence1 Aj 1 ill
< {i}, s’ > is a threat to s and s  ^ E^(A, Plu, s).
2. Suppose R i|: S^(x) .
Let s’ be any situation such that: e S^(x)
for all k £ (L - {i})
By reasoning directly analogous to that in 1 it can be shown that
Plu(s', A) = {x}. Since z £ Plu(sT, A) and xP^z it follows that s'Q^ p^us
and hence < {i}, s' > is a threat to s and s t|: E^(A, Plu, s) .
Now if, for some i £ L, xP^y and yP^z then 1 and 2 exhaust the 
possibilities. We have shown in each case that s \ E^(A, Plu, s).
A similar argument applies if there exists at least one i £ L
who holds any one of the other five possible strict orderings of
{x, y, z}. Since S^ = n0 for all i e L, it follows that all
i £ L must hold one or other of the six possible strict orderings
of {x, y, z}. Since we assume N 5 2, it follows that s | E^(A, Plu, s).
Hence for all A £ X and for every sincere situation s and for
all s e S, if Plu(s, A) contains three or more distinct elements then
s { E ^ (A, PLu, s).
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From theorems 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 we can simply deduce, for 
any given issue A, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
any given sincere situation to be an equilibrium (as opposed to a 
strict equilibrium) under the Plurality function. We state the 
conditions without proof:
Let A e X be any issue and let s be any sincere situation.
(1) If Plu(s, A) is a singleton, say x for some x c A,
then s ej: E^(A, Plu, s) iff for some y e (A - {x}),
IL j — IL 1 = 1  and I{i e L|yP.x}|  ^ |l j 1 x 1 ' y ' 1 1 i 1 x 1
(2) If Plu(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements, 
say x and y for some x, y e A, then s  ^E^(A, Plu, s) 
iff for some z e (A - (x, y}) , {i e l |zP_^ x & zP_^ y} =j= (j)
(3) If Plu(s, A) contains three or more distinct elements 
then s £ E*(A, Plu, s) .
We have utilized these conditions in the computer simulation 
to determine the probability that, for any issue A containing exactly 
three distinct elements, any given sincere situation will be an 
equilibrium.
We now prove (by lemma 4.1 and theorem 4.5) that for 
any given issue A and for any sincere situation s, the set of 
equilibria under the Plurality function is non-empty. Our proof 
is similar to that employed by Pattanaik in his theorem 8.1 




For all A £ X and for every sincere situation s, if 
N = 2 then s c E^A, Plu, s) .
Proof
Let A e X and let s be any sincere situation.
Let L = {j, k} where j and k are any two distinct individuals. 
Since we assume S^ = IIq for all i e L it follows that one of the 
following must hold:
1. For some x £ A,
xP.w for all w e (A - {x}) and 3
xP^w for all w e (A - {x})
2. For some distinct x, y e A, 
xP^ .w for all w e (A - {x}) and 
yP^w for all w e (A - {y})
We consider each possibility in turn and show that in each case 
s e E^(A, Plu, s).
1. Suppose for some x e A,
xP^w for all w e (A - {x}) and 
xP^w for all w £ (A- {x})
Given the definition of the Plurality function, Plu(s, A) = {x}. 
Suppose s I E^(A, Plu, s) and hence there exists a threat , say 
< L, s’ > to s such that L is a singleton. Obviously, Plu(s’, A) 
and hence there exists at least one y £ (A - {x}) such that 
y e Plu(s', A).
Given the maximin assumption, L _C {i e L|yP^x}.
By hypothesis, for all i e L, xP^w for all w e (A - {x}).
+ (x)
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Hence {i  e L |yP^x} = 4>. T h e r e f o r e  t h e r e  i s  no t h r e a t  < L, s '  > 
to  s and hence  s e E(A, P l u ,  s)  and t h u s  s e E^(A, P l u ,  s ) .
2. Suppose f o r  some d i s t i n c t  x ,  y e A, 
xP.w f o r  a l l  w c (A -  ( x ) )  and
yP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y })
Given the  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x, y ) .  
Suppose s i|: e \ a , P l u ,  s )  and hence t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t ,  say 
< L, s '  > to s such t h a t  L i s  a s i n g l e t o n .
O b v i o u s ly ,  P l u ( s ’ , A) =j= {x, y} .
We c o n s i d e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x h a u s t i v e  and m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s
(a)  P l u ( s * , A) = {xl
(b) P l u ( s ' , A) = {y>
(c)  x (j: P l u ( s '  , A) and y { P l u ( s ' ,  A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  
l e a s t  one z £ (A -  (x ,  y}) such  t h a t  z £ P l u ( s ' ,  A) .
(d) x e P l u ( s ' , A) and y £ P l u ( s ' ,  A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  
l e a s t  one z £ (A -  {x, y}) such  t h a t  z £ P l u ( s ' ,  A) .
(e)  x if P lu ( s *  , A) and y £ P l u ( s ' ,  A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  
l e a s t  one z £ (A -  {x, y})  such  t h a t  z £ P l u ( s ' ,  A) .
( f )  x £ P l u ( s ' , A) and y £ P l u ( s ’ , A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  
l e a s t  one z £ (A -  {x, y}) such  t h a t  z £ P l u ( s ' ,  A).
We c o n s i d e r  e a ch  p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  t u r n  and show i n  each  c a s e  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  no t h r e a t  < L, s ’ > to  s such  t h a t  L i s  a s i n g l e t o n  and hence 
s e E 1(A,  P l u ,  s ) .
(a)  Suppose P l u ( s ' ,  A) = { x } .
Given the maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,  L _C {i  c L |x P ^ y } .
O b v i o u s ly ,  L II L = (j). Thus i n  any s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  can be c r e a t e d  by
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members of L following strategies different from those which they 
followed in situation s while all members of (L - L) continue to 
follow the same strategies as in s,
{i g L|yP|w for all w e (A - {y}) } L^.
Hence |{i e L[yP|w for all w e (A - {y})}| $ 1 
By hypothesis, N = 2 and hence by definition of the Plurality 
function, y e Plu(s', A).
This is contrary to our hypothesis that Plu(s’, A) = {x} and hence 
there is no threat < L, s' > to s such that Plu(s', A) = {x}.
(b) Suppose Plu(s', A) = {y}.
Given the maximin assumption, L _C {i e L[yP^x}.
Obviously, L 11 = <}>.
By reasoning directly analogous to that in (a) it can be shown that 
x g Plu(s', A) .
This is contrary to our hypothesis that Plu(s’, A) = {y} and hence 
there is no threat < L, s' > to s such that Plu(s’, A) = {y}.
(c) Suppose x £ Plu(s', A) and y  ^Plu(s’, A) and there exists at
least one z e (A - {x, y}) such that z e Plu(s’, A).
Given the maximin assumption, L C {i e l |zP^x or zP^y}.
By hypothesis, x { Plu(s, A) and y £ Plu(s', A).
Since N = 2, it follows from the definition of the Plurality function 
that: {i c L|xP|w for all w c (A - {x})} = <j>
{i g L,|yP^ w for all w c (A - {y})} = <|>
Therefore |l | > 1. Hence there is no threat < L, s' > to s such that 
L is a singleton and x ij Plu(s* , A) and y t[ Plu(s', A) and for some 
z g (A - {x, y}), z g Plu(s', A).
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(d) Suppose x e P l u ( s ' ,  A) and y  ^ P l u ( s ' ,  A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  
l e a s t  one z e (A -  {x, y}) such  t h a t  z e P l u ( s ' , A ) .
Given the  maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,  L C { i  £ L , | zP .y} .
O b v i o u s ly ,  L fl L = 4>. Thus i n  any s i t u a t i o n  s ’ t h a t  can be 
c r e a t e d  by members o f  L f o l l o w i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h o s e  
which they  f o l l o w e d  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s w h i l e  a l l  members o f  (L -  L) 
c o n t i n u e  to  f o l l o w  the  same s t r a t e g i e s  a s  i n  s ,
{ i  e L|yP^w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {y})} _0
Hence, | {i  e L |yP!w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y } ) } | ;> 1.
By h y p o t h e s i s  N = 2 and h e n c e  by d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  
y £ P l u ( s ' ,  A ) .
T h i s  i s  c o n t r a r y  to  ou r  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  y ff P l u ( s ’ , A) and hence  
t h e r e  i s  no t h r e a t  < L, s '  > to  s such  t h a t  x £ P l u ( s ' , A) and
y  ^ P l u ( s ' , A) and f o r  some z e (A -  {x,  y } ) ,  z £ P l u ( s ’ , A) .
(e)  Suppose x £ P l u ( s ' ,  A) and y e P l u ( s ’ , A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t
l e a s t  one z £ (A -  {x, y}) such  t h a t  z £ P l u ( s ' ,  A) .
Given t h e  maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,  L { i  e L(zP^x} .
O b v i o u s ly ,  L H L = (j>.
X
By r e a s o n i n g  d i r e c t l y  a n a lo g o u s  to  t h a t  i n  (d)  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  
show t h a t  x £ P l u ( s ' , A).
T h i s  i s  c o n t r a r y  to  ou r  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  x tf P l u ( s ? , A) and hence  
t h e r e  i s  no t h r e a t  < L, s ? > to  s such t h a t  x tj: P l u ( s ' ,  A) and
y e P l u ( s ’ , A) and f o r  some z e (A -  {x, y } ) , z e P l u ( s ’ , A).
( f )  Suppose x e P l u ( s ' ,  A) and y £ P l u ( s ' ,  A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t
l e a s t  one z £ (A -  {x,  y})  such t h a t  z e P1u ( s ’ , A).
Given the  maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,  L {i  £ Lj z P^x  & zP^y}.
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By hypothesis, xP w for all w e (A - {x}) and 
yP^ w for all w e (A - {y}) .
4>.
Hence there is no threat < L, s’ > to s such that x e Plu(s', A) 
and y e Plu(s’, A) and for some z e (A - {x, y}), z e Plu(s', A).
Therefore {i e l IzP.x & zP.y}l l
Hence, if xP^. w for all w e (A - {x}) and yP^w for all w e  (A - {y}) 
and there exists a threat < L, s’ > to s then (a), (b), (c), (d), 
(e) and (f) exhaust the possibilities. We have shown in each case 
that there is no threat < L, s’ > to s such that L is a singleton.
In summary, if N = 2 and = IIq for all i e L, then either 
1 or 2 must hold. We have shown in each case that s e E^(A, Plu, s).
Hence for all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if N = 2 
then s £ E^(A, Plu, s).
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Theorem 4 . 5
F o r  a l l  A e X an d  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  
E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  =j= <j).
P r o o f
L e t  A e X an d  l e t  s b e  an y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n .
By a s s u m p t i o n  N $ 2. We c o n s i d e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x h a u s t i v e  an d  m u t u a l l y  
e x c l u s i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :
1 . N = 2
2. N > 2
We show t h a t  i f  N = 2 t h e n  s e E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  and h e n c e  E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  =j= <j). 
S u b s e q u e n t l y ,  we show t h a t  i f  N > 2 t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an  s e S s u c h  t h a t  
s e E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  and h e n c e  E (A, P l u ,  s )  =}= <j>.
1. S u p p o s e  N = 2.
I t  f o l l o w s  f rom lemma 4 . 1  t h a t  s e E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  an d  t h e r e f o r e  
E (A, P l u ,  s )  =}= c f > .
2. S u p p o se  N > 2.
L e t  s e S be  any s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t  f o r  some x e A,
R. c S . ( x )  f o r  a l l  i  e L.l l
Given t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x}.
Suppose  s ^ E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  a n d  h e n c e  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  t h r e a t ,  s a y  < L,  s ’ > 
t o  s s u c h  t h a t  L i s  a s i n g l e t o n .  O b v i o u s l y ,  P l u ( s ’ , A) ^ {x} and h e n c e  
t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one  y e (A -  {x}) s u c h  t h a t  y £ P l u ( s ' ,  A).
G iven  t h e  m axim in  a s s u m p t i o n ,  L _C { i  £ L | y P ^ x } .
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  L i s  a s i n g l e t o n  an d  h e n c e  i n  any s i t u a t i o n  s '  t h a t  c a n  b e  
c r e a t e d  by members  o f  L f o l l o w i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  d i f f e r e n t  f rom  t h o s e  w h ic h  
t h e y  f o l l o w e d  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s w h i l e  a l l  members o f  (L -  L) c o n t i n u e  to
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follow the same strategies as in s,
I{i e l |xP|w for all w 0 (A - {x})}| = N - 1.
By hypothesis N > 2.
Hence, by definition of the Plurality function, Plu(s', A) = {x}.
This is contrary to our hypothesis that there exists at least one 
y c (A - {x}) such that y c Plu(s', A). Hence, if N > 2, there is no 
threat < L, s' > to s such that L is a singleton and therefore 
s e E^(A, Plu, s) and therefore E^(A, Plu, s) =f (}>.
By assumption, N £ 2. We have shown in 1 that if N = 2 then 
s e E^(A, Plu, s) and hence E^(A, Plu, s) =f <j). We have shown in 2 
that if N > 2 then there exists an s e S such that s 0 E^(A, Plu, s) 
and therefore E^(A, Plu, s)
Hence for all A e X and for every sincere situation s,
E^(A, Plu, s) =j= ({).
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I n  C h a p t e r  2 ,  we d e f i n e d  a p r o p e r t y  o f  a GDF f  w h ic h  we 
r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  e x a c t  f - c o n s i s t e n c y . The GDF f  was c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be  a 
d e s i r a b l e  GDF w h ich  i s  n o t  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  and f  was a  GDF w h ic h  was 
l e s s  a t t r a c t i v e  b u t  w h ich  we m i g h t  c o n s i d e r  a d o p t i n g  on t h e  b a s i s  
t h a t  t h e  en d  j u s t i f i e s  t h e  m eans .  We became i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
o f  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f i e d  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  
e x a c t  M a j - c o n s i s t e n c y .
We p r o v e d ,  i n  t h e o r e m  4 . 5 ,  t h a t  f o r  an y  i s s u e  A an d  f o r  any 
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  =j= <f>. I n  o r d e r  t o  p r o v e  t h a t  t h e  
P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  e x a c t  M a j - c o n s i s t e n c y ,  we 
w ou ld  n e e d  t o  p r o v e  t h a t  f o r  a l l  A e X an d  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  
s ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an s e S s u c h  t h a t  s e E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  an d  P l u ( s ,  A) = 
M a j ( s ,  A) .  We w i l l  p r o v e ,  i n  t h e o r e m  4 . 8 ,  t h a t  i f  ( s ,  A) e D . and
i  -LCi J
M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  t h e n  t h e r e  d o e s  n o t  
e x i s t  an  s e S s u c h  t h a t  s e E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  an d  P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A).  
Hence t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  d o e s  n o t  s a t i s f y  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  e x a c t  
M a j - c o n s i s  t e n c y .
A l t h o u g h  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  d o e s  n o t  s a t i s f y  t h e  p r o p e r t y
o f  e x a c t  M a j - c o n s i s t e n c y ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  f o r  any A c X and f o r  an y
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a h i g h  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e
o f  an  s c S s u c h  t h a t  s  c e \ a , P l u ,  s )  and P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A).
The p r e c i s e  v a l u e  o f  t h i s  p r o b a b i l i t y  c a n n o t  be d e t e r m i n e d  s i n c e
Dw . 4  (S x X) an d  t h e r e f o r e  M a i l s ,  A) i s  n o t  d e f i n e d  f o r  some s i n c e r e  
Maj
s i t u a t i o n s  and i s s u e s .
However ,  i t  I s  p o s s i b l e  to  d e t e r m i n e ,  f o r  an y  A e X and f o r  
an y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s
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an s e S s u c h  t h a t  s e E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  an d  P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A ) ,  g i v e n
t h a t  ( s ,  A) e D . .  We w i l l  p r o v e ,  i n  t h e o r e m  4 . 6 ,  t h a t  t h e r e  a l w a y s  Maj
e x i s t s  s u ch  a s i t u a t i o n  i f  ( s ,  A) e ^  and M a j ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n
and we w i l l  p r o v e ,  i n  t h e o r e m  4 . 7 ,  t h a t  t h e r e  a l w a y s  e x i s t s  s u c h  a
s i t u a t i o n  i f  ( s ,  A) e D . and M a i ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t
Maj
e l e m e n t s .  As m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e ,  we w i l l  p r o v e ,  i n  t h e o r e m  4 . 8 ,  t h a t  i f  
( s ,  A) e and M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s
t h e n  t h e r e  d o es  n o t  e x i s t  a s i t u a t i o n  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  
w h ic h  we a r e  i n t e r e s t e d .
I n  t h e  c o m p u t e r  s i m u l a t i o n ,  we w i l l  u t i l i z e  t h e  r e s u l t s
e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  t h e o r e m s  4 . 6 ,  4 . 7  and 4 . 8  t o  d e t e r m i n e ,  f o r  any g i v e n
i s s u e  A c o n t a i n i n g  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  and f o r  any s i n c e r e
s i t u a t i o n  s ,  t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an s e S
s u c h  t h a t  s e E ^(A ,  P l u ,  s )  an d  P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A ) ,  g i v e n  t h a t
( s ,  A) e D . .  We w i l l  d e m o n s t r a t e  i n  C h a p t e r  7 t h a t  t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  Maj
p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  e q u a l  t o  1 .0 0 0 0  f o r  a l l  odd v a l u e s  o f  N and i t  i s  
g r e a t e r  t h a t  0 . 9 5  f o r  a l l  e v e n  v a l u e s  o f  N > 4 .  Howeve r ,  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  
o f  t h i s  r e s u l t  i s  d i m i n i s h e d  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o b s e r v a t i o n :  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  an s e S s u c h  t h a t  s e E^ (A ,  P l u ,  s )  an d  P l u ( s ,  A) =
M a j ( s ,  A) d o e s  n o t  r u l e  o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a n o t h e r  
s i t u a t i o n ,  s a y  s ’ , s u c h  t h a t  s '  e E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  and P l u ( s ,  A) M a j ( s ,  A)
We w i l l  s u b s e q u e n t l y  show t h a t  s u c h  d i f f i c u l t i e s  do n o t  
a r i s e  i f  we e x t e n d  t h e  above  a n a l y s i s  by r e p l a c i n g  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  
e q u i l i b r i u m  w i t h  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m .
130
T heorem  A.6
F o r  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f
( s ,  A) e an d  M a j ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s
an  s £ S s u c h  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A) an d  s £ E^(A ,  P l u ,  s )  .
P r o o f
L e t  A £ X and l e t  s be  an y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t  ( s ,  A) £ 
and M a j ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n ,  s a y  x f o r  some x c A.
L e t  s  £ S b e  a s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t :
£ S_^(x) f o r  a l l  i  £ L.
Given  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ,
I {i  £ L |xP^w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {x } ) } | = N
G iven  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  P l u ( s ,  A) = { x} .
S u p p o s e  s £ E (A, P l u ,  s ) . Then t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  < L,  s '  > 
t o  s s u c h  t h a t  L i s  a s i n g l e t o n .  O b v i o u s l y ,  P l u ( s ' ,  A) =j= {x}.
S u p p o s e  f o r  some y e (A -  { x } ) ,  y £ P l u ( s ' ,  A).
G iven t h e  max im in  a s s u m p t i o n  L _C { i  e L | y i \ x } .
By a s s u m p t i o n ,  N 5 2. We c o n s i d e r  two e x h a u s t i v e  and m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s :  1. N = 2
2.  N > 2
We c o n s i d e r  e a c h  p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  t u r n  and show t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no  t h r e a t  
< L, s '  > t o  s s u c h  t h a t  L i s  a s i n g l e t o n .
1. S u p p o s e  N = 2.
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  M a j ( s ,  A) = {x} and s i n c e  N = 2 i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  f o r  a l l  
i  c L,  xP y f o r  a l l  y £ (A -  { x } ) .
Hence { i  c h | y P ^ x }  = </».
S i n c e  L _C { i  £ LjyP^x}  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no t h r e a t  < L, s '  >
1
to  s and s c E(A, P l u ,  s )  and t h e r e f o r e  s £ E (A, P l u ,  s ) .
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2. S u p p o s e  N > 2.
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  y e P l u ( s ’ , A) and h e n c e  L _C { i  e L, |yP^x} and t h u s
s '  mus t  be  a s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t :  R ’ e S r (y)  f o r  some i  c L
1 i
R^ = f o r  a l l  k e (L -  { i }) 
Given  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ’ ,
I {i  e L | y P | w  f o r  a l l  w c (A -  {y })} [  = 1 
and
I { i  e L |xP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {x } ) } | = N -  1
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  N > 2 and h e n c e ,  g i v e n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  
f u n c t i o n ,  P l u ( s ’ , A) = {x}.
T h i s  i s  c o n t r a r y  to  o u r  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  y e P l u ( s ’ , A) an d  h e n c e
i f  N > 2 t h e r e  i s  no  t h r e a t  < L,  s ’ > t o  s  s u c h  t h a t  L i s  a s i n g l e t o n .
T h e r e f o r e  s e E^(A,  PLu,  s ) .
I n  summary,  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  < L,  s ’ > t o  s t h e n  P l u ( s ’ , A) 4 {x}
and h e n c e  f o r  some y e (A -  ( x } ) ,  y e P l u ( s ’ , A).
By a s s u m p t i o n  N £ 2 and t h u s  1 an d  2 e x h a u s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
"  1
We h a v e  shown i n  e a c h  c a s e  t h a t  s e E (A, P l u ,  s ) .
Hence f o r  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  ( s ,  A) c D. 
and M a j ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an s e S s u c h  t h a t  




For all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if
(s, A) e an<^  Maj(s, A) contains exactly two distinct
elements then there exists an s e S such that 
Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A) and s e E^(A, Plu, s).
Proof
Let A c X and let s be any sincere situation such that (s, A) e 11, .Maj
and Maj(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements, say x and y for 
some distinct x, y e A.
By assumption, N  ^ 2. We consider the following exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive possibilities: 1. N = 2
2. N > 2
We show that if N = 2 then Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A) and s e E^(A, Plu, s). 
We then show that if N > 2 there exists an s c S such that 
Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A) and s e E^(A, Plu, s).
1. Suppose N = 2.
By hypotheses, Maj(s, A) = {x, y} and it follows that: 
for some i e L, xP_^ z for all z e (A - {x}) 
and for k c (L - {i}), yP^z for all z c (A - {y}).
Given the definition of the Plurality function, Plu(s, A) = {x, y} 
and hence Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A).
By lemma 4.1, it follows that s c E (A, Plu, s) .
Hence 11 N = 2 there exists an s c S such that Plu(s, A) = Mnj(s, A) 
and s c E^(A, Plu, s).
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2. Suppose N > 2.
Since S^ = Hq for all i e L, it follows that: 
for all i e L, xP^y or yP^x 
Let s e S be a situation such that for all i e L,
R. e S.(x) iff xP .yl i  l
c S^(y) iff yP^x
Since Maj(s, A) = {x, y} it follows that:
I {i e LIxP^y}| = |{i e L|yP^x}|
Given the specification of s and given S^ = IT0 for all i e L,
I{i £ L|xP^w for all w e (A - {x})}| =
I {i £ L I yP^w for all w e (A - {y})} | =
Given the definition of the Plurality function, Plu(s, A) = {x, y}. 
Suppose s  ^E^(A, Plu, s). Then there exists a threat < L, s' > to 
s such that L is a singleton. Obviously, Plu(s', A) =f= {x, y}.
We consider three exhaustive and mutually exclusive possibilities:
(a) Nan(s', A) = {x}
(b) Nan(s', A) = {y>
(c) for some z £ (A- {x, y}), z £ Nan(s', A)
We show in each case that there is no threat < L, s’ > to s such 
that L is a singleton and hence s c E^(A, Plu, s).
(a) Suppose Plu(s', A) = {x}.
Given the maximin assumption, L (] {i c L|xP^y}.
Obviously, L G {i £ L|yP^x} = c}). Hence in any situation s' that 
can be created by members of L following strategies different from 
those which they followed in situation s while members of (L - L) 
continue to follow the same strategies as in s:
{i e L|yP jw for all w e (A - {y})} {i £ L|yP^x}£
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Since Maj(s, A) = {x, y} and = üq for all i e L,
|{i E L|yP±x}I = 5 .
Hence, |{i e L|yP!w for all w e (A - {y})}| 5
Given the definition of the Plurality function, Plu(sT, A) =}= {x}
and hence there is no threat < L, s’ > to s such that Plu(s’, A) =* {x}.
(b) Suppose Plu(s \ A) = {y}
Given the maximin assumption, L _C {i e h|yP^x}.
By reasoning exactly analogous to that in (a) it is possible to 
show that there is no threat < L, s’ > to s such that 
Plu(s\ A) = {y}.
(c) Suppose for some z e (A - {x, y}), z e Plu(s', A)
Given the maximin assumption, L C {i e L|zP^x or zP^ .y}.
Since Maj(s, A) contains exactly two elements it follows that N is 
even and by hypothesis, N > 2.
Hence, given the specification of situation s,
I{i e L|xP^w for all w e (A - {x})}| $ 2 
and
I {i e L|yP^w for all w e  (A - {y}) } | >, 2
Hence in any situation s' that can be created by some individual 
i e L following a strategy different from that which he followed 
in situation s while all members of (L - fi}) continue to follow 
the same strategies as in s,
I {i e l |zP ’w for all w e (A - {z})}| <: 1 
and either:
I{i e L|xP^w for all w e (A - {z})}[ > 1 
or:
I{i c L|yP|w for all w c (A - {y})}| > 1
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By d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  z P l u ( s ' ,  A).
T h i s  i s  c o n t r a r y  to ou r  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  z e P l u ( s ’ , A) and hence  
i f  N > 2 t h e r e  i s  no t h r e a t  < L, s '  > to  s such  t h a t  L i s  a 
s i n g l e t o n  and f o r  some z e (A -  {x, y } ) ,  z e P l u ( s ’ , A).
In  2, we have shown t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A). I f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a 
t h r e a t  < L, s '  > to  s such  t h a t  L i s  a s i n g l e t o n  then  ( a ) ,  (b) and (c) 
e x h a u s t  the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  We have  shown i n  each  case  t h a t ,  i f  N > 2,  
t h e r e  i s  no such  t h r e a t  and hence  s e E^(A, P l u ,  s ) .
We have shown i n  1 t h a t  i f  N = 2 th e n  P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A) and 
s e E^(A, P l u ,  s ) .
Hence f o r  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  ( s ,  A) e ^Maj 
and M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  t hen  t h e r e  e x i s t s  
an s c S such  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A) and s e E^(A, P l u ,  s ) .
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Theorem 4 . 8
For  a l l  A e X an d  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  
( s ,  A) e an d  M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t
e l e m e n t s  t h e n  t h e r e  d o es  n o t  e x i s t  an  s e S s u c h  t h a t  
P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A) an d  s e E ^ A ,  P l u ,  s )  .
P r o o f
S uppose  f o r  some A e X and  f o r  some s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  ( s ,  A) c II ,  .Maj
an d  M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s .
L e t  s e S b e  any s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A).
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  and  
h e n c e  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s .
I t  f o l l o w s  f rom t h e o r e m  4 . 4  t h a t  s e E^(A,  P l u ,  s ) .
Hence f o r  a l l  A e X an d  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  ( s ,  A) e 
an d  M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  t h e n  t h e r e  d o e s  
n o t  e x i s t  an  s  e S s u c h  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = H a j ( s ,  A) and s e E^(A,  P l u ,  s )
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In  C h a p te r  2, we d e f i n e d  a p r o p e r t y  o f  a GDF f  which  we 
r e f e r r e d  to  as  e x a c t  and s t r i c t  f - c o n s i s t e n c y . Th is  p r o p e r t y  
r e p r e s e n t s  a s t r o n g e r  demand on th e  GDF f  t h a n  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  e x a c t  
f - c o n s i s t e n c y  s i n c e  the  demand f o r  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an s e S such  t h a t  
s e E 1(A, f ,  s )  and f ( s ,  A) = f ( s ,  A) has  be e n  r e p l a c e d  by the  demand 
f o r  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an s e S such t h a t  s e E(A, f ,  s )  and f ( s ,  A) = 
f ( s ,  A) .  We became i n t e r e s t e d  i n  the  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h e  
P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f i e d  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  e x a c t  and s t r i c t  
M a j - c o n s i s  t e n c y .
We have shown, i n  theo rem 4 . 8 ,  t h a t  the  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  
does  n o t  s a t i s f y  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  e x a c t  M a j - c o n s i s t e n c y  and hence  i t  
f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  does n o t  s a t i s f y  the  p r o p e r t y  
o f  e x a c t  and s t r i c t  M a j - c o n s i s t e n c y . A l though  the  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  
does  n o t  s a t i s f y  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  e x a c t  and s t r i c t  M a j - c o n s i s t e n c y , 
i t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  f o r  any A e X and f o r  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  a h i g h  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an s e S such  t h a t  
s e E(A, P l u ,  s)  and P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A). Hence,  a l t h o u g h  D^ ^
(S x X ) , we can d e t e r m i n e  t h e  v a lu e  o f  t h e  above p r o b a b i l i t y  s i n c e  i f
( s ,  A) i  D„ . t h e n  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  E(A, P l u ,  s )  = <j>.T Maj
I n  o r d e r  to  d e t e r m i n e  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  
an s e S such t h a t  s c E(A, P l u ,  s)  and P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A), we w i l l  
p rove  a number o f  r e s u l t s  c o n c e r n i n g  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i a  
unde r  the P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  In  theorem 4 . 9 ,  we prove  t h a t  i f  
( s ,  A) e D ^  th e n  E(A, P l u ,  s)  =f <}>. I  p roved  the  r e s u l t  p r e s e n t e d  
i n  theo rem 4 .9  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  bu t  l a t e r  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  Dummet t  and 
F a r q u h a r s o n  have p roved  e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same r e s u l t  f o r  t h e  c l a s s  o f  
v o t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  which they  r e f e r  to a s  ' m a j o r i t y  games'  (Dummett &
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F a r q u h a r s o n : 1 9 6 1 ) .  S i n c e  I  h a v e  u t i l i z e d  t h i s  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n ,  
I  h a v e  p r e s e n t e d  t h e  p r o o f  h e r e .
We p r o v e ,  i n  t h e o r e m  4 . 1 0 ,  t h a t  i f  ( s ,  A) tr D_ . and
Smaj
( s ,  A) e DMnj an<  ^ A) i s  a  s i n g l e t o n  t h e n  E(A, P l u ,  s )  = <j>.
We p r o v e ,  v i a  lemma 4 . 2  and t h e o r e m  4 . 1 1 ,  a  s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  E(A,  P l u ,  s )  = d> i f  ( s ,  A) e Dw . and
Maj
M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s .  We p r o v e ,  i n  
t h e o r e m  4 . 1 2 ,  t h a t  i f  ( s ,  A) e and  M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r
more  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  t h e n  E(A, P l u ,  s )  = <j>. On t h e  b a s i s  o f  
t h e o r e m s  4 . 1 ,  4 . 9 ,  4 . 1 0 ,  4 . 1 1  and 4 . 1 2 ,  we ca n  e s t a b l i s h ,  f o r  any A e X 
an d  f o r  an y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  E(A,  P l u ,  s )  ^  <J>. I t  f o l l o w s  f rom t h e o r e m  4 . 1  t h a t  
i f  E(A,  P l u ,  s )  <J> t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a n  s e S s u c h  t h a t  
s e E(A,  P l u ,  s )  and P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A) .
We h a v e  e m p lo y ed  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e o r e m s  4 . 1 ,  
4 . 9 ,  4 . 1 0 ,  4 . 1 1  and 4 . 1 2  i n  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  to  d e t e r m i n e ,  f o r  any i s s u e  
A c o n t a i n i n g  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  and f o r  an y  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n  s ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an  s g S s u c h  t h a t  
s g E(A,  P l u ,  s )  and P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A) .  We w i l l  a l s o  d e t e r m i n e  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an s e S s u c h  t h a t  
s g E(A,  P l u ,  s )  and P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A) ,  g i v e n  t h a t  ( s ,  A) e .
We now i n t r o d u c e  some a d d i t i o n a l  n o t a t i o n  w h ic h  w i l l  be
u t i l i z e d  i n  lemma 4 . 2  and t h e o r e m  4 . 1 1 .
For any given issue A and for all x, y e A let:
S^(x, y) = {s e SI for all i e L, R. e S^(x) iff xP.y and
1 l i  l
for all i e L, R. e S^(y) iff yP.x}l l l
Hence S^(x, y) is the set of situations such that all individuals
who sincerely prefer x to y follow a strategy in which alternative
x is ranked above all of the other alternatives in the issue and
such that all individuals who sincerely prefer y to x follow a
strategy in which alternative y is ranked above all of the other
alternatives in the issue. When there is no ambiguity about the
Aissue A, we will write S (x, y) as S(x, y).
Theorem 4.9
For all A £ X and for every sincere situation s, if
(s, A) £ D0 . then E(A, Plu, s) ^ (J>. bmaj
Proof
Let A e  X and 
Since Smaj(s, 
some x £ A.
* rLet L = ii £ 
Since Smaj(s,
let s be any sincere situation such that (s, A) e D 
A) is always a singleton, let Smaj(s, A) = {x} for
Smaj ’
L|xP^y for some y e (A - {x})}.
A) = {x} and S . = nn for all i e L, it follows that 1 u
Let s be any situation such that: R. e S.(x) for all i e Ll l
= R^ for all k e (L - L )
Given the specification of situation s,
I{i e L|xP^y for all y e (A - {x})}| > ^
Given the definition of the Plurality function, Plu(s, A) = {x}. 
Suppose s j: E(A, Plu, s) and hence there exists a threat, say < L, s’ 
to s. Obviously, Plu(s*, A) {x} and hence there exists at least one 
z e (A - {x}) such that z £ Plu(s’, A).
Given the maximin assumption,
L C {i e l |for all y e (Plu(s', A) - {x}), vP^x}.
Hence L C {i £ l IzP.x }.
—  ' l
Sinct L = {i £ L xP.y for some y £ (A - {x})} it follows that:
l
* . _(L - L) 3 {i £ L xP.z}— 1 i
Since Smaj(s, A) = {x} and since S^  = Hq for all i c L,
I{i e L|xP.z}| > ^ and therefore |(L - L)| >
Hence in any situation s ’ that can be created by members of L 
following strategies different from those which they followed 
in situation s while all members of (L - L) continue to follow 
the same strategies as is s:
I{i e L|xPjy for all y e (A - {x})}| > ^
Hence Plu(s', A) = {x} which is contrary to our hypothesis.
Hence there is no threat to s and therefore s c E(A, Plu, s) and 
E(A, Plu, s) + <p.
Hence for all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if 
(s, A) e D0 . then E(A, Plu, s) 4= tj).
“l
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Theorem 4 . 1 0
Fo r  a l l  A e X an d  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f
( s ,  A) I  D. . and ( s ,  A) e Dw . and M a j ( s ,  A) i s  a r Smaj Ma-]
s i n g l e t o n  t h e n  E(A, P l u ,  s )  = <j).
P r o o f
L e t  A e X an d  l e t  s be  an y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t  ( s ,  A) i  D_T Smaj
an d  ( s ,  A) e anc  ^ A) i s  a  s i n g l e t o n ,  s a y  x f o r  some x e A.
L e t  s e S b e  any  s i t u a t i o n .
We c o n s i d e r  two e x h a u s t i v e  and m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :
1. P l u ( s ,  A) = {x}
2 .  P l u ( s ,  A) 4 ( x )
We w i l l  show i n  e a c h  c a s e  t h a t  s  ^ E(A, P l u ,  s )  an d  h e n c e  E(A, P l u ,  s )  = <}>.
1. S u p p o se  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x}.
S i n c e  ( s ,  A) A D„ t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one  z c (A -  {x})  s u c hr Smaj
t h a t :  I {i  c L | z P ^ x } |  = | {i  e L |x P  z } | .
L e t  L = { i  e l IzP . x }.
' l
S i n c e  S_^  = IT0 f o r  a l l  i  e L,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  |L 2 '
L e t  s ’ b e  an y  s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t :  R! e S . ( z )  f o r  a l l  i  e L
l i
R^ = f o r  a l l  k e (L -  L) .
Given t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ' ,
I { i  e L | z P ^ y  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  { z } ) } | = ^
By d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  z e P l u ( s ' ,  A).
We c o n s i d e r  two e x h a u s t i v e  and m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :
( a )  P l u ( s \  A) = {z}
(b)  P l u ( s ’ , A) 4 {z)
We show i n  e a c h  c a s e  t h a t  s sj: E(A,  P l u ,  s )  .
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(a)  S u p p o se  P l u ( s ' ,  A) = { z } .
Given t h e  max im in  a s s u m p t i o n ,  s ' Q ^  p-^us f ° r  a l l  i  c E an d  t h e r e f o r e
< L, s '  > i s  a t h r e a t  t o  s and s E(A, P l u ,  s )  .
(b)  S u p p o se  P l u ( s ’ , A) ^ {z}
S i n c e  j { i  e L | z P ^ y  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  { z } )} | = ^  and P l u ( s ' ,  A) =1= { z ) i t  
f o l l o w s  t h a t  z e P l u ( s ,  A) an d  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an  a e (A -  {z})  s u c h  t h a t  
I {i  e L | a P ^ b  f o r  a l l  b e  (A -  { a } ) } |  = ^
S i n c e  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x} i t  f o l l o w s  f r om  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  
f u n c t i o n  t h a t  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  { x } ) ,
I { i  e LIyP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y } ) } | < ^
Given t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ' ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  f o r  a l l  
y e  (A -  { z } ) ,
I { i  e LIyP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y } ) } | <
I { i  e L I yP_^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y })} |
Hence f o r  a l l  y e (A -  { x ,  z } ) ,
I { i  e LIyP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y } ) } | < ^ 
and t h e r e f o r e ,
I { i  e L |xP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {x } ) } | = ^ 
and h e n c e  P l u ( s ' ,  A) = {x ,  z } .
Given t h e  max im in  a s s u m p t i o n ,  s ' Q ^  p ^ u s f ° r  a H  i  c L an<i  t h e r e f o r e
< L,  s '  > i s  a t h r e a t  t o  s and s  ^ E(A,  P l u ,  s ) .
2.  S u p p o se  P l u ( s ,  A) =j= {x}
I t  f o l l o w s  f r om  th e o r e m  4 . 1  t h a t  s i| E(A,  P l u ,  s )  .
S i n c e  1 and 2 e x h a u s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  s £ E(A,  P l u ,  s )  
and h e n c e  E(A,  P l u ,  s )  = cj).
Our r e s u l t  f o l l o w s .
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Lemma 4.2
For all A e X and for all s e S and for every sincere
situation s such that (s, A) e D . and Mai(s, A) containsMaj
exactly two distinct elements, say x and y for some distinct 
x, y e A, if s I S(x, y) then s E(A, Plu, s).
Proof
Let A e X and let s be any sincere situation such that (s, A) e Dw .Maj
and Maj(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements, say x and y for 
some distinct x, y e A.
Let s e S such that s £ S(x, y).
We consider the following exhaustive and mutually exclusive 
possibilities:
(a) Plu(s, A) = {x, y}
(b) PI u (s , A) =f {x, y}
We show in each case that s { E(A, Plu, s).
(a) Suppose Plu(s, A) = {x, y}
By assumption S_^  = Hq for all i e L and hence either xP^y or yP^x for 
all i e L.
By hypothesis, s S(x, y) and hence the following possibilities are 
exhaus tive:
(i) for some i e L, x P .yl an d R . til 1 Si(x)
(it) for some 1 i. Ij, yP . xl and R. i| i 1 si(y)
We show in each case that s tj; E(A,Plu, s) .
(i) Suppose for some i e L, xP^y and R if S . (x) .
Let s' be any situation such that: R! e S.(x) for i c Li i
R,' = R, for all k c (L - {i}). k k
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Given  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ' ,
I { i  e l | xP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  { x } ) } |  =
I { i  £ L,|xP > 7 f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {x }) } | + 1. 
and f o r  a l l  z £ (A -  { x } ) ,
I { i  £ L |z P ^ w  f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  { z }) } | <:
I { i  £ l | zP^w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  { z } ) } |
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x,  y} and i t  f o l l o w s  f rom t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  t h a t :
I { i  £ L |x P^w  f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {x } ) } | =
I {i  £ L |yP^w  f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {y } ) } | 
and f o r  a l l  z £ (A -  {x ,  y } ) ,
I {i  £ L |x P^w  f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {x } ) } | >
j {i  £ L|zP_^w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  { z }) } |
Hence f o r  a l l  z £ (A -  { x } ) ,
I { i  £ l | xP ! w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {x } )} [  >
[ { i  £ l | zP % 7 f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  { z }) } |
I t  f o l l o w s  f r om  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  t h a t  
P l u ( s ' ,  A) = { x } .
S i n c e  xP^y i t  f o l l o w s  f r o m  t h e  maximin a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  s ' p-^u s an<  ^
h e n c e  < {i },  s '  > i s  a t h r e a t  t o  s and s ff e \ a , P l u ,  s )  and h e n c e  
s £ E(A,  P l u , s ) .
( i i )  S u p p o s e  f o r  some i  e L, y i \ x  and ij: S ^ ( y ) .
L e t  s ’ be any s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t :  R |  e S_^(y) f o r  i  e L
R^ = R f o r  a l l  k e (L -  { i } ) .
By r e a s o n i n g  d i r e c t l y  a n a l o g o u s  t o  t h a t  i n  ( i )  i t  can be  shown t h a t
P l u ( s ' ,  A) = {y }. S i n c e  y P . x  i t  f o l l o w s  f r om  t h e  maximin a s s u m p t i o n
t h a t  s ’ O'*" s and h e n c e  < { i } ,  s '  > i s  a t h r e a t  t o  s and 
A , P l u
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s £ E"^(A, P l u ,  s )  and h e n c e  s £ E(A,  P l u ,  s )  .
O b v i o u s l y ,  i f  s |  S ( x ,  y) and P l u ( s ,  A) = ( x ,  y} t h e n  ( i )  an d  ( i i )  
e x h a u s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  We h a v e  shown i n  e a c h  c a s e  t h a t  
s tf E (A , P l u , s )  .
(b)  S u p p o s e  P l u ( s ,  A) =j= ( x ,  y}
By h y p o t h e s i s  ( s ,  A) e and M a j ( s ,  A) = {x,  y} and  h e n c e  i t
f o l l o w s  f rom t h e o r e m  4 . 1  t h a t  i f  P l u ( s ,  A) =f {x ,  y} t h e n  s fj: E(A,  P l u ,  s )  .
I n  summary,  i f  s tj: S ( x ,  y) t h e n  (a )  and (b)  e x h a u s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
We h a v e  shown i n  e a c h  c a s e  t h a t  s $ E(A,  P l u ,  s )  .





For all A e X and for every sincere situation s such that
(s, A) e a^d Maj(s, A) contains exactly two distinct
elements, say x and y for some distinct x, y e A,
E(A, Plu, s) = (p iff for some z c (A - {x, y}),






> | (i e L xP.y & xP^z}I and
$ | (i e L|yP.x & xP^z}
> {i e L|yP.x & yP.z}| and
$ | {i e L|xP.y & yP^z)|
• zP.y}| > | {i e: L | xP . y1 l & yP±z} | and
' z?±y )| > | {i £: L|yP_.x & xP . zl >1
zP^y}| = | { i e: LIxP . yl & xP . z 1 } | and
: zP^y} | = |{i E: L|yP.,x & yP±z}|
Proof: Sufficiency
Let A c X and let s be any sincere situation such that (s, A) e D,, .Maj
and Maj(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements, say x and y for 
some distinct x, y e A. Let s e S be any situation. We consider two 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive possibilities:
(a) s c S (x, y)
(b) s i|: S (x, y)
We show in each case that if condition 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 is satisfied 
then s f E(A, Plu, s) and hence E(A, Plu, s) = <j>.
(a) Suppose s c S(x, y)
By hypothesis, (s, A) c and Maj(s, A) = {x, y}. 
S^ = ITq for all i e L and hence | {i c L|xP^y}| = | {i 
By hypothesis, s c S(x, y) and hence,
By assumption,
I -  I Nc L|yPix}I = -.
14 8
I {i £ L|xP_^w for all w e (A - {x})} | =
I{i £ LlyP^w for all w e (A - {y})}| = ^
Hence, it follows from the definition of the Plurality function 
that Plu(s, A) = {x, y}.
We now consider, in turn, each of the four conditions in the statement 
of the theorem. We show that if condition 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 is satisfied 
then s (j; E(A, Plu, s) .
1. Suppose I {i £ l |zP^x }| > I {i £ L.|xP^ y & xP^zl| and 
I {i £ l |zP^ ,x }| 5 I {i £ L|yP^x & xP^z)|
Let L = {i £ l IzP.x ).l
Let s' be any situation such that: R! £ S.(z) for all i £ Ll i
R^ = R^ for all k £ (L - L).
Given the specification of situation s’,
{i £ L|xP^w for all w £ (A - {x})} = (i £ L|xP^y} - (i £ l |zP_^ x }
= {i £ LIxP.y & xP.z)
and,
{i £ L|yP^w for all w £ (A - {y})} = {i e L|yP^x} - {i £ l |zP^x }
= {i £ LIyP . x & xP.z}1 l l
and,
{i £ l IzP'.w for all w £ (A - {z}) } = {i £ l |zP.x }.l l
By hypothesis, |{i £ l |zP^x }| > j{i £ L|xP^y & xlhz}|
and hence, |{i £ L|zP|w for all w e (A - fz})}| >
I{i e l |xP|w for all w e (A - {x})}|. 
By hypothesis, |{i c l |zP^x}| $ |{i e L | yP x & xP^ z}|
and hence, |{i £ L|zP|w for all w c  (A- {z})}| 5
Ifi r LIyPjw for all w r (A - (y})}|
149
Given the definition of the Plurality function, Plu(s', A) = {z}
or Plu(s', A) = {y, z}. In either case, given the maximin assumption,
s’Q'f s for all i 0 L and therefore < L, s' > is a threat to s A, Plu *
and s I E(A, Plu, s) .
2. Suppose I {i c L | zP ^ y} | > [ {i e L|yP^x & yP^z}| and
I{i G LlzP^yll > I{i 0 L|xP^y & yP^z}]
Let L = {i c LIzP.y}.l
Let s’ be any situation such that: 0 S^(z) for all i 0 L
R^ = R^ for all k 0 (L - L).
By reasoning directly analogous to that in 1 it follows that 
Plu(s', A) = {z} or Plu(s', A) = {x, z}.
In either case, given the maximin assumption, s'Q^ p-^ us f°r i e L
and hence < L, s’ > is a threat to s and s { E(A, Plu, s).
3. Suppose [{i e LlzP^x or zP^ylj > |{i 0 LlxP^y & yP^zlj and
I{i 0 L|zP.x or zP^y}I > |{i 0 L|yP^x & xP^z}|
Let L = {i 0 l IzP.x or zP.y}.
Let s' be any situation such that: R^ 0 S^(z) for all i e L
R^ = R^ for all k 0 (L - L) .
Given the specification of situation s',
(i 0 LlxPlw for all w 0 (A - {x})} = {i 0 L|xP.y} - {i 0 l |zP.x or zP y} 1 1 ' i  1 1
= {i c LlxP.y & yP , z}1 1 i
and,
{i e L|yP|w for all w 0 (A - {y})} = {i e L|yP^x) - {i 0 b|zP^x or zP^y)
= {i 0 LlyP^x & xP^z}
and,
{i 0 l |zP!w for all w 0 (A - {z})} = {i 0 L|zP_^x or zP^ .y}
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By hypothesis, |{i e L|zPix or zPiy}| > |{i e L|xPiy & yPiz}|
and hence, |{i e L|zP|w for all w e (A - {z})}| >
I {i e L|xP^w for all w e (A - {x})} |
By hypothesis, |{i e l Jz^ x or zP^y}| > | {i e L|yP x & xP.z}|
and hence, |{i e L|zP|w for all w £ (A- {z})}| >
I{i e L|yP|w for all w e (A - {y})}|.
By definition of the Plurality function, Plu(s’, A) = (z).
Given the maximin assumption, s’Q^ s for all i e L and thereforeA,Plu
< L, s' > is a threat to s and s fj: E(A, Plu, s) .
4. Suppose I {i e L|zP_^ x & zP_^ y} | = | {i e L|xP^y & xP_^ z} | and 
I {i e l |zP_^ x & zP_^ y} I = I {i e L|yP_^ x & yP^z} |
Let L = {i e l |zP.x & zP.y}.l l
Let s' be any situation such that: Rd £ S^(z) for all i £ L
= Rk for all k £ (L - L).
Given the specification of situation s’,
(i e l |xP^w for all w £ (A - {y})} = (i e L|xP^y) - (i £ l |zP^x & zP^y)
{ i £ L|xP.y & xP.z)l l
and,
(i £ L|yP!w for all w £ (A - (y))} = (i £ L|yP^x) - {i £ LlzP^x & zP_^ y}
{i £ LIyP^x & yP z)
and,
{i c l IzP’.w for all w £ (A - {z})} = {i £ l |zP.x & zP.y).l i i
By hypothesis, |(i £ l |zP^x & zP^y}| = |{i e L|xP^y & xP^z}| 
and hence, |{i c L|zP|w for all w e  (A - {z})}| =
[{i e l |xP|w for all w e (A - {x})}J 
By hypothesis, |{i e L|zP . x & zP.y}[ = |{i c L | yP . x & yP.z}|
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an d  h e n c e ,  | {i  e l | zP_^ w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  { z } ) } |  =
I {i  e L|yP_jw f o r  a l l  w e (A -  { y } ) } |
By d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  P l u ( s ' ,  A) = {x,  y ,  z } .
i  ~
G iven  t h e  max im in  a s s u m p t i o n ,  s ' Q ^  p ^ u s f o r  a l l  i  £ L and  t h e r e f o r e  
< L,  s ’ > i s  a t h r e a t  t o  s and s $ E(A,  P l u ,  s ) .
I n  summary,  we h av e  shown i n  ( a )  t h a t  i f  s £ S ( x ,  y) and c o n d i t i o n  1 o r  
2 o r  3 o r  4 h o l d s  t h e n  s |  E(A,  P l u ,  s ) .
(b)  S u p p o se  s £ S ( x ,  y)
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  ( s ,  A) £ 
d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  x and y .  
4 . 2  t h a t  s fj: E(A,  P l u ,  s )  . 
t h e n  s ff E(A, P l u ,  s )  .
and M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two 
S i n c e  s S ( x ,  y) i t  f o l l o w s  f rom lemma 
Hence i f  c o n d i t i o n  1 o r  2 o r  3 o r  4 h o l d s
O b v i o u s l y ,  e i t h e r  s e S ( x ,  y)  o r  s |  S ( x ,  y) and  h e n c e  (a )  and (b)  
e x h a u s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  We h a v e  shown i n  e a c h  c a s e  t h a t  i f  
c o n d i t i o n  1 o r  2 o r  3 o r  4 h o l d s  t h e n  s fj: E(A, P l u ,  s )  and h e n c e  
E(A,  P l u ,  s )  = <p.
N e c e s s i t y
L e t  A c X an d  l e t  s be any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t  ( s ,  A) £ 
and M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  s a y  x an d  y f o r  
some d i s t i n c t  x ,  y e A. L e t  s £ S be  an y  s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t  s £ S ( x ,  y ) . 
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  ( s ,  A) c 1)^  an d  M a j ( s ,  A) = {x,  y} .  By a s s u m p t i o n ,
S_^  =  II o  f o r  a l l  i  £  L and h e n c e ,  j  {i  c L | x l \ y } |  = | { i  c L | y P ^ x } |  = ^
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  s c S ( x ,  y) and h e n c e ,
| { i  c L | xP w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  { x } ) } |  =
I {i  £ L |yP^w f o r  a l l  w c (A -  {y } ) } | = ^
Given t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  P L u ( s ,  A) = {x, y} .
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Now if E(A, Plu, s) = (J) then s { E(A, Plu, s) and we show that if 
s  ^ E(A, Plu, s) then condition 1 or condition 2 or condition 3 
or condition 4 must be satisfied.
Suppose s £ E(A, Plu, s) and hence there exists a threat, say 
< L, s' > to s. Obviously, Plu(s’, A) =j= {x, y}.
There are six mutually exclusive possibilities:
(a) Plu(s’, A) = {x}
(b) Plu(s’, A) = {y}
(c) x { Plu(s', A) and y £ Plu(s?, A) and there exists at 
least one z e (A - {x, y}) such that z e Plu(s', A).
(d) x e Plu(s*, A) and y  ^ Plu(s’, A) and there exists at
least one z e (A - {x, y}) such that z e Plu(s', A).
(e) x I Plu(sf, A) and y e Plu(s', A) and there exists at
least one z e (A - {x, y}) such that z e Plu(s’, A).
(f) x e Plu(s', A) and y e Plu(s', A) and there exists at 
least one z c (A - {x, y}) such that z e Plu(s?, A).
We consider each of these possibilities in turn and show that if 
s tj: E(A, Plu, s) then condition 1 or condition 2 or condition 3 or 
condition 4 must hold.
(a) Suppose Plu(s', A) = {x}.
Given the maximin assumption, L _C {i e L|xP^y}.
Obviously, L R {i £ LjyP^x} = (J). Thus in any situation s’ that 
can be created by members of L following strategies different from 
those which they followed in situation s while all members of 
(L - L) continue to follow the same strategies as in s,
{i e L|yP|w for all w e (A - {y}) } 3_ {i e L,|yP x}.£
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Since = üq for all i e L and by hypothesis Maj(s, A) = {x, y), 
then,
I {i £ L I xP_^ y} I = I {i £ L | yP^x} | =
Hence,
[ {i £ L,|yP!w for all w e (A - {y}) } | £
Given the definition of the Plurality function, y e Plu(s', A).
This is contrary to our hypothesis that Plu(s’, A) = {x} and 
hence there is no threat < L, s' > to s such that Plu(s’, A) = {x}.
(b) Suppose Plu(s', A) = {y}.
Given the maximin assumption, L {i e L,|yP^ x}.
Obviously, L (1 {i £ LjxP_^y} = <j). Thus in any situation s' that can 
be created by members of L following strategies different from those 
which they followed in situation s while all members of (L - L) 
continue to follow the same strategies as in s,
{i e L|xP!w for all w e (A - {x}) } ^ {i e LjxP^y}.
By reasoning directly analogous to that in (a) it is possible to show 
that x e Plu(s', A). This is contrary to our hypothesis that 
Plu(s', A) = {y} and hence there is no threat < L, s' > to s such 
that Plu(s*, A) = {y}.
(c) Suppose x £ Plu(s’ , A) and y fj: Plu(s', A) and there exists at 
least one z e (A - {x, y}) such that z c Plu(s', A).
If, for some i c L, xP^y then given the maximin assumption, s'Q^ p^us 
iff for all w c Plu(sT, A), wP y.
If, for some i e L, yP^x then given the maximin assumption, s'Q^ ppus 
iff for all w e Plu(s’, A), wP.x.i
Hence, L _C {i £ L|for all w e P1u (s ’, A), wP^x or wP^y}.
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By h y p o t h e s i s ,  z e P l u ( s ' ,  A) and h e n c e ,  L C { i  e L |zP^,x  o r  z M y } .  
O b v i o u s l y ,  L A { i  £ L | xP y & yP z} = (j). Thus  i n  a n y  s i t u a t i o n  s ’ 
t h a t  ca n  b e  c r e a t e d  by  members o f  L f o l l o w i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  d i f f e r e n t  
f r o m  t h o s e  w h i c h  t h e y  f o l l o w e d  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s w h i l e  a l l  members 
o f  (L -  L) c o n t i n u e  to  f o l l o w  t h e  same s t r a t e g i e s  a s  i n  s ,
{ i  e L ix P !w  f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {x}) }  0 { i  e L l x P . y  & y P . z } .
S i m i l a r l y ,  s i n c e  L M i  e L |yP^x & x M z }  = (j) i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  i n  any  
such s i t u a t i o n  s ' ,
{ i  c L. |yP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y })} { i  e L | y M x  & x M z }
an d  s i n c e  s e S ( x ,  y) t h e n ,
{ i  e L | z P | w  f o r  a l l  w e (A -  { z } ) }  C { i  £ L | zM x o r  z M y } .
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  x fj: P l u ( s ’ , A) an d  y { P l u ( s ' ,  A) and z e P l u ( s ’ , A) 
and g i v e n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,
I { i  e LIzP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  { z } ) } | >
| { i  e L |xP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  { x } ) } |
a n d  h e n c e ,
| { i  e LI z M  x o r  z M y } |  > | { i  e L | xM  y & yP^z}  | .
S i m i l a r l y ,
I { i  e LI zP x o r  z M y } |  > | { i  c L | yM x & x M  z} | .
H e n c e ,  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  < L,  s '  > t o  s  s u c h  t h a t  x fj: P l u ( s ' , A)
and y tj: P l u ( s ' ,  A) an d  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one  z e (A -  {x,  y})  
s u c h  t h a t  z c P l u ( s ' , A) t h e n  c o n d i t i o n  3 m u s t  be  s a t i s f i e d .
(d)  S u p p o s e  x c P l u ( s ' ,  A) and y { P l u ( s ' ,  A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t
l e a s t  one  z c (A -  {x ,  y})  su ch  t h a t  z £ P l u ( s ' ,  A).
I f ,  f o r  some i  e L,  xP^y t h e n  g i v e n  t h e  m aximin  a s s u m p t i o n ,
s ' Q j  s  i f f  f o r  a l l  w £ P l u ( s ' ,  A) ,  wP y .
A , P l u  i
155
I f ,  f o r  some i  c L, yP_^x t h e n  g i v e n  t h e  max im in  a s s u m p t i o n ,
s ' Q ^  s i f f  f o r  a l l  w c ( P l u ( s ' , A) -  { x } ) ,  w P .y .A , P l u  l
H e n ce ,  L _C { i  e L | f o r  a l l  w £ ( P l u ( s ' ,  A) -  { x } ) ,  wP ^y }
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  z e P l u ( s T, A) an d  h e n c e  L _C { i  e L | zP^,y} .
O b v i o u s l y ,  L fl { i  c L | y P ^ x  & yP_^z} = (j). Thus  i n  an y  s i t u a t i o n  s ’ 
t h a t  can  be  c r e a t e d  by members o f  L f o l l o w i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  d i f f e r e n t  
f r o m  t h o s e  w h i c h  t h e y  f o l l o w e d  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s w h i l e  a l l  members o f  
(L -  L) c o n t i n u e  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  same s t r a t e g i e s  a s  i n  s ,
{ i  c L |y P^w  f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y }) } 0^  { i  e L|yP_^x & yP_^z}.
S i m i l a r l y ,  s i n c e  L fl { i  e L j x P ^ y  & yP_^z} = 4» i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  
i n  an y  s u c h  s i t u a t i o n  s ’ ,
{ i  e l | xP_^ w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  { x } ) }  _0 { i  c L | x l \  y & yP^z} 
an d  s i n c e  s c S ( x ,  y)  t h e n ,
{ i  £ L |z P ^ w  f o r  a l l  w e (A -  { z } ) }  _C { i  e L | z P . y } .
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  z e P l u ( s * , A) and y £ P l u ( s ’ , A) and h e n c e ,  by  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,
I { i  £ l | zP | w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  { z }) } | >
I {i  £ L |yP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y } ) } |
T h e r e f o r e ,  | { i  e L|zP_^y}|  > | { i  e L | y P ^ x  & yP_^z}|
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  z e P l u ( s ' ,  A) an d  x  e P l u ( s * ,  A) an d  h e n c e ,  by  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,
I { i  £ Lj zP ^w  f o r  a l l  w e (A -  { z })}[  =
I { i  £ l | xP_!w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {x }) } |
T h e r e f o r e ,  | { i  e L|zP_^y}|  5 | { i  £ L j x P ^ y  & y P ^ z } | .
Hence i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  t h r e a t  < L,  s '  > t o  s s u c h  t h a t  x e P l u ( s ' ,  A) 
and y fj; P l u ( s ' ,  A) an d  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one  z e (A -  {x ,  y } )  s u c h  
t h a t  z £ P l u ( s ' , A) t h e n  c o n d i t i o n  2 m u s t  be  s a t i s f i e d .
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(e)  Suppose x £ P l u ( s ’ , A) and y e P l u ( s ’ , A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  
l e a s t  one z e (A -  {x, y}) such  t h a t  z e P l u ( s ’ , A) .
I f ,  f o r  some i  e L, x P .y  t hen  g iv e n  th e  maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,  s ’Q^ s
i f f  f o r  a l l  w e ( P l u ( s ' ,  A) -  {y } ) ,  wP^x.
I f ,  f o r  some i  c L, yP^x then  g i v e n  t h e  maximin a s s u m p t io n  s 'Q ^  p-^u 3
i f f  f o r  a l l  w e P l u ( s ' ,  A) ,  wP^x.
Hence,  L C { i  e L | f o r  a l l  w e ( P l u ( s ’ , A) -  {y } ) ,  wP^x}
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  z e P l u ( s ' ,  A) and hence  L C_ { i  e L | z P ^ x } .
O b v i o u s l y ,  L fl { i  e L |xP^y  & xP_^z} = and by r e a s o n i n g  d i r e c t l y
a n a lo g o u s  to  t h a t  i n  (d) i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  show t h a t  i f  z e P l u ( s ’ , A)
and x £ P l u ( s ' , A) t hen  
I {i  e L | z P ^ x } |  > I { i  e L|xP_^y & xP^z} |
S i m i l a r l y ,  L H { i  c L |yP^x  & xP z} = <j> and by r e a s o n i n g  d i r e c t l y  
a n a l o g o u s  to  t h a t  i n  (d) i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  show t h a t  i f  z e P l u ( s ' ,  A) 
and y e P l u ( s ’ , A) t h e n ,
I { i  e L |z P^x}I  5 I {i  g LIyP^x & xP z ] | .
Hence i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  < L, s ’ > to  s such t h a t  x f[ P lu ( s *  , A)
and y c P l u ( s ’ , A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one z e (A -  {x, y})
such  t h a t  z e P l u ( s ' ,  A) t hen  c o n d i t i o n  1 must  be s a t i s f i e d .
( f )  Suppose x g P l u ( s ' , A) and y g P1u ( s ' ,  A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  
l e a s t  one z e (A -  {x, y}) such t h a t  z e P l u ( s ’ , A).
S in c e  x, y g P l u ( s ,  A) and x,  y e P l u ( s f , A) t h e n ,  g iv en  the
maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,  s ' p ] u s i f f  f o r  a l l  w e ( P l u ( s * , A) -  {x, y } ) ,
wP.x and wP.y . l l
Hence,  L { i  c h | f o r  a l l  w g (P lu ( s*  , A) -  {x,  y}) , wP , x & wP^y}.
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  z c P l u ( s ' ,  A) and t h u s  L _C { i  e l | zP^.x & zP^y}.
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O b v i o u s l y ,  L fl { i  £ L | x P . y  & xP^z} = <J>. Thus  i n  an y  s i t u a t i o n  s '  
t h a t  c a n  b e  c r e a t e d  by members  o f  L f o l l o w i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  d i f f e r e n t  
f rom  t h o s e  w h i c h  t h e y  f o l l o w e d  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s w h i l e  a l l  members o f  
(L -  L) c o n t i n u e  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  same s t r a t e g i e s  a s  i n  s ,
{ i  e l IxP ’.w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {x } ) }  0 { i  £ L l x P . y  & x P . z } .
S i m i l a r l y ,  s i n c e  L D { i  e L, |yP^x & yP^z} = <{> t h e n  i n  an y  s u c h  
s i t u a t i o n  s ' ,
{ i  £ L, |yPjw f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {y }) } 0_ { i  £ L|yP_^x & y P ^ z )  . 
a n d ,  s i n c e  s £ S ( x ,  y)  t h e n ,
{ i  e l | zP ! w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  { z })} C { i  £ L l z P . x  & z P . y } .
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  z £ P l u ( s ' , A) an d  x £ P l u ( s ’ , A) an d  i t  f o l l o w s  
f r o m  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  t h a t :
I { i  e L | z P l w  f o r  a l l  w e (A -  { z } ) } | =
I {i  c l | xP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {x } ) } | .
T h e r e f o r e ,
I { i  e L|zP_^x & zP^y} I $ I { i  £ L | x P ^ y  & xP_^z} | .
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  z £ P l u ( s ’ , A) an d  y £ P l u ( s T, A) an d  i t  f o l l o w s  
f r o m  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  t h a t :
I { i  £ L|zP_^w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  { z })} | =
I { i  £ L|yP_!w f o r  a l l  w a (A -  {y } ) } |
T h e r e f o r e ,
I { i  £ L I zP_^x & zP^y} I | { i  c L, |yP^x & yP^z}  | .
H e n ce ,  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  < L,  s '  > t o  s s u c h  t h a t  x e P l u ( s ' , A) 
an d  y e P l u ( s ' ,  A) an d  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one  z e (A -  {x,  y} )  
s u c h  t h a t  z £ P l u ( s T, A) t h e n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  m us t  h o l d :
I {i  e LI zP^x  & z P ^ y } |  ^ I { i  £ L | x i \ y  & x P ^ z ) !  and 
I {i  r h | z P ^ x  Si z P . y } |  > I {i  e L j y P ^ x  & y P . z } | .
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Obviously, the following possibilities, (i) to (iv), are exhaustive 
and we show in each case that one of the four conditions in the 
statement of the theorem must be satisfied.
(i) Suppose I {i e L^P^x & zP^y)! > | { i e L|xPiy & xP z}| and
I {i e L I zP^x & zP^y} I = |{i e L| yP x & yP z}|
It follows that:
I {i e L|zf\x}| > |{i g L|xP^y & xP_^ z}| and 
I{i e L|zPix}|  ^ I{i e L|yP x & xP^z)!
Hence condition 1 must be satisfied.
(11) Suppose I{i c LlzP^x & zP^y}! > |{i e LlyP^x & yP.z}| and
I {i c l |zP_^ x & zP^y}| = |{i c L,|xP^ y & xP^z} |
It follows that:
I {i e L|zP^y}| > |{i e L,|yP^x & yP_.z}| and 
1{i e L|zP^y}| $ |{i e LjxP^y & yP^z}|
Hence condition 2 must be satisfied.
(iii) Suppose | {i e L|zP_^x & zP^y} | > |{i e L|xP_^ y & xP^z}| and
I {i e L|zP^x & zP^y} I > I {i 0 L | yi\ x & yP_^ z}|
It follows that:
I {i 0 l |zP^ ,x or zP^y}| > |{i 0 L,|xP^ y & yP^z}| and 
I {i 0 l |zP_^ x or zP^y}| > |{i 0 L|yP_^x & xP^z}|
Hence condition 3 must be satisfied.
(Iv) Suppose I (I 1 l |zP x & zP^y}| = | { I 1 h|xP^y & xP^z]| and
I {i c L,|zP^ x & zP^y) I = I {i 0 LlyP^x & yP^z) |
Hence condition A must be satisfied.
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Hence i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  < L, s '  > to  s such t h a t  x e P l u ( s ’ , A) 
and y e P l u ( s ’ , A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one z e (A -  {x, y}) 
such  t h a t  z c P l u ( s ’ , A) t h e n  c o n d i t i o n  1 o r  c o n d i t i o n  2 o r  c o n d i t i o n  
3 o r  c o n d t i o n  4 must  be s a t i s f i e d .
In  summary, i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  t o  s and s { E(A, P l u ,  s)  then  
( a ) ,  ( b ) , ( c ) ,  ( d ) , (e)  and ( f )  e x h a u s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  We have 
shown i n  each  c a se  t h a t  c o n d i t i o n  1 o r  c o n d i t i o n  2 o r  c o n d i t i o n  3 o r  
c o n d i t i o n  4 must  be s a t i s f i e d .  Now i f  E(A, P l u ,  s)  = cj> then  
s sj: E(A, P l u ,  s)  and hence  c o n d i t i o n  1 o r  c o n d i t i o n  2 o r  c o n d i t i o n  
3 o r  c o n d i t i o n  4 must  be s a t i s f i e d .  Our r e s u l t  f o l l o w s .
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Th eorem  4 . 1 2
For  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f
( s ,  A) c D . and M a i ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more Maj
d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  t h e n  E(A,  P l u ,  s )  = (J>.
P r o o f
L e t  A e X and  l e t  s be  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s u ch  t h a t  ( s ,  A) c 
and M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s .
L e t  s e S be  any s i t u a t i o n .
We c o n s i d e r  two e x h a u s t i v e  a n d  m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :  
1. P L u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A)
o r  2.  P l u ( s ,  A) =f M a j ( s ,  A)
We show i n  e a c h  c a s e  t h a t  s tj; E(A,  P l u ,  s )  .
DMaj
1. S u p p o s e  P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A) .
S i n c e  M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  t h e n  P l u ( s ,  A) 
c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s .  Hence i t  f o l l o w s  f rom t h e o r e m  
4 . 4  t h a t  s fj: E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  and h e n c e  s ^ E(A,  P l u ,  s )  .
2.  S u p p o s e  P l u ( s ,  A) M a j ( s ,  A) .
I t  f o l l o w s  f r o m  t h e o r e m  4 . 1  t h a t  s sj: E(A,  P l u ,  s )  .
S i n c e  1 an d  2 e x h a u s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  s (j: E(A,  P l u ,  s )  
an d  t h e r e f o r e  E(A, P l u ,  s )  = .
Hence f o r  a l l  A c X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  ( s ,  A) e ^Mnj 
and M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  t h e n
E (A, P l u ,  s )  = <f>.
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In  theorems 4 . 1 3  and 4 .1 4  we e s t a b l i s h  a number o f  s u f f i c i e n t  
(b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r y )  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  any g iv e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  to  
be a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  The c o n d i t i o n s  
e s t a b l i s h e d  as  b e in g  s u f f i c i e n t  i n  theo rem  4 .1 3  a r e  e x t r e m e l y  
demanding ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  when t h e  number o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  the i s s u e  
i s  r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e .  However , i n  C h a p t e r s  5 and 6,  we w i l l  show 
t h a t  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  c o n c l u s i o n  
to  f o l l o w  unde r  the  Nanson and Borda f u n c t i o n s .  P e l e g  (1978)  has  
u t i l i z e d  th e  same r a t i o ,  N( j Aj -  1 ) / j A| i n  h i s  theorem  4 . 3  to  p rove  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an e x a c t l y  and s t r i c t l y  c o n s i s t e n t  GDF. P a t t a n a i k  
(1978)  h a s  u t i l i z e d  t h e  same r a t i o  i n  h i s  theorem 8.6 to p rove  t h a t  
a wide c l a s s  o f  GDF's f a i l  to  s a t i s f y  a c o n d i t i o n  he  d e f i n e s  as  
’min imal  s t r i c t  c o n s i s t e n c y * .
Theorem 4 .14  i s  o b v io u s  and has  been  i n c l u d e d  o n ly  f o r  
compar ison  w i t h  o t h e r  r e s u l t s  -  namely theorems 5 .1 1  and 6 . 6 .
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Theorem 4 . 1 3
For  a l l  A c X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  t h e r e  
e x i s t s  an x £ A such  t h a t  f o r  a l l  y £ (A -  {x}) ,
I {i  e L| xP y} |  > N( |A| -  1 ) / |A|
t he n  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x} and s £ E(A, P l u ,  s )  .
P r o o f
Le t  A c  X and l e t  s be any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  such t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  
an x c A such  t h a t  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  {x}) ,
I { i  e L | x P . y } |  > N( |A| -  1 ) / |A|
I t  f o l l o w s  f rom our  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  {x}) ,
I {i  e L | yP^x}[  < N/IAI and hence  | ] < N/ | A] and t h e r e f o r e  
|LXI > N / | A | .
Hence f o r  a l l  y £ (A -  {x}) ,  IL I > 1L Ix 1 y 1
By d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x}.
As we have  shown above ,  f o r  a l l  y £ (A -  {x}) ,
I { i  e L I yP±x}I < N/I AI and |L | > N / | a | .
Hence f o r  a l l  y e (A -  {x}) ,  | { i  e L|yP x} |  < | L_^_ |
I t  f o l l o w s  f rom theorem 4 . 2  t h a t  s £ E(A, P l u ,  s ) .
Hence f o r  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  t h e r e  
e x i s t s  an x e A such t h a t  f o r  a l l  y £ (A -  {x}) ,  
j {i  £ L | x P^ y } |  > N( I AI -  1 ) / |A| t hen  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x} and 
s £ E(A, P l u ,  s ) .
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Theorem 4 . 1 4
F o r  a l l  A e X an d  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  
t h e r e  e x i s t s  an x e A s u c h  t h a t :
I {i  e L l x P ^ y  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  {x } ) } | > ^ 
t h e n  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x} and s e E(A,  P l u ,  s ) .
P ro o  f
L e t  A e X an d  l e t  s be  an y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an  
x g A s u c h  t h a t :
I {i  e L l x P ^ y  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  {x } ) } | > ^
I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  L > -  an d  h e n c e  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  ( x ) ) ,
By d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x} 
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  { x } ) ,
I {i  e L I xP^y} | > ^
Hence f o r  a l l  y e (A -  { x } ) ,
I u  E L | y P i x}I < ®
S i n c e  L > i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  { x } ) ,
I { i  e L | y P . x } I  < |Lx |
I t  f o l l o w s  f r o m  t h e o r e m  4 . 2  t h a t  s e E(A,  P l u ,  s ) .
Hence f o r  a l l  A e X an d  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  
an x e A s u c h  t h a t :
I {i  c L | x P ^ y  f o r  a l l  y c (A -  {x } ) } | > ^ 
t h e n  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x} and s c E(A, P l u ,  s ) .
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A l l  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  r e s u l t s  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  h a v e  b e e n  
c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  Nash s t a b i l i t y  o r  g e n e r a l i z e d  Nash s t a b i l i t y  o f  v o t i n g  
s i t u a t i o n s  u n d e r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  S i n c e  t h i s  GDF i s  d e c i s i v e  
b u t  n o t  r e s o l u t e ,  we h a v e  u t i l i z e d  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  s t r o n g  b e h a v i o u r a l  
a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 2 .  We now c o n s i d e r  an  a l t e r n a t i v e  a p p r o a c h ,  n am e ly  
t h a t  o f  i n t r o d u c i n g  a t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e  and u t i l i z i n g  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 1  
i n s t e a d  o f  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 2 .  We w i l l  l a t e r  em ploy  b o t h  o f  t h e s e  
a p p r o a c h e s  i n  o u r  s i m u l a t i o n  and compare  t h e  r e s u l t s  o b t a i n e d .
As we p o i n t e d  o u t  i n  C h a p t e r  2 ,  o n c e  we s p e c i f y  a p a r t i c u l a r  
t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e ,  t h e  g e n e r a l i t y  o f  o u r  r e s u l t s  w i l l  be  l i m i t e d  by 
t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  d e v i c e  c h o s e n .  The m o s t  common t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e  i s  
t h e  n o m i n a t i o n  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l  a s  c h a i r m a n  b u t ,  a s  we 
m e n t i o n e d  i n  C h a p t e r  1 and a s  we w i l l  d i s c u s s  a t  l e n g t h  i n  C h a p t e r  7,  
t h i s  p r e s e n t s  some p r o b l e m s  i n  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  b e c a u s e  we ca n  n o t  
i d e n t i f y  a p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l  a s  c h a i r m a n .
We w i l l  a p p r o a c h  t h i s  p r o b l e m  i n  two w a y s .  F i r s t l y ,  we 
w i l l  i n t r o d u c e  an  u n s p e c i f i e d  t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e  and we w i l l  as sume 
t h a t  any g i v e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s i s  an e q u i l i b r i u m  ( o r  s t r i c t  
e q u i l i b r i u m )  u n l e s s  we can  show t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  t o  s 
w i t h o u t  s p e c i f y i n g  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e .  We w i l l  
u s e  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  t o  e s t a b l i s h  maximum number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  
w h ich  c o u l d  c o n s t i t u t e  e q u i l i b r i a  ( o r  s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i a ) . Once a 
p a r t i c u l a r  t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e  i s  s p e c i f i e d ,  i t  w i l l  be  p o s s i b l e  to  
p r o v e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a t h r e a t  i n  a l a r g e r  number o f  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n s .  T h i s  p o i n t  w i l l  be  d e m o n s t r a t e d  i n  o u r  s e c o n d  a p p r o a c h  
to  t h e  p r o b l e m  w he re  we em ploy t h e  d e v i c e  o f  b r e a k i n g  t i c s  by 
r e f e r e n c e  Lo a s l r i c t  o r d e r i n g  o f  Lhe a l t e r n a t i v e s  w h ich  i s  f i x e d
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throughout the simulation.
aWe begin by defining a GDF Plu as follows:
AThe function Plu is a GDF such that for all A e X and 
N *for all s e IIq , Plu (s, A) = {x} where x e Plu(s, A) .
AThe function Plu may be interpreted as the function Plu supplemented
by a tie-breaking device. We observe that if Plu(s, A) contains two
or more elements then our definition does not specify which of the
Aelements in Plu(s, A) is chosen as the sole element of Plu (s, A).
AGiven only that Plu (s, A) is a single element subset of 
Plu(s, A), we can establish a sufficient condition for any given
— A —sincere situation s not to belong to E(A, Plu , s) but we can not 
establish a set of necessary and sufficient conditions without specify­
ing the nature of the tie-breaking device. However, if we can show
— A —that a given sincere situations s does not belong to E(A, Plu , s)
without specifying anything about the nature of the tie-breaking device
— A _then s will not belong to E(A, Plu , s) regardless of the particular 
tie-breaking device which is adopted. Similar remarks apply to the 
question of whether or not any given sincere situation s belongs 
to E^ (A, Plu , s).
In theorem 4.15, we establish a sufficient condition for 
_ a _any given sincere situation s not to belong to E(A, Plu , s) and in 
theorem 4.16, we establish a sufficient condition for any given sincere
_  ^ A _ Asituation s not to belong to E (A, Plu , s). Since Plu is always a 
singleton we have employed assumption 2.1 rather than the less defensible
assumption 2.2.
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Theor em 4 . 1 5
F o r  a l l  A e X a nd  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  f o r  
a l l  x e P l u ( s ,  A) t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one  y e (A -  {x})  
s u c h  t h a t  | { i  e L [yP_^x} | > | | t h e n ,  g i v e n  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 1 ,
s { E(A,  P l u * , s )  .
P r o o f
S u p p o s e  f o r  some A e X an d  f o r  some s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s and f o r  a l l  
x e P l u ( s ,  A) ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one  y e (A -  {x})  s u c h  t h a t  
I {i  £ L I y P ^ x } I > |L I .
Su p p o s e  P l u * ( s ,  A) = {a} f o r  some a  e P l u ( s ,  A) .
From o u r  h y p o t h e s i s  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one  
b e (A -  {a})  s u c h  t h a t  | { i  £ L, | bP^a} |  > |L | .
L e t  L = { i  e L | b P ^ a }.
L e t  s '  b e  any  s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t :  R'. £ S . ( b )  f o r  a l l  i  £ Ll i
R'  = R^ f o r  a l l  k £ (L -  L)
Gi ven  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ’ ,
{ i  e L l b P ’.w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {b} ) }  = { i  £ L l b P . a }  U L, l  ' l b
= U  £ L I b l ^ a }
and  f o r  a l l  y £ (A -  {b } ) ,
{ i  e L | y ? ! w  f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y })} C L 
1 l  — y
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  a e P l u ( s ,  A) and  h e n c e  f o r  a l l  z £ (A -  { a } ) ,
|L I * |L I.1 a 1 1 z 1
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  | { i  e L | b P . a } | > | l | and  h e n c e  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  { b } ) ,
1  cl
{ i  c L l b P . a }  > |L I 1 l  1 y 1
and  h e n c e  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  { b } ) ,
I { i  e L[ bP! w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {b } ) } | >
I {i  £ LIyP !w f o r  a l l W £ (A -  {y })} I
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Given the definition of the Plurality function, Plu(s’ A) = {b}
and hence Plu*(s’, A) = {b}. Given assumption 2.1, it follows
that s’Q^ jS for all i £ L and hence < L, s' > is a threat to A,Plu* ’
s and s £ E(A, Plu*, s).
Hence for all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if for all 
x e Plu(s, A) there exists at least one y e (A - {x}) such that 
I {i £ L|yP^x}| > IL I then, given assumption 2.1, s t}: E(A, Plu*, s) .
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Theor em 4 . 1 6
F o r  a l l  A e X and  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  f o r  
a l l  x e P l u ( s ,  A) t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one  
y e ( P l u ( s ,  A) -  {x})  s u c h  t h a t  | { i  e L|yP_^x}|  > |L | 
t h e n  g i v e n  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 1 ,  s £ E^(A,  P l u * ,  s ) .
P r o o f
S u p p o s e  f o r  some A e X a nd  f o r  some s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s and  f o r  a l l  
x e P l u ( s ,  A) t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one  y £ ( P l u ( s ,  A) -  {x}) s u c h  
t h a t  I {i  £ L | y P ^ x } |  > [l  | .
Su p p o s e  P l u * ( s ,  A) = {a} f o r  some a  £ P l u ( s ,  A) .
From o u r  h y p o t h e s i s ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one
b £ ( P l u ( s ,  A) -  {a})  s u c h  t h a t  | {i  £ L|bP_^a}|  > |L | -
S i n c e  a ,  b £ P l u ( s ,  A) i t  f o l l o w s  f r om t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y
f u n c t i o n  t h a t  L = \ L, I .
S i n c e  | {i  e L|bP_^a}|  > | | i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  | {i  £ L|bP_^a}|  > | |
and  h e n c e  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one  i  e L s u c h  t h a t  b P . a  and  i l l .l  T b
L e t  s ’ b e  an y  s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t :  R \  £ S . ( b )  f o r  i  £ L
l i
f o r  a l l  k  £ (L -  { i } )
Gi v en  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ' ,
I {i  e L | bP^w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {b }) } | = |L | + 1 
a n d  f o r  a l l  y £ (A -  { b } ) ,
{ i  £ L|yP!^w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {y }) } < |L | .
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  b e P l u ( s ,  A) and i t  f o l l o w s  f rom t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
t h e  P l u r a l i t y  t h a t  f o r  a l l  y e  (A -  {b }) , | |  ^ |L | .
Hence  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  {b } ) ,
I {i  e L j b P j w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {b }) } | >
I {i  e L | yP^w f o r  a l l w e (A -  {y ) ) } I
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Given the definition of the Plurality function, Plu(s', A) = {b} and 
hence Plu*(s', A) = {b}.
Given assumption 2.1, it follows that s’Q^ p]uy'S an<^  ^ence 
< {i}, s’ > is a threat to s and s { E^(A, Plu*, s).
Hence for all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if for all 
x e Plu(s, A) there exists at least one y e (Plu(s, A) - {x}) 
such that I {i e L|yP_^ x}| > |L | then, given assumption 2.1, 
s  ^ (A, Plu*, s).
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Suppose ,  f o r  any i s s u e  A and f o r  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  
we can show t h a t  s $ E(A, P l u  , s )  on th e  b a s i s  o f  theo rem  4 . 1 5 .  I t  
f o l l o w s  t h a t  f o r  some x e P l u ( s ,  A) t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one 
y e (A -  {x}) such  t h a t  | { i  e L|yP^,x}|  > |L | .  Hence i f  P l u ( s ,  A) i s  
a s i n g l e t o n  then  we can use  theo rem  4 .2  to  show t h a t  s { E(A, P l u ,  s ) . 
S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  t hen  we 
can use  t heo rem  4 . 3  to  show t h a t  s fj: E(A, P l u ,  s)  . F u r t h e r ,  i f  P l u ( s ,  A) 
c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  t h e n  i t  f o l l o w s  from theorem  4 .4  
t h a t  s  ^ E(A, P l u ,  s ) . Hence i f  we can show t h a t  s £ E(A, P l u  , s )  on 
t h e  b a s i s  o f  theorem  4 .1 5  t h e n  we can show t h a t  s £ E(A, P l u ,  s)  on the  
b a s i s  o f  theo rem s  4 . 2 ,  4 . 3  and 4 . 4 .
Suppose ,  f o r  any i s s u e  A and f o r  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  
we can show t h a t  s £ E (A, P l u  , s )  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  theo rem 4 . 1 6 .  We 
o b s e r v e  t h a t  i f  P l u ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n  t h e n  we canno t  show t h a t
-  I 1 *  -
s £ E (A, P l u  , s )  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  e s t a b l i s h e d
_  *  -
i n  theo rem  4 .1 6  a l t h o u g h  we may be a b l e  to  show t h a t  s ff E(A, P l u  , s )  
on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  e s t a b l i s h e d  on theo rem  4 . 1 5 .
Suppose ,  however ,  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t
-  I 1 * -
e l e m e n t s  s ay  x and y and we can show t h a t  s ff E (A, P l u  , s )  on the  
b a s i s  o f  theo rem  4 .1 6 .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  j {i  c L |yP ^ x} |  > | l ^ |  and 
hence  we can show (a s  we d i d  i n  p a r t  (a)  o f  the  s u f f i c i e n c y  p r o o f  i n  
theo rem 4 .3 )  t h a t ,  g iv e n  a s su m p t io n  2 . 2 ,  s if E^(A, P l u ,  s )  . F u r t h e r ,  
i f  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  t h e n  i t  f o l l o w s  
from theorem  4 . 4  t h a t  s fj: E^(A, P l u ,  s)  . Hence i f  we can show t h a t
-  i 1 * -
s if E (A, P l u  , s )  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  theo rem 4 .1 6  then  we can show t h a t ,  
g iv e n  the  maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,  s tj: E^(A, P l u ,  s)  .
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We make t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a d d i t i o n a l  o b s e r v a t i o n s  which w i l l  
be u s e f u l  i n  C h a p te r  7. Suppose t h a t  f o r  t h e  i s s u e  A = {x,  y ,  z} 
and f o r  some s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s such t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x, y ,  z} ,  we
_ i 1 * _
can show t h a t  s i  E (A, P l u  , s) on t h e  1b a s i s  o f  theo rem 4 . 1 6 .  I t
f o l l o w s t h a t :
1 . | {i  e L yP^x} > L I
X
or I {i  e L | z P ^ x } |  > | l I1 X
and 2. | {i  e L | xP . y } | > | l
y
o r | {i  e L |zP  ^ y } | > | l I 
y
and 3. | { i  e L |x P ^ z } | > | Lz 1 o r | {i  e L |yP z} | > | l I1 z
Suppose ,  however ,  t h a t we c a n n o t  show t h a t  s £
1
E (A, P l u
on th e  b a s i s  o f theorem 4 .1 6 . I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t :
1 . | { i  e L |y P ^ x } | = | l1 X and | { i  e L |zP^x}  | := | l IX
o r 2. | { i  e L xP^y}| = | l I 
y
and | {i  e L z P ^ y } | = | l I 
y
o r 3. 1 {i  e L xP z}| = | l z 1 and | { i  e L | y ? i z}| = | l Iz
Hence f o r  some a e P l u ( s , A) t h e r e  does n o t  e x i s t  any
b e (A -  {a}) such t h a t  | { i  e L, |bP^a}|  > | L | . I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  i f
t h e  i s s u e  A = {x,  y ,  z )  and P l u ( s ,  A) = A and we ca n n o t  show t h a t  
1 * -
s f E (A, P l u  , s )  on th e  b a s i s  o f  theo rem 4 .16  t h e n  we c a n n o t  show
—  I *  -
t h a t  s $ E(A, P l u  , s )  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  theo rem  4 . 1 5 .
We have employed t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by theorems 
4 .1 5  and 4 .1 6  i n  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  to  d e t e r m i n e ,  f o r  any g iven  i s s u e  A 
c o n t a i n i n g  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  and f o r  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n
— — ~k —
s ,  t h e  maximum p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s e E(A, P l u  , s )  and th e  maximum p r o b a b i l -  
1 * _
i t y  o f  s e E (A, P l u  , s )  g i v e n  a s su m p t io n  2 . 1 .  We w i l l  compare t h e s e  
r e s u l t s  w i t h  the p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s e E(A, P l u ,  s)  and w i t h  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  
o f  s c E^(A, P l u ,  s)  g iv en  a s su m p t io n  2 . 2 .
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We now consider the device of breaking ties by reference to 
a strict ordering of the alternatives which is fixed throughout the 
simulation. This device can be interpreted as the appointment of a 
chairman who does not vote unless a tie occurs.
Let x, y and z £ X and let R be a strict ordering defined over
iX such that xRy and yRz. The function Plu is a GDF such that for all
N tA c X and for all s c IIq , Plu (s, A) = {a) where a e Plu(s, A) and 
aRb for all b e (Plu(s, A) - {a}).
4.
Hence for the issue A = {x, y, z} the choice set Plu (s, A) 
would be determined as follows:
1. If x c Plu(s, A) then Plu*(s, A) = {x}
4-
and 2. If x | Plu(s, A) and y c Plu(s, A) then Plu (s, A) = {y}
4-
and 3. If x | Plu(s, A) and y £ Plu(s, A) then Plu (s, A) = {z}
1Given assumption 2.1, the ordering R, the issue A and the GDF Plu ,
the relations T^ -,- t determine an ordering over S for all i e L.APlu
For the issue A = {x, y, z} and for any given sincere
—  —  4-situation s, the necessary and sufficient conditions for s £ E(A, Plu', s) 
are simply derived and are stated below without proof:
For the issue A = {x, y, z} and for any sincere situation s, 
s  ^ E(A, Plu*, s) iff:
1. x c Plu(s, A) and
(I{i £ L|yP.x}| > |L [ or |{i £ l |zP.x }| > |l |)
l X I X
or 2. x I Plu(s, A) and y £ Plu(s, A) and
( I { i £ L I xP^y} I 5 IL I or |{i £ LlzP^y)! > | L | )
or 3. x sj: Plu(s, A) and y Plu(s, A) and
(I{i e LIxP^z}[ 5 |L I or J{i £ LlyP^z)! 5 |L |)
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We have employed the above conditions in the simulation in 
order to determine, for the issue A = {x, y, z} and for any sincere 
situation s, the probability of s e E(A, Plu', s) given assumption 2.1. 
We will compare these results with the probability of s e E(A, Plu, s) . 
given assumption 2.2.
For the issue A = {x, y, z} and for any sincere situation s, 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for s if: E (A, Plu , s) are 
simply derived and are stated below without proof:
For the issue A = {x, y, z} and for any sincere situation s, 
s £ E^(A, Plu', s) iff:
1. Plu(s, A) = {y} and
1L I - IL I = 1 and I { i e L I xP .y} I  ^ |l I 
or 2. Plu(s, A) = {z} and
(a) IL I — IL I = 1 and |{i c l |xP.z }| £ |l |
or (b) |Lj - IL I = 1 and |{i e L,|yP^z}| £ | |
or 3. Plu(s, A) = {x, y} and
I (i e L|yPix}| > | |
or 4. Plu(s, A) = {x, z} and
I {i e LizP.x }I > |l I I 1 i 1 1 x'
or 5. Plu(s, A) = {y, z} and
(a) I{i e L|zP^y}| > |L |
or (b) IL I — IL [ = 1  and I{i e L|xP.y}| £ |l I
or 6. Plu(s, A) = {x, y, z} and
(a) I{i e LIyP^x}| > | |
or (b) I{i e LIzP.x}I > IL I1 l 1 1 x 1
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—  —  1  —
We n o t e  t h a t  i f  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x} t h e n  s e E (A, P l u  , s ) . We
a l s o  n o t e  t h a t ,  g i v e n  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 1 ,  t h e r e  can e x i s t  a  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n
—  —  —  ^  •{* __
s s u c h  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x ,  y ,  z} and s e E (A, P l u  , s ) . F u r t h e r ,  i f
s e E (A, P l u 1, s )  t h e n  I { i  e L | y P . x } |  < | l  I and  I { i  e l | zP . x }| < | l  I
1 x i  1 x
an d  h e n c e  s e E(A,  P l u ' ,  s ) . By c o n t r a s t ,  g i v e n  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 2 ,  t h e r e  
d o e s  n o t  e x i s t  an y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s s u c h  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x,  y ,  z} 
and s g E^(A,  P l u ,  s ) .
We h a v e  e m p lo y ed  t h e  ab o v e  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  i n
o r d e r  t o  d e t e r m i n e ,  f o r  t h e  i s s u e  A = {x,  y ,  z} and f o r  any s i n c e r e
-  1 + -
s i t u a t i o n  s ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s g E (A, P l u  , s )  g i v e n  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 1 .
We w i l l  co m pare  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  w i t h  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s c E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  
g i v e n  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 2 .
At t h i s  s t a g e  we m e r e l y  o b s e r v e  t h a t  f o r  t h e  i s s u e  A = {x ,  y ,  z} 
t h e r e  c a n  e x i s t  a s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s s u c h  t h a t  s e E(A,  P l u ,  s )  g i v e n  
a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 2  b u t  s £ E (A, P L u ' , s )  and h e n c e  s tj: E(A,  P l u  , s )  g i v e n  
a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 1 .  The f o l l o w i n g  exa m p le  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y .
Example  4 . 1
L e t  i s s u e  A = {x ,  y ,  z} and l e t  L = { 1 ,  2} and l e t  s be  a 
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t  y P ^ zP ^ x  and z P ? xP 2y*
L e t  s '  be  a  s i t u a t i o n  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to  s s u c h  t h a t  
y P ^ zP ^ x  and x P ^ zP ^ y .
I t  i s  e a s y  t o  v e r i f y  t h a t  P . l u ( s ,  A) = { y ,  z} and P l u ' ( s ,  A) = {y }. .
-j-
F u r t h e r ,  P l u ( s ' ,  A) = {x,  y} and P l u  ( s ' ,  A) = {x }.  Given a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 1 ,
2 — — — l -j- _
s ’ Q I s and h e n c e  < { 2 } ,  s '  > i s  a t h r e a t  t o  s and s tf E (A, P l u  , s )  .
ÄJL _L LI
H ow eve r ,  i t  f o l l o w s  f r o m  t h e o r e m  4 . 3  t h a t  s e E(A,  P l u ,  s )  g i v e n
a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 2 .
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The p o s s i b i l i t y  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  ex a m p le  4 . 1  ca n  o n l y  o c c u r  
when N = 2 .  H ow ever ,  when N > 2 ,  t h e r e  ca n  e x i s t  a s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n
—  _  . j .  _
s s u c h  t h a t  s t[ E(A,  P l u  , s )  g i v e n  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 1  a l t h o u g h  
s e E(A,  P l u ,  s )  g i v e n  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 2 .  The f o l l o w i n g  e x a m p le  i l l u s ­
t r a t e s  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y .
Example  4 . 2
L e t  A = {x,  y ,  z} and l e t  L = { 1 ,  2 ,  3,  4} and l e t  
s be  a  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t :  
f o r  a l l  i  c {1 ,  2 } ,  yP_^zP_^x
f o r  a l l  i  e {3 ,  4 } ,  z P . x P . y
l  l
L e t  s '  be  an y  s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t :  
f o r  a l l  i  £ {1 ,  2 } ,  y P ^zP ^x
f o r  a l l  i  £ {3,  4 } ,  x P ' . z P l y
l i
As i n  e x a m p l e  4 . 1 ,  P l u ( s ,  A) = { y ,  z} and P l u ^ ( s ,  A) = {y } . F u r t h e r ,
•j*
P l u ( s ’ , A) = {x ,  y} and P l u  ( s ’ , A) = { x } .  Given  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 1 ,
s ’ t s  f o r  a l l  i  e {3 ,  4} and h e n c e  < {3,  4 } ,  s ’ > i s  a  t h r e a t  t oA , P l u
s  and s j}: E(A,  P l u  , s )  . Ho we ve r ,  i t  f o l l o w s  f rom t h e o r e m  4 . 3  t h a t  
s £ E(A,  P l u ,  s )  g i v e n  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 2 .
The p o s s i b i l i t i e s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  e x a m p l e s  4 . 1  an d  4 . 2  o c c u r  
b e c a u s e  we h a v e  a d o p t e d  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  o f  b r e a k i n g  t i e s  by r e f e r e n c e  
to  t h e  o r d e r i n g  R s u ch  t h a t  xRy and yRz.  T h i s  o r d e r i n g  d o e s  n o t  
c o r r e s p o n d  w i t h  t h e  s i n c e r e  o r d e r i n g  o f  an y  i n d i v i d u a l  i n  e x a m p l e s  
4 . 1  o r  4 . 2 .
We c o n c l u d e  t h i s  c h a p t e r  by p r e s e n t i n g  a summary o f  t h e










Theorems in Chapter A
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s and for
all s e S, if s e E(A, Plu, s) then (s, A) e D_, . andMaj
Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A).
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s such 
that Plu(s, A) is a singleton say x for some x £ A, 
s I E(A, Plu, s) iff for some y e (A - {x}),
|{i E L|yP.x}| 5 |Lx |.
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s such that 
Plu(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements say x and y 
for some distinct x, y e A, s  ^ E(A, Plu, s) iff there exists 
at least one z £ (A - {x, y}) such that:
1. {i £ LlzP.x & zP.y} 4= d>
2. I {i e L|zP_^x or zP_^ y} | > j {i e L|xP^y & yP_^ z} | and
I {i £ L|zP_^x or zP_^ y} I > |{i £ L|yP_^x & xP_^ z} |
For all A £ X and for every sincere situation s and for all
s £ S, if Plu(s, A) contains three or more distinct elements 
then s { E^(A, Plu, s).
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s, 
E^(A, Plu, s) =j= (j).
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if
(s, A) e D^a_. and Maj(s, A) is a singleton then there exists 
an s e S such that Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A) and 





4 . 1 0
4 . 1 1
F o r  a l l  A £ X and  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  
( s ,  A) e an d  M a j ( s , A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t
e l e m e n t s  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an  s e S s u c h  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = 
M a j ( s ,  A) an d  s e E^(A,  F l u ,  s )  .
F o r  a l l  A £ X an d  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f
( s ,  A) e DMaj anC* A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more  d i s t i n c t
e l e m e n t s  t h e n  t h e r e  d o e s  n o t  e x i s t  a n  s £ S s u c h  t h a t
P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A) an d  s £ E (A, P l u ,  s ) .
F o r  a l l  A £ X an d  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f
( s ,  A) £ D_ . t h e n  E(A,  P l u ,  s )  =j= cp.bmaj 1
F o r  a l l  A e X an d  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f
( s ,  A) £ D . and ( s ,  A) £ D . and M a j ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n
OÜ13.J McLJ
t h e n  E(A,  P l u ,  s )  = <J>.
F o r  a l l  A e X an d  f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s s u c h
t h a t  ( s ,  A) £ an d  M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t
e l e m e n t s ,  s a y  x  an d  y f o r  some d i s t i n c t  x ,  y e A,
E(A,  P l u ,  s )  = 4> i f f  f o r  some z £ (A -  {x ,  y} )  ,
1. [ { i  £ L | z P ^ x } |  > I {i  £ L|xP_^y & xP_^z} | an d
I {i  £ L j zP_^x} I £ I { i  e L I yP_^x & x P ^ z } |
o r  2.  ] { i  £  L j zP ^ y ) I > | { i e L | y P . x & y P ^ z } |  and
I {1 c L Iz P  y } I $ I {i  £ L |x P  y & yP z} |
o r  3.  I {i  c L | z P ^ x  o r  z P ^ y } |  > | { i  £ L [xP^y & y P ^ z } |  and
I { i  £ L | z P ^ x  o r  z P , y } |  > | { i  e L j y P ^ x  & xP^z}  [
o r  4 .  | { i  £ l | zP^ x & zP^y} | = | {i  £ L | xP^y  & xP^z} | and
I {i  £ l | zP^ x & zP^y} I = J { i  £ L | y l \  x  & yP_^z} |





( s ,  A) £ Dw . and M a i ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  Maj
e l e m e n t s  then  E(A, P l u ,  s)  = <j).
For  a l l  A c X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f
t h e r e  e x i s t s  an x e A such  t h a t  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  {x} ) ,
| { i  e L I x P .y } I > N( |A| -  1 ) / |A| then  
P l u ( s ,  A) = {x} and s e E(A, P l u ,  s ) .
For  a l l  A £ X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  
t h e r e  e x i s t s  an x £ A such t h a t :
I {i  e LlxP^y f o r  a l l  y e (A -  {x}) } | > ^ 
t h e n  P l u ( s ,  A) = {x} and s e E(A, P l u ,  s ) .
For  a l l  A £ X and f o r  e v e ry  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  
f o r  a l l  x e P l u ( s ,  A) t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one 
y £ (A -  {x}) such  t h a t  | {i  £ L, |yP^x}|  > [L | t h e n ,  
g iv e n  t h e  a s s u m p t io n  2 . 1 ,  s £ E(A, P l u * ,  s ) .
For  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f
f o r  a l l  x e P l u ( s ,  A) t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one
y £ ( P l u ( s ,  A) -  {x}) such t h a t  | { i  £ L |y P ^ x } |  > | L | 
t h e n  g iv e n  a s s u m p t io n  2 . 1 ,  s £ E^(A, P l u * ,  s ) .
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5 THE STABILITY OF SITUATIONS UNDER THE 
NANSON FUNCTION
In this chapter we will study the stability of situations
under the Nanson function. We will assume throughout this analysis
Nthat S_^ = n0 for all i e L and hence S = IIq . Unless we state 
specifically otherwise, it will be assumed that all individuals 
follow the maximin rule i.e. assumption 2.2 is satisfied.
We begin by proving (theorem 5.1) that the Nanson function 
satisfies the property of weak Condorcet consistency which we defined 
in Chapter 2. We then establish, for any given issue A containing 
exactly three distinct elements, a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for any given sincere situation to be a strict equilibrium 
under this GDF (theorems 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4). From these conditions 
we deduce the necessary and sufficient conditions for any given 
sincere situation to be an equilibrium. We then prove that for 
every possible sincere situation and every possible issue the set 
of equilibria under the Nanson GDF is non-empty (theorem 5.5); and 
we establish a number of results concerning the existence of equilibria 
under the Nanson function which satisfy certain additional demands 
(theorems 5.6 and 5.7).
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As we have be e n  u n a b le  to  p rove  t h e  e x a c t  c o u n t e r p a r t  o f  
theo rem  4 . 1  b u t  o n ly  t h e  weaker  r e s u l t  s t a t e d  i n  theorem 5 . 1 ,  we 
have been  u n a b le  to  e s t a b l i s h  a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  the  s e t  o f  s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i a  under  t h e  Nanson 
f u n c t i o n  to be non-em pty .  However,  t h e  c o u n t e r p a r t  o f  theo rem  4 .9  
i s  p ro v ed  unde r  t h e  h e a d i n g  o f  theo rem 5 . 8 .
We p r o c e e d  to  p rove  t h a t ,  f o r  any g iv e n  i s s u e  A, e v e r y  
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  which i s  a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  
f u n c t i o n  i s  a l s o  a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n  
( th e o r e m  5 . 9 ) .  We c o n c lu d e  by p r o v i n g  a  number o f  c o n d i t i o n s  which 
a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  any g iv e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  
to be a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n .
We now p rove  theo rem  5 . 1 .  We have  s t a t e d  t h e  theo rem  i n  
a form which  w i l l  be  u s e f u l  i n  s u b s e q u e n t  p r o o f s .  I t  f o l l o w s  s im p ly  
from t h i s  r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f i e s  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  
weak C ondorce t  c o n s i s t e n c y .  We have n o t  been  a b l e  to  p rove  t h a t  t h e  
Nanson f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f i e s  the  s t r o n g e r  p r o p e r t y  o f  Condorce t  
c o n s i s t e n c y  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  p rob lem s  i n t r o d u c e d  by the  p r o c e s s  o f  
s u c c e s s i v e  e l i m i n a t i o n .
We w i l l  u t i l i z e  some o f  t h e  n o t a t i o n  i n t r o d u c e d  a t  t h e
b e g i n n i n g  o f  Cha p te r  4.
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Theorem 5 .1
For  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  and f o r
a l l  s e S, i f  s e E(A, Nan, s)  t h e n  ( s ,  A) £ Dw . andMaj
N a n( s ,  A) _C M a j ( s ,  A).
P r o o f
L e t  A e X and l e t  s be any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n .
Le t  s e S be any s i t u a t i o n  such t h a t  s e E(A, Nan, s ) . 
We c o n s i d e r  two m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :
1. ( i ,  A) i  D ^ .
2. ( s ,  A) e ^Maj anC  ^ ^ a n ( Sj A) jji M a j ( s ,  A) 
We show i n  e a ch  c a s e  t h a t  s £ E(A, Nan, s ) .
1. Suppose ( s ,  A) { D
S in c e  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n  i s  d e c i s i v e  and N a n ( s ,  A) i s  n e v e r  empty,  
i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one z e A such t h a t  
z e N a n ( s , A ) .
S in c e  ( s ,  A) { f ° - ^ ows f rom the  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  M a j o r i t y
f u n c t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one x c (A -  {z}) such t h a t :
I {i  e L|xP_^z}| > I {i  £ l | zP^x }|
I -  , ~ I n
L e t  L = { i  e L x P . z } .  S in c e  S. = Tin f o r  a l l  i  e L, L > tt.1 l  l  u 1 1 2
L e t  s '  be  any s i t u a t i o n  such  t h a t :  R*. e S . (x) f o r  a l l  i  e L
l i
Rj* = f o r  a l l  k e (L -  L) . 
Given the  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ’ ,
I { i  e L |x P |w  f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {x } ) } | > ^
By d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n ,  N a n ( s ’ , A) = {x}.
I f  f o r  some i  e L, and f o r  a l l  y £ (N an(s ,  A) -  { z } ) ,  yP^z then  
s i n c e  xP^z ,  i t  f o l l o w s  from the  maximin a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  s 'Q ^  ^ a n s * 
I f  f o r  some i  e L, zP y f o r  some y e (N an(s ,  A) -  {z})  t h e n  s i n c e
xP.z it follows that xP.y and given the maximin assumption, s’Q, >T l l A,Nan
Hence for all i e L, s'Q^ s and therefore < L, s' > is a threatA,Nan
to s and s | E(A, Nan, s).
2. Suppose (s, A) z D^_. and Nan(s, A) jjl Maj(s, A).
It follows from our hypothesis that there exists at least one
z z A such that z z Nan(s, A) and z | Maj(s, A).
Since z j: Maj(s, A) it follows from the definition of the Majority 
function that there exists at least one x e (A - {z}) such that:
I{i e l |xP^z}| > I{i e l |zP^x }|
Let L = {i e l IxP.z}. Since S. = Tin for all i e L, | LI >1 l l u 1 ' 2
Let s’ be any situation such that: R! e S.(x) for all i e Ll l
Rl = R^ for all k z (L - L). 
Given the specification of situation s’,
I{i e L|xP!w for all w z (A - {x})}| >
By definition of the Nanson function, Nan(s’, A) = {x}.
By reasoning directly analogous to that in 1 it follows from the
maximin assumption that s’Q^ s for all i e L and hence < L, s’ >A, Nan
is a threat to s and therefore s { E(A, Nan, s).
In summary, we have shown in 1 that:
If (s, A) A . then s A E(A, Nan, s)T Maj T
and we have shown in 2 that:
If (s, A) c IX, . and Nan(s, A) (I’ Maj(s, A) tlien s | E(A, Nan, s) . Maj -f- '
From 1 and 2 it follows that:
If s e E(A, Nan, s) then (s, A) z D,, . and Nan(s, A) C Maj(s, A).Maj —
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Hence f o r  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s and f o r  a l l
s e S, i f  s e E(A, Nan, s )  th en  ( s ,  A) e D . and N a n ( s ,  A) _C M a j ( s ,  A) .Maj
* We o b s e r v e  t h a t  th e  p r e m i s e s  h a ve  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  fo rm :
From 1 we h ave  vP  ->- v s  
From 2 we h a ve  P & v@ v s
w i th  th e  o b v i o u s  d i c t i o n a r y  and o u r  r e q u i r e d  c o n c l u s i o n  t h e r e f o r e  
has th e  form :
S -> P S Q
Our c o n c l u s i o n  f o l l o w s  fro m  th e  p r e m i s e s  in  t w o - v a l u e d  p r o p o s i t i o n a l  
l o g i c  w i th  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d e d u c t i o n :
1 v p -y v s P r e m is e
2 P & 'XiQ -y 'XjS P r e m is e
3 P -y (v  Q ~y VS) from  2 .
4 P -y (S -> Q) fro m  3 .
5 S -y P from  1 .
6 s -y (S -+ Q) from  4 ,
7 s -y Q from  6
8 s -y P & Q fro m  5 ,
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We now e s t a b l i s h ,  f o r  any g i v e n  i s s u e  A c o n t a i n i n g  e x a c t l y  
t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  
f o r  any g i v e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  to be a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  t h e  
Nanson f u n c t i o n .  We have  shown i n  C h a p te r  3 t h a t  i f  = PIq f o r  
a l l  i  e L t h e n  Nan i s  a d e c i s i v e  GDF and hence  f o r  any g iv e n  i s s u e  A 
and f o r  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  N a n ( s ,  A) i s  a lways d e f i n e d  and 
N a n ( s ,  A) i s  n e v e r  empty.  In  theo rem  5 . 2 ,  we c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  N a n ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  one e l e m e n t ;  i n  theorem  5 . 3 ,  we 
c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  N a n ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  
e l e m e n t s ;  and i n  theo rem  5 . 4 ,  we c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
N a n ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s .  ( I n  f a c t ,  i n  
t heo rem  5 .4  we p ro v e  a more g e n e r a l  r e s u l t  f o r  any g iv e n  i s s u e  A 
and f o r  any s i t u a t i o n  s c S such  t h a t  N a n ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  
more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s . )  O b v i o u s ly ,  t h i s  e x h a u s t s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
and h e n c e  on th e  b a s i s  o f  th eo rem s  5 . 2 ,  5 . 3  and 5 . 4 ,  we can d e t e r m i n e ,  
f o r  any g i v e n  i s s u e  A c o n t a i n i n g  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  
a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  any g iv e n  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n  to be a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n .  
However , I  have  been  u n a b le  to  g e n e r a l i z e  t h e  r e s u l t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
i n  theo rems  5 .2  and 5 . 3  to  a p p ly  to  an i s s u e  c o n t a i n i n g  any number 
o f  e l e m e n t s .
We w i l l  u t i l i z e  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  compute r  s i m u l a t i o n  
to  d e t e r m i n e ,  f o r  any g iv e n  i s s u e  A c o n t a i n i n g  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  
e l e m e n t s ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  any g i v e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  be 
a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n .
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Theorem 5.2
For  a l l  A e X such  t h a t  A c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  
e l e m e n t s  say  x,  y and z and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s such 
t h a t  N a n ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n  sa y  x £ A, s { E(A, Nan, s)  
i f f :
1.
o r  2. 
o r  3.  
o r  4. 
o r  5 .
o r  6.
{ i  e L I y P ^ x } |  
{ i  £ LIzP. x}I
1 l
{ i  £ L | y P . x } |  
{ i  £ L I z P . x } I  
{ i  £ L | y P ^ x } I  
( i  £ L I z P^ x } I  
( i  £ L | z P . x } I  
{ i  £ L I yP x} I
| {1 £ L|xP^y} |
| u £ L | x P ^ z } |
> | L | and IL 1
X X
> | l 1 and IL 11 x * 1 X
> lL 1 and IL 11 X 1 X
| l 1
X





P r o o f :  S u f f i c i e n c y
L e t  A e X such t h a t  A c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  say  
x, y and z. L e t  s be any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  such t h a t  N an (s ,  A) = {x}. 
We c o n s i d e r  e a ch  o f  t h e  s i x  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t u r n  and show t h a t  i n  
each  c a se  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  < L, s '  > t o  s and hence  
s { E(A, Nan, s ) .
Given t h e  maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,  L Q L^ = <j) and hence  
{i  e L I x P . y & x P .z }  C { i  £ L I xP y & x P ! z }
S i n c e  N a n ( s ,  A) = {x} i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  x i s  n o t  e l i m i n a t e d  from th e
i s s u e  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s .  T h e r e f o r e  IL I > IL I o r  IL I > IL I o r1 x 1 1 y ‘ ' x 1 1 z 1
b o t h .
I I I I I I N I I I I I INow i f  L > L and L <: ~ then  s i n c e  L + L + L = N ,1 x 1 * y x 3 x '  y z 1
, N I I I IL I > -  and hence  L > L . 
z 3 1 z 1 x 1i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t
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I , , ,  I I N I I NSimilarly, if L > L and L £ - then L > - and hence x ' z' 1 x1 3 1 y 3
|l I > |l I. Hence if Nan(s, A) = {x} and |l I £ ^ then one of the y x x 3
following must .hold:
Ly
> LX > L I z
or Lz > |l 1X > L Iy
We now consider.each of the six conditions in the statement of the 
theorem and show that in each case there exists a threat < L, sT > 
to s and hence s { E(A, Nan, s).
1. I {i £ L[yP x}|  ^ |{i e LlxP^y}] s |: E(A, Nan, s)
Since |{i e L|yl\x}|  ^ |{i £ L|xP_^ y}| and we assume S^, = IIq for 
all i £ L it follows that |{i £ L|yP^x}| £ ^
Let L = {i e LlzP.y & yP.x}l l
Let s’ be any situation such that: for all i e L, yP|zP|x
for all k £ (L - L),
Since |{i £ L|yP^x}| £ ^ it follows that:
I {i £ L I yP_^ x & yP^z} | + |{i £ L|zP^y & yP^x} | £ ^
Hence |{i £ L|yP|x & yP^z}| £ ^
By definition of the Nanson function, y e Nan(s', A).
Given the maximin assumption, any situation leading to an outcome 
other than {x} .is preferred to s for all i £ L. Hence s’Q^ ^ans 
for all i £ L and therefore < L, s’ > is a threat to s and 
s £ E (A, Nan, s) .
2. I {i e L|zP_^ x}|  ^ I {i £ l |xP^z }| ■+ s | E(A, Nan, s)
The proof is directly analogous to that for condition 1.
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3. | { i c L | yP . x} | > |l | and |l | < ^ -> s £ E(A, Nan, s),1 X X j
I I NAs we have shown earlier, if Nan(s, A) = {x} and | | <  ^ then
one of the following must hold:
(a) |Ly > L IX > ILz 1
(b) |l• z > |l j1 x 1 > |l I y
(a) Suppose L I > L I > |L I I y I 1 x 1 1 z
I I N I I I I 2NBy hypothesis, L < ~ and hence L + L > —  and therefore y r * x 3 1 y 1 1 z1 3
|l I + |l I > 2 IL [.y z1 1 x
Hence |l | - | l | > | l | - | l | y 1 1 x x 1 1 z1
Let L C {i e LlyP.x & yP.z} such that [LI = |l I - |l I.
Let s’ be any situation such that: for all i e L, zP^yP^x
for all k c (L - L),
Given the specification of situation s’,
(i e LI xP! y & xP’.z} = {i e LlxP.y & xP.z}
' l l  ' l l
Since |l I < ^ it follows that: I {i e l |xP’.y & xP’.z} I < ^1 x 1 3 1 ' tl l 1 3
Since L = L - L it follows from the specification of situation ' x ' 1 z1 r
s' that:
I{i £ L|xP!y & xP|z}I = J{i £ l |zP!x & zP^y}|
Hence |{i £ L|yP^x & yP^z}| > ^
Given the definition of the Nanson function, alternatives x and z 
will both be eliminated from the issue and Nan(s', A) = {y}- 
Given the maximin assumption, s'Q^ Nrms f°r all i £ L and therefore
< L, s' > is a threat: to s and s £ E(A, Nan, s) .
(b) Suppose 1L I > IL I > IL I1 z 1 x 1 y 1
By hypothesis > | {i e L|yP.x}| > II I and it 1 x 1 follows that:
|{i £ L|zP^y & yP^x}| + |l I > y |l I' x '
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and hence I{i e LIzP.y & yP.x}I > |l I - II I I 1 iy J l 1 1 x1 1 y 1
Let L C {i e LlzP.y & yP.x} such that IL [ = |l I - II I—  ' l  l 1 1  ' x 1 1 y '
Let s’ be any situation such that: for all i e L, yP^zP^x
for all k e (L - L) ,
Given the specification of situation s',
{i e LIxP!y & xP! z} = {i e LIxP . y & xP.z}' i i  ' i i
Since |L_^| < ^ it follows that: |{i e L|xPjy & xP_^ z}| < ^
Since L = L - L it follows from the specification of situation ' x ' y '
s' that: I {i e LjxP^y & xP^z}| = |{i e L|zP!^ x & zP!^ y} |
Hence |{i e L|yP!^ x & yP^z}| > ^
Given the definition of the Nanson function, alternatives x and z
will both be eliminated from the issue and Nan(s', A) = {y}.
Given the maximin assumption, any situation leading to an outcome
other than {x} is preferred to s for all i e L. Hence s'Q^ ,T s
r A,Nan
for all i e L and therefore < L, s' > is a threat to s and 
s E(A, Nan, s).
4. I {i e L|zP_^ x}| > |L I and |l |^ < ^ -* s £ E(A, Nan, s)
The proof is directly analogous to that for condition 3.
5. I{i e L|yP^x}| > IL^ | and |L^ | = ^ and
I {i e L|zP.x}| :> IL I s j: E(A, Nan, s)
As we have shown earlier, if Nan(s, A) = {x} and j L [ £  ^
then one of the following must hold:
(a) |L I y > IL I x 1 > L I z 1
(b) |l I1 z > |l 1' x 1 > |l I y
(a) Suppose IL I > IL I > IL I 
t-t- y 1 x1 1 z1
Since IL I > 1L I it follows that I{i e L|yP.x}| > |l 1 y 1 1 x 1 ' 1 l ' 1 x
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By hypothesis, |{i e L|zP^x}|  ^ |L | and it follows that 
|{i e LI yP±z & zP±x} | + |l J   ^ | |
Let L C {i e LIyP.z & zP.x} such that ILi = |l I - |l I 
Let sT be any situation such that: for all i e L, zP^yP^x
for all k e (L - L),
Given the specification of situation s’,
{i e LlxP'.y & xP'.z} = {i e LlxP.y & xP.z}' l l  ' l l
Since |l I = 75 it follows that: |{i e LlxP'.y & xP'.z} I = ^
Given the specification of situation s',
I {i e L|xP^y & xP|z}| = I {i e l |zP!^ x & zP^y}| = ^
Therefore: |{i £ L|yP|x & yP^z}| = ^
Given the definition of the Nanson function, Nan(s', A) = {x, y, z}
Given the maximin assumption, any situation leading to an outcome
other than {x} is preferred to situation s for all i e L. Hence
s'Q^ s for all i e L and therefore < L, s’ > is a threat to A,Nan
s and s £ E(A, Nan, s).
(b) Suppose L > |L > L1 z 1 1 x 1 1 y '
Since IL I > |L I it follows that |{i e l |zP.x }| > |l |
By hypothesis, |{i e L|yP_^ x}| > | L^ | and it follows that 
I(i e LIzP.y & yP.x}I + |l I > |l I
Let L C {i e LlzP.y & yP.x} such that ILI = |l I - |l I —  1 l y l 11 1 x1 1 y1
Let s’ be any situation such that: for all i e L, yP’zP^x
for all k £ (L - L),
It can be shown by an argument directly analogous to that in (a) 
that Nan(s', A) = {x, y, z}.
Given the maximin assumption, any situation leading to an outcome 
other than {x} is preferred to situation s for all i £ L. Hence
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s 'Q ^  >T s f o r  a l l  i  e L and t h e r e f o r e  < L, s '  > i s  a t h r e a t  to  A, Nan
s and s £ E(A, Nan, s ) .
6. I {i  e L | z P ^ x } |  > IL^I and |L | < ^ and
I {i  e LI yP_Lx} | ^ | l | -> s {  E(A, Nan, s)
The p r o o f  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  i n  5.
Hence i f  any one o f  t h e  s i x  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  
t heo rem  h o l d s  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  t o  s and s £ E(A, Nan, s ) .
P r o o f :  N e c e s s i t y
L e t  A e X such t h a t  A c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  say  
x, y and z .  L e t  s be any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  such t h a t  N a n ( s ,  A) = {x}. 
Suppose s  ^ E(A, Nan,  s)  and hence  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t ,  say  < L, s '  > 
to  s .  O b v i o u s ly ,  Nan ( s ’ , A) =}= {x}.
Given t h e  maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,  L fl L = (}> and hence  
{ i  e L I xP . y & x P .z }  C { i  £ L I xP ! y & xP'.z}
S i n c e  N a n ( s ,  A) = {x} i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  x i s  n o t  e l i m i n a t e d  from th e
i s s u e  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  IL I > IL I o r  IL I > IL I o r  b o t h .1 x 1 y x z 1
I f ,  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s ' , a l t e r n a t i v e  x i s  t h e  o n l y  member o f  t h e  
l o w e s t  i n d i f f e r e n c e  c l a s s  o r  i s  one o f  two members o f  t h e  l o w e s t  
i n d i f f e r e n c e  c l a s s  t hen
I {i  e L |xP ^ y  & xP^z} I < ^ and hence  j {i  e L|xP_^y & x fhz}  | < ^
I f  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s ' ,  a l l  t h r e e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  b e lo n g  t o  t h e  same 
i n d i f f e r e n c e  c l a s s  t h e n
I {i  £ L |x P j y  & xP^z}I  = ^ and he nc e  | { i  £ L |xP^y  & xfh z} |  £ ^
I f  1L N j  1£ ~ and L > 1L then  1L >








| l t h e n
z
| l 1 >1 x 1 3 1 x 1 1 z y
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Hence if, in situation s’, alternative x belongs to the lowest 




Lx 1 > L I z 1
or L1 z 1 > |l1 X > |l  I y
Since Nan(s’, A) =j= {x} then y e Nan(s’, A) or z e Nan(s’, A) 
or both. Suppose y e Nan(s’, A).
Given the maximin assumption, L _C {i e L|yP^x}
Given the definition of the Nanson function there are four possible 
paths by which y e Nan(s’, A).
(a) I {i e L|yP!x & yP_^ z}| £ |{i e L|xP^y & xP^z}| and
I {i £ L,|xP^y & xP^z}| > |{i e L | zP^x & zP^y} | and
I{i e LIyP^x}|  ^ |{i e L,|xP^y}|
(b) I{i e LIyP^x & yP^z}| 5 |{i e L|zP^x & zP^y}| and
I {i e L|zP!^x & zP!^y} | > |{i e L,|xP^y & xP^z}| and
I {i e L I yP!^ z} I  ^ |{i e L|zP^y}|
(c) I{i e L,|yP^x & yP^z}| > |{i £ L|xP|y & xP^z}| and
I {i £ L,|xP^y & xP^z}| = I {i £ L.|zP^x & zP^y} |
(d) I {i £ L,|yP^x & yPl^ z) I = |{i £ L|xP_!y & xP|z}| and 
I{i £ L,|xP|y & xP^z}| = |{i £ L,|zP^x & zP^y}|
We consider each possibility in turn and show that if y £ Nan(s’, A) 
then one of the six conditions in the statement of the theorem 
must be satisfied.
(a) I{i e L|yP^x & yP^z}| 5 |{i £ L|xP^y & xP^z}| and
I {i £ LI xP^y & xP^z} I > |{i £ L,|zP^x & zP|y}| and
I { i £ LI yP^x} I  ^I { i £ L | xPl^ y} |
Since L C! {i e L,[yP^x} it follows that in any situation s’ that can
be brought about by members of L following strategies different 
to those which they followed in s while members of (L - L) 
continue to follow the same strategies as in s,
{i e LjyP^x} _C {i' e L,|yF\x} and {i e L|xP^y} _3 {i e L|xP_^y}
By hypothesis, |{i e L|yP^x}| £ |{i e L.|xPjy}|
Hence |{i e L,|yP^x}|  ^ |{i e L|xP_j,y}|
Hence condition 1 must be satisfied.
(b) I {i e L|yP!x & yP^z}|  ^ |{i e LjzP^x & zP!y}| and
|{i e L|zP!x & zP^y}| > j{i e L|xP^y & xP^z}| and
I { i e L I yP^z} | £ |{i e L | zP_^y} |
As we have shown earlier, if x is the only member of the lowest




We consider each possibility in turn.
L
y > Lx 1 > L I z 1
Lz > |LX > L I y
(i) Suppose L > L > L y x z
Since !L I > IL I it follows that I{i e LlyP.x}) > !L I.
I y  I x  ' 1 y l  1 1 x
I I NWe have already shown |L^ | <
Hence condition 3 must be satisfied.
(ii) Suppose L > L > Lz1 x y'
Since |l I > IL I it follows that I{i e l |zP.x }| > |l I l z l l x l 1 1 i ' 1 x
We have already shown IL I < ^' x 1 3
Hence condition 4 must be satisfied.
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(c) I {i £ L|yP^x & yPl^ z} I > |{i e L|xP^y & xP^z}| and 
I{i e L[xP^y & xP^z}| = I{i £ l |zP^x & zP^y)|
As we have shown earlier if x is one of two members of the lowest
indifference class in situation s' then L
following must hold:
< 2 and one of the
(i) ]l I > |l I > |L IJ y I 1 X 1 1 z 1
or (ii) IL I > IL 1 > IL II z 1 1 x 1 1 y 1
If we consider each possibility in turn we can show by the same
argument as in (b) that condition 3 or condition 4 must be satisfied.
(d) I {i £ L|xP|y & xP^z}| = | {i e L,|yP^x & yP^z}| and
I{i £ L|xP^y & xP^z}I = I{i £ LjzP^x & zP!y}|
Given the definition of the Nanson function, Nan(s’, A) = {x,
As we have already shown, if all three alternatives belong to
same indifference class in situation s' then L £ ~ and one1 x 1 3
the following must hold:
(i) IL I > 1L I > IL I1 y 1 1 x 1 1 z 1
or (ii) IL I > IL I > IL II z 1 1 x 1 1 y 1




(i) Suppose L I > II I > |l I 1 y1 1 x 1 1 z1
Since IL I > Ii. I it follows that ] {i e L|yP.x}| > |l I 1 yI x 1 y x 1 x 1
I I NIf |L I < -r then condition 3 is satisfied. Hence the only possibilityX J
I ! Nthat remains to be considered is: |L | = -x. Since, by hypothesis,X J
Nan(s', A) = {x, y, z} then, given the maximin assumption,
L C {i £ LIyP.z & zP.x} and ILI = |l I - |l
Hence, |{i£LfyP.z&zP.x}|  ^ |l I - |l J 1 1 l x 1 1 x1 ' z 1
Thus j {i e L|yP^z & zP_x} | + j |  ^ |L |
Therefore |{i £ l |zP.x }|  ^ |l I I 1 i 1 1 x 1
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In summary we require:
I {i e L|yP_^ x}| > IL I and | | = ^ and
I{i e L|zP.x}| :> |L I
Hence condition 5' must be satisfied.
(ii) Suppose IL *1 > |l I > |l I 1 z1 1 x 1 1 y 1
Since jL I > [L ! it follows that |{i e l IzP.x }! > IL I 1 z1 1 x 1 1 1 l 1 ‘ x 1
I I NIf |L^ | < 2  then condition 4 is satisfied. Hence the only possibility
I I Nthat remains to be considered is: L = 0 .1 x 1 3
Since Nan(s', A) = {x, y, z} then, given the maximin assumption,
L C {i e LlzP.y & yP.x} and |l | = |l I - |l I —  ' 1 1  11 1 x 1 1 y 1
Hence I{i e LlzP.y &yP.x}| 5 |l I - |l I 1 1 1 1 1 x 1 1 y 1
Thus I{i e LlzP.y & yP.x}| + |l I 5 II I 1 1 1' 1 1 1 y 1 1 x 1
Therefore |{i £ L|yP_^ x}|  ^ | |
In summary we require:
|{i e l |zP.x }| > |L I and jL | = ^ and1 X X J
|{i e L|yP.x}| 5 Lx
Hence condition 6 must be satisfied.
Hence if y e Nan(s’, A) then condition 1 or condition 3 or condition 4 
or condition 5 or condition 6 must be satisfied.
By reasoning directly analogous to that above it is possible 
to show that if z e Nan(s', A) then condition 2 or condition 3 
or condition 4 or condition 5 or condition 6 must be satisfied.
Given the maximin assumption, Nan(s', A) =j= {x} and hence 
y e Nan(s', A) or z e Nan(s', A) or both. Therefore if there 
exists a threat < L, s' > to s and s £ E(A, Nan, s) then one 
of the six conditions in the statement of the theorem must be
satisfied. Our result follows.
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Theorem 5♦3
For all A e X such that A contains exactly three distinct
elements say x, y and z and for every sincere situation s
such that Nan(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements
say x and y, s £ E(A, Nan, s) iff:
1. ]{i e LlzP^x or zP^y}I > ^
or 2. I {i e L|xP_^y & yP^z}] < ^ and
I {i c L I yP_^ x & xP.z>| < ^
or 3. |{i e LlxP.y}! > |l I and III 1 ±J 1 1 y1 1 y
or 4. I {i e L|yP_^ x}| > | L | and |l^
Proof: Sufficiency
Let A g X such that A contains exactly three distinct elements say x, y 
and z. Let s be any sincere situation such that Nan(s, A) = {x, y}. 
Since Nan(s, A) = {x, y} it follows from the definition of the
Nanson function that L > L .and L I > |l |. if |l 1 < ■=' x ' ' z ' y 1 z 1 1 x 1 3
then since L > L I and 1L ! + |l I + |l | =  N it follows that
1 x ‘ 1 z 1 1 x ' y 1 z
|l [ > ^ and hence 1L | >  IL I > |l .
1 y 1 3 y x 1 1 z 1
Similarly, if |l |^ N<  2 then since |ly > |lz it follows that
It 1 N  j iL > and hence IL I >  IL | > |l I,
1 x 1 3 x 1 y 1 1 z 1
We now consider each of the four conditions in the statement of 
the theorem and show that in each case there exists a threat 
< L, s' > to s and hence s { E(A, Nan, s).
1. I {i e L|zP^x or zP y} | > ^ ■> s { E(A, Nan, s)
Let L = {i g l IzP.x or zP.y}1 l l
Let s' be any situation sucli that: for all i e L, zP'xP’y
l l
for all k g (L - L),
Since | {i e L|zP_^x or zP_^ y} | > ^ it follows that Nan(s', A) = {z}. 
Given the maximin assumption, s ’ j^ans f°r aH  i e L and hence 
< L, s' > is a-threat to s if. E(A, Nan, s) .
2. I {i e L|xP_^y & yP_^ z}| < ^ and
I {i e L|yP^-x & xP_^ z}| < ^ -> s £ E(A, Nan, s)
Let L = {i e LlzP.x or zP.y}1 l iy
We consider three exhaustive and mutually exclusive possibilities:
(i) |{i e L|xP_^y & yP_^ z}| > | {i £ L|yP^x & xP_^ z} |
(ii) I {i £ LjxP^y & yP^z} | = j {i £ LfyP^x & xP_^ z}|
(iii) I {i £ L|xP_^y & yP_^ z} | < j {i £ L|yP_^x & xP_^ z} |
We show in each case that members of L can produce a situation s'
such that j{i £ L|xP|y & xP^z}| = |{i £ LfyP^x & yP^z}| < ^
and hence |{i £ L|zP^x & zP^y}| > ^
Given the definition of the Nanson function, alternatives x and y 
will both be eliminated from the issue and Nan(s', A) = {z}.
(i) Suppose j {i £ L|xP_^y & yP^z} | > | {i £ LfyP^x & xP^z} |
Let L L such that
ILI = j {i £ LI xP^y & yi\z)f - | {i e L|yP^x & xP^zlf
Let s' be any situation such that: for all i e L, yP'zP'xl i
for all j e (L - L) , zP_!xP^y 
for all k £ (L - L) , R^ = R^
Given the specification of situation s',
I {i £ L|xP^y & xP^z}| = |{i £ L|xP_^y & yP_^ z}|
j{i £ LfyP^x & yP|z}| = [{i £ LfyP^x & xP^z}| + ]L|
= I{i £ LfxP^y & yP^ z}|
Hence, |{i e LfxP^y & xP^z}| = |{i e LfyPlx & yP jz I^ < ^
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Therefore, |{i e L|zP!^x & zP^y)| > ^
(ii) Suppose |{i e L|xP_^y & yP_^ z}| = |{i e L|yP^x & xP^z}|
Let s' be any situation such that: for all i £ L, zP^xP^y
for all k e (L - L), R^ = R^ 
Given the specification of situation s',
I {i £ L|xP^y & xP^z} | = | {i e L | xl\ y & yP_^ z}|
I {i e L|yP^x & yP^z} | = | { i  e L|yP_x & xP^z}|
By hypothesis, |{i e L|xP^y & yP^z)| = |{i e L|yP_^x & xP_^ z} | < ^
Hence, |{i £ L|xP^y & xP^z)| = |{i e L|yPkx & yP^z} | < ^
Therefore, |{i £ L|zP!x & zP^y}[ > ^
(iii) Suppose j{i e LjxP^y & yP^z}| < |{i e L|yP^x & xP^z}|
Let L C_ L such that
j LI = I { i  e L | y l \ x  & xP^z}]  -  | { i  e L|xP_^y & yP^z} |
Let s’ be any situation such that: for all i e L, xP!zP!y
i i
for all j e (L - L) , zP’.xP’y
J J
for all k £ (L - L), R^ = R^ 
Given the specification of situation s',
■A
I {i £ L|xP^y & xP^z} j = |{i £ L|xP_^y & yP^z}| + ] L|
= J {i £ L|yP^x & xP_^ z}|
I {i £ L|yP!,x &'yP^z}| = | {i £ L|yP_^x & xP_^ z}|
Hence, | {i £ L|xP_^y & xP^z}| = | {i £ L|yP!^x & yP^z} |
By hypothesis, |{i £ L|yP_^x & xP_^ z}| < ^
Hence, |{i £ L|xP^y & xP^z} | = | {i £ L|yP!^x & yP^z} | < ^
Therefore, |{i £ l |zP’.x & zP’.y}| > ^
l  l  3
Hence in cases‘(i), (ii) and (iii) alternatives x and y will both be 
eliminated from the issue in situation s' and Nan(s', A) = {z}.
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.n1Given the maximin assumption, s'Q^ j^ans f°r aH  i e L and hence
< L, ;s’ > is a th
3. | { i e L xP_Ly
As we have shown
then |l I > L I’X y.
Since I L I > |l IX y
Let L C {i E l |xP
|£, = I L I _ |ly z
y
it follows that L > L - Ly z
Let s' be any situation such that: for all i c L, zPjxP'.yl l
for all k £ (L - L) , R^ = 
Given the specification of situation s',
{i e L|yP^x & yP^z} = {i e L|yP_^x & yP^z}
By hypothesis, | |  < ^ and hence |{i e L|yP^x & yP^z}| < ^
Since L y - |L^ | it follows from the specification of s' that:
NI {i e L|yP_^x & yP^z} | = |{i e l |zP^x & zP^y} | < - 
Hence |{i e L|xP^y & xP^z}| > ^
Given the definition of the Nanson function, alternatives y and z 
will both be eliminated from the issue and Nan(s’, A) = {x}.
Given the maximin assumption, s' ^ans f°r all i e L and therefore 
< L, s’ > is a-threat to s and s £ E(A, Nan, s).
4. I {i e LI yP_^ x} I > IL | and |L_^_| < -> s { E(A, Nan, s)
. - NAs we have shown earlier if Nan(s, A) = {x, y} and |L^ | <  ^
then |L I > IL | > II I.I y I I x I I z I
Since |L I > IL | it follows that II | > |l I - |l I.
I y  I ‘ x 1 1 y ' 1 x 1 1 z
Let L _C {i e L|yP^x & yP^z} such that
1LI = IL I - IL Ix z
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Let s’ be any situation such that: for all i e L , zP^xP^y
for all k e (L - L),
By reasoning directly analogous to that in 3 it follows that 
Nan(s’, A) = {y}.
Given the maximin assumption, s'Q^ „ s for all i e L and thereforeA, Nan
< L, s’ > is a threat to s and s £ E(A, Nan, s).
Hence if condition 1 or condition 2 or condition 3 or condition 4 
holds then there exists a threat to s and s £ E(A, Nan, s).
Proof: Necessity
Let A e X such that A contains exactly three distinct elements say
x, y and z. Let s be any sincere situation such that Nan(s, A) = {x, y}.
Since Nan(s, A) = {x, y) it follows from the definition of the
Nanson function that L > L ,and |l 1 > |l  1. if |l | < ^x z y 1 z1 1 X 1 3
then since L > L and L + |l | + |l | = N it follows thatX z X y z
It 1 N , .L > » and hence IL I > IL I > |l I
1 y 3 y x 1 z
Similarly, if |L I < H then since |ly
> |l z it follows that
IL I > and hence AA IL I1 x 1 3 ■x' y ’ z
Suppose s  ^E(A, Nan, s) and hence there exists a threat, say < L, s’ > 
to s. Obviously Nan(sT, A) =j= {x, y}.
We consider three exhaustive and mutually exclusive possibilities:
(a) Nan(s', A) = {x}
(b) Nan(s' , A) = {y}
(c) z e Nan(s', A)
We consider each possibility in turn and show that in each case one
of the three conditions in the statement of the theorem must be satisfied.
(a) Suppose Nan(s', A) = {x}
Given the maximin assumption, L {i e L|xP^y}
Given the definition of the Nanson function there are three 
possible paths by which Nan(s', A) = {x}
(i) |{i e LIxP|y & xP^z}| ^
I{i e LIyP^x & yP^z}| >
I{i c LIxP|y}I >
(ii) I {i e L | xP^y & xP|z}|  ^
I{i e l |zP^x & zP^ y}I >
I{i e LIxP^z}I >
(iii) I{i e LjxP^y & xP^z}| > 
I{i £ LIyP^x & yP^z}I =
{i e L|yP^x & yP^z} | and 
{i £ l IzP.'x & zP !y} I and1 l 1
{i e LIyP^x}I
{i £ l |zP|x & zP!y}I and
{i £ L|yP|x & yP_!z}| and
{i £ LIzP^x}I
{i £ L|yP^x & yP^z}I and
{i £ l |zP!x & zP!y}|1 1 x 1
We consider each possibility in turn and show that if there exists 
a threat < L, s' > to s such that Nan(s’, A) = {x} then one of 
the four conditions in the statement of the theorem must hold.
(i) I {i e L|xP^y & xP^z} I  ^ |{i e L|yP_^x & yP^z} | and
I {i £ L|yP^x & yP^z}| > |{i £ L | zP_^ x & zP_^ y} | and
I{i e LIxP^y}| > |{i £ L|yP^x}|
Since L C_ {i e L|xP^y} it follows that in any situation s’ that 
can be brought .about by members of L following strategies different 
from those which they followed in situation s while members of 
(L - L) continue to follow the same strategies in s,
{i e L|xP|y} JC {i e L | xl\ y } and {i £ L|yPjx} 3. fi e L|yP^x}
By hypothesis, |{i e L|xP|y}| > |{i e L|yP|x}|
Hence J{i £ L|xP^y}| > |{i e L|yP^x}|
Since Nan(s, A) = {x, y} it follows that IL I > IL | and IL. I > IL1 x 1 1 z1 1 y1 'z
Hence, in situation s, alternative z is eliminated from the issue
202
and since Nan(s, A) = {x, y} it follows that:
I{i £ LIxP^y}I = I{i e L|yP x}|
Therefore there is no threat to s in this case.
(ii) |{i e L|xP^y & xP|z}|  ^ | {i £ L|zP_^x & zP^y} | and
I{i £ LIzP^x & zP^y}| > |{i £ L|yP^x & yP^z}| and
I{i £ l |xP^z}| > I{i e l |zP^x}|
Since y is the only member of the lowest indifference class in
situation s’ it follows that:
I{i £ LIyP^x & yPjz}| < ^
Since L C {i £ LlxP.y} it follows that L fl L = (j) and hence,- i y
{i £ L|yP^x & yP^z} 0_ {i e L|yP_^x & yP^z}
Therefore, |{i £ L|yP^x & yP_^ z} | < ^
As we have shown earlier, if Nan(s, A) = {x, y} and | |  <
then |l I > |L I > !l I. Since IL I > [L [ it follows that1 x' 1 y 1 1 z1 1 x 1 ' y '
I{i £ LIxP^y}I > I Ly I•
In summary,
I{i £ LlxP.y}! > |L I and |l I < ^I iy y' y 1 3
Hence condition 3 must be satisfied.
(iii) ]{i e L|xP^y & xP^z}| > |{i e L|yP^x & yP^z}| and
I {i e LI yP^x & yP^z} | = |{i e l |zP_^ x & zP^y} |
Since y is one of two members of the lowest indifference class 
in situation s' it follows that:
I {i £ L|yP!x & yP_|z}| < ^
Since L C {i e LlxP.y} it follows that L ü L = <J> and hence,-  1 i y
(i £ LI yP|x & yP_!z} D (i £ L|yP_.x & yP.z}





As we h a v e  a l r e a d y  shown,  i f  N a n ( s ,  A) = {x ,  y} and  [L | < -
% y
t h e n  | l  I > |L I > |L I .I x 1 y z 1
S i n c e  | l  I > | l  I i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t :  1{i  e L | x P . y } |  > | l  I
I x 1 1 y 1 1 !l y
I n  summary,
I {i  e L , | x P . y } |  > | l  I an d  IL I < ^I 1 l  1 . 1 y ' 1 y 1 3
Hence c o n d i t i o n . 3 m u s t  b e  s a t i s f i e d .
Now i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  < L,  s ’ > t o  s s u ch  t h a t  N a n ( s ' ,  A) = {x} 
t h e n  ( i ) ,  ( i i )  an d  ( i i i )  e x h a u s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  an d  t h e r e f o r e  
c o n d i t i o n  3 m u s t  b e  s a t i s f i e d .
(b)  S u p p o s e  N a n ( s ’ , A) = {y}
By r e a s o n i n g  d i r e c t l y  a n a l o g o u s  t o  t h a t  i n  (a )  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  
show t h a t  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  t h r e a t  < L,  s '  > t o  s s u c h  t h a t  
N a n ( s ' ,  A) = {y} t h e n  c o n d i t i o n  4 m u s t  b e  s a t i s f i e d .
( c )  S u p p o s e  z e N a n ( s  
Given 
G iven 
p a t h s
( i )  I ( i  
| U
( i i )  I { i
la
( ü i )  I a  
l a
L|xP_Jy & X P  ! 2 
1 = } |
a n d
L | y P ! x & y P ^ 2 = } | an d
L I x P ! z
1 l }|
L [ y P ' x & y P ’ 2'>1 a n d
L I x P ! y
1 l
& X P  ! 2 
1
0 | a n d
L | y P ’ z >1
L I x P ! y
. l
& x P !
i
«}| a n d
L | y P ’x & y P ^
A)
e L I z P ! x & zP ! y} 
1 l  l
c L I xP ! y & x P ! z }
1 l  l
t h e  max im in  a s s u m p t i o n ,  L jC { i  £ L|zP_^x o r  zP_^y} 
t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n  t h e r e  a r e  f o u r  p o s s i b l e  








I { i  e L I z P | x }  
£ L I zP ! x & z P ! y } 
c L I yP ! x & yP_!z} 
[ { i  £ L I z P ^ y } 
£ L I z P ! x & zP \ y }
1 l  l
£ L I x P ! y & xP ! z }
1 l  l U
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(iv) I {i e L|zP^x & zP^y} | = |{i e L,|xP_!y & xP^z} | and
I{i £ L|xP|y & xP^z}I = I{i e L|yP^x & yP^z}|
We consider each possibility in turn and show that if there exists 
a threat < L, s' > such that z e Nan(s', A) then one of the 
four conditions in the statement of the theorem must be satisfied.
(i) I{i e LIzP^x & zP^y}| £ |{i 0 L|xP^y & xP^z}| and
I {i £ L|xP^y & xP|z}| > |{i £ L|yP_^x & yP^z} | and
I{i £ LIzP^x}I 5 I{i £ LIxP^z}I
Firstly, suppose |{i £ L | zP^x} | > | {i £ l |xP^z }|
Given the definition of the Nanson function, Nan(s’, A) = (z)
Since L C {i £ l IzP.x or zP.y} and |l I > |l I and |l I > |l I — 1 1 1 x z 1 y z
then s' must be any situation such that: for all i e L, zP!xP!y or1 1
zP!yP ! x 1 1
for all k e (L - L),
Given the specification of situation s',
{i e l |zP!x } = {i e l IzP.x } U {i £ l IzP.x or zP.y}
1 1 1 x 1 1
= {i £ l IzP.x or zP.y}1 1
By hypothesis, | {i e l |zP^x }| > | {i e L,|xP!^ z}|
Since S^ = II q for all i £ L it follows that: |{i £ l |zP|x }| > ^
and hence, |{i e L|zP_^x or zP^y} | > ^
Hence condition 1 must be satisfied.
Secondly, suppose |{i e L|zP|x}| = |{i e l |xP^z }|
Given the definition of the Nanson function, Nan(s’, A) = {x, z} 
Given the maximin assumption, L _C (i e L|zP^y}
Hence L fl L = <j) and (i e L | yP^x & yP^z} _D {i e L|yP_^x & yP_^ z}
Since alternative y is the only member of the lowest indifference
class in situation s’ it follows that
205
I{i e LIyP^x & yP^z}| < ^
and hence, [ {i e LjyP^x & yP_^ z}| < ^
As we have shown earlier, if Nan(s, A) = {x, y} and [L | < —• y
then IL I > IL I •> IL I . x y z
Since |L I > IL I it follows that {i e LlxP.y} > |l I .1 x 1 1 y 1 1 i y 1
In summary,
I{i e L|xP.y}| > |l I and |l I < ^1 1 l ' 1 y 1 1 y ' 3
Hence condition 3 must be satisfied.
(ii) I {i e LI zP^x & zPjy}| £ |{i £ L|yP_jx & yP^z}| and
I {i £ L|yP|x & yP^z} | > | {i £ L|xP_!y & xP^z}| and
I{i £ LIzP^y}I £ I{i £ L|yP^z} j
By reasoning directly analogous to that in (i) it is possible 
to show that condition 1 or condition 4 must be satisfied.
(iii) J{i e L|zP^x & zP^y}| > |{i £ L|xP^y & xP^z}| and
|{i £ LIxP|y & xP^z}| = I{i £ L|yP|x & yP^z}|
Given the definition of the Nanson function, Nan(s’, A) = {z}
Since L C {i e LlzP.x or zP.y} and !l I > |l I and |l I > |l I—  1 l l 1 x 1 z 1 y z
then s' must be any situation such that: for all i £ L, zP^xP^y or
zP yP ! xl l
for all k £ (L - L), \
Given the specification of situation s',
{i e LIxP!v & xP!z} Q {i £ LlxP.y & yP , z }
{i £ L|yP|x & yP^z} _Q {i e L|yP^x & xP^z}
Since x and y are both members of the lowest indifference class in 
situation s' it follows that: |{i e L|xP^y & xP^z}[ < - and
|{i e L|yPjx & yP^z}| < |
206
Hence | {i £ L | xP_^ y & yP_^ z} j
I{i 0 LIyP^x & xP^z}| < ^
Hence condition 2 must be satisfied.
(iv) I {i s L|zP^x & zP^y) | = |{i e L|xP^y & xP_^ z} | and
I {i e L|xP‘^y & xP^z} I = I {i e L|yP^x & yP_^ z}|
Given the definition of the Nanson function, Nan(s', A) = {x, y, z}.
Given the maximin assumption, L {i e l |zP jk & zP^y)
Hence L H L = <j) and L H L = <p x y
Hence, {i £ LlxPjy & xPjz} 0 {i £ LlxP.y & xP.z}
1 i  l  —  1 i  i
{i £ L|yP|x & yP^z} _0 {i £ L|yP_^x & zP_^ z}
{i £ l IzPJx & zP.’y} C {i e LlzP.x & zP.y}
1 l  i y —  1 l i J
Since Nan(s, A) = {x, y} it follows that |l I > |l I and |l I > |l I. 
Hence, |{i £ L|xP^y 6 xP^z}| > [{i £ L|z V \ x & zP|y)|
I{i £ L|yP^x & yP^z}| > |{i £ l |zP^x & zP^y}|
Hence there is no threat < L, s’ > to s such that Nan(s', A) = {x, y, z}.
Now if there is a threat < L, s' > to s such that z £ Nan(s’, A)
then (i), (ii) , (iii) and (iv) exhaust the possibilities. Therefore 
if there exists a threat < L, s' > to s such that z £ Nan(s', A) 
then condition 1 or condition 2 or condition 3 or condition 4 
must be satisfied.
In summary, if there exists a threat < L, s' > to s then Nan(s’, A) = {x} 
or Nan(s’, A) = {y} or z £ Nan(s’, A). Hence (a), (b) and (c) exhaust 
the possibilities. Therefore if there exists a threat to s and 
s  ^E(A, Nan, s) then condition 1 or condition 2 or conditon 3 or
condition 4 must be satisfied. Our result follows.
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Theorem 5.4
For all A c X and for every sincere situation s and for 
all s £ S, if Nan(s, A) contains three or more distinct 
elements then s  ^E(A, Nan, s).
Proof
Let A e X and let s be any sincere situation.
Let s e S be any situation such that Nan(s, A) contains three or more 
distinct elements.
Let Nan(s, A) = $ where $ _C A which contains three or more distinct 
elements and suppose for some distinct x, y, z e A that x, y, z e $ 
Since S_^ = IIq for all i e L, it follows that all members of L 
must rank these three alternatives in one of six possible ways.
We proceed in two steps:
1. We show that if x | Maj(s, A) or y | Maj(s, A) or z  ^Maj(s, A) 
then there exists a threat to s and s  ^E(A, Nan, s).
2. We show that if x, y, z e Maj(s, A) then there exists a threat 
to s and s \  E(A, Nan, s).
1. Suppose x  ^Maj(s, A) or y sj; Maj(s, A) or z { Maj(s, A).
Firstly, let us suppose x  ^Maj(s, A).
Since x  ^Maj(s, A) and S^ = IIq for all i e L, then there exists at 
least one w e (A - {x}) such that:
I {i e L I wP^x} I > |
Let L = {i c LIwP.x}1 l
Let s' be any situation such that: e S^(w) for all i e L
R^ = R^ for all k e (L - L).
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Given the specification of situation s',
I{i c l |wP|v for all v e (A - {w})}| > ^
Hence Nan(s', A) = {w}
Given the maximin assumption, s'Q^ s for all i e L and hence 
< L, s' > is a threat to s and s  ^ E(A, Nan,s).
Secondly, suppose y £ Maj(s, A).
By reasoning directly analogous to that above it is possible to 
show that if y *j: Maj(s, A) then there exists a threat to s and 
s { E(A, Nan, s).
Thirdly, suppose z £ Maj(s*, A).
By reasoning directly analogous to that above it is possible to 
show that if z I Maj(s, A) then there exists a threat to s and 
s  ^ E(A, Nan, s).
2. Suppose x, y, z e Maj(s, A).
Since S_^ = ITq for all i e L and since x, y, z e Maj(s, A) it follows 
that:
I {i e LlxP^yll = |{i £ L | xi^z} | = |{i £ LlyP^z}] = ^ 
and
|{i £ LlyP^x}] = j{i £ l IzP^x }! = |{i £ LlzP^y)! = ^
(a) Suppose {i e L|xP_^z & zP_^ y} =|= (})
Since | {i e L|xP.y}| = |{i e L,|yP^x}| it follows that:
j {i e LI xf\ y & yP^z}| + | {i £ L|xP^z & zT\y}| + |{i £ L | zi\ x & xP_^ y} | =
I {i £ L|yP^x & xP_^ z} I + I {i £ L|yP^z & zP_^ x} | + | {i £ L | zP^y & yP_^ x} |
If {i e L|xP^z & zP^y} ^ <j> then
I {i e L|zP_j,x or zl\y}| > |{i £ L|xP_^y & yP_^ z}| + |{i £ L,|yl\x & xP^z}| 
and since these three sets constitute a partition of L,
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I {i £ LIzP ^ x or zP^y}| > |
Let L C {i e LlzP.x or zP.y}
—  1 l  l
Let s' be any situation such that: R! £ S.(z) for all i £ L
• l i
= R for all k e (L - L).
Given the specification of situation s ’,
I{i e l |zP!w  for all w £ (A - {z})}| > ^
Hence Nan(s?, A) = {z}.
Given the maximin assumption, s'Q^ s for all i e L and henceA y iNcin
< L, s' > is a threat to s and s { E(A, Nan, s).
(b) Suppose {i £ L|xP_^z & zP_^ y} = and {i £ L|yP^x & xP_^ z} =j= <j)
Since ] {i e l |zP_x }| = |{i e L|zP^y}| it follows that if 
{i e l |xP_^ z & zP y} = 4> then {i e LjyP^z & zP^x} = <J>
Since | {i e L|xP^y}| = |{i e L|yP_^x}| then,
I {i e L|xP^y & yP_^ z}| + | {i £ L|yP^x & xP^z}| =
I {i £ L | zE\ x & xi\y}| + I {i £ L|zP^y & yP^x} | 
Hence if {i e LjxP^z & zP_^ y} = cf> and {i £ L|yP_^z & zP_^ x} = cj> and 
{i £ L|yP_^x & xP^z} =|= (|) then
I {i £ L|xP_^y or xE\z} | > |{i £ L|zP^y & yP_^ x} |
Since these two sets constitute a partition of L,
I{i £ LjxP^y or xP^z}| > ^
Let L = {i e LlxP.y or xP.z}
1 i y  l
Let s' be any situation such that: R! £ S .(x) for all i £ L
l i
R^ = R for all k £ (L - L). 
Given the specification of situation s',
I{i £ l |xP^w  for all w £ (A - {x})}| > ^
Hence Nan(s', A) = {x}
Given the maximin assumption s'Q^ Nans for all i e L .
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Hence < L, s' > is a threat to s and s  ^E(A, Nan, s).
(c) Suppose {i e L|xP^z & zf\y} = 4> and {i e L|yP^x & xP_^ z} = <p 
Since ] {i £ L |xP^y} | = |{i c l |xI\z}| it follows that if 
{i e L|yf\x & xP^z) = (|) then {i e L|zP_^ x & xP_^ y} = <f>.
We have already .shown that if {i e L|xP^z & zP^y} = (p then 
{i e L|yP^z & zP^x} = (p.
Since |{i e L|xP^y}| = |{i e L|yP^x}| it follows that 
I {i e L|xP_^ y & yP^z}| = |{i e L|zP^y & yP^x} |
Since these two sets constitute a partition of L,
I {i e L|yP^x or yP_^ z} | = N
Let L = (i £ L|yP^x or yP^z}. Obviously L = L.
Let s ’ be any situation such that: e S_^ (y) for all i e L.
Hence Nan(s’, A) = {y1.
Given the maximin assumption, s'Q^ ^ans f°r all i £ L.
Hence < L, s’ > is a threat to s and s £ E(A, Nan, s).
Hence if x, y, z £ Maj(s, A) then (a), (b) and (c) exhaust the
possibilities. We have shown in each case that there exists 
a threat to s and s  ^E(A, Nan, s).
We have shown in 1 that if x { Maj(s, A) or y { Maj(s, A) or
z  ^Maj(s, A) then there exists a threat to s and s  ^E(A, Nan, s).
Hence for all A e X and for every sincere situation s and for all 
s e S, if Nan(s, A) contains three or more distinct elements then 
s £ E(A, Nan, s).
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We note that in theorem 5.2 conditions 3 and 4 could be 
' I I Nreplaced by one condition, namely |L | < ■=, since one or other of
X  J
conditions 3 and 4 must be satisfied in this case. I have retained 
the statement in' its present form in order to facilitate comparison 
of these conditions with those conditions in the corresponding 
theorems 4.2 and 6.2. Similarly, conditions 5 and 6 can be 
written as one equivalent condition:
j {i e L,|yP.x}| £ |L | and |{i e l |zP.x}| £ |L | and |L |
I have retained the statement in its present form for the same reason 
as above.
We also note that in theorem 5.3 condition 3 could be re-
i I Nduced to the condition that | |  < - since the remaining part of 
condition 3 necessarily follows in this case. Similar remarks apply 
to condition 4. As above, I have retained the statement in its 
present form to facilitate comparison with theorems 4.3 and 6.3.
From theorems 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 we can simply deduce, for 
any given issue A containing exactly three distinct elements, a set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions for any given sincere situation 
to be an equilibrium (as opposed to a strict equilibrium) under the 
Nanson function. We state the conditions below without proof. In 
part (a), conditions 1 to 6 have been derived from the corresponding 
conditions 1 to 6 in theorem 5.2; in part (b), conditions 1, 2 and 3 
have been derived from conditions 1, 3 and 4 respectively in 
theorem 5.3; and in part (c), the conditions have been derived from 




L e t th e  i s s u e  A = {x, y> z } and l e t  s be any s i n c e r e
s i t u a t i o n
(a)  I f  N an (s , A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n , s ay  x, t hen  s { e L a , Nan, s)  i f f
1. ( i ) | {i  e L yP x} | $ ( i  e L | x P . y } | and | l 1 = | l 1i Z 1 1 y 1
o r ( i i ) | { i  e L | yP_^x} > | { i  e L | x P . y } | and IL | — | L | z 1 y
or 2. ( i ) | {i  e L | zP^x) 1 ^ | U  e L | xP ^  z } | and | L | = | L |1 y l Z
o r ( i i ) | { i  e l | zP^ x } 1 * | {i  e L xP^z} | and | l 1 -  |L |1 y 1 ' Z '
o r 3. | u e L yP^x)  | > | l I
X
and I t 1 N1 x 1 3 and |L | -  |L | 1 X 1 1 z 1
o r 4 . 1 t i e L | zP^x} | > | l I1 x 1 and
I t 1 N and |L I -  | L |i x 1 1 y 1
o r 5. | u e L yPi x} > I L1 x 1 and |L 1 = 2 1 x 1 3 and
| ( i e L | z P . x } | ^ I LX and IL I — ILi x 1 1 z ^ 1
o r 6 . | ( i e L | z P ^ x } | > | l1 X and |L | = 5 1 x 1 3 and
1 ( i e L | yP^x)  j ^ lL1 X and L x l -  |Ly l -
1
(b) I f  N an (s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  s ay  x and 
t h e n  s £ E^(A, Nan, s )  i f f :












o r  2 .  | { i e L I xP . y  } 1 > IL 
1 1 1 y
| and It 1 NL < Qy 3
and | l
y
o r  3 .  | { i e L yP . x }  | > | l
‘ 1 1 1 X
j a n d It 1 NL < Qx  3
a n d | l
X
(c)  I f  N a n ( s ,  A) = {x,  y ,  z} t h e n  s  ^ E^(A,  Nan, s)  i f f :  
1. x (j: Maj (s  , A)
o r  2. y tj: Maj (s  , A)









We state the following results without proof:
Lemma 5.1
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if 
N = 2 then s e E"*"(A, Nan, s).
Theorem 5.5
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s,
E"^ (A, Nan, s) =|= •
Theorem 5.6
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if 
(s, A) e and Maj(s, A) is a singleton then there
exists an s e S such that Nan(s, A) = Maj(s, A) and 
s e E^(A, Nan, s).
Theorem 5.7
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if
(s, A) e Dw . and Mai(s, A) contains exactly two distinct Maj
elements then there exists an s e S such that Nan(s, A) =
Maj(s, A) and s e E (A, Nan, s).
The reader can verify that in the proofs of Lemma 4.1 and theorems 
4.5 and 4.6, the only properties of the Plurality function that we 
have used are:
N(i) Any coalition with greater than - members is decisive.
Nand (ii) Any coalition with exactly - members is quasi-decisive. 
Since the Nanson function also satisfies these properties, the proofs 
of lemma 5.1 and theorems 5.5 and 5.6 are directly analogous to those 
of lemma 4.1 and theorems 4.5 and 4.6 respectively.
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S i m i l a r  r em a rks  a p p ly  to  t h e  p r o o f  o f  theo rem  5 .7  e x c e p t  
t h a t  p a r t  2 ( c )  i n  t h e  p r o o f  o f  theo rem  4 . 7  ne e ds  t o  be sup p le m e n te d  
w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  comment: S in c e  z b e l o n g s  to  t h e  l o w e s t  i n d i f f e r e n c e
c l a s s  and t h e r e  I s  a t  l e a s t  one h i g h e r  i n d i f f e r e n c e  c l a s s  th e n  i t  
f o l l o w s  from t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n  t h a t  z £ N a n ( s ' , A).
The c o u n t e r p a r t  o f  t heo rem  4 . 8  does  n o t  h o l d  f o r  t h e  Nanson 
f u n c t i o n .  C o n s id e r  example 3 .3  i n  C h a p te r  3. Suppose t h a t  s i t u a t i o n  
s i n  example 3 .3  i s  a s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n .  The r e a d e r  can v e r i f y  t h a t  
M a j ( s ,  A) = ( x ,  y ,  z} and N a n ( s ,  A) = {x,  y ,  z} and s £ E^(A, Nan, s ) . 
Hence M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  e l e m e n t s  and N a n ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A) 
and s e EX(A, Nan,  s ) . However , t h i s  i s  n o t  a lw ays  t r u e  as  shown by 
th e  f o l l o w i n g  example :
Example 5 .1
L e t  i s s u e  A = ( x ,  y ,  z} and l e t  L = {1 ,  2} and l e t  s be 
a s i t u a t i o n  such  t h a t  xP^yP^z and z ? 2 yP 2 x *
The r e a d e r  can v e r i f y  t h a t  M a j ( s ,  A) = ( x ,  y ,  z} .  S in c e  N i s  n o t  a 
m u l t i p l e  o f  3 ,  t h e r e  does n o t  e x i s t  any s £ S such  t h a t  
N a n ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A).
We s t a t e  t heo rem  5 . 8  which  i s  the  c o u n t e r p a r t  o f  t h eo re m  4 .9  
Theorem 5 . 8
For  a l l  A £ X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,
i f  ( s ,  A) e Dn . t h e n  E(A, Nan, s)  4= cf>. bmaj
The p r o o f  o f  t 'heorem 5 . 8  i s  d i r e c t l y  a n a lo g o u s  to  t h a t  o f  t heo re m  4 .9
N
(remembering  t h a t  c o a l i t i o n s  w i t h  more t h a n  ^ members a r e  d e c i s i v e
unde r  P l u  and N a n ) .
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We now prove (theorem 5.9) that, for any given issue A, 
any sincere situation which is a strict equilibrium under the 
Plurality function is also a strict equilibrium under the Nanson 
function. I first suspected that such a result might hold while 
I was studying the results of the computer simulation which indicated 
that the above.theorem held for the issue A = {x, y, z}. In theorem 
5.9 we prove a result which holds for any given issue A.
We utilize this result to prove theorem 5.10 which is the 
counterpart of theorem 4.13. We subsequently prove theorem 5.11 
which can be compared with theorem 4.14.
It is now appropriate to consider the effects of supplement­
ing the Nanson function by the introduction of a tie-breaking device. 
Unfortunately, I have not been able to examine this question under the 
Nanson or Borda functions since I have exhausted my allocation of 
computer time.
We conclude this chapter by giving a summary of the results 
which we have established.
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Theorem 5.9
For  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  
s e E(A, P l u ,  s)  t h e n  P l u ( s ,  A) = N a n ( s ,  A) and 
s e E(A, Nan , s ) .
P r o o f
L e t  A £ X and l e t  s be any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  such  t h a t  
s e E(A, P l u ,  s ) . S inc e  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  d e c i s i v e  and 
P l u ( s ,  A) i s  n e v e r  empty i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) must  be e i t h e r  
a s i n g l e t o n  o r  must  c o n t a i n  more th a n  one e l e m e n t .  We c o n s i d e r  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  e x h a u s t i v e  and m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :
1. P l u ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n
2. P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s
3. P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s
We c o n s i d e r  each  p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  t u r n  and show t h a t  i f  s £ E(A, P l u ,  s)  
t hen  P l u ( s ,  A) = N a n ( s ,  A) and s e E(A, Nan, s ) . Throughout  t h e  
r e m a in d e r  o f  t h i s  p r o o f  we w i l l  w r i t e  A ^ U as  
k i s  a lways  an i n t e g e r .
A^ and we w i l l  assume
1. Suppose P l u ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n ,  say  x f o r  some x e A.
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  s e E(A, P l u ,  s)  and hence  i t  f o l l o w s  from theo rem 
4 .2  t h a t  f o r  a l l  y e (A -  { x } ) ,
|LXI > | U  e L | y P . x } |
O b v i o u s l y ,  f o r  a l l  k $ 0 ,  i f  x e A^ t h e n :
{ i  £ LlxP.w f o r  a l l  w £ (A, -  {x})} 0 L
and f o r  a l l  k 5 0 ,  i f  x £ A^ t h e n  f o r  a l l  y e (A^ -  { x } ) ,
( i  e L|yP_^w f o r  a l l  w £ (A^ -  {y })} C ( i  £ LjyP^x}
and hence  f o r  a l l  k $ 0 and f o r  a l l  y £ (A -  {x}) ,
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I {i £ L,|xP_jW for all w e (A^ - {x})}| >
I{i £ L,|yP^w for all w £ (A^ - {y})}|
Hence for all k £ 0, alternative x will be the only member of the 
highest indifference class defined by plu(s, A^). Hence, when 
for some k 5 0, C(A^, plu(s, A^) ) = A^ we will have = {x}.
Given the definition of the Nanson function, Nan(s, A) = {x}. 
Suppose s £ E(A, Nan, s) and hence there exists a threat say 
< L, s’ > to s. Obviously, Nan(s’, A) =)= {x} and hence there exists
at least one z e (A - {x}) such that z e Nan(s', A).
Given the maximin assumption, , L jC {i £ l |zP^x }.
Since z £ Nan(s', A) it follows from the definition of the Nanson
function that for all k $ 0, z e A^.
Since z e Nan(s’, A) and since x, z e An it follows from the 
definition of the Nanson function that there exists a positive 
integer h £ 0 such that:
|{i e L|zP^w for all w £ (A^ - {z})}[ ;>
I{i £ l |xP^w for all w £ (A^ - {x})}| 
Obviously, L fl {i £ l |x!\z } = (}). Hence in any situation s’ that 
can be created by members of L following strategies different 
from those which they followed in situation s while all members of 
(L - L) continue to follow the same strategies as they followed in
s,
(i i: l IzPJx } C {i i; l IzI’.x }
l  —  1 i
Obviously, for nil k $ 0, if x c A then:
{i e l |zP^w for all w £ (A^ - {z})} {i e l |zP_^ x }
and hence for 'all k 5 0, if x e A, then:k
{i e l |zP|w for all w £ (A^ - {z})} _C {i £ l|z5Äx}
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Similarly, since L Q L = 4> it follows that for all k £ 0, 
if x e A^ then:
{i e L|xP V  for all w e (A^  - {x})} D_ L^_
By hypothesis, s e E(A, Plu, s) and hence it follows from theorem 4.2 
that for all y e (A - {x}),
|lJ  > I {i e l ]yP^x} I
and hence,
IL 1 > I{i e LIzP.x}II x 1 1 1 i 1
and hence for all k 5 0, if x e A^ then:
I {i e LI xP_!w for all w e (A^ - {x}) } | >
I {i £ L|zP_!w fpr all w £ (A^ - {z}) } |
Hence there does not exist a positive integer h 5 0, such that:
I {i £ l |zP_!w for all w e (A^ - { z}) } | £
I{i £ l |xP_!w for all w e (A^ - {x})}|
Hence z { Nan(s', A). This is contrary to our hypothesis and hence 
there does not exist a threat to s and therefore s e E(A, Nan, s).
2. Suppose Plu(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements, say 
x and y for some x, y e A.
Since Plu(s, A) = {x, y} it follows from the definition of the
Plurality function that |L [ = |l Ix1 1 y 1
Since s e E(A, Plu, s) it follows from theorem 4.3 that for all 
z e (A - {x, y}),
{i £ LlzP.x & zP.y} = (J).
1 i l
By assumption S^ = IIq for all i e L and hence it follows that
j L I = IL I = 11 x y J-
By definition of the Nanson function, Nan(s, A) = {x, y}.
Suppose s f E(A, Nan, s) and hence there exists a threat say 
< L, s' > to s. Obviously, Nan(s', A) ]• {x, y}.
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We c o n s i d e r  s i x  e x h a u s t i v e  and m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :
(a)  N a n ( s ' ,  A) = {x}
(b) N a n ( s ’ , A) = {y}
(c)  N a n ( s ’ , A) -  {z} f o r  some z e (A -  {x, y})
(d) x e N a n ( s ' ,  A) and y £ N a n ( s ' ,  A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one 
z e (A -  {x, y}) such  t h a t  z e N a n ( s T, A).
(e)  x £ N a n ( s ' ,  A) and y e N a n ( s ' ,  A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one 
z e (A -  {x,  y}) such  t h a t  z e N a n ( s ' ,  A).
( f )  x e N a n ( s ' ,  A) and y £ N a n ( s ' ,  A) and  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one 
z e (A -  {x,  y}) such  t h a t  z e N a n ( s ’ , A).
We c o n s i d e r  each  p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  t u r n  and shown t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no 
t h r e a t  < L, s '  > to  s and hence  s e E(A, Nan, s ) .
(a)  Suppose N a n ( s ’ , A) = {x}
Given the  maximin a s s u m p t io n ,  L _C { i  e L |xP^y}
S ince  L fl L = 6 i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  i n  any s i t u a t i o n  s ’ t h a t  can  bey
b r o u g h t  a b o u t  by members o f  L f o l l o w i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  d i f f e r e n t  to  
t h o se  which  they  f o l l o w e d  i n  s w h i l e  members o f  (L -  L) c o n t i n u e  
to  f o l l o w  the  same s t r a t e g i e s  a s  i n  s ,
{i  e L |yPjw f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y })} 0^
Hence,  | {i  e L|yP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y } ) } | £ ^
Given th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n ,  y e N a n ( s ’ , A), 
l ienee t h e r e  i s  no t h r e a t  < L, s '  > to  s such t h a t  N a n ( s T, A) = {x}.
(b) Suppose N a n ( s ’ , A) = {y }
Given the  maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,  L _C {i r. T, |yP.x]
O b v i o u s ly ,  h p L = 1
by r e a s o n i n g  d i r e c t l y  a n a lo g o u s  to t h a t  i n  (a)  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  show 
Lhat x c N a n ( s ' ,  A). T h i s  is  c o n t r a r y  to  ou r  h y p o t h e s i s  and hence
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there is no threat < L, s’ > to s such that Nan(s’, A) = {y}.
(c) Suppose Nan(s’, A) = {z} for some z £ (A - {x, y}).
Given the maximin assumption, L (2 {i £ L,|zP^x or zP^y}
Since Nan(s', A) = {z} it follows from the definition of the Nanson 
function that for all k $ 0, z e A^.
Since Nan(s', A) = {z} and since x e A^ it follows from the defini­
tion of the Nanson function that there exists a positive integer 
h $ 0 such that:
I{i e l |zP_!w for all w e (A^ - {z})}| >
I{i £ L|xP^w for all w e (A^ - {x})}|
Since Nan(s', A) = {z} and since y £ A^ it follows from the 
definition of the Nanson function that there exists a positive 
integer j 5 0 such that:
I{i e l |zP|w for all w £ (A^  - {z})}| >
I {i £ L|yP_!w for all w £ (A_. - {y}) } | 
Obviously, L fl {i £ l |xP^z & yP_^ z} = cf>. Hence in any situation s' 
that can be created by members of L following strategies different 
from those which they followed in situation s while all members of 
(L - L) continue to follow the same strategies as in s,
{i e l IzP.'x } C {i £ LlzP.x or zP.y}
and,
{i £ LlzP.’y} C {i £ LlzP.x or zP.y}
Obviously, for all k 5 0, if x e A^ then:
{i £ l |zP|w for all w £ (A^ - {z})} _C {i £ L|zP^x}
and hence for all k £ 0, if x £ A^ then:
{i e l |zP|w for all w e (A^ - {x}) } _C {i £ L|zP^x or zP^y}
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S i m i l a r l y ,  f o r  a l l  k  £ 0 ,  i f  y e t h e n :
{ i  g LjzP^w f o r  a l l  w g (A^ -  { z })} _C { i  g L |z P ^ y }
and h e n c e  f o r  a l l  k  £ 0 ,  i f  y g A^ t h e n :
{ i  g l | zP_Jw f o r  a l l  w e (A^ -  { z }) } _C { i  e L | z P ^ x  o r  zP_^y}
S i n c e  s g E(A,  P l u ,  s )  i t  f o l l o w s  f rom  t h e o r e m  4 . 3  t h a t  f o r  a l l  
a e  ( A -  {x ,  y }) ,
{i  c L | aP ^  x & aP^y} = cp
and h e n c e  f o r  a l l  i  g L, i f  x P . y  t h e n  xP .w f o r  a l l  w g (A -  {x})l l
O b v i o u s l y ,  L Ü { i  e L | x P ^ y  & yP^z} = <J>. Hence i n  an y  s i t u a t i o n  s ’ 
t h a t  c a n  be  c r e a t e d  by members o f  L f o l l o w i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  d i f f e r e n t  
f r o m  t h o s e  w h i c h  t h e y  f o l l o w e d  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s w h i l e  a l l  members o f  
(L -  L) c o n t i n u e  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  same s t r a t e g i e s  a s  i n  s ,  
f o r  a l l  k $ 0 ,  i f  x  e A^ t h e n :
{ i  e L |x P^w  f o r  a l l  w e (A^ -  {x})  } _0 { i  g L,|xP_^y & yP_^z}
S i m i l a r l y ,  s i n c e  L Ü { i  g L | y P ^ x  & xP^z} = <j> i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t
f o r  a l l  k £ 0 ,  i f  y e A^ t h e n :
{ i  g L,|yP_Iw f o r  a l l  w g (A^ -  {y})}  _0 { i  g L|yP_^x & xP^z}
S i n c e  s g E(A,  P l u ,  s )  i t  f o l l o w s  f rom  t h e o r e m  4 . 3  t h a t
( i )  I{i  g L l x P ^ y  & y P ^ z ) | £ | { i  g L l z P ^ x  o r  z P ^ y } |
o r  ( i i )  I {i  g L|yP_^x & xP^z} | £ | { i  g L|zP_^x o r  zP^y} |
We c o n s i d e r  e a c h  p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  t u r n  an d  show t h a t  Nan ( s ' ,  A) =]= { z } .
( i )  S u p p o s e  I { i  e L | xE\ y & y P ^ z } |  $ [ { i  s L|zP_^x o r  zP^y} |
Hence f o r  a l l  k £ 0 ,  i f  x g A^ t h e n :
I {i  g L | x P | w  f o r  a l l  w g (A^ -  {x } ) } | £
I { i  c L | z P | w  f o r  a l l  w g (A^ -  { z } ) } |
Hence t h e r e  d o e s  n o t  e x i s t  a p o s i t i v e  i n t e g e r  h ^ 0 s u c h  t h a t :
I { i  g l | zP_!w f o r  a l l  w g (A^ -  { z } ) } | >
I { i  g L IxP!w f o r  a l l  w g (A^ -  {x } ) } |
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Hence N a n ( s ' ,  A) 4 { z } •
( i i )  S u p p o s e  | {i  e L |yP ^ x  & xP_^z}j £ | { i  e l | zP^,x o r  zP_^y}|
Hence f o r  a l l  k £ 0 ,  i f  y e A^ t h e n :  
j {i  e L,|yP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A^ -  {y }) } | $
I {i  e L,|zP_!w f o r  a l l  w e (A^ -  {z }) } |
Hence t h e r e  does n o t  e x i s t  a p o s i t i v e  i n t e g e r  j  $ 0 such  t h a t :
I {i  e l | zP_!w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {z }) } j >
[ {i  £ L|yP_!w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {y }) } |
Hence N a n ( s ' ,  A) 4 {z} .
S inc e  s £ E(A, P l u ,  s)  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  e i t h e r  ( i )  o r  ( i i )  o r  b o t h  
must  h o l d  and hence  t h e r e  i s  no t h r e a t  < L, s '  > to  s such  t h a t  
N a n ( s ' , A) = {z }.
(d) Suppose x e N a n ( s ' ,  A) and y 4 N a n ( s ' ,  A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  
a t  l e a s t  one z e (A -  ( x ,  y}) such  t h a t  z e N a n ( s ' ,  A).
Given t h e  maximin a s s u m p t io n ,  L _C {i  £ L|zP_^y}
Hence L fl L = <j>. Thus i n  any s i t u a t i o n  s '  t h a t  can be  b r o u g h t
a b o u t  by members o f  L f o l l o w i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h o s e
which  they  f o l l o w e d  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s w h i l e  a l l  members o f  (L -  L)
c o n t i n u e  to  f o l l o w  t h e  same s t r a t e g i e s  as  i n  s ,
{ i  e LjyP^w f o r  a l l  w £ (A -  {y })} ^
I I NAs we have shown e a r l i e r  L = and hence1 y 1 2
J{i  £ LIyP^w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {y } ) } | £ ^
Given the  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the  Nanson f u n c t i o n ,  y £ N a n ( s ' ,  A) .
T h i s  i s  c o n t r a r y  to  ou r  h y p o t h e s i s  and hence  t h e r e  i s  no t h r e a t  
< L, s '  > to  s such t h a t  x e N a n ( s ' ,  A) and y 4 N a n ( s ' ,  A) and 
f o r  some z £ (A -  {x,  y } ) ,  z e N a n ( s ' ,  A).
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(e)  Suppose x £ N a n ( s ’ , A) and y e N a n ( s ’ , A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  
l e a s t  one z e (A -  {x,  y}) such t h a t  z e N a n ( s ’ , A).
Given the  maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,  LC^ {i  e L jzP^x} .
Hence L H L = <J>‘.x
By r e a s o n i n g  d i r e c t l y  a n a lo g o u s  to  t h a t  i n  (d) i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to 
show t h a t  x e N a n ( s ’ , A). T h i s  i s  c o n t r a r y  to  ou r  h y p o t h e s i s  and 
hence  t h e r e  i s  no t h r e a t  < L, s ’ > to  s such  t h a t  x tf N a n ( s ' ,  A) and
y e N a n ( s ’ , A) and f o r  some z e (A -  {x,  y } ) ,  z e N a n ( s ’ , A).
( f )  Suppose x e N a n ( s ' ,  A) and y e N a n ( s ’ , A) and t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t
l e a s t  one z e (A -  { x ,  y}) such  t h a t  z e N a n ( s ’ , A).
Given the  maximin a s s u m p t i o n ,  L C_ { i  e L| zP_^ x & zP^y} .
S in c e  s £ E(A, P l u ,  s)  i t  f o l l o w s  from theorem  4 . 3  t h a t  
{ i  e L| zP^ x & zP^y} = (p •
Hence t h e r e  i s  no t h r e a t  < L, s ’ > to  s such  t h a t  x e N a n ( s ’ , A)
and y £ N a n ( s ’ , A) and f o r  some z e (A -  { x,  y } ) ,  z e N a n ( s ’ , A ) .
In  summary, i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  < L, s ’ > to s then  ( a ) ,  ( b ) ,
( c ) ,  ( d ) , (e)  and ( f )  e x h a u s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  We have shown in
each c a se  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no t h r e a t  to  s and hence s e E(A, Nan, s ) .
Hence,  i f  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  and 
s £ E(A, P l u ,  s)  t h e n  P l u ( s ,  A) = N a n ( s ,  A) and s e E(A, Nan, s ) .
3. Suppose P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s .
I t  f o l l o w s  from theorem 4 .4  t h a t  s i): E^(A, P l u ,  a)  and hence  
s I E(A, P l u ,  s)  .
O b v i o u s ly ,  i f  s r E(A, P l u ,  s)  then  1, 2 and 3 e x h a u s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
We have shown in each c a se  t h a t  :i f  s r. E(A, P l u ,  s )  then
P l u ( s ,  A) = N a n ( s ,  A) and s c E(A, Nan, s ) . Our r e s u l t  f o l l o w s .
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Tli eo rem 5.10
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if there 
exists an x e A such that for all y c (A - {x}),
I{i e L|xP y}| > N(|a | - 1)/|A|
then Nan(s, A) = {x} and s e E(A, Nan, s).
Proof
Let A e X and let s be any sincere situation such that there exists an 
x e A such that for all y e (A - {x}),
I (i e L I xP^y} | > N( | A | - 1)/|a |
It follows from theorem 4.13 that Plu(s, A) = {x} and s e E(A, Plu, s). 
Hence it follows from theorem 5.9 that Nan(s, A) = {x} and 
s e E(A, Nan, s) .
Hence, for all A c X and for every sincere situation s, if there exists 
an x e A such that for all y e (A - {x}),
I(i e L|xP.y}| > N(|a | - 1)/|a |
then Nan(s, A) = {x} and s e E(A, Nan, s).
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Theorem 5.11
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if 
(s, A) e D . and Smaj(s, A) = {x} for some x e A and
Olllcl J
I{i e LlxP^y for all y e (A - {x})}| > ^ 
then Nan(s, A) = {x} and s e E(A, Nan, s).
Proof
Let A c X and let s be any sincere situation such that (s, A) £ ^Smaj 
and Smaj(s, A) = {x} for some x e A and
j{i e L|xP^y for all y £ (A - {x})}| >
For the remainder of this proof, we will write A ^ U as and will 
assume k is always an integer.
A
Since |L | > - it follows that for all integers k > 0, Z t (R.) >,X «3 • x ^ 1 31 £ L
and hence if A^ contains more than two distinct elements then 
alternaive x will not belong to the lowest indifference class 
defined by plu(s, A^) and hence x will belong to A^+ .^
By hypothesis, Smaj(s, A) = {x} and hence it follows from the 
definition of the Strict Majority function that for all y e (A - {x}),
I {i £ L|xf\y}| > J {i £ L|yP^x}|
Hence if A^ contains only two distinct elements then x will not 
belong to the -lowest indifference class defined by plu(s, A^) and 
hence x will belong to A^+ ^.
Given the definition of the Nanson function, Nan(s, A) = {x}.
Suppose s *(: E(A, Nan, s) and hence there exists a threat say 
< L, s ’ > to s. Obviously, Nan(s', A) =j= {x} and hence there exists 
at least one y c (A - {x}) such that y £ Nan(s', A).
Given the maximin assumption, L {i e L|yP^x}
Obviously, L fl L = <j> and hence in any situation s ’ that can be
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c r e a t e d  by members o f  L f o l l o w i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h o s e
which they  f o l l o w e d  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s w h i l e  a l l  members o f  (L -  L)
c o n t i n u e  to  f o l l o w  the  same s t r a t e g i e s  a s  i n  s ,
{ i  e L,[xP|w f o r  a l l  w e (A -  {x})} 3.
I I NS in c e  by h y p o t h e s i s ,  |L | > -^  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  f o r  a l l  i n t e g e r s
• X  j
k * 0,
t V . )  >  \x i  3i  £ L
and hence  i f  c o n t a i n s  more t h a n  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  t h e n  
a l t e r n a t i v e  x w i l l  n o t  b e l o n g  to  the  l o w e s t  i n d i f f e r e n c e  c l a s s  
d e f i n e d  by p l u ( s ? , A^) and hence  x w i l l  b e l o n g  to  A ^ ^ .
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  y e N a n ( s ? , A) and hence  i n  s i t u a t i o n  s '  i t  f o l l o w s  
t h a t  f o r  a l l  i n t e g e r s  k > 0,  y £ A^.
Hence i f  A^ c o n t a i n s  o n l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  t h e n  A^ = {x,  y}.  
S in c e  L M i  £ L|xP^y} = <j> i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  i f  A^ c o n t a i n s  o n ly  two 
d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  th e n
{ i  e L.|xP^y} 2. { i  £ h | x M y }
and
{i £ LI yP^x} {i e LlyP^x}
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  S m a j ( s ,  A) = {x} and hence  i t  f o l l o w s  from th e  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  S t r i c t  m a j o r i t y  f u n c t i o n  t h a t :
I {i  e L |xP y} |  > I {i  £ L | yP x} |
and h e n c e ,
I {i  e L IxP^y} | > | { i  e L |yP . :x} |
Hence p l u ( s ' ,  {x, y}) = xP^.y and g i v e n  the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the  Nanson
f u n c t i o n ,  N a n ( s ’ , A) = {x}.
T h i s  i s  c o n t r a r y  to ou r  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  y £ N a n ( s ' ,  A) and hence 
t h e r e  i s  no t h r e a t  to  s and t h e r e f o r e  s e E(A, Nan, s ) .














o f  Theorems i n  C h a p te r  5
For  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,
and f.or a l l  s e S, i f  s e E(A, Nan, s)  t h e n  ( s ,  A) e .Maj
and N a n ( s ,  A) _C M a j ( s ,  A).
For  a l l  A e X such  t h a t  A c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  
e l e m e n t s  say  x ,  y and z and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s such  
t h a t  N a n ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n  say  x e A, s { E(A, Nan, s)  
i f f :
1. | { i £ L | y P . x } | £ | { i £ L | xP_^y } |
2 . I u £ L | z P . x } | | { i e L | xP_^z} |
3. l ( i £ L | y f . x } | > | l  I , I t  I Na n d  L < -1 x 1 3
4 . l ( i £ L | zP . x  } | ' 1 ‘
> | l  Ix 1
, | T | Na n d  L < -
1 x 1 3
5 . l ( i £ •H
IPh > | l  IX
a n d  IL I = ^  a n d  
1 x  3
l { i £ L zP . x } 1' l  1 L I x  1
6 . l ( i £ L | z P . x } |1 l  1
> | l  I
X
a n d  | l  I = ^  a n d  
x 3
l { i £ L | y P  x } | * | l  IV
For a l l  A c X such  t h a t  A c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  
e l e m e n t s  say  x,  y and z and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s 
such t h a t  N a n ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  





{ i  e l |zP,x or  zP.y}| 1 i  i  1
(1
{i e LIyP x } |
N
> 2
P . z } | < ^ and
i  1 3















For a l l  A £ X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s and f o r  
a l l  s e S, i f  N a n ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  
e l e m e n t s  t hen  s ff. E(A, Nan, s)  .
For  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,
E^(A, Nan, s)  =j= c|>.
For  a l l  A e X 
( s ,  A) e DMaj
an s e S such
and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f
and M a j ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n  th e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s
t h a t  N a n ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A) and s e E^(A, Nan, s ) .
For  a l l  A z X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  
( s ,  A) e and M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t
e l e m e n t s  then  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an s e S such t h a t  N a n ( s ,  A) = 
M a j ( s ,  A) and s e E^(A, Nan, s ) .
For  a l l  A c X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f
( s ,  A) e D0 . t h e n  E(A, Nan, s )  4= 4> - Smaj '
For  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  
s e E(A, P l u ,  s)  th e n  P l u ( s ,  A) = N a n ( s ,  A) and s e E(A, Nan,  s ) .
For  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  t h e r e  
e x i s t s  an x e A such  t h a t  f o r  a l l  y £ (A -  {x} ) ,
I { i  e L I xP y } I > N ( I AI -  1) /  | A |
t h e n  N a n ( s ,  A) = {x} and s £ E(A, Nan, s ) .
For  a l l  A £ X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f
( s ,  A) e . and S m a j ( s ,  A) = {x} f o r  some x £ A andSmaj
I{i  c L IxP^y f o r  a l l  y c  ( A -  {x}) } | > ^ 
t h e n  N a n ( s ,  A) = {x} and s £ E(A, Nan, s ) .
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6 THE STABILITY OF SITUATIONS UNDER THE 
BORDA FUNCTION
In this chapter we will study the stability of situations
under the Borda function. We will assume throughout this analysis
Nthat = IIo for all i e L and hence S = Il0 . Unless we state 
specifically otherwise, it will be assumed that all individuals 
follow the maximin rule i.e. assumption 2.2 is satisfied.
We begin by proving (theorem 6.1) that the Borda function 
satisfies the property of weak Condorcet consistency which we defined 
in Chapter 2. We provide a counter-example to show that the Borda 
function does not satisfy the stronger property of Condorcet 
consistency. We then establish, for any given issue A containing 
exactly three distinct elements, a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for any given sincere siutation to be a strict equilibrium 
under this CDF (theorems 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4). From these conditions 
we deduce the necessary and sufficient conditions for any given 
sincere situation to be an equilibrium. We conclude by proving 
a number of conditions which are sufficient but not necessary for 
any given sincere situation to be a strict equilibrium under the
Borda function.
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We will utilize some of the notation introduced at the 
beginning of Chapter 4 as well as some additional notation defined 
below.
For all i e L and for all R. e S., we define a weakl l
preference relation R_^  (with associated strict preference relation
•f' * ^P. and indifference relation I.) as follows:l l
For all distinct a, b e X, 
aR^b iff bR.a and bR^a iff aR.bl i i i
1Hence the relation R^ may be interpreted as a relation which ranks 
the elements of X in exactly reverse order to the ranking determined 
by the relation R^ . We utilize this notation in the proof of 
theorem 6.1. In effect, we exploit the fact that the Borda function 
satisfies the 'cancellation property' defined by Young (1974) and 
used by him as one of a set of properties which together character­
ize the Borda function.
Throughout this chapter we will denote the sum of the rank
numbers assigned by the Borda operator to any alternative x e A
in situations s, s, and s' etc as w , w and w' respectively.x x  x
We now prove theorem 6.1. We have stated the theorem 
in a form which is consistent with that of theorems 4.1 and 5.1.
It follows simply from this result that the Borda function satisfies 
the property of weak Condorcet consistency. We defer giving a 
counter-example to demonstrate that the Borda function does not 
satisfy the stronger property of Condorcet consistency until we 
have proved theorems 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4.
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Theorem 6.1
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s and for all
s e S, if s e E(A, Bor, s) then (s, A) £ D . andMaj
Bor(s, A) Maj(s, A).
Proof
Let A e X and let s be any sincere situation.
Let s e S be any situation such that s £ E(A, Bor, s). 
We consider two mutually exclusive possibilities:
1. (s. A) i DMa.
2. (s, A) e D and Bor(s, A) C Maj(s, A)Maj
We show in each case that s { E(A, Bor, s).
1. Suppose (s, A) i D ..' Maj
Since the Borda function is decisive and Bor(s, A) is never empty
it follows that there exists at least one z e A such that z £ Bor(s, A)
Since (s, A) tj: D ., it follows from the definition of the Majority Maj
function that there exists at least one x e (A - {z}) such that:
|{i e L|xP_^z}| > I {i £ L|zP x}|.
Let L = {i e l |xP,z }.
1 l
By assumption, S^ = Hq for all i £ L and hence |l | > ^ and | (L — L) | < 
Let L C L  such that |L | = |(L — L)|
~  k
Let s’ be any situation such that: R. c S f(x) for all i e (L - L )i ' i
R. for all k c (L - L) k
mul all ) c 1. choose their strategies such that for all :L £ (L - T.)
■k f
there exists exactly one j e L such that = R^.
Given the specification of situation s’ it follows that for all 




£ - * ^ (RP = E - * %(R1>i e (L - (L - LO) i e (L - (L - L )) y
and for all y e (A - {x}),
E - * t V - )  > Z
i e ( L - L )  i e (L - L )
cA(R!) y i
and hence for all y e (A - {x}),
E tA (R!) > E tA (R!) 
i c L X 1 i e L y 1
and hence for all y e (A - {x}),
w* > w ’.x y
Given the definition of the Borda function, Bor(s’, A) = {x}. 
Given the maximin assumption, s’Q^ Bors for aH  i £ L and hence 
< L, s’ > is a threat to s and s E(A, Bor, s).
2. Suppose (s, A) e D . and Bor(s, A) G Maj(s, A).Maj
It follows from our hypothesis that there exists at least one z c A 
such that z z Bor(s, A) and z { Maj(s, A).
Since z tj; Maj(s, A) it follows from the definition of the Majority 
function that there exists at least one x e (A - {z}) such that:
I{i e l |xP.z}| > I{i e l |zP.x }|
Let L = {i z l IxP.z }.l
By assumption, S^ = ITq for all i e L and hence |l | > ^ anc ^ | (L - L) | < 
'k  ^ Vc ~Let L C L  such'that |l | = |(L — L)|
~ kLet s’ be any situation such that: R! c S .(x) for all i e (L - L )i l
K R. for all k c (L - L) k
and all j c L choose their strategies such that for all i c (L - L)
>v fthere exists exactly one j e L such that R “ R_^ .
By reasoning ditcctly analogous to that in 1, it can be shown that 
Bor(s’, A) = {x}.




< L, s '  > i s  a t h r e a t  t o  s and s  ^ E(A, Bor ,  s)
In  summary, we have  shown i n  1 t h a t :
I f  ( s ,  A) (I . t hen  s tt E(A, Bor ,  s)  r Maj . T
and we have shown i n  2 t h a t :
I f  ( s ,  A) e . and B o r ( s ,  A) (Maj • ] M a j ( s ,  A) t h e n  s £ E(A, Bor ,  s ) .
From 1 and 2 i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t :
_  _  _  *
I f  s t  E(A, Bor ,  s)  t h e n  ( s ,  A) c D„, . and B o r ( s ,  A) C M a i ( s ,  A).Maj —
Hence f o r  a l l  A e X and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s and f o r  a l l  
s e S, i f  s e E(A, Bor ,  s)  t h e n  ( s ,  A) e an<  ^ B o r ( s > A) _C M a j ( s ,  A).
* We o b s e r v e  t h a t  t h e  p r e m i s e s  have  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  form:
From 1 we have ^P -> ^S  
From 2 we have P & ^S
w i t h  t h e  o b v io u s  d i c t i o n a r y  and o ur  r e q u i r e d  c o n c l u s i o n  t h e r e f o r e  
has  the  form:
S -* P & 0
Our c o n c l u s i o n  f o l l o w s  f rom t h e  p r e m i s e s  i n  t w o - v a l u e d  p r o p o s i t i o n a l  
l o g i c  w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d e d u c t i o n :
1 %p -* %s Premise
2 P & ^ 0  -> Prem ise
3 P -> (^'Q -> ^ S ) from 2 by e x p o r t a t i o n
4 P -> (S -> 0) from 3 by c o n t r a p o s i t i o n
5 S -► P f rom  1 by c o n t r a p o s i t i o n
G * S > (S > Q) from 4 ,  5 by t r a n s i t i v i t y
7 S -> 0 from  6 by c o n t r a c t i o n
8 S -> P Ä 0 from 5,  7 by c o m p o s i t i o n
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We now establish, for any given issue A containing exactly 
three distinct elements, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for any given ‘sincere situation to be a strict equilibrium under the 
Borda function. We have shown in Chapter 3 that if = TIq for all 
i e L then Bor is a decisive GDF and hence for any given issue A 
and for any sincere situation s, Bor(s, A) is always defined and 
Bor(s, A) is never empty. In theorem 6.2, we consider the possibility 
that Bor(s, A) contains exactly one element; in theorem 6.3, we 
consider the possibility that Bor(s, A) contains exactly two distinct 
elements; and in theorem 6.4, we consider the possibility that 
Bor(s, A) contains exactly three distinct elements. (In fact, in 
theorem 6.4 we prove a more general result for any given issue A 
and for any situation s e S such that Bor(s, A) contains three or 
more distinct elements.) Obviously, this exhausts the possibilities 
and hence on the basis of theorems 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4, we can determine, 
for any given issue A containing exactly three distinct elements, 
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for any given sincere 
situation to be a strict equilibrium under the Borda function.
However, I have been unable to generalize the results established 
in theorems 6.2 and 6.3 to apply to an issue containing any number 
of elements.
We will utilize these results in the computer simulation 
to determine, for any given issue A containing exactly three distinct 
elements, the probability that any given sincere situation will be
a strict equilibrium under the Borda function.
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In theorems 6.2 and 6.3, we assume the issue A consists of exactly three 
distinct alternatives x, y and z. Since |Aj = 3, it follows that:
tj = ‘I AI -1 = 2
4  = hi - 2 = 1
tj » |A| - 3 - 0
and hence in any situation s c S,
w = 2 I {i c L I xP , yP , z } I + 2 I { i c LI xP , zP , y} I +x 1 ' i i 1 1 1 i l 1
+
Wy = 2 j {i c L[yP^,xP^z}| + 2 | {i e L|yP^zP_^x}| +
+
w^ = 2 I {i e L|zP_^xP^y}| + 2 | {i e L|zP^yP_^x}| +
+
I{i e LIyP^xP^z}| 
I{i £ L J zP^xP^y}| 
I{i £ LIxP.yP^z}I 
I{i e LIzP yP^x}I 




For all A e X such that A contains exactly three distinct 
elements say x, y and z and for every sincere situation s such 
that Bor(s, A) is a singleton, say x e A, s tf E(A, Bor, s) iff 
1. I{i e L | yf\x}| > |{i £ LjxP^y & zP^yll and
2 I {i e L I yP^x} | 5 |{i £ L|xPiy & zi^y} | + | |
or 2. |{i e l IzP^x }! > |{i e LjxP^z & yP^z}| and
2 I {i e L|zP^x}|  ^ I {i £ L | xP z & yP_^ z}| + |l |^
Proof: Sufficiency
Let A e X such that A contains exactly three distinct elements say 
x, y and z. Let s be any sincere situation such that 
Bor(s, A) = {x}.
1. Suppose I{i z L|yP x}| > |{i e LlxP^y & zP^y} | and
2 I {i z L I yP±x} I  ^ |{i c LlxP^y & zP^y}| + |L^  |
From our hypothesis it follows that:
2 I{i c L|yP xP z}| + 2 I{i e L|yP.zP.x}| + 2|{i e L|zP.yPix}| :>
I {i z L|xP_^ zP^ y}| + I {i z L|zi\xP^y}| +
I {i z L|xPiyPiz}| + I {i z L|xP;.zPiy}|
and therefore,
I {i £ L|yPixPiz'}| :> 21 {i £ LlxP.yP.z)! + 21 {i £ L|xPizPiy}| +
I{i £ L|yP^xP z}| + I{i e L|zP^xP^y}| -
2 I{i e L|yP1xP±z}I - 2 I{i c Llyf^zP.x}! -
|{I c L|xP yP z}| - 21 f i r L|zPiyPJx}|
and therefore,
I{i c LIyP^xP^z}I  ^wx “ wy ” |{i e L|zP^yP^x}|
Let L C [1 £ LiyP.xP.z] such that |L | = w - w - |{i £ L|zP yP x}|. — ' i i  x y  r i
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Let L/; = {i c LlzP.yP.x} and let L = h' U L#.. 1 1
Let s’ be any situation such that: for all i e L, yP^zP^x
for all k g ( L -  L ) ,  R £ -  \
Given the specification of situation s’,
I *w' = w - L X X 1 1
= - (w^ - .w^  - I {i e L|zP^yP^x}|)
+ I {i g L| zP.jyP.jX
//,w - Ly
+ I{i e LIzP^yP^x
I * ,  I //w + L - L
w ^ + (wv - w r - I{i g L|zP^yP^x}|) - |{i e h|zP ,yPi
wv - ww + - 21 {i g L|zP^yP^x}|.
Hence, w' = w' x y
By hypothesis,
I{i g LIyP^x}I > I{i g L|xP^y & zP^ y}! 
and therefore,
31 { i g L I yP^xP^z} I + 31 {i e L | yPn. zP_,x} | + 3 | {i c L|zP^.yPi i




4 I {i g L|yP_^xP^z}| + 4 j {i g L|yP^zP_^x}| +
2 I {i g L|xP_^yP^z}| + 2 I {i e L|zP^ .yP^ .x}| >
2 J{i g LIxP^yP^z} 
I {i e L|yi\xP z}
2 I{i g LizP.xP.y]1 1 i l
I{i c L|xP^zP y}
3 j{i c LIzP^yP^x}
i i
+ 21{i c L|xP^zP^y}| + 
+ I{i c LIzP^xP^y}j + 
+ 21{i c L|zP yP x )| + 
+ I{i e LlyP.zP.x)! -
and therefore,
2w > w + w - 3 I{i g LIzP.yP. x. y x z 1 ' l l
and therefore,
w + I { i e L I zP . yP . x} j > w - w + w -2j{ieL|zP.yP.x}| y 1 ' l l '  x y z ' 1 1
and it follows that:
w ’ > w'Y z
Given the definition of the Borda function, Bor(s', A) = (x, y}.
Given the maximin assumption, s'Q^ s for all i e L and henceA,Bor
< L, s' > is a threat to s and s (j: E(A, Bor, s) .
2. Suppose I {i e l |zP_^ x }| > |{i e l |x!\z & yP^z} j and
21 {i e l |zP_^ x }| £ I {i e L|xP_^ z & yP_^ z}| + | 
From our hypothesis it follows that:
2 I{i e LlzP^xP^yll + 2|{i e LlzP^yP^x}] + 2|{i e LlyP^zP^xll ^
I{i e LIxP^yP^z}| + |{i e LlyP^xP^zlI +
I {i e L I xP^yP^z} I + | {i e L|xP_^zP^y}| 
and therefore,
I{i e LlzP^xP^yll  ^2 I{i e LlxP^yP^z}] + 2|{i e LlxP^zP^y)! +
I {i e LlyP^xP^z}! + |{i e LlzP^xP^y}] -
2 I{i e LlzP^xP^yll - 2|{i e LlzP^yP^xll -
I{i e LlxP^zP^yll — 2 j{i e LlyP^zP^x)!
and therefore,
I {i £ L|zP xP y}| £ wx “ wz ” I {i e LlyP^zP^x)!
— — k _ — — —Let L C {i £ LlzP.xP.y} such that |l I = w  - w  - |{ieLjyP.zP.x — ' l l  1 1  x z ' ' l l
// I -  -  *  //Let L = {i e L yP.zP.x} and let L = L U L .' l l
Let s' be any situation such that: for all i e L, zP.'yP.'xl l
for all k e (L - L),
By reasoning directly analogous to that in 1 it is possible to show 
that Bor(s', A) = {x, z}.
Given the maximin assumption, s'O^ „ s for all i e L and henceA,Bor
< L, s' > is a threat to s and s £ E(A, Bor, s).
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P r o o f :  N e c e s s i t y
L e t  A e X s u c h  t h a t  A c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  s a y  x ,  y 
a n a  z .  L e t  s be  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t  
B o r ( s ,  A) = {x}.
S u p p o se  s ij: E(A,  B o r ,  s )  and h e n c e  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t ,  s a y  < L, s '  > 
to  s .  O b v i o u s l y ,  B o r ( s '  , A) =j= {x} . We c o n s i d e r  t h r e e  e x h a u s t i v e  an d  
m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :
( a )  y e B o r ( s ’ , A) and z B o r ( s ’ , A)
(b)  y { Bor ( s ’ , A) an d  z e B o r ( s ' ,  A)
(c )  y £ B o r ( s ’ , A) an d  z e B o r ( s ' ,  A)
We c o n s i d e r  e a c h  p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  t u r n  and show t h a t  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s
a  t h r e a t  t o  s t h e n  c o n d i t i o n  1 o r  c o n d i t i o n  2 m u s t  b e  s a t i s f i e d .
(a )  S u p p o s e  y e B o r ( s ’ , A) and z tf B o r ( s ’ , A)
Given t h e  m axim in  a s s u m p t i o n ,  L C { i  e L | y P ^ x }  .
G iven t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  B o rd a  f u n c t i o n  t h e r e  a r e  two ways  by w h i c h  
members o f  L can  i n t r o d u c e  y i n t o  t h e  c h o i c e  s e t :
( i )  By r a i s i n g  y i n  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r i n g s
( i i )  By l o w e r i n g  x i n  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r i n g s .
H e n ce ,  z P . y P ^ x  ca n  f o l l o w  s t r a t e g y  y P ^ z P j x
^ i X^ i Z -can f ° - ^ ow s t r a t e gy yP^zP^x  
Hence s '  i s  a s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t :  f o r  a l l  i  e L,  yP.’ zP.’x
l  l
f o r  a l l  k c (L -  L ) , R  ^ ^
L e t  L n ( i  £ L |y P ^ x P ^ z }  = L .
L e t  L fl { i  £ L l z P . y P . x }  = L^.
1 l  i
Given  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ' ,
w ’ = w _ | l
X X
w' = w + l L
y y
w ’ = w + | l
z z
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By hypothesis, y e Bor(s', A) and hence it follows from the definition 
of the Borda function that w'  ^w T.y x
Hence,
w + Ly $ w
and therefore, 
, *,
L £ w - w - L X y
By hypothesis, y e Bor(s', A) and z Bor(s', A) and hence it follows 
from the definition of the Borda function that w ’ > w'. Hence,
y z
- . I _ //1 - I * I I //1w + L > w + L - L y z ' 1 1 1
and therefore,
* - - I //1L < w - w + 2 Ly z
We have already shown that if y e Bor(s', A) then:
* - i t //1L 5 w w hx y
Hence it follows that:
- - „ I # I — - i, //1w - w + 2 L > w - w - Ly z x y 1
and therefore,
2w > w  + w - 3 L . y x z
Since C {i c LlzP.yP.x} it follows that—  ' l l
2w > w  + w — 3 1{i g LlzP.yP.x}! y x z 1 ' l l 1
and therefore,
4 I {i e L I yP^xl\'z} | + 4 | {i e L | yP_. zP_. x} | +
2 I {i e L|xP^,yP^z}| + 2 
21 {i f h|xP yP z}| + 2
Ifi r I.|yP xP z}I +
21{i e L|zP.xPiy}| + 2 
I{i e LIxP^zP^y}I +
3 I {1 c L I zi^yP^x} I
{i e LIzP^yP^x} 
{i e L I xP . zP y} 
f i r L I zP xP y} 
{i e LlzP.yP.x} 
{i e LIyP zP.x}
an d  t h e r e f o r e ,
I {i  e L ly P ^ x P ^ z } !  +  | { i  e L | yP ,^ zP^x} | + | { i  e L |zP^yP_^x}|  >
I {i  e L |xP_. zP_.y} | +  | {± e L | z P ^ x P ^ y } |
and t h e r e f o r e ,
I {i  e L I y f h x }  | > | { i  e L l x P ^ y  & zP \y }  |
As we h a v e  a l r e a d y  shown,  i f  y e B o r ( s ’ , A) t h e n :
■ *,  -  -  ,
L £ w -  w -  Lx y
S i n c e  C { i  e L l z P . y P . x }  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t :—  ' i i
. *  _  _  . . _  _  ,
L £ w -  w -  { i  e L z P . y P . x }
i i  x  y  ' i i '
and h e n c e ,
| ( i  e L yP^xP^z )|  ^ 2 | {i  e L |x P i yP i z } | + 2 | {i  e L|xP  zP y} |  +
| {i  e L yP^xP z }| + | {i  £ L |z P^ xP^ y} |  -
2 | {i  c L|yi;ixPi z}| ■- 2 | {i  c L l y P . z P ^ l l  -
| {i  £ L | x P . y P . z } |  -- 2 | { i  e L z P^yP^x} |
and t h e r e f o r e ,
2 | {i e Llyivxi^z ) | + 2| {i £ L | y I \ z P  x} | + 2 | {i c L|zP.yP x } | $
l a e L I xP . zP .y } I' i i ' + | U e L | zP^xP^y} | +
l a E L|xP^yP_^z}| + | { i £ L |xP^zP^y}|
and t h e r e f o r e ,
2 | {i e L | y P . x } | * | {i  £ L xP^y & z P ^ y } | + II I.1 X
Hence i f  t h e r e e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  < L, s ’ > to  s such t h a t  y e B o r ( s
and z £ B o r ( s ' , A) t h e n
|u e L ly f^x}  | > | a  c l|x i ^ y  & z l \ y } and
2 | {i e L | y P ±x ) | * 1 { i  £ L |xP^y & z P ^ y } | + L | .X
Hence c o n d i t i o n 1 must  be s a t i s f i e d .
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(b) Suppose y £ Bor(s', A) and z e Bor(s’, A)
Given the maximin assumption, L jC {i e L|zP_^x}.
Given the definition of the Borda function there are two ways by 
which members of L can introduce z into the choice set:
(i) By raising z in their individual orderings
(ii) By lowering x in their individual orderings.
Hence yP.zP.x can follow strategy zP.’yPjx
zP^xP^y can follow strategy zP!yP!x 
Hence s’ is a situation such that: for all i e L, zPlyP'x
l l
for all k e (L - L),
Let L n {i e LlzP.xP.y} = L*.
1 l l
Let L n {i c L I yP.zP.x} = L^.' l l
Given the specification of situation s’,
w' = w * 1 LX
w ’
X
= w + |l * 1y
w'
y
= w + |L# |z z
By hypothesis, z e Bor (s’, A) and hence it follows from the definition 
of the Borda function that w'  ^w'. Hence,
w + L £ w - L
Z 1 1 X
and therefore,
I *, - - • , //,L £ w - w - L .I I  x z
By hypothesis, y sj: Bor(s', A) and z e Bor(s’, A) and hence it follows 
from the definition of the Borda function that w* > w'.
Hence,
I //1 - | * iw + L > w + Lz y
and therefore,
, * i  -  -  I //L < w - w + 2 L z y 1
z y
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We have already shown that if z e Bor (s ', A) then:
I *  I -L £ w - w - LI I  x z
Hence it follows that:
- 4- 9 l T //l S-- - It ^  Iw - w + 2 L > w - w - L .z y 1 x z 1 1
By reasoning directly analogous to that in (a) it is possible to 
show that if there exists a threat < L, s' > to s such that 
y ij: Bor(s', A) and z e Bor(s', A) then:
I {i £ l |zP^x }| > I {i e L|xP_^ z & yP_^ z}| and
21 {i e l |zP_^ x }| £ I {i e l |xP_^ z & yP_^ z}| + |l |^.
Hence condition 2 must be satisfied.
(c) Suppose y c Bor(s', A) and z e Bor(s', A).
Given the maximin assumption, L _C {i e L|yP_^x & zP_^ x}.
Obviously, L ft {i e L,|xP_^ y or xP^ ,z} = (f>. Hence in any situation s'
that can be created by members of L following strategies different
from those which they followed in situation s while all members of
(L - L) continue to follow the same strategies as in s,
w'  ^w x x
and therefore
w' + w' <: w + w . y z y z
By hypothesis, Bor(s, A) = {x} and hence it follows from the
definition of the Borda function that:
w > w and w > w x y x z
and therefore,
2w > w + w x y z
and therefore,
2w' > w ' + w 'x y z
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By h y p o t h e s i s ,  y e B o r ( s ’ , A) an d  z e B o r ( s ’ , A) an d  h e n c e  i t  f o l l o w s
fr o m  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  B o rd a  f u n c t i o n  t h a t :
w' 5 w ’ an d  w ’ > w’ 
y x z ' x
an d  t h e r e f o r e ,
w’ + w' £ 2w’ .
y z x
We h a v e  a l r e a d y  .shown t h a t  i n  any s u c h  s i t u a t i o n  s ' ,
2w’ > w’ + w ’ .
x y z
Hence t h e r e  i s  no  t h r e a t  < L,  s ’ > t o  s s u c h  t h a t  y e B o r ( s ' ,  A) 
an d  z e B o r ( s ’ , A ) .
I n  summary,  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  t o  s t h e n  ( a ) ,  (b)  an d  (c )  
e x h a u s t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  We h a v e  shown i n  e a c h  c a s e  t h a t  i f  t h e r e  
e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  to  s t h e n  c o n d i t i o n  1 o r  c o n d i t i o n  2 m u s t  be
s a t i s f i e d .  Our r e s u l t  f o l l o w s .
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Theorem 6 .3
For  a l l  A e X such t h a t  A c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  
e l e m e n t s  s a y  x ,  y and z and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  
i f  Bor ' ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  then  
s (  E 1(A, Bor ,  s)  .
P r o o f
LeL A c X such t h a t  A c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  say 
x,  y and z .  Le t  s be any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  such t h a t  B o r ( s ,  A) 
c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  s ay  x and y.
By a s s u m p t i o n ,  = Üq f o r  a l l  i  c L and by h y p o t h e s i s  t h e  i s s u e  A 
c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  and hence  i t  f o l l o w s  from 
t h e  d e f i n t i o n  o f  t h e  Borda f u n c t i o n  t h a t  t ^  = 2 ,  t ^  = 1 and t ^  = 0.
Hence i n  any s i t u a t i o n  s c S,
„ , A , A , AWt£ w = ( t  + t 0 + t  )N . a 1 2 3a e A
= 3N
T h e r e f o r e ,  w + w + w = 3N. x y z
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  B o r ( s ,  A) = {x, y} and h e n c e ,
w > w and w > w and w = w . x z y z x y
I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t :  w £ N + 1 and w  ^ N + 1 and w $ N -  2x y, z
and t h e r e f o r e :  w > w + 1 and w > w + 1x z y z
We c o n s i d e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :
1. ( i e L|xP_^yP^z} =}= <f>
2. ( i c L | yP^xP^z} ={= (j)
3. u e L|zP^xP_^y} =]= (j)
4. * a c L. |zP^yP^x} =j= (J)
We show t h a t  i n  each  c a s e  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t h r e a t  < L, s '  > to  s such
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that L is a singleton and hence s £ E^(A, Bor, s). We subsequently 
show that unless at least one of the four conditions is satisfied 
then Bor(s, A) ,=f= {x, y} which is contrary to our hypothesis.
1. Suppose {i c L|xP^yP^z}  ^cj).
Let L _C {i e L|xP^yP_^z}.
Let s’ be any situation such that: for some i e L, xP^zP^y
for all k c (L - Ci)), R.' = R.k k
Given the specification of situation s', w* = wX X
w' = w - 1y y
w' = w + 1  z z
We have already shown that: w = w and hence w' > w ’x y x y
w > w + 1 and hence w' > w' x z x z
Given the definition of the Borda function, Bor(s', A) = {x}.
Given the maximin assumption, s’Q^ gors anc^ hence < {i}, s’ > is 
a threat to s and s £ E (A, Bor, s).
2. Suppose {i e L|yP^xP_^z} = (p.
Let L C {i e LIyP.xP.z } .
—  ' l l
Let s’ be any situation such that: for some i £ L, yP^zP^x
for all k e (L - {i}), = \
By reasoning directly analogous to that in 1 it can be shown that
Bor(s', A) = {y}. Given the maximin assumption, s’Q^  ^ s and henceA,Bor
< {i}, s’ > is a threat to s and s i| E (A, Bor, s) .
3. Suppose {i e L|zP_^xP^y} = (j).
Let L C {i £ LlzP.xP.y}.
—  . l l
Let s’ be any situation such that: for some i e L, xP^zP^y
for all k e (L - {i}),
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Given the specification of situation s', w' = w + 1X X
w ’ = wy y
w' = w - 1 z z
We have already shown that: w = w and hence w’ > w ’x y x y
w > w + 1 and hence w' > w* x z x z
Given the definition of the Borda function, Bor(s’, A) = {x}.
Given the maximin assumption s'O^ „ s and hence < {i}, s’ > is a1 A,Bor
threat to s and s { E^(A, Bor, s).
4. Suppose {i e L|zP.yP_^x} = <j).
Let L C {i e LlzP.yP.x}. ,
—  ' l l
Let s’ be any situation such that: for some i e L, yP^zP^x
for all k e (L - {i}), \  = \
By reasoning directly analogous to that in 3 it can be shown that 
Bor(s’, A) = {y}. Given the maximin assumption, s' ßors an<^  hence 
< {i}, s' > is a threat to s and s £ E^(A, Bor, s) .
Hence if condition 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 holds then s £ E^(A, Bor, s) .
Let us suppose that none of these conditions is satisfied. Since
S^ = IIq for all i £ L it follows that:
I {i e L I xP_^ zP_^ y} | = |{i e L|yP zP x}| = ^
Hence w = N, w = N and w = N. x y z
Given the definition of the Borda function, Bor(s, A) = {x, y, z}. 
This is contrary to our hypothesis and hence condition 1 or 
condition 2 or condition 3 or condition 4 must be satisfied.
Hence for all A e X such that A contains exactly three distinct 
elements say x, y and z and for every sincere situation s, if 
Bor(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements then 
s {J: E^  (A, Bor, s) .
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Theorem 6.4
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s and for all 
s e S,.if Bor(s, A) contains three or more distinct elements 
then s *|:’E^(A, Bor, s) .
Proof
Let A e X and let s be any sincere situation. Let s e S be any situation
such that Bor(s, A) contains three or more distinct elements.
Suppose for some distinct x, y and z e A that x, y and z e Bor(s, A). 
Since S^ = IIq for all i e L then all members of L must rank x, y and z 
according to one of the six possible strict orderings of {x, y, z}. 
Suppose for some i e L, xP_^ y and yP^z. We consider the following 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive possibilities: (a) xP_^ y
(b) yP.x
We show in either case that s | E^(A, Bor, s).
(a) Suppose for some i e L, xP^y and yP^z and xP^y.
Let s' be any situation such that:
U) R^ =
and (ii) for all a, b c (A - {x}) , aR|b iff aR^b and bR^a iff bR_^ a
and (iii) for all c e (A - {x, y}) , xR^c iff xR^c and cR^x iff cR_^ x
and (iv) yP^x
Given the specification of situation s’, v r \ = w - 1X X
w' = w + 1y y
and for all a c (A - {x, y}) we have: w* = w
cl cl
Since x, y e Bor(s, A) it follows from the definition of the Borda
function that: w = wx y
and for all a c (A- {x, y}), w ;> w and w > wx a y a
Hence for all a e (A - {y}), w' > w'.y a
\ for all k z (L - ii))
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G iven  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  B o rd a  f u n c t i o n ,  B o r ( s ' , A) = { y} - 
Given t h e  max im in  a s s u m p t i o n ,  s ’ Q^ ß o r s an<  ^ h e n c e  < { i}  , s '  > i s  a 
t h r e a t  to  s and s fj: E^(A,  B o r ,  s )  .
(b)  S u p p o se  f o r  some i  e L,  xP^y and  y P ^ z  and y P ^ x .
L e t  s ’ b e  an y  s i t u a t i o n  s u c h  t h a t :
( i ) = It f o r  a l l  k  e (L - { i ) )
and ( i i ) f o r  a l l  a ,  b e (A -  {x}) , aR jb  i f f aR.
l
and ( i i i ) f o r  a l l  c e (A -  {x ,  y}) , x R ! c  i f f xR.l
and ( i v ) xP \ yl
G iven t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  s i t u a t i o n  s ’ , w ’ =  w
X X
+ 1
w ’ =  w -  1
y y
an d  f o r a l l  a £ (A -  {x ,  y } )  we h a v e : w* =  w  
a a
S i n c e  x ,  y e B o r ( s ,  A) i t  f o l l o w s  f rom  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  B o rd a  
f u n c t i o n  t h a t :  w = w
x y
and f o r  a l l  a e (A -  {x ,  y } ) , w ^ w and w 5 wx a  y a
Hence f o r  a l l  a  £ (A -  { x } ) ,  w’ > w'
x a
Given t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  B o rd a  f u n c t i o n ,  B o r ( s ’ , A) = { x } .
G iven  t h e  max im in  a s s u m p t i o n ,  s ’ Q^ „ s an d  h e n c e  < { i } ,  s ’ > i s  a
A ,B or
t h r e a t  t o  s and s ^ E^(A,  B o r ,  s ) .
Now i f  f o r  some i  £ L,  xP^y  and y P ^ z ,  t h e n  ( a )  and (b)  e x h a u s t  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  We h a v e  shown i n  e a c h  c a s e  t h a t  s fj: E^(A,  B o r ,  s )  .
A s i m i l a r  a r g u m e n t  a p p l i e s  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one  i  e L who h o l d s  
any one o f  t h e  o t h e r  f i v e  p o s s i b l e  s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g s  o f  {x ,  y ,  z} .  S i n c e  
S_^  = Fto f o r  a l l  i  £ L,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  a l l  i  £ L m u s t  h o l d  one o r  o t h e r  
o f  t h e  s i x  p o s s i b l e  s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g s  o f  {x,  y ,  z} .  S i n c e  N £ 2 ,  i t  
f o l l o w s  t h a t  s fj; E ^ A ,  B o r ,  s )  . Our r e s u l t  f o l l o w s .
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We now demonstrate, by means of the following example, 
that the Borda function does not satisfy the property of Condorcet 
consistency.
Example 6.1
Let the issue A = {x, y, z} and let L = {1, 2, ..., 10} 
and let s e S be a situation such that:
for all i e (1, 2} xP.yP.zl l
for all i e (3, 4, 5} yP^xP^z
for all i e {6, 7, 8, 9, 10} zP.xP^y
It is easy to verify that (s, A) e anc  ^ A) = (x, z}
Further, w = 12, w = 8  and w = 10 and hence Bor(s, A) = {x}. x y z
Given the specification of situation s,
j {i e L|yP^x}| = 3 and | {i e L|xP_^y & zP_^ y}| = 5
and hence,
I {i e LlyP^xll j | {i c L | xP^y & zP^y}|
Similarly,
I {i e L|zP_^x}| = 5 and |{i £ l |xP_^ z & yP_^ z} | = 5
and hence,
I {i £ l |zP.x }| \ I {i £ L|xP^z & yP_^ z}|
It follows from theorem 6.2 that s £ E(A, Bor, s).
We have shown above that Bor(s, A) =j= Maj(s, A) and hence the Borda 
function violates the property of Condorcet consistency.
From theorem 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 we can simply deduce, for 
any given issue A containing exactly three distinct alternatives, 
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for any given sincere 
situation to be an equilibrium (as opposed to a strict equilibrium)
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under the Borda function. We state the conditions below without 
proof.
Let the issue A = {x, y, z) and let s be any sincere
situation.
(a) If Bor(s, .A) is a singleton, say x, then s £ E^(A, Bor, s) iff:
1. I {i f. L|y?^x)| > I {i c L | xP^y & zP^y}| and
2 I {i e L,|yP^x}| 5 | {i e L | xP ^y & zP^y)| + | L | and
w - w = 1x y
or 2. I {i e L|zP^x}| > | {i e L|xP_^z & yP^z}| and
2 1 {i e L|zP_^x}] ;> | (i e L|xP_^z & yP_^ z}| + |l |^ and
w - w = 1  X z
(b) If Bor(s, A) contains more than one element then s  ^ E (A, Bor, s).
We will utilize these results in the computer simulation 
to determine, for any given issue A containing exactly three distinct 
elements, the probability that any given sincere situation will be 
an equilibrium under the Borda function.
We now prove (theorems 6.5 and 6.6) a number of conditions 
which, for any given issue A, are sufficient but not necessary for 
any given sincere situation to be a strict equilibrium under the 
Borda function. Theorems 6.5 and 6.6 can be compared with theorems 
4.13 and 4.14 as well as with theorems 5.10 and 5.11 respectively.
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Theorem 6.5
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if there 
exists an x e A such that for all y e (A - {x}),
I U  g L|xP_.y} I > N ( I AI - 1) / IAI
then Bor(s, A) = {x} and s e E(A, Bor, s).
Proof
Let A g X and let s be any sincere situation such that there exists 
an x g A such that for all y c (A - {x}),
I{i g L|xP.y}| > N(IAI - 1)/|A|
Suppose Bor(s, A) =)= {x}. Then since Bor(s, A) is never empty there 
exists at least one y e (A - {x}) such that y e Bor(s, A).
Let L = {i g L|yP_^x}. By hypothesis | (L — L ) | > N ( | A | - 1) / | A |
and hence L N/I AI.
By definition,
P(R ) = £ * tA(R ) + £ *P(R )
i g L i e ( L - L )  i e L
w = Ey tA (R,) = £
A,-
i g L i g (L - L ) i g Ly'-i' : . /T a s ty(Ri) + 5 „ ..‘J ' V -
Since for all i g (L - L ), xP.y it follows that for all i g (L
tA (R.) $ tA (R.) + 1 x i  y l
* ^
and since by hypothesis, j(L — L ) | > N (|A| - 1)/|A|,
£ * L ( R  ) > £ tA (R ) + N (j AI - 1)/|a |.
i e ( L - L )  i g (L - L ) 7
*L ),
Since for all i e L , yP^x it follows that for all i e L ,
tA (R.) <: tA (R.) + 1. x i  y l
It follows from our definition that:
tA (R.) < (IAI - 1) and tA (R ) £ 0. y i 11 x 1
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and hence,
tx (Si) 5 ty (5i) - <IA| - 1)- 
By hypothesis, -|l | < N / |A| and hence,
E > 1 ~N (IAI ■ 1);IAIi e L i c L y
As we have already shown,
“x “ E * + * *tA (R )
i e ( L - L )  i e L
and hence,
w > S
i e (L - L )
* tA(R.) + N (IAI - 1)/IAI + E *tA(R ) - N (|a | - 1)/|a |
y  ^ t yi e L
and hence,
«X ' E * 4 ( V  + 1 *<(Ri)i e ( L - L ) 7 i e L y
and hence, w > w .x y
Given the definition of the Borda function, y A Bor(s, A). 
This is contrary to our hypothesis and hence Bor(s, A) = {x}.
Suppose s £ E(A, Bor, s) and hence there exists a threat say < L, s' > 
to s. Obviously, Bor(s', A) =j= {x} and hence there exists at least 
one y e (A - {x}) such that y e Bor(s’, A).
Given the maximin assumption, L _C {i e L|yP^x} and it follows from
our hypothesis .that | L j < N / j A | . Obviously, L fl {i e L|xP_^y} = (J).
Hence in any situation s' that can be created by members of L following
strategies different from those which they followed in s while all
members of (L - L) continue to follow the same strategies as in s,
E _ tA (R!) = E _ tA (R.)
i e (L - I.) X 1 i e (L - L) X 1
and,
£ - tA (R :) = E _ tA (R.).
i e (L - L) y 1 i £ (L - L) y 1
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S i n c e  f o r  a l l  i  £ (L -  L ) ,  x P . y  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  f o r  a l l  i  e (L -  L ) ,l
t A( R . )  ^ t A( R . )  + 1 x i  y l
an d  s i n c e  by h y p o t h e s i s ,  J(L -  L) | > N ( J A| -  1 ) / | A | ,
E .  t A( R . ) ' >  E .  t A(R . )  + N ( | A |  -  1 ) / ! A|
i  e (L -  L) X 1 i  c (L -  L) y 1
an d  h e n c e ,
E .  t A( R’ ) > E .  t A(R!)  +  N ( IAI -  1 ) / IA|
i  £ (L -  L) X 1 i  £ (L -  L) y 1
G iv en  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  B o rd a  f u n c t i o n ,  t h e r e  a r e  two ways  by  
w h i c h  members  o f  L ca n  i n t r o d u c e  y i n t o  t h e  c h o i c e  s e t :
( i )  by  r a i s i n g  y i n  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r i n g s
( i i )  by  l o w e r i n g  x i n  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  o r d e r i n g s  
H ow eve r ,  w h a t e v e r  s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  s e l e c t e d  by  members  o f  L we h a v e ,  
f o r  a l l  i  £ L,
t y O O  -  t A ( R p  .< ( | A |  -  1)  -  o  
s M - l
By h y p o t h e s i s ,  | l | < N / | a | an d  h e n c e ,
E _ t A(R !)  -  E _ t A(R !)  < N ( | A |  -  X)/ IAI 
i  e L y 1 i  e L x 1
an d  h e n c e ,
E _ t A(R! )  > E _ t A(R !)  -  N ( | A |  -  1 ) / IA|
, x  l  , y l1 £ L 1 £ L
I t  f o l l o w s  f r o m ' o u r  d e f i n i t i o n  t h a t :
w' = E .  t A(R !)  + E - t A(R'.)x . /T Ts X l  . x il  e (L -  L)  l  £ L
an d  h e n c e ,
w' > E .  t A( R!) +  N ( | A |  -  1 ) / IAI + X . t A(R !)  ~ N ( |A| -  1 ) / |A|
X i  c (L -  L) 7 1 L c L Y 1
and h e n c e ,
w* > 
x Ei  £
-  cA( R ' )  +  E . t A(R !)  
(L -  L) y 1 i  e L y 1
and therefore w ’ > w T.x y
Given the definition of the Borda function, y  ^ Bor(s', A).
This is contrary to our hypothesis and hence there is no threat 
to s and therefore s e E(A, Bor, s).
Hence for all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if there 
exists an x c A such that for all y e (A - {x}),
I{i c L|xP.y}| > N (IAI - 1)/|a |
then Bor(s, A) = {x} and s e E(A, Bor, s) .
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Theorem 6.6
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if there 
exists an x e A such that
I{i e LjxP^y for all y e (A - {x})}| > N(|A| - 1)/|A| 
then Bor(s, A) = {x} and s e E(A, Bor, s).
Proof
Let A c X and let s be any sincere situation such that there exists 
an x e A such that:
I{i e LjxP^y for all y c (A - {x})}| > N (|A( - 1)/[A|
It follows from our hypothesis that for all y e (A - {x}),
|{i e L|xP.y}| > N(|A| - 1)/IA|
Hence it follows from theorem 6.5 that Bor(s, A) = {x} and 
s e E(A, Bor, s).
Hence, for all A c X and for every sincere situation s, if there 
exists an x e A such that
I{i £ LlxP^y for all y £ (A - {x})}j > N (|A| - 1)/|A| 
then Bor(s, A) = {x} and s e E(A, Bor, s).
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We now demonstrate, by means of the following example, that 
the sufficient conditions established in theorems 6.5 and 6.6 are not 
necessary conditions.
Example 6.2
Let the issue A = {x, y, z ) and let L = {1, 2, ..., 9} and 
let s be any sincere situation such that:
for all i £ {1} * xl^zi^y
for all i c (2, 3, 4, 5), yPiXP . z
for all i e {6, 7, 8, 9},
It is easy to verify that wV = 10, w = 8 and w = 9 and henceT *7
Bor(s, A) = {xl.
We observe that:
I (i £ L I xP_^y} I = 5 < N ( IA I - 1) / | A |
I {i e L|xP.z}| = 5 < N(|A| - 1) / I A|
Hence the sufficient conditions required by theorems 5.5 and 5.6 are 
not satisfied.
We also observe that:
I {i £ L I yP_^ x} I = I {i e L I xP^y & zPLy} |
I {i £ l |zP^x }| = I {i e L|xP^z & yP_^ z}|
Hence it follows from the conditions established in theorem 6.2 that 
s £ E(A, Bor, s).
We conclude this chapter by giving a summary of the results









of Theorems in Chapter 6
For all A £ X and for every sincere situation s and 
for all s e S, if s e E(A, Bor, s) then (s, A) e ^Maj 
and Bor(s, A) _C Maj(s, A).
For all. A c X such that A contains exactly three distinct 
elements say x, y and z and for every sincere situation s such 
that Bor(s, A) is a singleton, say x c A, s i[ E(A, Bor, s) iff
1. I{i c L|yP^x}| > I{i e LIxP^y & zP.y} I and
2 I{i e LIyP.x}I * |{i c L|xP.y & zP.y}| + |L |
2. I {i c L|zP^x}| > I {i £ L|xP_^ z & yP_^ z} I and
21 {i e L|zP^x}|  ^I {i e L|xP^z & yPAz}| + | L |
For all A e X such that A contains exactly three distinct 
elements say x, y and z and for every sincere situation s, 
if Bor(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements then 
s [ (A, Bor, s) .
For all A £ X and for every sincere situation s and for all
s z S, if Bor(s, A) contains three or more distinct elements
then s  ^E^(A, Bor, s).
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if there
exists an x e A such that for all y e (A - {x}),
I {t c T,|x?,y)| > N( IAI - 1) / IAI
then Bor(s, A) = {x} and s c E(A, Bor, s) .
For all A e X and for every sincere situation s, if there 
exists an x c A such that
I {i e L|xP_^ y for all y £ (A - {x})} | > N ( | A | - 1) / | A | 
then Bor(s, A) = {x} and s £ E(A, Bor, s).
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7 A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF VOTING SITUATIONS
In this chapter we present and interpret the results of our 
computer simulation of voting situations. The simulation has been 
executed for each value of N = 2, 50. We have made the following
assumptions: (1) the issue A consists of exactly three distinct
elements, (2) the sincere and the expressed preferences of all 
individuals are strict orderings, (3) the distribution of individual 
preferences satisfies the equiprobability assumption and (4) assumption 
2.2 is satisfied. Subsequently, we have modified the simulation 
program by supplementing the Plurality function with a tie-breaking 
device and incorporating stability conditions based on assumption 2.1 
as opposed to assumption 2.2.
We begin by defining the equiprobability assumption and 
discussing the suitability of this assumption as the basis for our 
simulation of voting situations. We then discuss the principal 
features of the election simulation program which we have developed.
We begin the presentation of our results by examining our
determination of the probability of (s, A) c D ., the probability ofMaj
(s, A) e D . and Maj(s, A) is a singleton, and the probability of Maj
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(s. A) £ D„ .. Since the issue A consists of exactly three distinct ’ Smaj
elements, the probability of (s, A) e is equivalent to the
probability of the non-existence of a cyclical majority. Hence we can 
comfirm the accuracy of the techniques which we have employed by 
comparing these results with those given by other writers.
As we have shown in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for any given sincere situation to be an equilib­
rium under the Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions vary with the 
number of elements in the choice set. Accordingly, we examine the 
probability of each of these GDF’s defining a choice set which consists 
of (a) exactly one element, (b) exactly two distinct elements and 
(c) all three distinct elements in the issue A. For purposes of 
comparison, we have included the Majority function in this analysis.
We proceed to examine the probability of s e E (A, Plu, s), 
the probability of s c E^(A, Nan, s) and the probability of 
s e e \ a , Bor, s) . We analyze these results by examining the conditional 
probability of any sincere situation s being an equilibrium under 
each of these GDF’s given that the choice set consists of (a) exactly 
one element, (b) exactly two distinct elements and (c) all three 
distinct elements in the issue A.
We proceed to examine the probability of s e E(A, Plu, s), 
the probability of s e E(A, Nan, s) and the probability of 
s e E(A, Bor, s). We analyze these results by examining the conditional 
probability of any sincere situation s being a strict equilibrium under 
each of these GDF’s given that the choice set consists of (a) exactly 
one element, (b) exactly two distinct elements and (c) all three
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d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  i s s u e  A.
We t h e n  c o n f i n e  ou r  a n a l y s i s  to  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  on ly
-  1 * -
and we examine the p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s e E (A, P lu  , s)  and th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
— •>'< _
o f  s e E(A, P l u  , s ) , g iv e n  a s s u m p t io n  2 . 1 .  We examine t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  an e q u i l i b r i u m  and t h e  
c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  a s t r i c t
e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  the  GDF P l u  g iven  ( a ) ,  (b) and (c)  a s  above .  We
t
s u b s e q u e n t l y  r e p e a t  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  f o r  t h e  GDF P l u  .
We then  r e v e r t  to  t h e  use  o f  a s s u m p t io n  2 .2  and we examine 
the  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  the e x i s t e n c e  o f  an s e S such t h a t  
s e E ^ A ,  P l u ,  s)  and P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A), g iv en  ( s ,  A) e .
We s u b s e q u e n t l y  examine th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an s e S 
such t h a t  s e E(A, P l u ,  s)  and P l u ( s ,  A) ,= M a j ( s ,  A). We c o n c lu d e  
by exam in ing  t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  E(A, P l u ,  s )  =j= <f>, 
g iv e n  ( s ,  A) e D .
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The Equiprobability Assumption
Our computer simulation of voting situations is based on the 
assumption that the distribution of individual preferences satisfies 
the equiprobability assumption i.e. for all i e L, the sincere ordering 
is equally likely to be any element of the set ITq of all possible 
strict orderings defined over X. Hence, for all i e L, the probability 
of being any given element of ][q is equal to 1 / | Jl0 | ! •
For any given value of N, our simulation program generates, in 
effect, every possible sincere situation on the basis of the equiproba­
bility assumption. Since the Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions all 
satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives, we only need to 
generate, in effect, every possible N-tuple of sincere individual 
preferences defined over the issue A. Since we assume that the issue A 
consists of exactly three distinct elements, there are 3! possible 
strict orderings of the three alternatives. Hence, for all i e L, the 
probability of the sincere ordering of the elements in the issue A being 
any one of these six possible strict orderings is 1/6.
As many writers have pointed out, it is unlikely that the 
equiprobability assumption would be satisfied in any real society.
The assumption that any individual is equally likely to prefer x to y, 
y to z, z to w and so on amounts to a denial of any cultural influence 
underlying the formation of preferences. Sen makes the following 
comment:
the equiprobability assumption is a very special one, and 
seems to involve a denial of society, in a significant sense. 
Depending on peoples' values and their personal and group 
interests there would be a fair amount of link-up between 
individual preferences. Individual preferences are determined
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not by turning a roulette wheel over all possible 
alternatives, but by certain specific social, economic, 
political, and cultural forces. This may easily produce 
some patterns in the set of individual preferences.
(Sen:1970:165)
However, if we wish to determine the probability of any 
sincere situation being an equilibrium or strict equilibrium, we must 
make some assumption about the distribution of individual preferences.
The equiprobability assumption has been used by a number of writers 
who have sought to determine the probability of cyclical majorities for 
various values of N and |A| (see later). Although we may be critical 
of the equiprobability assumption, there is no other alternative 
assumption which stands out as being particularly suitable.
Obviously, the equiprobability assumption (as we have defined 
it) is equivalent to the assumption that every possible sincere situation 
(preference profile) is equiprobable. Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976b) 
have recently suggested that, when studying GDF’s which satisfy the 
property of anonymity, we could assume instead that every possible 
’anonymous preference profile’ is equiprobable. Their definition of an 
’anonymous preference profile' is equivalent to what we will define in 
the next section as a 'ballot set’.
We have re-executed our simulation on the basis of this alter­
native assumption but we have not presented the results here partly for 
reasons of space and partly because of difficulties in interpreting the 
assumption of equiprobable ’anonymous preference profiles'. However, 
the results we have obtained on the basis of this assumption differ 
significantly from those which we have obtained on the basis of the 
assumption of the equiprobable 'preference profiles’.
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We have  a l s o  e x p l o r e d  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  im pos ing  each  o f  
t h e  t h r e e  forms o f  v a l u e  r e s t r i c t i o n  ( n o t  b e s t ,  n o t  w o r s t ,  n o t  medium) 
on the  s e t  o f  a l l  p o s s i b l e  s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g s  d e f i n e d  o v e r  A and o f  
a ssum ing  t h a t  t h e  s i n c e r e  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  d i s t r i b u t e d  
e q u i p r o b a b l y  o v e r  t h i s  r e d u c e d  s e t .  We have  n o t  p r e s e n t e d  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  
f o r  r e a s o n s  o f  s p a c e .
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The Election Simulation Program
The election simulation program was originally written in 
Burroughs Extended Algol and run on a Burroughs B6700 installation. It 
was later converted to the Simula language and run on the PDP-10 install­
ation in the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National 
University. There are a number of versions of the program designed to 
explore different sets of questions but a listing of the principal version 
is given in Appendix 1.
The listing given in Appendix 1 has been modified to make the 
program more readable. In this version, the choice sets defined by the 
Strict Majority, Majority, Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions have been 
defined as text variables whereas in the production version of the program 
the choice sets have been defined as integer variables. This modification 
results in a very significant reduction in the amount of computer (CPU) 
time required to execute the program. The listing of the program given 
in Appendix 1 will output results to a line printer whereas the production 
version of the program writes all results to disk for subsequent plotting. 
All results are output correct to eight significant figures. The perform­
ance of the program has been optimized by the use of the Program Perform­
ance Measurement System (FQCRED and FQCLST) available as part of the 
Simula package on the PDP-10.
Other writers have employed the technique of computer 
simulation to answer questions which have arisen in the theory of 
social choice - see for example Klahr (1966) and Fishburn (1974).
For N = 3 and |Aj =3, 4 Klahr used enumeration methods to determine 
the probability of a cyclical majority; for all other values of N
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and IA| K l a h r  u s e d  Monte C a r l o  m e th o d s  t o  g e n e r a t e  a random s a m p le
■ . N
from t h e  c o m p l e t e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  ( | A | ! )  s i t u a t i o n s .  He g e n e r a t e d  
a  ra ndom s a m p l e . o f  1 0 ,0 0 0  s i t u a t i o n s  f o r  e a c h  v a l u e  o f  N an d  |A| 
and t h u s  o b t a i n e d  an  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  c y c l i c a l  
m a j o r i t i e s .
F i s h b u r n  (1 97 4)  u s ed  Monte C a r l o  m e t h o d s  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  
' t h e  d e g r e e  to  w h ic h  s i n g l e  b a l l o t  w e i g h t e d  v o t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  
m u l t i p l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  e l e c t i o n s  s e l e c t  t h e  s i m p l e  m a j o r i t y  a l t e r n a t i v e  
when i t  e x i s t s ' .  He g e n e r a t e d  a  random s a m p l e  o f  1 ,0 0 0  s i t u a t i o n s  
f o r  e a c h  v a l u e  o f  N and | A [ and t h u s  o b t a i n e d  e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  i n  w h ic h  he  was i n t e r e s t e d .  F i s h b u r n  c h e c k e d  t h e  
a c c u r a c y  o f  t h e  ' p r o f i l e  g e n e r a t o r '  b y  c o m p a r i n g  ' t h e  p e r c e n t a g e s  
o f  p r o f i l e s  h a v i n g  s i m p l e  m a j o r i t y  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a s  g i v e n  by o u r  
o u t p u t  w i t h  e x a c t  o r  o t h e r  s i m u l a t i o n  r e s u l t s  f rom  p r e v i o u s  s t u d i e s ' .  
He c l a i m s  t h a t  h i s  r e s u l t s  ' a g r e e d  r e a s o n a b l y  w e l l '  a l t h o u g h  he  
d o e s  n o t  p r e s e n t  an y  s u p p o r t i n g  d a t a  ( F i s h b u r n : 1 9 7 4 : 1 6 9 ) .
The s i m u l a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  we h a v e  a d o p t e d  e n a b l e s  us  
to  d e t e r m i n e  e x a c t  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  i n  w h i c h  we a r e  
i n t e r e s t e d .  I  h a v e  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  p r o g r a m ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  g e n e r a t e s  
e v e r y  p o s s i b l e  N - t u p l e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  d e f i n e d  o v e r  t h e  
i s s u e  A on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  e q u i p r o b a b i l i t y  a s s u m p t i o n .  The e x a c t  
p r o c e d u r e  i s  a s  f o l l o w s .  For  t h e  i s s u e  A = {x ,  y ,  z} and  f o r  any 
g i v e n  v a l u e  o f  N, t h e  p r o g r a m  g e n e r a t e s  w h a t  we w i l l  r e f e r  to  a s  
e v e r y  p o s s i b l e  b a l l o t  s e t .  We d e f i n e  a  b a l l o t  s e t  a s  an  u n o r d e r e d  
s e t  c o n t a i n i n g  fJ e l e m e n t s  e a c h  o f  w h ich  i s  a s t r i c t  i n d i v i d u a l
o r d e r i n g  o f  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  A. O b v i o u s l y ,  many d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s
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can give rise to the same ballot set since a situation is an 
ordered N-tuple which associates a particular ordering with each 
individual i e.L. We will refer to any ordered N-tuple of individual 
orderings over A which can be derived from a given ballot set as a. 
situation corresponding to the given ballot set. (Strictly speaking, 
a situation is .an N-tuple of individual orderings over X but we will 
use the term somewhat loosely in this chapter.)
For the issue A = (x, y, z} and for any i e L, the sincere 
preferences over the alternatives in A will be one of the six 
possible strict orderings of (x, y, z}. Let:
N^ = I {i e L I xP^yE\z } | N^ = |{i e LlyP^zP^x)!
N2 = I{i e LIxP^zP^y}| N^ = |{i e LlzP^xP^y}!
N^ = I {i e L I yP_^ xP_^ z} | N6 = I ^  e LlzP^yP^xJl
Hence N. + N„ + N. + N. + Nr + N, = N and, once we have generated al 2 J 4 D o
particular set of values of N., N_, ..., N, satisfying this constraint,i Z b
we have generated a ballot set. The number of sincere situations, 
say K, corresponding to a particular ballot set can be calculated as 
follows:
K = N! / N. ! N0 ! N0! N. ! Nc! N,!1 Z J 4 5 o
The procedure we have adopted utilizes the fact that the 
GDF's we have selected for study all satisfy the property of 
anonymity. Hence, for any given sincere situations s, we can deter­
mine the choice sets under each of these GDF's and examine the 
stability of situation s without specifying the situation completely. 
We do not need to know which individual ordering of the alternatives 
in A is associated with each individual: we need to know only the
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ballot set to which that situation corresponds. Hence, instead of 
generating every possible sincere situation we have generated every 
possible ballot set. We have calculated the number of sincere 
situations which correspond to each ballot set and incremented all 
counters by this number. Obviously, for GDF*s which satisfy 
anonymity, this, procedure is equivalent to (but more efficient than) 
generating every possible sincere situation.,
Our simulation proceeds as follows. For any given value of 
N, the program generates, in turn, every possible ballot set. When 
each new ballot set is generated, the program begins by calculating 
the value of K. Subsequently, the program determines, for any 
sincere situation s corresponding to that ballot set, the alternatives 
belonging to Maj(s, A), Smaj(s, A), Plu(s, A), Nan(s, A) and Bor(s, A). 
The program then determines the stability of any sincere situation s 
corresponding to the particular ballot set under each of the Plurality, 
Nanson and Borda functions. The stability of any such s under each 
of these functions is then compared. Finally, the program determines 
for any such s, whether or not E(A, Plu, s) = <{>. All counters are 
incremented by the value of K. The program then generates a new ballot 
set and repeats this process until all possible ballot sets for the 
given value of N have been generated and examined.
Initially, the program sets the value of N = 2 and proceeds 
to generate and examine every possible ballot set for this value of 
N. The value of N is then incremented by one and the procedure 
repeated until'the upper limit of N is reached. This value has been 
set at N = 50. The range N = 2, ..., 50 is sufficiently wide to enable 
us to have a clear perception of the trends in our results.
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For any given value of N, the total number of sincere sit­
uations which can be generated on the basis of the equiprobability 
Nassumption is 6 . When N > 11, this number is too large to be represent­
ed in Simula as ’type integer’. Consequently, all counters in the simu­
lation program were declared as variables of 'type real’ which gives a 
precision of approximately nine decimal digits (Decsystern-10 Simula 
Language Handbook, Part I). The execution of the program in this form 
for N = 2, ..., 35 requires approximately 5*2 hours of computer (CPU) 
time. The computer (CPU) time required increases with each value of N: 
for example, the execution of the program for N = 36, ...» 41 requires 
approximately 6 hours; the execution of the program for N = 42 requires 
2^ hours; and the execution of the program for N = 50 requires 8 hours.
At this point, the amount of computer time required for each additional 
value of N does not seem to be justified and we have set N = 50 as the 
upper limit of our simulation.
The program was then modified by declaring all counters as 
variables of ’type long real’ which gives a precision of approximately 
18 decimal digits (Decsystern-10 Simular Language Handbook, Part I). The 
execution of the program in this form increases the computer time 
required by approximately 400%. The program was re-run for N = 2, ..., 40 
and the results were compared with those obtained from the previous 
version of the program.
Each version of the program recorded all results correct to 
8 significant figures and the results agreed exactly for values of N =
2, ..., 10. However, for values of N >10, a variation of more than 
±1 was found in the 7th significant figure; for values of N >20, a 
variation of more than ±1 was found in the 6th significant figure; and
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for values of N > 30, a variation of more than ±1 was found in the 5th 
significant figure. The 'type long real' version of the program was 
also run for N .= 48 (25 hours of CPU time) and the results from this run 
were also compared with those obtained using the 'type real' version.
A variation of more than ±1 was found in the 4th significant figure. 
Accordingly, our results have been presented correct to four significant 
figures only. This degree of accuracy is adequate for our purpose.
For each value of N we have, in effect, generated every 
possible sincere situation on the basis of the equiprobability assump­
tion and we have determined the number of sincere situations which • 
satisfy a particular property, say a. Unless stated specifically other­
wise, we have expressed, for each value of N, the number of sincere 
situations satisfying property a as a percentage of the total number 
of sincere situations. Hence, by adjusting the decimal point in an 
obvious manner, our results can be interpreted as the probability, for 
each value of N, that any sincere situation will satisfy property a.
All of our results will be presented graphically. The graphs 
have been produced by the Houston DP3 plotter attached to the PDP-10 
installation on which the simulation was executed; they are drawn to 
an accuracy of ±0.1mm. For ease of interpretation, I have presented 
the percentage of situations satisfying property a as a continuous 
line as N ranges from 2 to 50 but obviously our results constitute 
only a set of points lyLng on this line corresponding to each integer 
value of N. The exact percentage of situations satisfying property a, 
for each integer value of N, will be shown in the figure. All percent­
ages are given correct to two decimal places.
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The P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) e . , t h e  P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) e ^ g ma • ’ anc*
t h e  P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) e . and M a j ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n
Wc c o n f i r m  th e  a c c u r a c y  o f  t h e  t e c h n i q u e s  we h a v e  emp loyed  
by c o m p a r i n g  o u r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) c D^_. w i t h  
t h a t  g i v e n  by o t h e r  w r i t e r s .  For  any g i v e n  i s s u e  A c o n t a i n i n g  e x a c t l y  
t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  we have  d e t e r m i n e d ,  by c o m p u t e r  s i m u l a t i o n ,  
e x a c t  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) e ^Maj ^o r  ^ = ^ > • • • »  50.
Our r e s u l t s  add t o  t h o s e  c u r r e n t l y  p u b l i s h e d  s i n c e  we have  d e t e r m i n e d  
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  f o r  e v e n  a s  w e l l  a s  odd v a l u e s  o f  N. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  we 
h a v e  d e t e r m i n e d  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) e and t i^e P r ° h a b i l i t y  o f
( s ,  A) e D ^ j  a nd M a j ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n .
The p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) c ^p[aj can i n t c r Pr e t e d a s  t h e
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a t  l e a s t  one  a l t e r n a t i v e  w h ic h  i s  a t
l e a s t  a s  good a s  e v e r y  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  b e l o n g i n g  to  t h e  i s s u e .  F o r
IAI = 3, t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) e D . i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t yMaj
o f  t h e  n o n - e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  c y c l e .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) e can  b e
i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  s i n g l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
w h ic h  i s  s t r i c t l y  p r e f e r r e d  to  e v e r y  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  b e l o n g i n g  to  t h e  
i s s u e .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) e °Haj  an<  ^M a j ( s > A) i s  a  s i n g l e t o n
can b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a s i n g l e  a l t e r ­
n a t i v e  w h ic h  i s  a t  l e a s t  a s  good a s  e v e r y  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  i n  t h e  i s s u e .  
The v a l u e s  o f  t h e s e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  w i l l  c o r r e s p o n d  e x a c t l y  when N i s  odd
b u t  t h e y  w i l l  u s u a l l y  d i f f e r  when N i s  e v e n .
I n  f i g u r e  7 . 1 ,  we p r e s e n t  o u r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  number  o f  
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s s u ch  t h a t  ( s ,  A) c . a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  
num ber  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  f o r  N = 2 ,  . . . ,  50 .  The e x a c t  p e r c e n t a g e s
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a r e  shown i n  t h e  f i g u r e :  t h e  f i r s t  row c o r r e s p o n d s  to  v a l u e s  o f  N
f r o m  2 t o  10,  t h e  s e c o n d  row c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  v a l u e s  o f  N f rom  11 t o  20 ,  
t h e  t h i r d  row c o r r e s p o n d s  to  v a l u e s  o f  N f r o m  21 t o  30 ,  an d  so  on .
As we h a v e  d i s c u s s e d  e a r l i e r ,  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  c a n  be  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  ( s ,  A) e D^_.  s i m p l y  by m a k in g  a p p r o p r i a t e  a d j u s t m e n t s  
to  t h e  p o s i t i o n  .of  t h e  d e c i m a l  p o i n t .
We o b s e r v e  f r om  f i g u r e  7 .1  t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f
( s ,  A) e IX, . o s c i l l a t e s  w i t h  e v e r y  s e c o n d  v a l u e  o f  N. Fo r  odd v a l u e s  Maj
o f  N, t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  0 . 9 4 4 4 4  when N = 3 an d  t h e r e a f t e r  i t  g r a d u a l l y  
d e c r e a s e s  a s  N i n c r e a s e s ;  i t  r e a c h e s  t h e  v a l u e  0 . 9 1 4 0  when N = 49 .  For  
ev e n  v a l u e s  o f  N, t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  1 .0 0 0 0  when N = 2 and when N = 4 
and t h e r e a f t e r  i t  g r a d u a l l y  d e c r e a s e s  a s  N i n c r e a s e s ;  i t  r e a c h e s  t h e  
v a l u e  0 . 9 5 7 6  when N = 50.
I n  f i g u r e  7 . 2 ,  we p r e s e n t  o u r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  number  o f
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s  s u c h  t h a t  ( s ,  A) c . a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h eSmaj
t o t a l  nu mber  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s .  As we p o i n t e d  o u t  e a r l i e r ,  t h e s e  
r e s u l t s  a g r e e  e x a c t l y  w i t h  t h o s e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  f i g u r e  7 . 1  when N i s  odd 
b u t  t h e y  d i f f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  when N i s  e v e n .  For  e v e n  v a l u e s  o f  N, 
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) e ^Smaj  ^*3 3 3 3  when N = 2 and  t h e r e a f t e r  
i t  i n c r e a s e s  a s  N i n c r e a s e s ;  i t  r e a c h e s  t h e  v a l u e  0 . 7 5 2 2  when N = 50 .
A c o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  f i g u r e s  7 . 1  and 7 . 2  r e v e a l s  
t h a t ,  f o r  e v e n  v a l u e s  o f  N, t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) c ^ g maj 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l o w e r  t h a n  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) e b u t  t h e
d i f f e r e n c e  g r a d u a l l y  d e c r e a s e s  a s  N i n c r e a s e s .
We d e l a y  t h e  g r a p h i c a l  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  o u r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) c D . an d  M a j ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n  u n t i l  t h e
Fla j
f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  ( f i g u r e  7 . 1 3 ) .
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A number of writers have published estimates of the 
probability that (s, A) e for all values of N and for
IAI =3, 4, 5 etc. We have already referred to Klahr (1966) and 
other writers include Carman and Kamien (1968), Nieml and Weisberg 
(1968) and De Meyer and Plott (1970). Gehrlcin and Fishburn (1976a) 
developed ’an exact solution for the paradox probability that is 
easily computable for m and n that are quite large by previous 
standards’. They calculated exact values of the probability for 
odd values of N ranging from 3 to 21 and then used an approximate 
formula for odd values of N ranging from 23 to 49. We present
their results below for A| = 3 using the same format as that which
we have used in figure 7.1. (Dashes indicate that no values are
given for even values of N.)
0.94444 ---- 0.93056 ---- 0.92498 ---- 0.92202 ---
0.92019 ---- 0.91893 ---- 0.91802 ---- 0.91733 ---- 0.91678 --
0.91635 ---- 0.91599 ---- 0.91568 ---- 0.91543 ---- 0.91521 ---
0.91501 ---- 0.91484 ---- 0.91470 ---- 0.91456 ---- 0.91444 ---
0.91434 ---- 0.91424 ---- 0.91415 ---- 0.91407 ---- 0.91399 ---
When these results are expressed correct to four significant figures 
they agree exactly with those which we have obtained except for N = 21 
where the difference is due to rounding.
As we mentioned earlier, we have used a double precision 
version of the simulation program for values of N = 2, ..., 40. For
IAI =3, our determination of the probability that (s, A) e D^_. is 
possibly the most accurate yet obtained. Since the determination of 
this probability has attracted some interest in the literature, we 
present our results for N = 2, . .., 40 correct to 8 significant figures.
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In Cable 7.1, we present our determination of the probability
of (s, A) £ ^Maj an<^  t i^e Profrafri-^ty °f (s> A) £ ^Smaj an<^  t*ie
probability of .(s, A) e D . and Maj(s, A) is a singleton for any givenMaj
issue A containing exactly three distinct elements. As mentioned 
earlier, the values of each of these probabilities correspond exactly 
when N is odd but can differ significantly when N is even. For odd 
values of N, our results agree exactly with those presented by 
Gchrlcin and Fishburn (1976a). Obviously, it would be interesting to 
extend these results by considering issues containing more than three 
distinct elements and by assuming = IT rather than S ^ = ITq for all 
i c L.
Before we address the principal questions which we have sought 
to answer by means of the simulation, we present one other set of results 
relating to the existence of an alternative which might be considered as 
’best’. In figure 7.3, we present our determination of the number of 
sincere situations s such that there exists an a e A such that 
I{i z L|aP^b for all b £ (A - (a})}| > ^ as a percentage of the total 
number of sincere situations. The probability of the existence of an 
a e A such that [{i e L|aP^b for all b £ (A - {a})}| oscillates with 
every second value of N but there is a long run trend for the 
probability to decrease at a decreasing rate as N increases; it reaches
the value 0.0147 when N = 50.
275
T a b l e  7 . 1 : The  P r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t ( s ,  A) e D . a n d  
Maj
t h e  P r o b a b i l i t y
t h a t  ( s ,  A) e D^. .Maj a n d  M a j ( s , A) i s  a
s i n g l e t o n  a n d  t h e




( i > A) e V i | M a j ( s ,  A) | = 1 ( " ’ A) E Vaj
2 ' 1 .00000000 0 . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 0 . 9 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 . 9 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 . 9 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
4 1.00000000 0 . 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
5 0 . 9 3 0 5 5 5 5 6 0 . 9 3 0 5 5 5 5 6 0 . 9 3 0 5 5 5 5 6
6 0 . 9 9 6 1 4 1 9 8 0 . 5 8 5 9 0 5 3 5 0 . 5 0 8 7 4 4 8 6
7 0 . 9 2 4 9 8 2 8 5 0 . 9 2 4 9 8 2 8 5 0 . 9 2 4 9 8 2 8 5
8 0 . 9 9 1 9 9 8 1 7 0 . 6 3 8 4 1 7 3 5 0 . 5 5 1 8 9 7 5 8
9 0 . 9 2 2 0 2 3 8 4 0 . 9 2 2 0 2 3 8 4 0 . 9 2 2 0 2 3 8 4
10 0 . 9 8 8 2 2 6 4 8 0 . 6 7 4 1 6 7 1 9 0 . 5 8 3 3 9 6 4 4
11 0 . 9 2 0 1 8 5 9 2 0 . 9 2 0 1 8 5 9 2 0 . 9 2 0 1 8 5 9 2
12 0 . 9 8 4 8 9 5 7 4 0 . 7 0 0 2 6 2 9 7 0 . 6 0 7 6 9 9 2 2
13 0 . 9 1 8 9 3 1 5 9 0 . 9 1 8 9 3 1 5 9 0 . 9 1 8 9 3 1 5 9
14 0 . 9 8 1 9 6 0 8 8 0 . 7 2 0 2 5 6 1 5 0 . 6 2 7 1 9 6 6 1
15 0 . 9 1 8 0 2 0 4 2 0 . 9 1 8 0 2 0 4 2 0 . 9 1 8 0 2 0 4 2
16 0 . 9 7 9 3 6 1 5 3 0 . 7 3 6 1 2 8 0 1 0 . 6 4 3 2 9 6 9 8
17 0 . 9 1 7 3 2 8 3 8 0 . 9 1 7 3 2 8 3 8 0 . 9 1 7 3 2 8 3 8
18 0 . 9 7 7 0 4 3 1 6 0 . 7 4 9 0 7 5 7 6 0 . 6 5 6 8 9 0 3 7
19 0 . 9 1 6 7 8 4 8 6 0 . 9 1 6 7 8 4 8 6 0 . 9 1 6 7 8 4 8 6
20 0 . 9 7 4 9 6 0 5 5 0 . 7 5 9 8 6 7 8 4 0 . 6 6 8 5 7 0 4 7
21 0 . 9 1 6 3 4 6 6 5 0 . 9 1 6 3 4 6 6 5 0 . 9 1 6 3 4 6 6 5
22 0 . 9 7 3 0 7 7 1 0 0 . 7 6 9 0 2 1 3 5 0 . 6 7 8 7 5 0 6 0
23 0 . 9 1 5 9 8 5 8 4 0 . 9 1 5 9 8 5 8 4 0 . 9 1 5 9 8 5 8 4
24 0 . 9 7 1 3 6 3 2 2 0 . 7 7 6 8 9 7 8 0 0 . 6 8 7 7 2 8 6 4
25 0 . 9 1 5 6 8 3 5 9 0 . 9 1 5 6 8 3 5 9 0 . 9 1 5 6 8 3 5 9
26 0 . 9 6 9 7 9 4 9 2 0 . 7 8 3 7 5 7 9 7 0 . 6 9 5 7 2 5 4 8
27 0 . 9 1 5 4 2 6 7 0 0 . 9 1 5 4 2 6 7 0 0 . 9 1 5 4 2 6 7 0
28 . 0 . 9 6 8 3 5 2 6 1 0 . 7 8 9 7 9 4 9 9 0 . 7 0 2 9 0 8 8 9
29 0 . 9 1 5 2 0 5 6 8 0 . 9 1 5 2 0 5 6 8 0 . 9 1 5 2 0 5 6 8
30 0 . 9 6 7 0 2 0 1 3 0 . 7 9 5 1 5 5 1 5 0 . 7 0 9 4 0 8 9 1
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Ta b le  7 . 1 :  ( c o n t i n u e d )
N ( s ,  A) e DMaj I Ma j ( s , A) | = 1
( s ,  A) c D * Smaj
31 0 .91501350 0 .91501350 0 .91501350
32 0 .96578406 0 .79995137 0.71532815
33 0.91484487 0 .91484487 0 .91484487
34 0 .96463317 0.80427236 0.72074878
35 0 .91469570 0.91469570 0 .91469570
36 0.96355796 0 .80818876 0.72573752
37 0 .91456281 0 .91456281 0.91456281
38 0 .96255035 0.81175762 0.73034919
39 0.91444367 0.91444367 0.91444367
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The number of sincere situations s such that there exists an a e A such that




as a percentage of the total number of
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An analysis of choice sets under Plu, Nan and Bor
We begin our analysis by examining the probability that the 
Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions define choice set which contain 
(a) exactly one element, (b) exactly two distinct elements and (c) 
exactly three distinct elements. We have demonstrated in Chapters 4, 5 
and 6 that the necessary and sufficient conditions for any given sincere 
situation to be an equilibrium or strict equilibrium under each of these 
GDF*s vary, according to the number of elements in the choice set. We 
have also foreshadowed that we will explore the implications of intro­
ducing a tie-breaking device (for the Plurality function only). Hence 
we present our determination of the above probabilities for the 
Plurality function in figures 7.4 - 7.6, for the Nanson function in 
figures 7.7 - 7.9, and for the Borda function in figures 7.10 - 7.12.
For purposes of comparison, we have included the Majority function in 
this analysis - figure 7.13 - 7.15.
We observe from figure 7.4 that the probability of the 
Plurality function defining a choice set which is a singleton oscillates 
with every third value of N but there is a long run trend for the proba­
bility to increase as N increases and it approximates 0.9 as N approaches 
50. We observe from figure 7.5 that the probability of this GDF defining 
a choice set which consists of exactly two distinct elements oscillates 
with every second value of N but there is a long run trend for the 
probability to decrease as N increases and it approximates 0.10 as N 
approaches 50. We observe from figure 7.6 that this GDF defines a 
choice set which consists of all the elements in the issue only when N 
is a multiple of |A| and the probability of this event when N is a 
multiple of |A[ approaches zero as N approaches 50.
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We observe from figure 7.7 that the probability of the 
Nanson function defining a choice set which is a singleton oscillates 
with every sixth value of N but there is a long run trend for the 
probability to increase as N increases and it exceeds 0.8 when N > 24. 
It seems unlikely that there would be any significant change in the 
pattern when N > 50. The oscillation of the graph with every sixth 
value of N is a pattern which we will see repeated for many of our 
subsequent results relating to the Nanson function. Whenever N is 
not a multiple of two or three the Nanson function always defines a 
choice set which is a singleton; whenever N is a multiple of two 
and three i.e. a multiple of six, the probability of this GDF defining 
a choice set which is a singleton is a local minimum.
We observe in figure 7.8 that the Nanson function defines a 
choice set consisting of exactly two distinct elements only when N is 
even and that for even values of N there is a long run trend for the 
probability to decrease as N increases and it is always less than 0.15 
when N > 42. A detailed examination of figure 7.8 reveals that, once 
again, there is a cycle for every sixth value of N. We observe from 
figure 7.9 that the probability of the Nanson function defining a 
choice set which consists of all of the elements in the issue is 
exactly the same as the corresponding probability for the Plurality 
function.
In figure 7.10 we observe that the Borda function defines 
a choice set which is a singleton with a probability approaching 0.95 
as N approaches 50. For values of N > 6 (the number of possible 
strict orderings of the elements in the issue A), this probability 
depends littie on whether or not N is a multiple of 2 or 3. The
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r e s u l t i n g  sm oo thness  o f  t h e  c u rve  i s  a f e a t u r e  o f  a l l  o f  ou r  r e s u l t s  
r e l a t i n g  to  the  Borda f u n c t i o n .  From f i g u r e  7 .11  we o b s e rv e  t h a t  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  Borda f u n c t i o n  d e f i n i n g  a c h o i c e  s e t  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  
e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  g r a d u a l l y  d e c r e a s e s  as  N i n c r e a s e s  and 
i t  a p p ro a c h e s  0 .0 5  as  N a p p r o a c h e s  50.  i t  can be se en  from f i g u r e  7 .12 
t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  GDF d e f i n i n g  a c h o ic e  s e t  which c o n s i s t s  
o f  a l l  o f  t h e  e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  i s s u e  a p p r o a c h e s  z e ro  as  N a p p ro a c h e s  50.
We o b s e r v e  from f i g u r e  7 .13  t h a t  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  the  
M a j o r i t y  f u n c t i o n  d e f i n i n g  a c h o i c e  s e t  which  i s  a s i n g l e t o n  o s c i l l a t e s  
w i t h  e v e r y  second  v a l u e  o f  N; f o r  odd v a l u e s  o f  N t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
s lo w ly  d e c r e a s e s  a s  N i n c r e a s e s  and f o r  even v a l u e s  o f  N the  p r o b a b i l i t y  
i n c r e a s e s  a s  N i n c r e a s e s .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  e xc ee ds  0 . 8  when N > 32.
We o b s e r v e  from f i g u r e  7 .14  t h a t  t h e  M a j o r i t y  f u n c t i o n  d e f i n e s  a c h o ic e  
s e t  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  o n l y  when N i s  even and 
t h a t  f o r  even  v a l u e s  o f  N t h e r e  i s  a s t e a d y  t r e n d  f o r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
to  d e c r e a s e  a s  N i n c r e a s e s  and i s  l e s s  t h a n  0 .15  f o r  N > 36. We o b s e r v e  
from f i g u r e  7 .15  t h a t  t h e  M a j o r i t y  f u n c t i o n  d e f i n e s  a c h o ic e  s e t  con­
s i s t i n g  o f  a l l  o f  t h e  e l e m e n t s  i n  the  i s s u e  o n l y  when N i s  even and 
t h a t  f o r  even  v a l u e s  o f  N th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  e v e n t  s t e a d i l y  
d e c r e a s e s  as  N i n c r e a s e s  and i s  l e s s  th a n  0 . 1  when N > 14.
A b y - p r o d u c t  o f  ou r  s i m u l a t i o n  o f  v o t i n g  s i t u a t i o n s  has  been  
th e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  any two,  any t h r e e ,  any f o u r ,  
o r  a l l  f i v e  o f  the  S t r i c t  M a j o r i t y ,  M a j o r i t y ,  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and 
Borda f u n c t i o n s  d e f i n e  c h o i c e  s e t s  which c o n s i s t  o f  e x a c t l y  the  same 
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Figure 7.8: 
The number of sincere situations such that Nan(s, 
A) 
contains exactly two distinct
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elements as a percentage of the total number of sincere situations.
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PERCENTAGE OF SITUATIONS
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Figure 
7. 15: 
The number of sincere situations such 
that Maj(s, 
A) 
contains exactly three distinct
elements as a percentage of the total number of sincere situations.
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The Probability of s £ E^(A, Plu, s) , the Probability of s £ E~*~(A, Nan, s) 
and the Probability of s e E^(A, Bor, s)
We now present a series of results which provide a partial 
answer to one of the principal questions which we have explored in our 
analysis - the probability that any given sincere situation will be an 
equilibrium under each of the Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions.
In figure 7.16, we present our determination of the number of 
sincere situations s such that s e E^(A, Plu, s) as a percentage of the 
total number of sincere siutations. These results have been determined 
on the basis of conditions (stated in Chapter 4) which were deduced from 
the results established in theorems 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. We observe that 
the curve is well-behaved only when the number of individuals is greater 
than the number of all possible strict orderings over the alternatives 
in A (N > 6). Many of our results exhibit this feature.
The probability of s e E^(A, Plu, s) oscillates with every 
third value of N (compare figure 7.4) but there is a long run trend for 
the probability to increase as N increases. The probability is a 
minimum of 0.5306 when N = 9. Assuming the trends we have observed 
continue for N > 50, we can say that the probability exceeds 0.7 when 
N > 50.
Hence, when | A| = 3 and the number of voters is small, the 
probability of any sincere situation being an equilibrium under this 
CDF is relatively low. Thus there is a relatively high probability 
of some individual being able to obtain an outcome which he prefers 
by adopting a strategy which docs not reflect his sincere preferences
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However,  when j Aj = 3 and t h e  number o f  v o t e r s  i s  l a r g e ,  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any g iv en  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  n o t  b e i n g  an e q u i l i b r i u m  
under  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  q u i t e  low.  Such a r e s u l t  i s  n o t  
s u r p r i s i n g :  i t  m igh t  w e l l  be e x p e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  any
s i n g l e  i n d i v i d u a l  can pose  a t h r e a t  to  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  would 
d e c l i n e  a s  t h e  number o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n c r e a s e s .  However , i t  i s  
i n t e r e s t i n g  to  have some i d e a  o f  t h e  m agn i tude  o f  t h i s  p r o b a b i l i t y  
f o r  N = 2, . . . ,  50.
As we have shown i n  C h a p te r  4,  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  any g iv e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s to  b e l o n g  to  e \ a , P l u ,  s)  
v a ry  w i t h  the  number o f  e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  c h o ic e  s e t  and we have 
fo re shadowed  t h a t  we w i l l  c o n s i d e r  t h e  e f f e c t  on ou r  r e s u l t s  o f  the  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  a t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  we have  d i v i d e d  
a l l  s b e l o n g i n g  to  i n t o  t h r e e  s u b s e t s ,  namely (a)  t h e  s e t  o f
s i t u a t i o n s  such  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n ,  (b) the  s e t  o f  
s i t u a t i o n s  s such t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  
e l e m e n t s  and (c)  t h e  s e t  o f  s i t u a t i o n s  such  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = A.
W i th in  each  o f  t h e s e  s u b s e t s ,  we have d e t e r m i n e d  th e  number o f  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n s  which  b e l o n g  t o  E^CA, P l u ,  s)  a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  
number o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  t h a t  s u b s e t .
I n  f i g u r e  7 .1 7 ,  we p r e s e n t  o u r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  the  number 
o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s such  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n  and 
s c E^(A, P l u ,  s)  a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  number o f  s such t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) 
i s  a s i n g l e t o n .  Hence th e  r e s u l t s  i n  f i g u r e  7 .17  have been  d e t e r m i n e d  
on the  b a s i s  o f  c o n d i t i o n s  ( s t a t e d  i n  C h a p te r  4) which were deduced  
from the  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  theo rem  4 . 2 .  
We o b s e rv e  t h a t  t h e  p a t t e r n  i s  g e n e r a l l y  s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  i n  f i g u r e  7 .16 ,
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but that the corresponding percentages are about 10 per cent 
higher.
In figure 7.18, wc. present our determination of the number 
of sincere situations s such that Plu(s, A) contains exactly two 
distinct elements and s e E^(A, Plu, s) as a percentage of the 
number of s such that Plu(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements. 
Hence Lhe results in figure 7.18 have been determined on the basis of 
conditions (stated in Chapter 4) which were deduced from the necessary 
and sufficient conditions established in theorem 4.3. We observe that 
when N > 6 almost every sincere situation s such that Plu(s, A) 
contains exactly two distinct elements is not an equilibrium under 
this GDF if assumption 2.2 is satisfied. We will
demonstrate later that this conclusion does not change significantly 
if we introduce a tie-breaking device and employ assumption 2.1 
rather than assumption 2.2.
We have shown in theorem 4.4 that for every sincere situation 
s, if Plu(s, A) contains three or more distinct elements then 
s fj: E"^ (A, Plu, s) .
In figure 7.19, we present our determination of the number . 
of sincere situations s such that s e E^(A, Nan, s) as a percentage 
of the total number of sincere situations. These results have been 
determined on the basis of conditions (stated in Chapter 5) which 
were deduced from the necessary and sufficient conditions established 
in theorems 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. We observe that the probability that 
s e E^(A, Nan, s) is a minimum (0.6667) when N = 4 and that when 
N > 6 the curve is well behaved and oscillates with every sixth value 
of N but the amplitude of the oscillations decreases as N increases.
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There is a long run trend for the probability to increase as N increases 
and it exceeds 0.85 when N > 38. It seems unlikely that there would be 
any significant change in this pattern when N > 50. Hence when |Aj = 3 
and the number of voters is large, the probability of any given sincere 
situation not being an equilibrium under the Nanson function is quite 
low.
As we have shown in Chapter 5, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for any given sincere situation s to belong to E^(A, Nan, s) 
vary with the number of elements in the choice set. Accordingly, we 
have divided all s belonging to into three subsets, namely,
(a) the set of sincere situations s such that Nan(s, A) is a singleton,
(b) the set of sincere situations s such that Nan(s, A) contains 
exactly two distinct elements and (c) the set of sincere situations 
s such that Nan(s, A) = A. Within each of subsets (a) and (b) we 
have determined the number of sincere situations which belong to 
E^(A, Nan, s) as a percentage of the number of sincere situations in 
that subset. The number of sincere situations in category (c) is 
extremely small and we have not analyzed them separately.
In figure 7.20, we present our determination of the number 
of sincere situations s such that Nan(s, A) is a singleton and 
s e E^A, Nan, s) as a percentage of the number of s such that 
Nan(s, A) is a singleton. Hence the results in figure 7.20 have 
been determined on the basis of conditions (stated in Chapter 5) 
which were deduced from the necessary and sufficient conditions 
established in * theorem 5.2. We observe that the pattern is 
generally similar to that in figure 7.19.
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In figure 7.21, we present our determination of the number 
of sincere situations s such that Nan(s, A) contains exactly two 
distinct elements and s e E^(A, Nan, s) as a percentage of the number 
of s such that Nan(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements.
Hence the results in figure 7.21 have been determined on the basis 
of conditions (stated in Chapter 5) which were deduced from the 
necessary and sufficient conditions established in theorem 5.3.
We observe from figure 7.8 that Nan(s, A) will only consist of 
two distinct elements when N is even. We observe from figure 7.21 
that there is a cycle involving every sixth value of N and that the 
amplitude of the oscillations decreases as N increases. However, it 
is difficult to decide whether the long run trend is upwards, down­
wards or steady. Certainly, these results are very different from 
the corresponding results for the Plurality function presented in 
figure 7.18.
In figure 7.22, we present our determination of the number 
of sincere situations s such that s e E^(A, Bor, s) as a percentage 
of the total number of sincere situations. These results have been 
determined on the basis of conditions (stated in Chapter 6) which 
were deduced from the necessary and sufficient conditions established 
in theorems 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. We observe from figure 7.22 that the 
probability that s e E^(A, Bor, s) is a minimum when N = 6 (0.6251) 
and thereafter it rises smoothly (but at a decreasing rate) to 0.8246 
when N = 50. It seems unlikely that there would be any significant 
change in this pattern when N > 50. Hence when |A| = 3  and the number 
of voters is large, the probability of any given sincere situation 
not being an equilibrium under the Borda function is quite low.
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As we have shown in Chapter 6, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for any given sincere situation s to belong to E^(A, Bor, s) 
vary with the number of elements in the choice set. Accordingly, we
have divided all s belonging to S into two subsets, namely,
(a) the set of situations such that Bor(s, A) is a singleton and
(b) The set of.situations such that Bor(s, A) contains more than
one element.
In figure 7.23, we present our determination of the number 
of sincere situations s such that Bor(s, A) is a singleton and 
s e E^(A, Bor, s) as a percentage of the number of s such that Bor(s, A) 
is a singleton. Hence the results in figure 7.23 have been determined 
on the basis of conditions (stated in Chapter 6) which were deduced 
from the necessary and sufficient conditions established in theorem 6.2. 
When N > 6, the curve is very similar to that in figure 7.22.
When Bor(s, A) contains more than one element, it follows 
from theorems 6.3 and 6.4 that s £ E^(A, Bor, s).
From the results we have presented in figures 7.16, 7.19 and 
7.22 it appears that when j A ] = 3  and N > 50 the probability of any 
given sincere situation being an equilibrium under the Plurality 
function is greater than 0.70; under the Nanson function is greater 
than 0.85; and under the Borda function is greater than 0.80.
Our simulation program has enabled us to determine the 
probability that any given sincere situation will be (or will fail 
to be) an equilibrium under any two of these CDF’s or under all 
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The number of sincere situations s such that Nan(s, 
A) 
contains exactly two distinct
elements and s 
e E1(A, Nan, 
s) 
as a percentage of 




contains exactly two distinct elements.
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The Probability of s e E(A, Plu, s) , the Probability of s e E(A, Nan, s) 
and the Probability of s c E(A, Bor, s)
We now.present a series of results which provide a partial 
answer to another one of the principal questions which we have explored 
in our analysis-- the probability of any sincere situation being a strict 
equilibrium under the Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions.
In figure 7.24, we present our determination of the number of 
sincere situations s such that s e E(A, Plu, s) as a percentage of the 
total number of sincere situations. These results are based on the 
necessary and sufficient conditions established in theorems 4.2, 4.3 
and 4.4. When N > 7, the curve is well behaved and slopes smoothly 
downwards to the right: the probability of s e E(A, Plu, s) decreases at 
a decreasing rate as N increases. It seems unlikely that there would be 
any significant change in this pattern when N > 50. When N = 7, the 
probability is 0.5379 and when N = 50 the probability is 0.1411.
Hence when ]A| = 3 and the number of voters is relatively large, 
it is highly probable that, in any sincere situation, .there will exist 
a coalition of individuals who can secure an outcome which they prefer 
by some or all members of the coalition following a non-sincere strategy. 
This picture is very different from that which we obtained (figure 7.16) 
when we examined the probability of s e E^(A, Plu, s).
In figure 7.25, we present our determination of the number 
of sincere situations s such that Plu(s, A) is a singleton and 
s e E(A, Plu, s) as a percentage of the number of sincere situations 
such that Plu(s, A) is a singleton. These results have been determined 
on the basis of the necessary and sufficient conditions established in
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theorem  4 . 2 .  We o b s e r v e  t h a t  t h e  p a t t e r n  i s  g e n e r a l l y  s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  
i n  f i g u r e  7 .2 4 .
In  f i g u r e  7 .2 6 ,  we p r e s e n t  ou r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  the number 
o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s such t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two 
d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  and s e E(A, P l u ,  s)  a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  the  number 
o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  such  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  
e l e m e n t s .  These r e s u l t s  have been  d e t e r m i n e d  on th e  b a s i s  o f  the 
n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  theo rem 4 . 3 .
We o b s e r v e  from t h e  f u g u re  t h a t ,  when N > 6,  a l m o s t  a l l  such  
s i t u a t i o n s  f a i l  to  c o n s t i t u t e  s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i a .  We w i l l  d e m o n s t r a t e  
l a t e r  ( f i g u r e s  7 .37  and 7 .40 )  t h a t  t h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  does n o t  change 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i f  we i n t r o d u c e  a t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v ic e  and employ 
a s s u m p t io n  2 . 1  r a t h e r  t h a n  2 . 2 .
We have shown i n  t heo rem  4 . 4  t h a t  f o r  any i s s u e  A and f o r  
e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  
e l e m e n t s  than  s £ E^(A, P l u ,  s )  and hence  s £ E(A, P l u ,  s ) . Hence 
f o r  t h e  i s s u e  A = {x, y ,  z} and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  
P l u ( s ,  A) = A t h e n  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s e E(A, P l u ,  s)  i s  a lways z e r o .  
We have  n o t  p r e s e n t e d  t h i s  r e s u l t  g r a p h i c a l l y .
In  f i g u r e  7 .2 7 ,  we p r e s e n t  ou r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  number 
o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s such  t h a t  s e E(A, Nan, s)  as  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  
t h e  t o t a l  number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s .  The c u rve  i s  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  
f rom t h a t  i n  f i g u r e  7 .24  b u t  i s  n o t  a l t o g e t h e r  u n l i k e  t h a t  in  f i g u r e  
7 .1 9 .  The cu rve  o s c i l l a t e s  w i t h  e v e r y  s i x t h  v a l u e  o f  N a l t h o u g h  t h e  
a m p l i t u d e  o f  t h e  o s c i l l a t i o n s  a p p e a r s  to  d e c r e a s e  as  N i n c r e a s e s .
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However , i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  d i s c e r n  (by i n s p e c t i o n )  w h e t h e r  t h e  lo n g  
run  t r e n d  i s  upwards ,  downwards o r  s t e a d y .
We o b s e r v e  t h a t  f o r  e v e ry  s i x t h  v a lu e  o f  N s t a r t i n g  w i t h  
N = 7 t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  s e E(A, Nan, s)  i s  a m o n o t o n i c a l l y  
d e c r e a s i n g  s e q u e n c e :
8 5 .0 0 ,  8 3 . 7 3 ,  8 3 .3 3 ,  8 3 .1 5 ,  8 3 .0 5 ,  8 2 .9 9 ,  82 .96
S i m i l a r l y ,  f o r  e v e r y  s i x t h  v a l u e  o f  N s t a r t i n g  w i t h  N = 11, t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  s e E(A, Nan, s)  i s  a m o n o t o n i c a l l y  d e c r e a s i n g  
s e q u e n c e :
8 7 .1 7 ,  8 6 .7 9 ,  8 6 .1 9 ,  8 5 .8 0 ,  8 5 . 5 2 ,  8 5 .3 1 ,  85.15
However ,  f o r  e v e r y  s i x t h  v a l u e  o f  N s t a r t i n g  w i t h  8, 9,  10 o r  12 the  
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  s e E(A, Nan, s)  i s  a m o n o t o n i c a l l y  i n c r e a s i n g  
s e q u e n c e .
I f  we a v e r a g e  t h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  ea ch  o f  t h e  s e ven  c o m p le te  
o s c i l l a t i o n s ,  s t a r t i n g  w i t h  N = 7, we o b t a i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  v a l u e s :
N = 7, . . . ,  12 0 .7280 N = 31, . . . ,  36 0 .7531
N = 13, . . . ,  18 0 .7315 N = 37, • , 42 0 .7584
N = 19, . . . ,  24 0 .7393 N = 43 ,  . . . ,  48 0 .7 6 2 8
N = 25, . . . , 30 0 .7467
From t h e s e  r e s u l t s  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a l o n g  run  t r e n d  f o r  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  s e E(A, Nan, s)  t o  i n c r e a s e  as  N i n c r e a s e s .
We draw t h e  t e n t a t i v e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  when |A| = 3  and th e  
number o f  v o t e r s  i s  l a r g e ,  t h e r e  i s  a r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  
any g iv e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  be a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  t h e  
Nanson f u n c t i o n .  As we m e n t io n e d  i n  C h a p te r  1, t h i s  p r o c e d u r e  was 
o r i g i n a l l y  a d v o c a t e d  by Nanson f o r  use  i n  A u s t r a l i a n  p a r l i a m e n t a r y
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elections precisely because he believed it to be less manipulable than 
other systems (Nanson:1882). Our results provide some support for 
Nanson's assertion but we have not yet been able to determine if 
similar results hold when |A| >3. Nevertheless, our results might 
be considered as an argument in support of the use of this GDF.
However, as we have shown in Chapter 3, the Nanson function has 
some less desirable properties e.g. it does not satisfy monotonicity.
In figure 7.28, we present our determination of the number 
of sincere situations s such that Nan(s, A) is a singleton and 
s £ E(A, Nan, s) as a percentage of the number of sincere situations 
such that Nan(s, A) is a singleton. These results are based on the 
necessary and sufficient conditions established in theorem 5.2.
For N = 5 ,  11, ..., 47 and for N = 7, 13, ..., 49 these results agree 
exactly with those given in figure 7.27 since, for these values of N, 
the Nanson function always defines a choice set which is a singleton.
In general, the form of the curve follows closely that in figure 7.20.
In figure 7.29, we present our determination of the number 
of sincere situations s such that Nan(s, A) contains exactly two 
distinct elements and s e E(A, Nan, s) as a percentage of the number 
of sincere situations such that Nan(s, A) contains exactly two 
distinct elements. These results have been determined on the basis 
of the necessary and sufficient conditions established in theorem 5.3.
We observe from the figure that, when N > 30, almost all such 
situations fail to constitute strict equilibria.
We have shown in theorem 5.4 that for any issue A and for every 
sincere situation s, if Nan(s, A) contains three or more distinct elements 
then s i|: E(A, Nan, s) . Hence for the issue A = {x, y, z} and for every
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s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  N a n ( s ,  A) = A t h e n  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f
s e E(A,  Nan,  s )  i s  a l w a y s  z e r o .  We h a v e  n o t  p r e s e n t e d  t h i s  r e s u l t
g r a p h i c a l l y .
I n  f i g u r e  7 . 3 0 ,  we p r e s e n t  o u r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  number  
o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s s u c h  t h a t  s £ E(A,  B o r ,  s )  a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  
t h e  t o t a l  number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s .  When N > 7 t h e  c u r v e  i s  w e l l  
b e h a v e d  and s l o p e s  s m o o t h l y  downwards  to  t h e  r i g h t :  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
o f  s £ E(A,  B o r ,  s )  d e c r e a s e s  a t  a  d e c r e a s i n g  r a t e  a s  N i n c r e a s e s .  I t  
seems u n l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e r e  w ou ld  b e  an y  s i g n i f i c a n t  ch a n g e  i n  t h i s  p a t t e r n  
when N > 50 .  When N = 7 t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  0 . 4 6 0 6  and when N = 50 
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  0 . 0 6 1 3 .
Hence when |A| = 3 and t h e  number  o f  v o t e r s  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  
l a r g e ,  i t  i s  h i g h l y  p r o b a b l e  t h a t ,  i n  an y  g i v e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e r e  
w i l l  e x i s t  a c o a l i t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  who ca n  s e c u r e  an  ou tcom e  w h ic h  
t h e y  p r e f e r  by some o r  a l l  members o f  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  f o l l o w i n g  a  n o n -  
s i n c e r e  s t r a t e g y .  T h i s  p i c t u r e  i s  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom  t h a t  w h ic h  we 
o b t a i n e d  ( f i g u r e  7 . 2 2 )  when we e x a m i n e d  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  •. 
s e E^ (A ,  B o r , s ) .
I n  f i g u r e  7 . 3 1 ,  we p r e s e n t  o u r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  number  
o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s s u c h  t h a t  B o r ( s ,  A) i s  a  s i n g l e t o n  and 
s £ E(A,  B o r ,  s )  as  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  
s u c h  t h a t  B o r ( s ,  A) i s  a  s i n g l e t o n .  The c u r v e  i s  v e r y  s i m i l a r  t o  
t h a t  i n  f i g u r e  7 . 3 0 .
We hav e  shown i n  t h e o r e m s  6 . 3  and 6 . 4  t h a t  f o r  t h e  i s s u e  
A = {x,  y ,  z} and f o r  e v e r y  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  i f  B o r ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  
more t h a n  one e l e m e n t  t h e  s ij: E^(A,  B or ,  s )  and h e n c e  s tj: E(A,  B o r ,  s )  .
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S in c e  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s 0 E(A, Bor ,  s)  i s  a lways  ze ro  we have  n o t  
p r e s e n t e d  t h i s  r e s u l t  g r a p h i c a l l y .
We summarize t h e  r e s u l t s  p r e s e n t e d  in  t h i s  s e c t i o n  a s  f o l l o w s :  
Under t h e  P l u r a l i t y  and Borda f u i i c t i o n s ,  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  "a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  d e c r e a s e s  a t  a d e c r e a s i n g  r a t e  as 
N i n c r e a s e s .  Assuming the  t r e n d s  we have o b s e rv e d  c o n t i n u e  f o r  N > 50,  
we can say  t h a t  the p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s e E(A, P l u ,  s)  i s  l e s s  than  0 .15  
when N > 50; and the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s c E(A, Bor ,  s )  i s  l e s s  than  0 .0 7  
when N > 50. However , t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s e E(A, Nan, s)  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  
h i g h  and i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a l o n g  run t r e n d  f o r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
to i n c r e a s e  as  N i n c r e a s e s .
Our s i m u l a t i o n  p rogram has  e n a b le d  us to  d e t e r m i n e  the  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  ( o r  f a i l i n g  to  be) a s t r i c t  
e q u i l i b r i u m  under  any two of  t h e s e  GDF’ s o r  under  a l l  t h r e e  o f  t h e s e  
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Figure 7.24. 
The number of sincere situations s such that s e E(A, Plu, 
s) as a percentage of the 
total number of sincere situations.
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Figure 7.31: 
The number of sincere situations s such that Bor(s, A) 
is a singleton and 
s e E(A, Bor, 
s) as a percentage of the number of sincere situations such 
that Bor(s, A) 
is a singleton.
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The Probability of s c E (A, Plu , s), the Probability of s e E(A, Plu , s)
The results we have presented in figures 7.16 to 7.31 have been 
concerned with the stability of sincere situations under the Plurality, 
Nanson and Borda functions when these CDF's are not supplemented by any 
tie-breaking device. In order to obtain a complete classification of 
sincere situations as constituting (or as falling to constitute) equi­
libria or strict equilibria we have employed the relatively strong be­
havioural assumption 2.2. For the Plurality function only, we now con­
sider Lhe effect of Introducing a tie-breaking device and employing the 
much less demanding behavioural assumption 2.1. Limitations of computer 
time have prevented me from extending this approach to include the Nanson 
and Borda functions.
The introduction of a tie-breaking device has presented some 
problems within the framework of our simulation. As explained earlier, 
our simulation program generates every possible ballot set for any given 
value of N and calculates the number of sincere situations corresponding 
to every ballot set so generated. Hence the program does not specify any 
particular sincere situation completely. This approach still enables us 
to determine exact values of the probabilities in which we are interested 
and is more efficient (with respect to the computer time required) then 
generating every possible sincere situation. However, it does prevent us 
from identifying any particular individual as chairman and hence it rules 
out one of the most commonly used tie-breaking devices.
In Chapter 4, we defined a GDF Plu which can be interpreted 
as the Plurality function supplemented by an unspecified tie-breaking 
device. We noted in Chapter 4 that without specifying the tie-breaking
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device our classification of the stability of situations would be 
incomplete but we would be able to identify a minimum number of 
situations which would not be stable regardless of the tie-breaking 
device which was finally chosen.
In figure 7.32, we present our determination of the maximum
1 * _number of sincere situations s such that s e E (A, Plu , s) as a 
percentage of the total number of sincere situations. These results 
are based on the sufficient conditions established in theorem 4.16.
We observe that, although our classification of situations is incomplete, 
more that 10% of situations fail to constitute equilibria when N = 50. 
These results can be compared with those in figure 7.16.
In figure 7.33, we present our determination of the maximum
number of sincere situations s such that Plu(s, A) is a singleton and 
1 * -s c E (A, Plu , s) as a percentage of the number of sincere situations 
such that Plu(s, A) is a singleton. As we observed in Chapter 4, 
if Plu(s, A) is a singleton then it is not possible to show that
-  I 1 * -s q: E (A, Plu , s) on the basis of theorem 4.16.
In figure 7.34, we present our determination of the maximum
number of sincere situations s such that Plu(s, A) contains exactly
- 1 * -two distinct elements and s e E (A, Plu , s) as a percentage of the
number of sincere situations such that Plu(s, A) contains exactly two
distinct elements. These results have been determined on the basis
of the conditions established in theorem 4.16. The maximum value of
1 * -the conditional probability that s e E (A, Plu , s), given that 
Plu(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements, oscillates with 
every third value of N but there is a long run trend for the
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probability to decline rapidly; when N > 33 the conditional probability 
is less than 0.0001. The results in figure 7.34 can be compared with 
the results presented in figure 7.18.
Tn figure 7.35, wo present our determination of the maximum
number of sincere situations s such that Plu(s, A) = A and 
1 * _
s e E (A, Plu , s) as a percentage of the number of sincere situations
s such that Plu(s, A) A. These results have also been determined
on the basis of the conditions established in theorem 4.16. As we
have shown in figure 7.6, there can exist situations such that
Plu(s, A) = A only when N is a multiple of |A| and, when N is a
multiple of |a |, the probability that Plu(s, A) = A is very low.
- 1 * -The conditional probability that s c E (A, Plu , s), given that 
Plu(s, A) = A, is 0.7500 when N = 3 and 0.1875 when N = 6; when N > 30 
the conditional probability is less that 0.0001.
In figure 7.36, we present our determination of the maximum
_  _  Vc _
number of sincere situations s such that s c E(A, Plu , s) as a 
percentage of the total number of sincere situations. The results 
are based on the sufficient conditions established in theorems 4.15 
and 4.16. If we compare these results with those in figure 7.24, we 
note that two ciirves are basically similar and, although the curve 
in figure 7.36 is somewhat higher, the difference between the two 
curves decreases as N increases. When N = 50, the percentage given 
in figure 7.24 is 14.11% and the percentage given in figure 7.36 
is 19.41%
In figure 7.37, we present our determination of the maximum
number of sincere situations s such that Plu(s, A) is a singleton and 
_ _
s e E(A, Plu , s) as a percentage of the number of sincere situations
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such that Plu(s, A) is a singleton. The results have been determined
on the basis of the sufficient conditions established in theorem 4.15.
_ * _
The maximum value of the conditional probability that s e E(A, Plu , s) , 
given that Plu(s, A) is a singleton, oscillates with every third 
value of N but there is a long run trend for it to decline rapidly; 
when N = 50 the.maximum value of the condtional probability is 0.2178. 
These results can be compared with the results presented in figure 7.25. 
The curves in figures 7.25 and 7.37 arc very similar.
In figure 7.38, we present our determination of the maximum
number of sincere situations s such that Plu(s, A) contains exactly
_ * _
two distinct elements and s e E(A, Plu , s) as a percentage of the 
number of sincere situations such that Plu(s, A) contains exactly two 
distinct elements. These results have been determined on the basis 
of the sufficient conditions established in theorems 4.15 and 4.16.
_  A _  —
The conditional probability that s e E(A, Plu , s), given that Plu(s, A) 
contains exactly two distinct elements, oscillates with every third 
value of N but there is a long run trend for it to decline rapidly; 
when N > 30 the conditional probability is less that 0.01. These 
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The P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s c E**~(A, Plu '  , s)  , t h e  P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s £ E(A, Plu* , s)
For  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  o n l y ,  we now c o n s i d e r  t h e  e f f e c t  
o f  b r e a k i n g  Lies  by r e f e r e n c e  lo a s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g  o f  the  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
which i s  f i x e d  th r o u g h o u t  the  s i m u l a t i o n .  L e t  x ,  y and z c X and l e t  R
be a s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g  d e f i n e d  o v e r  X such t h a t  xRy and yRz. In  Cha p te r
t  N4, we d e f i n e d  a CDF P l u  such  t h a t  f o r  a l l  A e X and f o r  a l l  s e IIq ,
P l u * ( s ,  A) = {a} where a c P l u ( s ,  A) and aRb f o r  a l l  b e ( P l u ( s ,  A) -  {a} ) .
f
We p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  f o r  t h e  i s s u e  A = {x,  y ,  z} the  c h o ic e  s e t  P l u  ( s ,  A) 
would be d e t e r m i n e d  a s  f o l l o w s :
1. I f  x £ P l u ( s ,  A) t h e n  P l u * ( s ,  A) = {x}
4.
and 2.  I f  x |  P l u ( s ,  A) and y e P l u ( s ,  A) t h e n  P l u  ( s ,  A) = {y}
and 3. I f  x £ P l u ( s ,  A) and y £ P l u ( s ,  A) th e n  P l u * ( s ,  A) = ( z )
We o b s e rv e d  t h a t  g iv e n  a s s u m p t io n  2 . 1 ,  t h e  o r d e r i n g  R, t h e  i s s u e  A and 
i  it h e  GDF P l u  , t h e  r e l a t i o n s  T A_.  t  d e t e r m i n e  an o r d e r i n g  o v e r  S f o r  a l lAPlu
i  e L. We s u b s e q u e n t l y  s t a t e d  a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  con-
_ 1
d i t i o n s  f o r  any g iv e n  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s to  b e lo n g  to  E (A, P l u  , s )  
and a s e t  o f  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  any g iv en  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n  s to  b e l o n g  to  E(A, Plu* , s ) .
In  f i g u r e  7 . 3 9 ,  we p r e s e n t  ou r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  number
■ — — 1 f  -
o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s such  t h a t  s e E (A, P l u  , s )  a s  a p e r c e n t a g e
o f  the  t o t a l  number o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s .  These r e s u l t s  have  been
d e t e r m i n e d  on th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s
— 1 ts t a t e d  i n  C h a p te r  4. The p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  s c E (A, P l u  , s) i s  a 
minimum o f  0 .7091  when N = 14 and r i s e s  g r a d u a l l y  t o  0 .8084  when 
N = 50. We o b s e rv e d  from f i g u r e  7 .16  t h a t ,  g iv e n  the  maximin 
a s s u m p t i o n ,  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  s e E^(A,  P l u ,  s)  was a minimum o f  
0 .5306  when N = 9 and Lt g r a d u a l l y  r o s e  Lo 0.7255  when N = 50.
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The r e s u l t s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  f i g u r e  7 .39  can a l s o  be compared 
w i t h  the  r e s u l t s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  f i g u r e  7 .3 2 .  The c u rve  i n  7 .39  i s  a 
smooth c u rve  w he re as  the  c u rv e  i n  f i g u r e  7 .32  ( l i k e  t h a t  i n  7 .16 )  
o s c i l l a t e s  w i t h  e v e ry  t h i r d  v a l u e  o f  N. We o b s e r v e  t h a t  t h e  cu rve  i n  
f i g u r e  7 .38  l i e s  be tw een  t h e  two c u r v e s  i n  f i g u r e s  7 .16  and 7 .3 2 .
In f i g u r e  7 . 4 0 ,  we p r e s e n t  ou r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  number
o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s such  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n  and 
—  i  •]* —
s e E (A, P l u  , s )  a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  the  number o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s
such t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n .  These r e s u l t s  have been  d e t e r m i n e d
on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  s t a t e d  i n
— 1 l  —
C hap te r  4. The c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  s e E (A, P l u  , s ) , g iv en  
t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n ,  o s c i l l a t e s  w i t h  e v e r y  t h i r d  v a l u e  o f  N 
b u t  t h e r e  i s  a l o n g  run  t r e n d  f o r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  to  i n c r e a s e  as  N 
i n c r e a s e s ;  i t  i s  a  minimum o f  0 .7619  when N = 4 and i t  r i s e s  to  0 .9 071  
when N = 50. These r e s u l t s  can be  compared w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t s  p r e s e n t e d  
in  f i g u r e s  7 .17  and 7 .3 3 .  The cu rv e  i n  f i g u r e  7 .40  l i e s  be tw een  th e  
two c u rv e s  i n  f i g u r e s  7 .17  and 7 .3 3 .
In f i g u r e  7 .4 1 ,  we p r e s e n t  ou r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  number o f
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s such t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  
— 1 *j* —
e le m e n t s  and s e E (A, P l u  , s )  a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  number o f
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  such t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t
e l e m e n t s .  These r e s u l t s  have been  d e t e r m i n e d  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e
n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  s t a t e d  i n  C ha p te r  4.  The c o n d i t i o n a l  
— 1 *j* — —
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  s e E (A, P l u  , s ) , g iv e n  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  
e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ,  o s c i l l a t e s  w i t h  e v e r y  t h i r d  v a l u e  o f  N 
b u t  t h e r e  i s  a l o n g  run  t r e n d  f o r  i t  to  d e c l i n e  r a p i d l y ;  when N > 30 
the  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  l e s s  t han  0 . 0 1 .  These  r e s u l t s  can be compared w i t h
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the results presented in figures 7.18 and 7.34. When N > 2, the curve 
in figure 7.41 lies between the two curves in figures 7.18 and 7.34.
In figure 7.42, we present our determination of the number of
1 f -sincere situations s such that Plu(s, A) = A and s e E (A, Plu , s) as
a percentage of the number of sincere situations such that Plu(s, A) = A.
— 1 +The conditional probability that s c E (A, Plu , s), given that 
Plu(s, A) = A, is 0.2500 when N = 3 and 0.0625 when N = 6; when N > 21 
the conditional probability is less than 0.0001. As we demonstrated in
I .r. '_ .u
Chapter 4, if Plu(s, A) = A and s c E (A, Plu , s) then s e E(A, Plu , s). 
The results presented in figure 7.42 can be compared with the results 
presented in figure 7.35.
In figure 7.43, we present our determination of the number
of sincere situations s such that s e E(A, Plu^, s) as a percentage
of the total number of sincere situations. These results have been
determined on the basis of the necessary and sufficient conditions
stated in Chapter 4. We observe from the figure that the curve
slopes smoothly downwards to the right: the probability that
—  •)• _s e E(A, Plu , s) decreases at a decreasing rate as N increases.
It seems unlikely that there would be any significant change in the 
pattern when N > 50. When N = 7 the probability is 0.6699 and when 
N = 50 the probability is 0.1663.
These results can be compared with those in figure 7.24 
where, given the maximin assumption, we examined the probability that 
s e E(A, Plu, s). The two curves are very similar and, although the 
curve in figure 7.43 is somewhat higher, the difference between the 
curves decreases as N increases. We observed from figure 7.24 that 
the probability that s e E(A, Plu, s) when N = 50 was 0.1411.
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In figure 7.44, we present our determination of the number of
sincere situations s such that Plu(s, A) is a singleton and 
— i —s £ E(A, Plu , .s) as a percentage of the number of sincere situations 
such that Plu(s, A) is a singleton. These results resemble closely 
those presented in figures 7.25 and 7.37. The curve in figure 7.44 
lies between the two curves presented in figures 7.25 and 7.37.
In figure 7.45, we present our determination of the number of
sincere situations s such that Plu(s, A) contains exactly two distinct 
— t —
elements and s £ E(A, Plu , s) as a percentage of the number of sincere 
situations such that Plu(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements. 
These results resemble closely those presented in figures 7.26 and 7.38 
The curve in figure 7.45 lies between the two curves presented in 
figures 7.26 and 7.38.
We conclude on the basis of these results that when |A[ = 3
and = IIo for all i £ L and the number of voters is relatively large,
—  —
the probability that any sincere situation s £ E(A, Plu , s) given 
assumption 2.1 varies little from the probability that s e E(A, Plu, s) 
given assumption 2.2. This conclusion holds whether we consider 
the set of all possible sincere situations or whether we examine 
separately those subsets of sincere situations such that (a) Plu(s, A) 
is a singleton or (b) Plu(s, A) contains exactly two distinct elements 
or (c) Plu(s, A) = A. It is possible that this conclusion may change 
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distinct elements and s e E 
(A, Plu , 
s) as a percentage of the number of sincere 
situations such that Plu(s, A) 
contains exactly two distinct elements.
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Figure 7.42 : 
The number of sincere situations s such that Plu(s, A) and s e E
a(A, Plu , s) as 
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Figure 7.44: 
The number of sincere situations s such that Plu(s, A) 
is a singleton and
s e E(A, 
Plu', 
s) 
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The C o n d i t i o n a l  P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an s c S such t h a t
s e E^(A, P l u ,  s)  and P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A),  g iven  ( s ,  A) e D ._____ __________________________ Maj
We now p r e s e n t  n p a r t i a l  answer to a n o t h e r  q u e s t i o n  which we. 
have e x p l o r e d  e a r l i e r  in  ou r  a n a l y s i s .  In  C h a p te r  2,  we d e f i n e d  a p r o p e r ­
ty  o f  a CDF f  wh ich we r e f e r r e d  to  as  e x a c t  f - c o n s i s t e n c y .  The GDF f  was 
c o n s i d e r e d  to  be a d e s i r a b l e  CDF which i s  n o t  s t r a t e g y - p r o o f  and f  was a 
CDF which was l e s s  a t t r a c t i v e  b u t  whLch we might  c o n s i d e r  a d o p t i n g  on the 
b a s i s  t h a t  the  end j u s t i f i e s  the means. We became i n t e r e s t e d  i n  the  
q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  the  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f i e d  t h e  p r o p e r t y  
o f  e x a c t  M a j - c o n s i s t e n c y .
As we have  shown i n  C h a p te r  4,  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  does n o t
s a t i s f y  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  e x a c t  M a j - c o n s i s t e n c y  ( the o rem  4 . 8 ) .  However ,
on th e  b a s i s  o f  r e s u l t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  th eo rem s  4 . 6  and 4 . 7 ,  we a rg u e d
t h a t ,  f o r  any A e X and f o r  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  t h e r e  i s  a h i g h
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an s e S such  t h a t  s e E^(A, P l u ,  s )  and
P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A). As we p o i n t e d  o u t  i n  C h a p te r  4 ,  t h i s  p r o b a b i l i t y
ca n n o t  be d e t e r m i n e d  s i n c e  D,, . 4= (S x X) and hence  M a j ( s ,  A) i s  n o tMaj 1
d e f i n e d  f o r  some s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  and i s s u e s .
However ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  d e t e r m i n e ,  f o r  any A e X and f o r  any 
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  s ,  t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an 
s e S such t h a t  s e e \ a , P l u ,  s)  and P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A), g iv e n  t h a t  
( s ,  A) e D^ . In  theorem  4 . 6 ,  we p roved  t h a t  t h e r e  a lw ays  e x i s t s  such  a 
s i t u a t i o n  i f  ( s ,  A) e D ^ . and M a j ( s ,  A) i s  a s i n g l e t o n ;  i n  theorem  4 . 7 ,  
we p roved  t h a t  t h e r e  a lw ays  e x i s t s  such a s i t u a t i o n  i f  ( s ,  A) e and
M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s ;  and i n  theo rem  4 . 8 ,  we
proved  t h a t  t h e r e  does n o t  e x i s t  such a s i t u a t i o n  i f  ( s ,  A) e D^ and 
M a j ( s ,  A) c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  o r  more d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s .
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I n  f i g u r e  7 . 4 6 ,  we p r e s e n t  o u r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  number
o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s s u c h  t h a t  ( s ,  A) e Dw .Maj
s c S s u c h  t h a t  s c E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  and P l u ( s ,  A)
and t h e r e  e x i s t s  an
M a j ( s ,  A) a s  a
For  odd v a l u e s  o f . N ,  M a j ( s ,  A) i s  a l w a y s  a s i n g l e t o n  and t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an  s e S s u c h  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A)
e v e n  v a l u e s  o f  N, t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  a p p r o a c h e s  1 .0 0 0 0  a s  N 
a p p r o a c h e s  5 0 ,  an d  when N = 50 t h e  v a l u e  i s  0 . 9 9 8 1 .  I t  w ou ld  be  
i n t e r e s t i n g  to  e x t e n d  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  to  i s s u e s  c o n t a i n i n g  more t h a t  
t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s .
As we p o i n t e d  o u t  i n  C h a p t e r  4 ,  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h i s  r e s u l t  
i s  d i m i n i s h e d  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o b s e r v a t i o n :  The e x i s t e n c e  o f  an  s e S
s u ch  t h a t  s e E^(A,  P l u ,  s )  and P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A) d o e s  n o t  r u l e  o u t  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a n o t h e r  s i t u a t i o n ,  s a y  s ’ , s u c h  t h a t  
s ’ e E*(A,  P l u ,  s )  and P l u ( s ’ , A) =j= M a j ( s ,  A) .  As we h a v e  shown i n  
C h a p t e r  4 ,  t h e s e  p r o b l e m s  do n o t  a r i s e  i f  we r e p l a c e  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  
e q u i l i b r i u m  w i t h  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m .  We w i l l  c o n s i d e r
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The number of sincere situations s such that 
(s, A) 
£ ^Maj anC^ t*iere exists an s £
such that s e E!(A, Plu, 
l) 
and Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A) 
as a percentage of the number 
of sincere situations such that (s, A) 
e D^_. .
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The Probability of the existence of an s c S such that s c E(A, Plu, s) 
and Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A)
Wo now present a partial answer to another question which we 
have explored earlier in our analysis. In Chapter 2, we defined a proper­
ty of a GDF which we referred to as exact and strict f-consistency. We 
became interested in the question of whether or not the Plurality function 
satisfied the property of exact and strict Maj-consistency.
As we demonstrated in Chapter 4, the Plurality function does not 
satisfy the property of exact Maj-consistency and hence it does not 
satisfy the property of exact and strict Maj-consistency. However, on the 
basis of the results established in theorems 4.1, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 and 
4.12, it is possible to determine the probability, for any A e X and for 
any sincere situation s, that there exists an s c S such that 
s c E(A, Plu, s) and Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A). We foreshadowed, in Chapter 
4, that we would use these results to determine this probability for any 
issue A containing exactly three distinct elements.
In figure 7.47, we present our determination of the number of 
sincere situations s such that E(A, Plu, s) ^ <|) as a percentage of the 
total number of sincere situations. As we pointed out in Chapter 4, it 
follows from theorem 4.1 that if E(A, Plu, s) then there exists an
s e S such that s c E(A, Plu, s) and Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A). Obviously, 
if E(A, Plu, s) = (J) then there does not exist a situation satisfying 
these conditions.
The results in figure 7.47 can be compared with those in 
figure 7.2 where we examined the probability that (s, A) c . We
observe from figure 7.47 that the probability that E(A, Plu, s) =j= (j)
349
o s c i l l a t e s  w i t h  e v e r y  s e c o n d  v a l u e  o f  N. For  odd v a l u e s  o f  N, t h e
p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  ( s ,  A) c Dgmaj  an<^
g r a d u a l l y  d e c r e a s e s  a s  N i n c r e a s e s .  Fo r  e v e n  v a l u e s  o f  N, t h e
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t -  E(A,  F l u ,  s )  =(= (j) i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h i g h e r  t h a n  th e
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  ( s ,  A) e ^gmaj w^ en  N as  smaH  b u t  a s  N i n c r e a s e s
t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  g r a d u a l l y  d i s a p p e a r s .  When N = 6 t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y
t h a t  E ( A, P l u ,  s )  =j= cf> i s  0 . 6 0 9 1  and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  ( s ,  A) e Dgmaj
i s  0 . 5 0 8 7  b u t  when N = 50 t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s
a r e  0 . 7 5 2 3  an d  0 . 7 5 2 2  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  We c o n c l u d e  t h a t ,  a s  N i n c r e a s e s ,
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  E(A,  F l u ,  s )  =f <J> a p p r o a c h e s  t h e  same l i m i t  a s  t h e
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  ( s ,  A) e D„Smaj
Tl  i s  in to  r e s t  Ing to  compart* t h e  r e s u l t s  in f i g u r e  7 .4  7 w i t h  
t h e  r e s u l t s  i n  f i g u r e  7 . 2 4  w he re  we ex a m i n e d  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  
s c E(A,  P l u ,  s ) . As we h av e  shown i n  f i g u r e  7 . 2 4 ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
t h a t  s c E(A,  F l u ,  s )  d e c l i n e s  r a p i d l y  a s  N i n c r e a s e s  and h e n c e  i t  
a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  s ij: E(A,  P l u ,  s )  and E(A,  F l u ,  s )  =j= c|) 
w i l l  i n c r e a s e  a s  N i n c r e a s e s .
I n  f i g u r e  7 . 4 8 ,  we p r e s e n t  o u r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  number  
o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s s u c h  t h a t  s fj: E(A,  P l u ,  s )  and E(A,  P l u ,  s )  =j= (f> 
a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s .  As 
s u g g e s t e d  by o u r  c o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  i n  f i g u r e s  7 .2 4  and 7 . 4 7 ,  
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  s i[ K(A, P l u ,  s )  and E(A, P l u ,  s )  4 <f> o s c i l l a t e s  
w i t h  e v e r y  s e c o n d  v a l u e  o f  N b u t  t h e r e  i s  a l o n g  r u n  t r e n d  f o r  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  to  i n c r e a s e  a t  a g r a d u a l l y  d e c r e a s i n g  r a t e .  Assuming t h i s  
t r e n d  c o n t i n u e s  f o r  N > 5 0 ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  f o r  ev e n  v a l e s  o f  N i s  
g r e a t e r  t h a t  0 . 6 0  when N > 50 and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  f o r  odd v a l u e s  
o f  N i s  g r e a t e r  t h a t  0 . 7 5  when N > 50.
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The number of sincere situations s such that s $ E(A, Plu,
as a percentage of the total number of sincere situations.
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The Conditional Probability of E(A, Plu, s) 6, given (s, A) £ .
We now present a partial answer to another question which we 
have explored earlier in our analysis. In Chapter 2, we defined a 
property of a CDF which we referred to as Condorcet-consistency and, in 
theorem 4.1, we proved that the Plurality function satisfied this property. 
However, as we suggested in Chapter 2, the significance of this result 
depends upon the conditional probability of E(A, Plu, s) =j= <|», given 
that (s, A) e D ..
In figure 7.49, we present our determination of the number of
sincere situations s such that (s, A) c Dw . and E(A, Plu, s) f $ as aMaj
percentage of the number of sincere situations such that (s, A) £ .
These results have been calculated by dividing the probability of 
(s, A) e DMaj anc* E(A, Plu, s) =f= cj) by the probability of (s, A) £ .
The conditional probability of E(A, PLu, s) =f= (j>, given that (s, A) £ DMaj
oscillates with every second value of N. For odd values of N, the condi­
tional probability is always equal to 1.0000. For even values of N, the 
conditional probability is a minimum of 0.6114 when N = 6 and thereafter 
it gradually increases and reaches the value of 0.7856 when N = 50.
These values may be compared with the conditional probability of
(s, A) £ D_ ., given that (s, A) e D_, when N = 6 the conditional Smaj Maj
probability is 0.5107 and when N = 50 the conditional probability is 
0.7855. Hence, as N increases, the conditional probability of 
E(A, Plu, s) =j= (|>, given that (s, A) £ D^_., approaches the conditional 
probability of (s, A) e , given that (s, A) £ . This conclusion
is consistent with our interpretation of the results presented in
figure 7.47.
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C h a p t e r  Summary
I n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  we h a v e  p r e s e n t e d  and i n t e r p r e t e d  t h e  r e s u l t s  
o f  o u r  c o m p u t e r  s i m u l a t i o n  o f  v o t i n g  s i t u a t i o n s .  The s i m u l a t i o n  h a s  
b e e n  e x e c u t e d  f o r  e a c h  v a l u e  o f  N = 2,  . . . ,  5 0 .  We h a v e  made t h e
f o l l o w i n g  a s s u m p t i o n s : (1)  t h e  i s s u e  A c o n s i s t s  o f  e x a c t l y  t h r e e
d i s t i n c t  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  (2)  t h e  s i n c e r e  and t h e  e x p r e s s e d  p r e f e r e n c e s  
o f  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g s ,  (3)  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  e q u i p r o b a b i l i t y  a s s u m p t i o n  and 
(4 )  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 2  i s  s a t i s f i e d .
We b e g a n  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  o u r  r e s u l t s  by  e x a m i n i n g  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) e , t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) e DMaj anc*
M a j ( s ,  A) b e i n g  s i n g l e t o n ,  and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  ( s ,  A) e ^ s ma j * 
co m f i rm e d  t h e  a c c u r a c y  o f  t h e  t e c h n i q u e s  w h ich  we h a v e  em ployed  i n  t h e  
s i m u l a t i o n  by c o m p a r i n g  o u r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
( s ,  A) e w i t h  e q u i v a l e n t  s e t s  o f  r e s u l t s  g i v e n  by C e h r l e i n  and
F i s h b u r n  (1976)  f o r  odd v a l u e s  o f  N o n l y .  Our r e s u l t s  a g r e e d  e x a c t l y  
w i t h  t h o s e  p r e s e n t e d  by G e h r l e i n  and F i s h b u r n .  No c o m p a r i s o n  d a t a  
a p p e a r  t o  b e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  e v e n  v a l u e s  o f  N. We a l s o  e x a m in e d  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an  a e A s u ch  t h a t
| { i  e L I a l \ b  f o r  a l l  b (A  -  {a } ) } | > ^  and found  t h a t  t h i s  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d e c r e a s e s  a t  a  d e c r e a s i n g  r a t e  a s  N i n c r e a s e s ;  i t  d e c l i n e s  t o  t h e  
v a l u e  0 . 0 1 4 7  when N = 50.
We ex a m i n e d  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  P l u r a l i t y ,  N a n so n ,  ß o r d a  
a n d  M a j o r i t y  f u n c t i o n s  d e f i n i n g  c h o i c e  s e t s  w h ich  c o n s i s t  o f  ( a )  e x a c t l y  
one  e l e m e n t ,  (b)  e x a c t l y  two d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s  an d  (c )  a l l  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  
e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  i s s u e  A. As sum ing  t h e  t r e n d s  we h a v e  o b s e r v e d  c o n t i n u e
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f o r  N > 50,  we can say  t h a t  the p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  P l u ( s ,  A) b e i n g  a
s i n g l e t o n  e x c e e d s  0 .8 9  when N > 50;  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  N a n ( s ,  A)
b e i n g  a s i n g l e t o n  e x c e e d s  0 .85  when N > 50;  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  B o r (3 , A)
b e i n g  a s i n g l e t o n  e x c e e d s  0 .9 4  when N > 50;  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f
( s ,  A) e Dj^_. and M a j ( s ,  A) b e i n g  a s i n g l e t o n  e x c ee d s  0 .8 2  when N > 50.
We examined th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  an 
e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  e a ch  o f  the  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and Borda f u n c t i o n s .
Under eacli o f  t h e s e  GDF's,  t h e r e  i s  a l o n g  run  t r e n d  f o r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
to i n c r e a s e  a s  N i n c r e a s e s .  Assuming t h a t  the t r e n d s  we have o b s e rv e d  
c o n t i n u e  f o r  N > 50 ,  we can sa y  t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s e E^(A,  P l u ,  s)  
i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  0 . 7 0  when N > 50;  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s e E"^(A, Nan, s)  i s  
g r e a t e r  t h a n  0 .8 7  when N > 50;  and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s e E^(A, Bor ,  s)  
i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  0 .8 2  when N > 50.
We examined  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  a 
s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  each  o f  the  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and Borda 
f u n c t i o n s .  Under t h e  P l u r a l i t y  and Borda  f u n c t i o n s ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d e c r e a s e s  a t  a d e c r e a s i n g  r a t e  a s  N i n c r e a s e s .  Assuming the  t r e n d s  we 
have o b s e r v e d  c o n t i n u e  f o r  N > 50,  we can say  t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
s e E(A, P l u ,  s )  i s  l e s s  t h a n  0 .1 5  when N > 50;  and th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
s e E(A, Bor ,  s') i s  l e s s  t h a n  0 .0 7  when N > 50. However,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
o f  s £ E(A, Nan, s)  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  and i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a 
lo n g  run  t r e n d  f o r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  to i n c r e a s e  as  N i n c r e a s e s .
We s u b s e q u e n t l y  c o n f i n e d  ou r  a n a l y s i s  to  the P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  
on ly  and we examined  th e  e f f e c t  on ou r  r e s u l t s  o f  s u p p le m e n t i n g  t h i s  
GDF w i t h  an u n s p e c i f i e d  t i e - b r e a k i n g  d e v i c e  and employ in g  a s s u m p t io n  2 .1  
as  opposed to  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 2 .  We o b s e rv e d  t h a t ,  f o r  any g iv e n  v a l u e  o f
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N, the maximum probability of s e E (A, Plu , s), given assumption 2.1,
is higher than the probability of s e E^(A, Plu, s), given assumption
2.2. However, this difference decreases as N increases. We also
observed that, for any given value of N, the maximum probability of 
_ * _
s e E(A, Plu , s), given assumption 2.1, is higher than the probability 
of s g E(A, Plu, s), given assumption 2.2. This difference decreases 
as N increases and is less than 0.06 when N = 50.
We also examined the effect on our results of breaking ties 
under the Plurality function by reference to a strict ordering of the 
alternatives which is fixed throughout the simulation. We observed
— 1 f -
that, for any given value of N, the probability of s e E (A, Plu , s), 
given assumption 2.1, is somewhat higher than the probability of 
s e E^(A, Plu, s), given assumption 2.2. This difference decreases 
as N increases and is less than 0.09 when N = 50. We also observed 
that, for any given value of N, the probability of s e E(A, Plu^, s), 
given assumption 2.1, is somewhat higher than the probability of 
s e E(A, Plu, s), given assumption 2.2. This difference decreases 
as N increases and is less than 0.03 when N = 50.
We then reverted to the use of assumption 2.2 and examined
the conditional probability of the existence of an s e S such that
s e E^(A, Plu, s) and Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A), given (s, A) c D ..rlaj
Assuming the trends we have observed continue for N > 50, we can say 
that this probabilily exceeds 0.99 when N > 50.
We have shown that the necessary and sufficient conditon 
for the existence of an s g S such that s c E(A, Plu, s) 'and 
Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A) is that E(A, Plu, s) =j= <(>. We examined the
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p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  E(A,  P l u ,  s )  =f 4> an d  we f o u n d  t h a t ,  a s  N i n c r e a s e s ,  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  E(A,  P l u ,  s ) 4> a p p r o a c h e s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f
( s ,  A) e When N = 5 0 ,  t h e  two p r o b a b i l i t i e s  d i f f e r  by  o n l y
0 . 0 0 0 1 .  We c o n c l u d e d  by e x a m i n i n g  t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f
E(A,  P l u ,  s )  =)= <J>, g i v e n  ( s ,  A) e D . .
Maj
I t  would  be  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  e x t e n d  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  by r e l a x i n g  
some o f  Liie a s s u m p t i o n s  w h ich  we h a v e  made .  The m o s t  o b v i o u s  l i n e  o f  
i n q u i r y  i s  t o  exa m in e  i s s u e s  w h ic h  c o n s i s t  o f  more t h a n  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  
e l e m e n t s  and to  compare  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  w i t h  t h o s e  a b o v e .  I n  C h a p t e r  4 ,  
we p l a c e d  no r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  number  o f  e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  i s s u e  and 
h e n c e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  w h i c h  we e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  
t h a t  c h a p t e r  can  b e  u s e d  a s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  s u ch  an  e x t e n s i o n .  However ,  
i n  C h a p t e r s  5 and 6 ,  we a s s u m ed  ( i n  t h e o r e m s  5 . 2 ,  5 . 3 ,  6 . 2  an d  6 . 3 )  
t h a t  t h e  i s s u e  c o n s i s t e d  o f  e x a c t l y  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s .  O b v i o u s l y ,  
t h e s e  r e s u l t s  w ou ld  n e e d  t o  b e  g e n e r a l i z e d  b e f o r e  we c o u l d  e x t e n d  t h e  
s i m u l a t i o n  to  i s s u e s  c o n t a i n i n g  f o u r ,  f i v e ,  e t c  d i s t i n c t  e l e m e n t s .
T h e r e  a r e  many o t h e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  We c o u l d  r e l a x  t h e  
a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  = 11 q f o r  a l l  i  e L;  we c o u l d  c o n s i d e r  o t h e r  
b e h a v i o u r a l  a s s u m p t i o n s  s u c h  a s  t h o s e  u s e d  by P a t t a n a i k  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ;  and 
we c o u l d  c o n s i d e r  o t h e r  a s s u m p t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d ­
u a l  p r e f e r e n c e s .  The m o s t  i n t e r e s t i n g  e x t e n s i o n  w ould  be  t o  c o n s i d e r
o t h e r  CDF's .
358
8 CONCLUSION
We began this thesis by noting a number of negative results 
proved by Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1973,1975) and Pattanaik (1973-78) 
concerning the existence of acceptable GDF’s under which it would never 
be possible for any individual (or any coalition of individuals) to 
obtain an outcome which he (they) preferred by adopting a strategy 
which did not reflect his (their) sincere preferences. In Pattanaik's 
terms, these results paint a bleak picture of the possibility of finding 
a GDF which is strategy-proof or strictly strategy-proof.
We decided to explore the significance of these results by 
determining the probability of any sincere situation being an equilibrium 
or strict equilibrium under three selected GDF’s which we referred to as 
the Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions. As we pointed out in 
Chapter 1, even if we know that a given GDF is not strategy-proof or 
strictly strategy-proof, we do not know the probability of any sincere 
situation being an equilibrium or strict equilibrium under that CDF.
If the probability of any sincere situation being a strict equilibrium 
is relatively high then we might not be too disturbed by the negative 
thrust of these results. However, if the probability of any sincere 
situation being an equilibrium is relatively low then we have every
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r e a s o n  t o  b e  c o n c e r n e d .
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  e x p l o r i n g  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s ,  we h a v e  a l s o  ex a m in e d
t h e  a p p r o a c h  o f  P c l c g  (197S)  who s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  n e x t  s t e p  i n  t h e  i n ­
v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  s t r a t e g i c  v o t i n g  i s  to l o o k  f o r  n o n - d i c t a t o r i a l  v o t i n g  
s ch e m e s  i n  w h ic h  th e  m a n i p u l a t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  by i n d i v i d u a l s ,  o r  by 
g r o u p s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  d o e s  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  f i n a l  s o c i a l  c h o i c e .  We h a v e  
e x p l o r e d  a m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  by i n t r o d u c i n g  t h e  c o n c e p t s  o f  
C o n d o r c e t  c o n s i s t e n c y  an d  weak C o n d o r c e t  c o n s i s t e n c y .
We a d o p t e d  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  d e v e l o p e d  by P a t t a n a i k  i n  S t r a t e g y  and 
Group C h o i c e  ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  Hence o u r  a n a l y s i s  h a s  b e e n  c o n d u c t e d  w i t h i n  t h e  
p u r e l y  o r d i n a l  f r am ew o rk  o f  an  N - p e r s o n  c o - o p e r a t i v e  game w i t h o u t  s i d e -  
p a y m e n t s  an d  i n  n o r m a l i z e d  fo rm.  We as sum ed  t h a t  t h e  s e t  o f  p l a y e r s ,  L, 
was a  f i n i t e  s e t  and t h a t  | l | £ 2.  We as su m ed  t h a t  t h e  s e t  X o f  a l l
c o n c e i v a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  w h i c h  may b e  p r e s e n t e d  f o r  c h o i c e  was a f i n i t e
s e t  an d  t h a t  | x |  $ 3.  We d i d  n o t  im pose  any s t r u c t u r e  on t h e  s e t  X. We 
a s s u m ed  t h a t ,  a t  any p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e ,  a  n o n - e m p t y  s u b s e t  o f  t h e  a l t e r ­
n a t i v e s  b e l o n g i n g  to  X w o u ld  a c t u a l l y  b e  p r e s e n t e d  f o r  c h o i c e  an d  we 
r e f e r r e d  t o  t h i s  s u b s e t  a s  t h e  i s s u e ,  A.
We h a v e ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  a s sum ed  t h a t  t h e  s i n c e r e  an d  t h e  e x p r e s s e d  
p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  s t r i c t  o r d e r i n g s .  We h a v e  made t h e  
b e h a v i o u r a l  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  f o l l o w  t h e  max im in  r u l e  
i . e .  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 2  i s  s a t i s f i e d  a l t h o u g h  we h a v e ,  on o c c a s i o n ,  a d o p t e d  
t h e  much w e a k e r  a s s u m p t i o n  w h ich  we d e f i n e d  a s  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 1 .  We h a v e  
u t i l i z e d  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n t r o d u c e d  by Nash (1 951)  an d  a l s o  
t h e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h i s  c o n c e p t  by F a r q u h a r s o n  (1 955 )  an d  S h u b ik
(1 9 5 9 )  .
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This framework was developed formally in Chapter 2. Within 
this framework, we have studied the possibilities and the effects of 
the strategic misrevelation of preferences by voters when the GDF, the 
issue and the sincere preferences of all individuals are given.
In Chapter 3, we defined the Plurality and Borda functions 
as simple finite ranking rules based on a finite ranking operator and 
we defined the Nanson function as a method of exhaustive voting based on 
a finite ranking operator. We subsequently defined a number of properties 
of GDF’s and we discussed the Plurality, Nanson and Borda functions in 
terms of these properties.
In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, we proved a number of results concerning 
the stability of situations under the Plurality, Nanson and Borda 
functions.respectively. These results are summarized at the end of each 
chapter. In general, we have assumed that the issue consists of three 
or more distinct elements although in theorems 5.2, 5.3, 6.2 and 6.3 
we have assumed that the issue consists of exactly three distinct 
elements. Many of these results are concerned only with the stability 
of sincere situations but the remainder are concerned with the 
stability of situations, sincere or otherwise.
We incorporated many of the results established in Chapters 4,
5 and 6 in a computer program designed to simulate voting situations and 
analyze their stability. The simulation program was executed for each 
value of N = 2, ..., 50. We made the following assumptions: (1) the 
issue A consists of exactly three distinct elements, (2) the sincere 
and the expressed preferences of all individuals are strict orderings,
(3) the distribution of individual preferences satisfies the equiprob- 
ability assumption and (4) assumption 2.2 is satisfied.
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We now r e v i e w  ou r  p r i n c i p a l  r e s u l t s  and comment on t h e i r  
s i g n i f i c a n c e .
The p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  an e q u i l i b r i u m  under  
t h e  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson and Borda f u n c t i o n s .
We have e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  when t h e  number o f  v o t e r s  i s  s m a l l ,  
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  an e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  t h e  
P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson o r  Borda  f u n c t i o n s  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  low.  Hence ,  t h e r e  i s  
a r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  some i n d i v i d u a l  b e i n g  a b l e  to  o b t a i n  an 
outcome which he p r e f e r s  by a d o p t i n g  a s t r a t e g y  which  does n o t  r e f l e c t  
h i s  s i n c e r e  p r e f e r e n c e s .  However , under  each  o f  t h e s e  GDF's,  t h e r e  i s  
a l o n g  run  t r e n d  f o r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  an 
e q u i l i b r i u m  to  i n c r e a s e  as  N i n c r e a s e s .  Assuming t h a t  t h e  t r e n d s  we have 
o b s e rv e d  c o n t i n u e  f o r  N > 50 ,  we can sa y  t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
s e E"^(A, P l u ,  s)  i s  g r e a t e r  t h e n  0 .7 0  when N > 50;  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f
s e E^"(A, Nan, s)  i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  0 .8 7  when N > 50;  and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y
o f  s e E^(A, Bor ,  s)  i s  g r e a t e r  t h e n  0 .8 2  when N > 50.
Such a r e s u l t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g :  i t  m igh t  w e l l  be e x p e c t e d
t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n g l e  i n d i v i d u a l  b e i n g  a b l e  to  pose  a t h r e a t
to  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  would d e c l i n e  as  t h e  number o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n ­
c r e a s e s .  I n d e e d ,  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  o n l y ,  P a z n e r  
and Wesley (1978)  have r e c e n t l y  come to  a s i m i l a r  c o n c l u s i o n .  However ,  
g iven  the  a s s u m p t io n s  on which  the  s i m u l a t i o n  i s  b a s e d ,  ou r  r e s u l t s  
i n d i c a t e  the  e x a c t  v a l u e  o f  the p r o b a b i l i t y  f o r  N = 2,  . . . »  50.
We have n o t  examined  th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  how the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  an e q u i l i b r i u m  v a r i e s  w i t h  the number o f
e l e m e n t s  i n  the  i s s u e .  As th e  number o f  e l e m e n t s  i n  the i s s u e  i n c r e a s e s ,
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t h e  number o f  e f f e c t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g i e s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  e a c h  v o t e r  
i n c r e a s e s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  and i t  w ou ld  a p p e a r  t h a t  t h e  s c o p e  f o r  s t r a t e g i c  
m i s r e v e l a t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  w o u ld  i n c r e a s e  a c c o r d i n g l y .  We c o n j e c t u r e  
t h a t ,  f o r  an y  g i v e n  v a l u e  o f  N, t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  
b e i n g  an  e q u i l i b r i u m  w o u ld  d e c l i n e  a s  t h e  number  o f  e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  
i s s u e  i n c r e a s e s .
The p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  
u n d e r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y ,  Nanson  and B ord a  f u n c t i o n s
We h a v e  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  an y  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  a  s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  u n d e r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  and B o rd a  
f u n c t i o n s  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  low and i t  d e c r e a s e s  a t  a  d e c r e a s i n g  r a t e  as  
t h e  number  o f  v o t e r s  i n c r e a s e s .  A ssum ing t h e  t r e n d s  we h a v e  o b s e r v e d  
c o n t i n u e  f o r  N > 5 0 ,  we can  s a y  t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s e E(A,  P l u ,  s )  
i s  l e s s  t h a n  0 . 1 5  when N > 5 0 ;  and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s e E(A,  B o r ,  s )  
i s  l e s s  t h a n  0 . 0 7  when N > 50.  Ho we ver ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
s c E(A,  Nan,  s )  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  and i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a 
l o n g  r u n  t r e n d  f o r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  to  i n c r e a s e  a s  t h e  number  o f  v o t e r s  
i n c r e a s e s .
F o r  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  o n l y ,  we h a v e  shown t h a t  t h e s e  
r e s u l t s  do n o t  ch a n g e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i f  we i n t r o d u c e  a  t i e - b r e a k i n g  
d e v i c e  and u t i l i z e  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 1  as  o p p o s e d  t o  a s s u m p t i o n  2 . 2 .
As we p o i n t e d  o u t  i n  C h a p t e r  1, Nanson a d v o c a t e d  a method  o f  
e x h a u s t i v e  v o t i n g  b a s e d  on th e  P l u r a l i t y  r u l e  f o r  u s e  i n  A u s t r a l i a n  
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  e l e c t i o n s  p r e c i s e l y  b e c a u s e  he  b e l i e v e d  i t  t o  be  l e s s  
m a n i p u l a b l e  t h a n  o t h e r  s y s t e m s  ( N a n s o n : 1 8 8 2 ) .  Our r e s u l t s  p r o v i d e  
some s u p p o r t  f o r  N a n s o n ’ s a s s e r t i o n  and th e y  m i g h t  be  c o n s i d e r e d  as  an
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argument: in  support:  o f  t h e  use  o f  t h i s  GDF. However , a s  we have shown 
i n  Cha p te r  3, t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n  does n o t  s a t i s f y  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  
m o n o t o n i c i t y  and t h i s  must  be c o n s i d e r e d  as  a s t r o n g  c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t .
We have n o t  examined the  q u e s t i o n  o f  how the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  v a r i e s  w i t h  t h e  number 
o f  e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  i s s u e .  We c o n j e c t u r e  t h a t ,  f o r  any g iv e n  v a l u e  o f  N, 
the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  
would d e c l i n e  as  the  number o f  e l e m e n t s  i n  the  i s s u e  i n c r e a s e s .
We c o n c lu d e  t h a t ,  under  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  and Borda f u n c t i o n s ,  t h e  
p rob lem  o f  the  s t r a t e g i c  m i s r e v e l a t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  by c o a l i t i o n s  
c a n n o t  be e s c a p e d  by a r g u i n g  t h a t  the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  such  b e h a v i o u r  a r e  
l i m i t e d .  However ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  make such an argument  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
to  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n .
There  a r e  o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  Under the  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  s t r a t e g i c  m i s r e v e l a t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  
s im p le  to  d i s c e r n  and i n v i t e  e x p l o i t a t i o n .  Under t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n ,  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  s t r a t e g i c  m i s r e v e l a t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  a r e  by no 
means o b v i o u s .  The e f f o r t  r e q u i r e d  to  a n a l y z e  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  the  
s e l e c t i o n  o f  d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g i e s  under  t h i s  GDF may l e a d  mos t  v o t e r s  
to  a d o p t  t h e  s im p le  e x p e d i e n t  o f  a d o p t i n g  t h e i r  s i n c e r e  s t r a t e g i e s .  
F u r t h e r ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  may be scope  f o r  the  s t r a t e g i c  m i s r e v e l a t i o n  o f  
p r e f e r e n c e s  by c o a l i t i o n s  o f  v o t e r s  and a l t h o u g h  v o t e r s  may be aware o f  
t h i s  o p p o r t u n i t y ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  v o t e r s  may choose  n o t  to  t ak e  
a d v a n ta g e  o f  such  a p o s s i b l i t y .  I n  many s o c i e t i e s ,  v o t e r s  may be m o t i ­
v a t e d  by a d e s i r e  to  e x p r e s s  o n l y  t h e i r  s i n c e r e  p r e f e r e n c e s .
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These  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  may l e a d  one to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  p rob lem  
i s  n o t  as  r e l e v a n t  to  the  r e a l  w or ld  as  ou r  p r o b a b i l i t y  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  
s u g g e s t .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i n  an u n p u b l i s h e d  s t u d y  conduc ted  d u r i n g  a 
b y - e l e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n  May 1970, I  
e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  some e l e c t o r s  i n  a c r o s s - s e c t i o n  sample  a c t u a l l y  ad o p te d  
s t r a t e g i e s  which d i d  n o t  r e f l e c t  t h e i r  s i n c e r e  p r e f e r e n c e s .  The re  were 
seven  c a n d i d a t e s  and the  b y - e l e c t i o n  was conduc te d  u s i n g  t h e  Nanson 
f u n c t i o n .  On t h e  a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  t h e s e  e l e c t o r s  had an a c c u r a t e  p e r ­
c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  s i n c e r e  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  a l l  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  i t  i s  
p o s s i b l e  to  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  above f i n d i n g  as  an a t t e m p t  by some e l e c t o r s  
to  d i s r u p t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .
Hence,  a l t h o u g h  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  b e i n g  
a s t r i c t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unde r  t h e  Nanson f u n c t i o n  a p p e a r s  to  be  r e l a t i v e l y  
h i g h  and a l t h o u g h  th e  t a s k  o f  a n a l y z i n g  the  e f f e c t s  o f  the  s e l e c t i o n  o f  
d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g i e s  unde r  t h i s  GDF i s  by no means s i m p l e ,  t h e r e  i s  some 
e v id e n c e  t h a t  v o t e r s  have  a t t e m p t e d  to  d i s r u p t  a s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n  by the  
s t r a t e g i c  m i s r e v e l a t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s .
Condorce t  C o n s i s t e n c y
In  C h a p te r  2 ,  we i n t r o d u c e d  th e  c o n c e p t  o f  Condorce t  c o n s i s t ­
ency and i n  C h a p te r  4,  we p roved  t h a t  t h e  P l u r a l i t y  f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f i e d  
t h i s  p r o p e r t y .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  f o r  any i s s u e  A and f o r  any s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n  s ,
(1) i f  ( s ,  A) e D-, . t h en  f o r  a l l  s e E(A, P l u ,  s)  ,Maj
P l u ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A)
and (2) i f  ( s ,  A) i| D.. , t hen  E(A, P l u ,  s )  = (|>.' Maj
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If we accept that Maj is a desirable GDF then the GDF Plu
which is Condorcet consistent has considerable appeal although the
strength of this appeal depends on the conditional probability of
E(A, Plu, s) =f cf>, given that (s, A) e D . . We have established inMaj
Chapter 7 that this probability approaches the conditional probability
of (s, A) e • , given that (s, A) e D„ , .Smaj Maj
The significance of this result depends on the ethical desir­
ability of the GDF Maj. We note that K.O. May (1952) has characterized 
this GDF by proving that Maj is the only GDF to satisfy the properties 
of limited decisiveness, limited neutrality, limited anonymity and limited 
strict monotonicity. However, given assumption 2.2, Maj does not satisfy 
the property of strategy-proofness. We illustrate this by means of the 
following example which is due to Sen (1970).
Example 8.1
Let the issue A = (x, y, z) and let L = (1, 2, 3, 4} and
let s be any sincere situation such that:
xP.yP.z and xP_yP_z and zP0xP„y and yP.zP.x 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
It is easy to verify that (s, A) e D . and Maj(s, A) = {x}.Maj
Let s’ be any situation such that: 
xP^yP^z and xP^yP^z and zP^xP^y and zP^yP^x
It is easy to verify that (s’, A) e and Maj (s’, A) = (x, z}
Given the maximin assumption, s ’ ^ s and hence < {4}, s' > is a
threat to s and s { E^(A, Maj, s).
A further problem with Maj is that this GDF does not satisfy 
the property of decisiveness for any issue containing three or more 
distinct elements. This difficulty can be overcome by the convention
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of adopting the status-quo in the event of (s, A)
i’c
Let Maj be a GDF defined as follows: For all s e S and for
all Ac X,
:k
(1) if (s, A) e DMaj t^en (s > = Maj(s, A)
and (2) if (s, A) i[. then Maj (s, A) = {q} where q e X.
If we interpret q c X as the status-quo then Maj may be interpreted as
Maj supplemented by the convention of adopting the status-quo in the 
event of (s, A) (f . However, Maj does not satisfy the property of
neutrality. We demonstrate this by means of the following example.
Example 8.2
Let the issue A = {x, y, z} and let L = {1, 2, 3} and let 
q £ X. Let o be a one-to-one function from X to X such 
that: a(x) = y, o(y) = z, a(z) = x and o(q) q.
Let s be any situation such that:
xPl^P lZ anc* XP2zP2x anc* zP3xP3^
It is easy to verify that (s, A) if anc* hence> Maj (s, A) = {q}.
Let s' be any situation such that for all i £ L and for all a, b £ X, 
aR^b iff a(a)R^a(b).
Hence in situation s',
yP^zP^x and zP^xP^y and xP^yP^z
It Ls easy to verify that (s', A) if. D , and hence, Maj (s’, o(A)) = {q}.
Since Maj (s , A) = fq) and o(q) =f= q i t follows that a(q) if Maj (s’, o(A)) 
■}<
and hence Maj does not satisfy the property of neutrality.
ic
A further objection to Maj is that this GDF does not satisfy 
the property of strategy-proofness, given assumption 2.1. We demonstrate
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this by means of the following example.
Example 8.3
Let the issue A = {x, q, z) and let L = {1, 2, 3}. 
Let s be any sincere situation such that: 
xE^l^l'2 and qP^xP^z and zP^xP^q
It is easy to verify that (s, A) e D . and Mai(s, A) = {x} and henceMaj
Maj (s, A) = {x}.
Let s’ be any situation such that:
xP^qP|z and qP^zP^x and zP^xP^q
1 AIt is easy to verify that (s’, A) fj: D ^  and hence Maj (s’, A) = {q}.
2Given assumption 2.1, s’Q^ ^ .*s and hence < {2}, s’ > is a threat to s
-  I 1 v'c —and s $ E (A, Maj , s) .
In the above example, we chose an issue A such that q e A. 
It is easy to construct a similar example where q tj: A and (s, A) e D 
and s tj: E (A, Maj , s) , given assumption 2.1.
Maj
In summary, we may consider Maj to be a desirable GDF but
we may object to its use on the grounds that Maj does not satisfy the
properties of strategy-proofness (given assumption 2.2) and decisiveness.
■k
The most obvious way of avoiding the latter objection is to adopt Maj 
but this GDF does not satisfy the properties of strategy-proofness 
(gLven assumption 2.1) and neutrality. A possible solution is to 




We have studied the possibilities and the effects of strategic 
misrcvelation of preferences by voters under three specific CDF’s when 
the issue and the sincere preferences of all individuals are given. 
Obviously, there are many directions in which our analysis might be 
extended.
Firstly, we could extend the simulation to cover issues con­
sisting of more than three distinct elements. Secondly, we could employ 
other assumptions about the distribution of individual preferences. 
Thirdly, we could relax the assumption that = Tig for all i e L. We 
could employ other behavioural assumptions, such as those defined by 
Pattanaik (1978), as an alternative to the assumption of maximin behaviour 
of all individuals. We could consider the use of other solution concepts 
such as the weaker notions of equilibrium and strict equilibrium intro­
duced by Pattanaik (1978:Chap ter 6). The most interesting extension 
would be to consider other GDF's.
We have assumed throughout our analysis that the issue is 
given. Other writers, for example Pattanaik (1978), have considered the 
problem of the strategic sponsoring of alternatives when the GDF and 
the sincere preferences of all individuals are given and voters are 
assumed to adopt sincere strategies. Ideally, we require a model in 
which both political parties on one hand and voters on the other are 
assumed to behave strategically.
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APPENDIX 1
COMMENT ELECTION SIMULATION PROGRAM -  BRIAN L. EMBURY 
DEPT. OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES,
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY,
CANBERRA, A. C.T.  2600,
1 MAY 1978;
BEGIN
CLASS p i i n o ( b u f  , n C ) ; TEXT huf  ; REF(PrLntCLie)  pf ;
BEGIN TEXT a b ,  t b ; TEXT ARRAY a £ [ l : 3 ] ,  n l [ 1 : 3 J ; INTEGER ne t  
PROCEDURE f i 1.1 ( t , rv )  ; NAME rv;  TEXT t ;  REAL r v ,
BEGIN
a £ [ nc f ] : = t ;
n f [ne I] . Put I l x  ( rv , 8) ; 
ne I := ne f  + I ;
IF n e f  > 3 THEN p r i n t ;
END;
PROCEDURE p r i n t ;
BEGIN
ab := t b ; 
pf  .Out Linage; 
n e f  : = 1; 
tb := NOTEXT;
END;
ab : -  b u f ;
tb : -  B l a n k s ( 1 3 2 ) ;
BEGIN INTEGER i :
FOR n e f  := 1 , 2 , 3  DO 
BEGIN i  := ( n e f  -  1) * 40;  
a f [ n c f ]  t b . S u b ( i  + 1 . 2 4 ) :  
n f [ n c f j  tb . Sub ( i  4- 2 5 , 1 1 ) ;
END;
END;
n e f  : = 1;
END:
R E F ( P r i n t f i l e )  p r i n t ;  TEXT b u f ;  RE F ( p l i n e )  l i n ;
INTEGER n ,  m, h ,  1 ,  g ,  a ,  b ,  c ,  d ,  e ,  f ,  x ,  y ,  z ,
n 1, n2 , n3 , n4 ,
xMy, xMz, yMx, yMz, zMx, zMy,
wx,  w y , wz ,
min,  max;
REAL t ,  s ,  k ,  m n i l ,  s mn i l  , som,  s o p ,  s o n ,  s o b ,  
tom,  t o p ,  t o n ,  t o b , horn, hop,  hon,  hob,
p i s ,  pks , p lu , pku,  nks , n Is , n lu , nku,  b i s ,  bks , b l u ,  bku,  
mp, mn, mb, p n , p b , n b , s mp, smn,  smb, 
mpn , mpb, mno, smpn, smpb , smnb, p n b , 
mpnb , smpnb,
pnks ,  p b k s , n b k s , pn Is , p b l s ,  n b l s ,  pn l u , p b l u ,  n b l u ,
p n k u , pbku.  nbku,
p n b k s , pnb I s ,  p n b l u ,  pnbku,
peq ,  no q ,  beq;
REAL ARRAY f a c t [ 0 : 33 ] ;
BOOLEAN xPy ,  xPz , yPx ,  yPz , zPx ,  zPy ,  x l y ,  x l z ,  y l z ,  
x Rny , x Rz , y Rx , y Rz , z Rx , z Ry ; 
XT Smaj , Mai ,  P l u ,  Nan,  Bor,  
f B l a n k s ( i 32 ) ;
p s t , n s t  , b s t  , t v ;TE 
bu
p r i n t  NEW P r i n t f i l e ( " L P T : " ) ;  p r i n t . O p e n ( b u £ ) ;  
l i n  NEW p i i n o ( b u f  , p r i n t ) ; 
tv : -  B l a n k s ( 2 4 ) ;
Smaj B l a n k s ( 5 ) ;
Mnj B l a n k s ! 5)
Plu B l a n k s ( 5 )
Nan B l a n k s ( 5 )
Bo r : -  B L a u k s ( 5 )  
p s t  : -  B l a n k s ( 3)  
ns t  : -  B l a n k s ( 3 )  
bs t  B l a n k s ( 3 )
COMMENT SET PARAMETERS FOR RUN; 
min := 2; max 49;  
f a e  t [0]  : = 1 ;
FOR j; :» 1 STEP 1 UNTIL 33 DO 
f a e t l g j  := g * f a c t [ g - l ] ;
FOR n min STEP 1 UNTIL max DO
BEGIN
m : = n / / . 2h : = (n-1) // 3;
t : = s : = 0 ;
mnil := sranil := 0;
mp := ran : = mb : = pn
mpn := mpb := mnb :=
smpn := smpb :* sinnb
pks := pis := plu :=
nks := nls := nlu :=
hks := bis := blu :=
son := sop := son :=
tom :- top ■:- ton :-
horn := hop := hon :=
pnks := pbks := nbks
pn Is 
pn lu 
p n ku 
pabks 
peq
: = pb : = nb 







pb 1 s : = nb 1 s : = 
pb 1 u : = nb 1 u : = 
pbku := nbku : = 
: pnbIs := pnblu 







pub ku : = 0;
COMMENT GENERATE A BALLOT SET; 
FOR a := 0 STEP 1 UNTIL n DO 
BECIN
FOR*b := 0 STEP 1 UNTIL nl DO 
BEGINn2 := nl - b ;
FOR c : = 0 STEP 1 UNTIL n2 DO 
BEGIN
n3 := n2 - c•FOR d : = 0 STEP 1 UNTIL n3 DO 
BEGIN
n4 := n3 - d;
FOR e : = 0 STEP I UNTIL n4 DO 
BEGIN
f : = n4 - c ;
COMMENT CALCULATE NO. OF SITUATIONS;
IF n <= 33 THEN BEGIN
k := fact[n] / ( £act[a] * fact[b] * f ac t [ c] )




IF b > 1 THEN 1 := b;
IF c > I THEN I := c;
IF d > 1 THEN 1 := d;
IF e > 1 THEN 1 := c;
IF 1 > 1 THEN I := f;
IF 1 > 33 THEN 
BEGIN INTEGER i; 
k : = 1 ;





< =  a THEN k = k l i;IF i <= b THEN k k !, i;IF i <= c THEN k = k / i;
IF L <- d THEN k cr k / i;
IF i <= c THEN k = k / i;IF i <- f THEN k sr k / I;END;
FOR i 1 + 1 STEP 1 UNTIE n DO
k : = k * i;
END ELS E
BEGIN INTEGER j ;
k : = lact[33j / i'act[a]; 
k : ■= k / lac t f b) ; 
k := k / iac t[c] ; 
k : *= k / fact [ d] ;
k := k /  f a c t [ e] ; 
k := k /  f a c  t  [ f ] ; 
FOR j  := 34 STEP 
k * j ;




•COMMENT BEGIN ANALYSIS OF SITUATION;
Smaj • = » " •  ■ .. .. »
M aj _ it
P I u 11 It.>
N an _ 11 II.j
Bor = " " •  J
p‘S t II I» .
n s t = 11 "•
b s t - M II 1y
t  : = t  +  k ;
x : = a  +  b ;
y : = c +  d ;
z : = c +  £ ;
I F  x <= m AND y <
xMy = a +  b + e ;
xMz = a  +  b + c ;
yMx = c +  d +  f  ;
y Mz = a +  c + d ;
zMx = d +  e  +  f  ;
zMy = b +  e +  f  ;
x P y = xMy > yM x,
x P z = xMz > zM x;
y Px = yMx > xM y;
y Pz =  yMz >  zM y ;
z Px =  zMx > xMz ;
z Py =  zMy >  y M z ;
xRy =  xMy > =  yMx
xRz =  xMz > =  zMx
y Rx =  yMx > =  xMy
y Rz =  yMz >  =  zMy











x l z =  xMz =  zMx
y I z =  yMz -  zMy
m AND z <= m THEN s
COMMENT CHOICE SET UNDER MAJORITY FUNCTION
IF xPy AND xPz THEN Maj • — 1x , 11 ELSE
IF y Px AND y Pz THEN Maj • — 1jy>
II ELSE
IF z Px AND zPy THEN Maj • — * z > 11 ELSE
IF x Iy AND xPz AND y Pz THEN Mai = |x >y > J)
IF y Iz AND y Px AND zPx THEN Maj > ’ z >IF x Iz AND xPy AND zPy THEN Maj = x , z  ,
IF x l y AND x l z AND y Iz THEN Mai = > , y , z
IF xPy AND y Pz AND x Iz THEN Maj x ,
IF x Py AND y Iz AND x l z THEN Maj =s " x ,Z  , "
IF xPz AND zPy AND x l y THEN Maj = " x ,  "
IF xPz AND y Iz AND x l y THEN Maj ; ;x ,y , ;;
IF y Px AND xPz AND y Iz THEN Maj Vi , y  y ..
IF y Px AND X  Iz AND y Iz THEN Ma] =: y , z  > "
IF y Pz AND z Px AND x l y THEN Maj =s "v "
IF y Pz AND x l z AND x l y THEN Mai
IF z Px AND x Py AND y Iz THEN Ma] z ,
IF z Px AND x l y AND y Iz THEN Maj I’y , ;;
IF z Py AND y Px AND x Iz THEN Maj " z ,  "
IF z Py AND x Iy AND x Iz THEN Mai = " x , z ,  "
IF x P y AND y Pz AND z Px THEN Maj sz "em pty "
IF x Pz AND z Py AND y Px THEN Maj m empty
IF Maj 11
OR Maj E= y »
11
OR Maj =  Mz , "  THEN som : =  som + k ELSE
IF Maj x , y  , 11
‘OR Maj
1 1
x , z  ,
1 1 rp
tom : « 
IF Maj 
hom : = 
IF Ma j
THENy , z , 
t o  in T k 
= ' x , y  ,z'  
hoin + k ELSE 
-  " e m p t y "  THEN m n i l
ELSE 
fr THEN



















COMMENT CHOICE'SET UNDER 
IF  xPy AND xPz THEN Smaj 
IF yPx AND yPz THEN Smaj 
IF  zPx AND zPy THEN Smaj 
BEGIN
Smaj := " e m p ty " ;  
s m n i l  := s m n i l  + k ;




COMMENT CHOICE SET UNDER PLURALITY FUNCTION
IF  x > y AND x > z THEN P lu = " x ,  " ELSE
IF y > X AND y > z THEN P l u = " y ,  " ELSE
IF z > X AND z > y THEN P lu " z ,  " ELSE
TF x = y AND x > z THEN P lu 33 " x , y ,  " ELSE
IF x = z AND x > y THEN P lu 3= " x , z ,  " ELSE
I F  y = z AND y > X THEN P lu 33 " y , z ,  " ELSE
IF x = y AND y 33 z THEN P l u = " x , y , z " ;
IF  P iu =3 " x , 11
OR Pi u XX y »
11
OR PI u = " z , 11 THEN
s o p  : = sop 4  k ELSE
IF PIu «= x , y  , 11
OR PI u 33 x , z  , 11
OR P lu zs "y  , Z  , tl THEN
t o p  : = to p  4  k ELSE
IF P lu 33 x , v , z" THEN
hop : = hop 4  k )U V J  • U U  p  I t v  y
COMMENT CHOICE SET UNDER NANSON FUNCTION;
I F  x < y AND x < z THEN
BEGIN
IF yPz THEN Nan := " y , " ELSE
IF zPy THEN Nan := " z ,  " E L S E
IF y l z  THEN Nan := " y , z ,  "
END 
ELS E
IF y < x AND y < z THEN 
BEGIN
IF xPz THEN Nan := " x ,  " ELSE
IF zPx THEN Nan := " z ,  " E L S E
IF x l z  THEN Nan := " x , z ,  "
END 
ELS E
IF z < x AND z < y THEN 
BEGIN
IF xPy THEN Nan := " x ,  " ELSE
IF yPx THEN Nan := " y , " ELSE
IF x l y  THEN Nan := " x , y ,  "
END
ELSE
IF x = y AND y 33 z THEN
IF x > y AND y 33 z THEN
















OR Nan 33 " z , I I THEN
s o n  : «= 
IF Nan 
OR Nan
s o n  4  k




OR Nan "y , z , 11 THEN
t o n  : = to n  4 k ELS E
Nan := " x , y , z " ELSE
Nan := " x ,  " ELSE
Nan := " y ,  " ELSE
Nan := " z ,  "
IF Nan = " x , y , z "  THEN 
h o n  : =  h o n  4  k ;
COMMENT CHOICE SET UNDER BORDA FUNCTION;
wx : «= ( a + b ) * 2 +  c 4 C ;
wy : = f e + d *2 4 a 4 f ;
wz : = ( e + f j * 2 4 b 4 d ;
IF wx > wy AND WX > wz
I F wy > wx AND wy > wz
IF wz > wx AND wz > wy
I F wx «= wy AND wx > wz
I F wx = wz AND wx > wy
IF wy =  wz AND wy > wx
I F wx ”  wy AND wx nx wz
THEN Bor = " x , ELSE
THEN Bo r = "y> " ELSE
THEN Bor 33 ill. it ELSE
THEN Bor xn x ,y , " ELSE
THEN Bor 33 " x , z ,  ' ELSE
THEN Bor 33 , ' y , z ,  " ELSE
THEN Bo r “ X ,y , z >
377
IF  Bor = " x , ''
OR Bor = " y , 11
OR Bor = " z , " THEN
so b  : = sob + k ELSE
IF Bor = " x , y , 11
OR Bor = " x , z , 11
OR Bor = " y , z , " THEN
t o b  : *= tob 4- k ELSE 
z " THENIF Bor * " x , y ,
hob : = hob 4- k >
COMMENT COMPARIS ION OF CHOICE SETS;
IF  Maj 
1*F Ma j  
IF  Maj 






rap 4- k ; 
ran 4- k ; 







PLu THEN rap 
Nan THEN ran 
Bor THEN mb 
Nan THEN pn 
Bor  THEN pb 
Bor  THEN nb 
P l u  AND P lu  “
P l u  AND P lu  -  
Nan AND Nan =
Nan AND Nan a 
P l u  AND P lu  =
: = rannb 4- k ;
P l u  THEN smp 
Nan THEN sran 
Bor  THEN smb 
P l u  AND P lu  
P l u  AND P lu  
Nan AND Nan 
P l u  AND P lu  
THEN smpnb : = smpnb 4- k ;  
COMMENT PLURALITY STABILITY;
IF  P lu  = " x ,  " THEN
BEGIN




IF Maj = 
THEN rapnb 













pb 4- k ;
= nb 4- k ;
Nan THEN mpn 
Bor  THEN mpb 
Bor  THEN mnb 
Bor  THEN pnb 
Nan AND Nan =
= smp 4- k ;
= smn 4- k ;
= smb 4- k ;
Nan THEN srapn 
Bor THEN smpb 
Bor  THEN smnb 
Nan AND Nan =
= mpn + k 
= mpb 4- k 
= mnb 4- k 
;= pnb 4- k 
Bor
BEGIN 
p s t  : = 
p lu : = 
END 
ELSE
IF yMx >' 
BEGIN 
p s t  : = 




p s t  : = 




IF P lu  = 
•BEGIN
IF ( y - x  = 
BEGIN 
p s t  : = 
p l u  : = 
ENI)
( x - z
= smpn + k ; 
= smpb + k ; 
= smnb + k ; 
Bor
1 AND zMx >=
" l - u " ; 
p l u  + k ;
; x OR zMx >= x THEN
" k - u " ;  
pku + k ;
" k - s " ;  
pks + k ;
THEN
; 1 AND xMy >= y) OR ( y - z  = 1 AND zMy
" l - u " ;  
p l u  + k ;
> =
ELS E
IF xMy >= y OR zMy >= y THEN 
BEGIN
p s t  : “ " k - u " ;
 ^ ^>ku := pku + k ;
ELSE
BPXIN
p s t  " k - s " ; 







IF P Iu  -  " z ,  " THEN
..BEGIN
IF ( z - x  = 1 AND xMz > = z) OR ( z - y  = 1 AND yMz >= z 
BEGIN
p s t  := " 1 - u " ; 
p lu : = p lu  4- k ;
' END 
E LS E
IF xMz >= z OR yMz >= z THEN 
BEGIN
p s t  " k - u " ;
^>ku := pku 4- k ;
ELSE 
' BEGIN
p s t  :=  " k - s " ; 




IF P Iu  = " x , y ,  " THEN 
BEGIN
IF z > 0 THEN 
BEGIN
p s t  :=  " 1 - u " ;
IF  z = 0 AND b+d > a AND b+d > c THEN









p s t : =
p ks : =
END
pku + k ;
END 
ELS F
IF P Iu  = " x , z ,  " THEN 
BEGIN
IF y > 0 THEN 
BEGIN
p s t  : = " 1 - u " ;  
p lu : = p lu 4- k ;
END 
ELS E
IF y = 0 AND a4-£ > b AND a+£ > c THEN 
BEGIN
p s t  := " k - u " ;
^ ) k u  • =  P ^ u  +  ^  >
■ ELSE 
BEGIN
p s t  :=  " k - s " ;  
p ks : = pks  4- k ;
END 
END 
ELS Eiv PIu -  " y , z , "  THEN 
BEGIN
IF x > 0 THEN 
BEGIN
p s t  " 1 - u " ;  
p lu : = p lu 4- k ;
. END 
ELS E
IF x = 0 AND c4-e > d AND c+ e > £ THEN 
BEGIN
p s t  := " k - u " ;  






p s t  




IK IM.U «  
BEGIN 
p s t  : = 
p lu : -  
END; 
COMMENT 
IF  Nan -  
BEGIN 
IF y= z 
OR 
OR
" k - s " ;  
pks + k ;
1 x , y , z " THEN
" l - u " ;  







AND ( yRx OR zRx ) 
= 1 AND zRx
OR x - z  - 1 AND y+z > 2*x AND yMx > X
OR x - z  =» 1 AND y+z ss 2*x AND zMx > =  X AND yMx >
OR x - y  - 1 AND y+z > 2*x AND zMx > X
OR x - y  = 1 AND y+z 2*x AND yMx > =  X AND zMx >
BEGIN 















n s t  













" l - u ” ; 
n lu + k ;
2*x AND yMx 
2*x AND zMx 
2*x AND yMx
" k - u " ;  
nku + k ;
" k - s " ;  
nks  + k ;
>
>
> = x AND zMx >= x THEN
x - z  
z - x  
y - z  
y - z  
y - x  
y - x  
BEGIN 
























-  1 
=  1 
=  1
" THEN
( xRy OR 
AND z Ry 
AND xRy 
AND x+z : 
AND x+z = 
AND x+z : 
AND x+z c
zRy )
2*y AND xMy 
2*y AND zMy 
2*y AND zMy 
2*y AND xMy
> y
>= y AND xMy >
> y
>= y AND zMy >
" l - u " ;  






AND xMy y AND zMy >= y THEN
" k - u " ;  
nku + k ;
" k - s " ;  






IF Nan = "z ,  " THEN
BEGIN
IF  x=y AND ( xRz OR yRz )
OR x - y = 1 AND yRz
OR y - x zz. 1 AND xRz
OR z - y - 1 AND x+y > 2*z AND xMz > z
OR z - y zs 1 AND x+y = 2*z AND yMz >= z AND xMz > z
OR z - x = 1 AND x+y > 2*z AND yMz > z
OR z - x 1 AND x+y ** 2*z AND xMz >*= z AND yMz > z THEN
B E G I N
n s t * £ 1 f1 - u " ;L I  Ü  L  • 1  U  y





OR x+y > 2*z AND xMz > z 
OR x+y > 2*z AND yMz > z
OR x+y = 2*z AND xMz >“ z AND yMz >= z THEN 
BEGIN
n s t  := " k - u " ;  




n s t  := " k - s " ;  




IF Nan -  " x , y ,  " THEN 
BEGIN
IF y - z  = 1 AND x+z > 2*y 
OR y - z  = 1 AND zPx 
OR x - z  = 1 AND y+z > 2*x 
OR x - z  = 1 AND zPy THEN 
BEGIN
n s t  := " 1 - u " ;  
n l u  : = n lu +  k ;
END
FT QF
IF  b+ d + e+ f  > m
OR a <= h AND c <= h
OR x+z > 2*y AND xMy > y
OR y+z > 2*x AND yMx > x THEN
BEGIN
n s t  :=  " k - u " ;  




n s t  :=  " k - s " ;  




IF Nan = " x , z ,  " THEN 
BEGIN
IF z - y  = 1 AND x+y > 2*z 
OR z - y  =* 1 AND yPx 
OR x - y  « 1 AND y+z > 2*x 
OR x - y  = 1 AND yPz THEN 
BEGIN
n s t  := 1-u  ;
n lu  := n l u  + k ;
END
ELSE
IF a + i '+c+d > m
OR b <= h AND c <= h
OR y+z > 2*x AND zMx > x
OR x+y > 2*z AND xMz > z THEN
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BEGIN
n s t  := " k - u " ;  




n s t  := " k - s " ;  




IF*Nan = " y , z ,  " THEN 
B'EGIN
IF z - x  = 1 AND x+y > 2*z 
OR z - x  = 1 AND xPy 
OR y - x  = 1 AND x+z > 2*y 
OR y - x  = 1 AND xPz THEN 
BEGIN
n s t  := " l - u " ;  
n lu : = n lu + k ;
END
ELSE
IF c+e +a+b  > m
OR d <= h AND f <= h
OR x+z  > 2*y AND zMy > y
OR x+y > 2*z AND yMz > z THEN
BEGIN
n s t  := " k - u " ;  









:= nks  + k ;
IF Nan = 
BEGIN
" x , y , z "  THEN
IF Maj 
BEGIN
\ =  " x , y , z "  THEN





:= n l u  + k ;
n s t := " k - u " ;
nku
END
:= nku + k ;
END
COMMENT BORDA STABILITY;
IF  Bor = r,x ,  n THEN 
BEGIN
IF wx-wy = 1 AND 2*yMx >= x+b+e AND yMx > b+e 
OR wx-wz = 1 AND 2*zMx >= x+a+c AND zMx > a+c THEN 
BEGIN
b s t  :=  " l - u " ;  
b l u  := b l u  + k ;
END
ELSE
IF 2*yMx >= x+b+e AND yMx > b+e
OR 2*zMx >*= x+a+c AND zMx > a+c THEN
BEGIN
b s t  " k - u " ;  




b s t  : = " k - s " ;  





IF  l ior  -  " y ,  " THEN
BEGIN
IF wy-wx = 1 AND 2*xMy >= y+d+f  AND xHy > d+f
OR wy-wz = 1 AND 2*zMy >= y+a+c AND zl-ly > a+c  THEN
BEGIN
b s t  := " 1 - u " ; 
b l u  := b l u  + k ;
END
ELSE
IF 2*xMy >« y+d+C AND xMy > d+f
OR 2* zlly >«= y+a+c AND zl-ly > a+c THEN
BEGIN
b s t  := " k - u " ;  




b s t  " k - s " ;  




IF Bor » " z ,  " THEN
BEGIN
IF wz-wx = 1 AND 2*xMz >= z+d+f  AND xMz > d+f
OR wz-wy = 1 AND 2*yMz >= z+b+e AND yMz > b+e THEN
BEGIN
b s t  := " 1 - u " ;  




OR 2* yMz 
BEGIN 
b s t  : = 
bku : = 
END
>= z+d+f  AND xMz > d+f  
>= z+b+e AND yMz > b+e THEN
" k - u " ; 
bku + k ;
ELSE
BEGIN
b s t  := " k - s " ;  





b s t  := " 1 - u " ;  
b l u  : = b l u  + k ;
STABILITY OF SITUATIONS;
= n s t  THEN p n k s  := pnks  + k ;  
= b s t  THEN pbks  := pbks  + k ;  
= b s t  THEN n b k s  := nbks  + k ;  
= n s t  AND n s t  = b s t  THEN
V
END;
COMMENT COMPARISON OF 
IF  p s t  = " k - s "  AND p s t  
IF  p s t  = " k - s "  AND p s t  
IF  n s t  = " k - s "  AND n s t  
IF  p s t  = " k - s "  AND p s t  
p n b k s  := pnbks  + k ;
I F  p s t  \ =  " 1 - u "  AND n s t
IF  p s t  \ «  " 1 - u "  AND b s t  \ =
IF  n s t  \ =  " 1 - u "  AND b s t  \=
IF  p s t  \ =  " 1 - u "  AND n s t  \=
p n b l s  := p n b l s  + k ;
IF p s t  \ =  " k - s "  AND n s t  \=
IF  p s t  \ =  " k - s "  AND b s t  \=
IF  n s t  \ “ " k - s "  AND b s t  \ *
IF  p s t  \ =  " k - s "  AND n s t  X«
pnbk u  := pnbku + k ;
IF  p s t  “ " 1 - u "  AND p s t  = n s t  THEN p n l u
IF  p s t  = " 1 - u "  AND p s t  = b s t  THEN p b l u
IF  n s t  -  " 1 - u "  AND n s t  = b s t  THEN n b l u
" 1 - u "
" 1 - u "
" 1 - u "
" 1 - u "
" k - s "
" k - s "
" k - s '
THEN p n I s  
THEN p b I s  
THEN n b I s  




pn Is  + 
pb I s  + 
nb 1 s +
' k - s "  AND b s t  \ !
" 1 - u "  THEN
= pnku + k 
= pbku + k 
■= nb ku + k 
" k - s "  THEN
p n l u  + k ; 
pb 1 u + k ; 
nb 1 u + k ;
IF  p s t  = " 1 - u "  AND p s t  = n s t  AND n s t  = b s t  THEN 
pnb lu  : *• pnb lu  + k ;
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COMMENT SINCERE SIT NOT EQUILM BUT E ( A . P l u , s )  non empty 




IE p s t  \ =  " k - s "  AND Maj = " x , y ,
(tH-d-fe+I < = a OR b +d+e +f  <= c) - 
z \ =  x OR z \ =  y) AND
zMx <= x OR zMx < c ) AND ( zMy <= y OR zMy < a ) 
THEN p e q  := peq + k ELSE 
IE p s t  \  = " k - s '  AND Maj = " x , z ,  " AND 
( c+d+a+f  <= b OR c + d + a + f  <** c) AND 
(y \** x OR y \ -  z) AND
(yMx <= x OR yMx < e ) AND ( yMz O z OR yMz < b )
THEN peq  := peq + k ELSE
IF p s t  \ =  " k - s 1' AND Maj = " y . z ,  " AND
(a+pTc+e  <= d OR a+b+c+e  <«= 1) AND
(x \ =  y OR x \ =  z) AND
( xMy <= y OR xMy < f ) AND (xMz <= z OR xMz < d ) 




END OE B ;
END OF A;
COMMENT PRINT SUMMARY;
1 i n . p r i n t ;
1 i n . p r i n t ;
t v  := Number o i  e l e c t o r s  = 
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  n ) ;
1 in . p r  i n  t ;
1 i n . p r i n t ;
1 i n . p r i n  t ;
t v  := "No a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y  
l i n . f i l l ( t v ,  s /  t  ) ;  
l i n . p r i n t ;  
l i n . p r i n t ;
1 i n . p r i n t ; 
t v  := "Maj =
1 in  . f i  L 1 ( t v  . 
l i n . p r i n t ; 
t v  := "Maj = 
l i n . f i l K  t v  
l i n . p r  i n t ; 
t v  := "Maj =
1 in • £ i  11 ( t v  
1 i n  • p r  in t ;
t v  := "Maj -  empty "
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  m n i l  /  t  ) ;  
t v  := "Smaj  = empty "
l i n . f i l K  t v ,  s m n i l  /  t  ) ;
1 in . p r  i n t ;
t v  := "Maj = non empty "
l i n . f i l K  t v ,  ( t  -  m n i l )  /  t  ) ;  
t v  := "Smaj  = non empty "
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  ( t  -  s m n i l )  /  t  ) ;  
l i n . p r i n t ;
t v  := "Maj = . P l u  "
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  mp /  t  ) ;  
t v  := "Smaj  = P l u  , 
l i n . f i l K  t v ,  smp /  t  ) ;  
l i n  . p r  i n t ;
t v  := "Maj = Nan "
l i n . f i l K  t v ,  mil / t ) ;
t v  "Snuij -  Nan 
1 i n . f i 11(  t v , smn /  t  ) ;  
l i n . p r i n t ; 
t v  := "Maj = Bor  
l i n . f i l l ( t v , mb /  t  ) ; 
t v  := "Smaj  = Bor  "
l i n . f i l K  t v ,  smb /  t  ) ;
1 i n . p r i n t ;
t v  := "Maj = P l u  = Nan "
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  mpn /  t  ) ;  
t v  := "Smaj  = P l u  «= Nan "
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  smpn /  t  ) ;
1 in . p r  in t ;
s i n g l e t o n  
s o n  /  t  ) ;
two e l e m e n t s  
, tom /  t  ) ;
t h r e e  e l e m e n t s  
, hom /  t  ) ;
ELS E
t v  : =* "MaJ * P l u  “ Bor  
l i n  . f i l  1 ( .. t v  , mpb /  t  ) ;  
t v  := "Smaj  = P l u  = Bor  
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  smpb /  t  ) ;
1 in . p r i n t ;
t v  := "Maj m Man *= Bor  
1 In • f i ] 1 ( ‘ t v , mnb /  t ) ;  
t.v : » Smaj -  Nan ** Bor 
l L n . £ i l l (  t v ,  smnb /  t  ) ;  
l i n . p r i n t ;
t v  : *» "Mai “ P l u  “ Nan « Bor  
l i n . £ i l l (  t v ,  inpnb / t  ) ;  
t v  :*= "Smaj  * P l u  « Nan “ Bor  
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  smpnb /  t  ) ;
1 in . p r  in t 
1 in . p r  in t ; 
l i n . p r i n t ;
t v  : « " P l u  « s Lnp , l o t on  
1 in . 1 i l L ( t v  , s o p  /  L ) ;  
t v  := Nan = s i n g l e t o n  
1 in • C i  1 l  ( t v  , s o n  /  t  ) ; 
t v  := "Bor  » s i n n l e t o n  
1 in . f i l l  ( t v  , sob /  t  ) : 
t v  : *= P l u  « two e l e m e n t s  
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  t o p  /  t  ) ;  
t v  : * "Nan *= two e l e m e n t s  
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  t o n  /  t  ) •  
t v  : •= Bor  “ two e l e m e n t s
1 i n . f i  L I ( t v ,  t o b  /  t  ) ;  
t v  := " P l u  *= t h r e e  e l e m e n t s  
l i n . £ i l l (  t v ,  hop /  t  ) ;
-  t h r e e  e l e m e n t s  
hon  /  t  ) ; 
t h r e e  e l e m e n t s  
hob /  t  ) ;
t v  := ' Nan 
1 in . f i  11 ( t v  
t v  := "Bor  “ 
l i n . f i l l ( t v  
l i n  . p r i n t ;
1 i n . p r i n t ; 
t v  := " P l u  = Maj 
1 i n . i i l l ( t v , mp / 
t v  := "Nan = Maj 
l i n . f i l l ( t v , mn /  
t v  := "Bor  = Maj 
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  mb /  




l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  smp /  t  ) ;  
t v  := "Nan = Smaj 
l i n . £ i l l (  t v ,  smn /  t  ) ;  
t v  := Bor  = Smaj 
l i n . £ i l l (  t v  
t v  := " P l u  = 
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  pn /  
t v  := "Nan = P l u  
1 i n  • f i  11 ( t v  
t v  := "Bor  =
1 in . £ i  1.1 ( t v  
t v  := f,P l u  « 
l i n . f i 11( t v  
t v  := "Nan « 
l i n . f i  L I ( t v  
tv : -  Bor =
1 in . £ i  11 ( t v  , nb /  t  ) ; 
t v  := " P l u  = Mai = Nan







, pn /  
P l u
. pb /  Bor
, pb / 
Bor  









1 in • £ 111(  t v , mpn /  L ) ; 
t v  : *= "Nan a Maj = P l u  
1 in . f i 11 ( t v , mpn /  t  ) ;  
t v  := "Bor  -  Maj = P l u  
l i n  . f i l l ( . t v , mpb /  t  ) ;  
t v  := " P l u  = Smaj = Nan 
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  smpn /  t  ) ;  
t v  := "Nan = Smaj = P l u  
l i n . £ i l l (  t v ,  smpn /  t  ) ;  
t v  := ' B o r  = Smaj = P l u  
l i n . f i l K  t v ,  smpb /  t  ) ;
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t v  : 
1 i n . 
t v  : 
l i n . 
t v  : 
l i n .  
t v  : 
1 in . 
t v  : 
l i n .  
t v  : 
l i n  . 
t v  : 
l i n .  
t v  : 
1 in • 
t v  : 
1. in  . 
t v  : 
1 i n . 
t v  : 
1 i n . 
t v  : 
1 i n . 
t v  : 
1 i n . 
t v  : 
1 i n . 
t v  : 
1 i n . 
1 i n  . 
1 in  • 
t v  : 
l i n .  
t v  : 
1 i n  • 
t v  : 
1 i n . 
t v  : 
1 i n  • 
t v  
l i n  
t v  
1 in 
t v  
1 in 
t v  
1 in 
t v  
l i n  
t v  
1 in 
t v  
1 in 
t v  
1 in 
l i n  
l i n  
t v  
l i n  




t v  
1 in 
t v  
1 i n  




= " F l u  = Maj = Bor  
f i l K *  t v  , mpb /  t  ) ;  
= 'Nan = Maj = Bor  
f i l l ( t v  , mnb /  t  ) ;  
= "Bor  = Ilaj  = Nan 
f i l K  t v , mnb /  t  ) ;  
= " F l u  -  Smaj = Bo r 
C i l L( t v  , smpb /  t  ) 
= "Nan = Smaj = Bor  
f i  1 1 ( t v ,  sinnb /  t  ) 
= ' B o r  =» Smaj = Nan 
f i l l (  t v ,  smnb /  t  )
" P l u* '
f i l l ( t v ,  
= "Nan = 
f i l 1( t v . 
= "Bor  = 
f i l l ?  t v ,  
-  f’P l u  » '  
f i 11( t v  
= "Nan = 
f i l K  t v  
= "Bor  = 
f 111(  t v  
= " P l u  = 
f i l K  t v  
= "Nan *= 
f i l l (  tv 











pno /  t  ) ;
P l u  = Bor  
pnb /  t  ) ;
P l u  = Nan 
pnb /  t  ) ;
Maj = Nan -  
mpnb /  t  )
Maj = P l u  «= 
mpnb /  t  )
Maj = P l u  = 
mpnb /  t  )
Smaj = Nan = 
smpnb /  t  )
Smaj = P l u  =
smpnb /  t  )
Smaj = P l u  -
f i 11(  t v ,  smpnb /  t  ) w 
• p r i n t ;
. p r  in t ;
= "PLURALITY k - s t a b l e  
U K  t v ,  n k s / t  ) ;
= "NANSON k - s t a b l e  
. f i l  1 ( t v , n k s / t  ) ;
= "BORDA k - s t a b l e  
• f i l l (  t v  b k s / t  ) ;
= "PLURALITY 1 - s t a b l e
f i l l (  t v ,  ( p i s  + pks + pku)  /  t
:= "NANSON 1 - s t a b l e  " ;
. £ i l l (  t v ,  ( n l s  + nks  + nku)  /  t  
:= "BORDA 1 - s t a b l e  " ;
. f i 11(  t v ,  ( b i s  + bks  + bku)  / t  
:= "PLURALITY 1 - u n s t a b l e  
• f i l K  t v ,  p l u  /  t  )
:= "NANSON 1 - u n s t a b l e  
• f i l l (  t v ,  n l u  /  t  )
:= "BORDA 1 - u n s t a b l e  
. f i l l (  t v ,  b l u  /  t  )
:= "PLURALITY k - u n s t a b l e
• £ i  1 1( t v  , ( pku  + p l u  + p i s )  /
:= "NANSON k - u n s t a b l e  
. f i l K  ' t v ,  ( nku  + n lu + n l s )  /
:= "BORDA k - u n s t a b l e  " ;
- f i 11(  t v ,  ( bku  + b l u  + b i s )  /  
. p r i n t ;
:= ^P1 u *- Nan l o r  k - s / t o t a l " ;
• £ i  11( t v  , p nks  /  t  ) ;
:= "Nan = Bor  f o r  k - s / t o t a l " ;  
• f i l K  t v , n b k s  /  t  ) :
"Bor  “ P l u  f o r  k - s /  t o t a l  ;
- f i  11(  t v  , pbks  /  t  ) ;
:= " P l u  “ Nan f o r  1 - s / t o t a l " ;
• f i l l (  t v ,  p n l s  /  t  ) :
:= Nan = Bor  f o r  1 - s / t o t a l  ;
. f i l l ( t v , n b I s  /  t  ) ;
:= "Bor  = P l u  f o r  1 - s / t o t a l " ;
. f I L 1 ( t v , p b 1s /  t  ) :
:= " P l u  ■= Nan f o r  1 - u / t o t a l " ;








t v  := "Nan = 
1 in . f i  1 1 (• t v  
t v  : *= Bor = 
1 in . f  i  1 1( t v  
t v  := "Plu = 
l i n . f i l K .  t v  t v  Nan ■
1 Ln . C L1 1 ( tv 
t v  := "Bor  = 
1 in . f 1 1 1 ( t v  
1 in . p r in t ; 
l i n  . p r i n t ; 
t v  mE(A;
1 in . f i l  l  ( t v  
t v  := hE(Ä,  
l i n . f i l K  tv  
t v  := "E(A,  
l i n . C i l U  tv  
t v  := " E ( A,
Bor  f o r  
, n b 1u /  
P l u  f o r  
> p b l u  /  
Man f o r  
, pnku / 
Bor  f o r  
, nbku / 
P i u f o r  
, pbku /
l - u / t o t a l "  
t  ) :
I - u / t o  t a l "  
t  ) ;
k - u / t o  t a l "  
t  ) :
k - u / t o t a l "  
L ) ;
k - u / t o  t a l "  
t ) ;
P l u ,  s )
A PCC1 ( Na n , s )
> n c q  /  
Bo r  , S )
t  ) ;
t  ) ;
t ) ;  
t o  t a l
II 
I r 
i i  
i t
l i n . f i l l ( t v ,  ( peq + pks ) 
t v  := "E(A,  Nan,  s )  t o t a l  
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  ( neq  + nks  ) 
1 i n . p r  i n  t ;
1 in . p r  i n t ;
1 in . p r  i n t ;
t v  := " P l u  = Nan = Bor  f o r  
l i n . f i l l (  t v ,  pnbks  /  t  ) ;  
l i n . p r i n t ;
t v  := " P l u  = Nan = Bor  f o r  
l i n . f i l K  t v ,  p n b l s  /  t  ) ;  
l i n  . p r  i n t  ;
t v  := " P l u  = Nan «= Bor  f o r  
l i n . f i l K  t v ,  p n b l u  /  t  ) ;
1 i n  . p r i n t ;
t v  := " P l u  = Nan = Bor  f o r
I t ] ;
k - s " ;
1 - s " ;
1 - u " ;
k - u " ;
l i n . f i l K  t v ,  pnbku /  t  ) ;  
l i n . p r i n t ; 
p r i n t . C l o s e ; 
l i n  NONE;
p r i n t  : -  NEW P r i n t f i l e ( " L P T : " ) ;
p r i n t . O p e n ( b u f ) ;
l i n  : -  NEW p i i n e ( b u f , p r i n t ) ;
END OF N; 
p r i n t . C l o s e ;
END.
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APPENDIX 2 ; COMPARISON OF CHOICE SETS
A2. 1 The number of sincere situations such that Plu(s, A) = Nan(s, A) 
as a percentage of the total number of sincere, situations.
A2.2 The number of sincere situations such that Plu(s, A) = Bor(s, A) 
as a percentage of the total number of sincere situations.
A2.3 The number of sincere situations such that Plu(s, A) = Maj(s, A) 
as a percentage of the total number of sincere situations.
A2.4 The number of sincere situations such that Plu(s, A) = Smaj(s, A) 
as a percentage of the total number of sincere situations.
A2.5 The number of sincere situations such that Nan(s, A) = Bor(s, A) 
as a percentage of the total number of sincere situations.
A2.6 The number of sincere situations such that Nan(s, A) = Maj(s, A) 
as a percentage of the total number of sincere situations.
A2.7 The number of sincere situations such that Nan(s, A) = Smaj(s, A) 
as a percentage of the total number of sincere situations.
A2.8 The number of sincere situations such that Bor(s, A) = Maj(s, A) 
as a percentage of the total number of sincere situations.
A2.9 The number of sincere situations such that Bor(s, A) = Smaj(s, A) 
as a percentage of the total number of sincere situations.
A2.10 The number of sincere situations such that Plu(s, A) = Nan(s, A)
= Bor(s, A) as a percentage of the total number of sincere
situations.
388
A2.11 The number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s u c h  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = N a n ( s ,  A) 
= M a j ( s ,  A) a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  number  o f  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n s .
A2.12 The num ber  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s u c h  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = N a n ( s ,  A) 
= S m a j ( s ;  A) a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  number  o f  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n s .
A2 .13 The number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s u c h  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = B o r ( s ,  A) 
= M a j ( s ,  A) a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  number  o f  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n s .
A2.14 The number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s u c h  thaL P l u ( s ,  A) = B o r ( s ,  A) 
= S m a j ( s ,  A) a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  number  o f  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n s .
A 2 . 15 The num ber  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s u c h  t h a t  N a n ( s ,  A) = B o r ( s ,  A) 
= M a j ( s ,  A) a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  number  o f  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n s .
A2 .16 The num ber  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s u c h  t h a t  N a n ( s ,  A) = B o r ( s ,  A) 
= S m a j ( s ,  A) a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  number  o f  s i n c e r e  
s i t u a t i o n s .
A2 .17 The num ber  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s u c h  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = N a n ( s ,  A) 
= B o r ( s ,  A) = M a j ( s ,  A) a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  the  t o t a l  number  o f  
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s .
A2 .18  The number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s u c h  t h a t  P l u ( s ,  A) = N a n ( s ,  A) 
= B o r ( s ,  A) = S m a j ( s ,  A) a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  number  o f
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Figure A2.1: 
The number of sincere situations such that Plu(s, A) 
= Nan(s, A) as a percentage of the
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as a percentage of the
total number of sincere situations.
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Figure A2.12: 
The number of sincere situations such that Plu(s, A) = Nan(s, A) = Smaj(s, A) as
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Figure A2.14: 
The number of sincere situations such that Plu(s, A) = Bor(s, A) = Smaj(s, 
A) as
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APPENDIX 3 : COMPARISON OF THE STABILITY OF SITUATIONS
A3.1 The number of sincere situations s such that s e E(A, Plu, s) 
and s e E(A, Nan, s) as a percentage of the total number of 
sincere situations.
A3.2 The number of sincere situations s such that s £ E (A, Plu, s) 
and s £ E^(A, Nan, s) as a percentage of the total number of 
sincere situations.
A3.3 The number of sincere situations s such that s £ E^(A, Plu, s) 
and s £ E"^ (A, Nan, s) as a percentage of the total number of 
sincere situations.
A3.4 The number of sincere situations s such that s  ^E(A, Plu, s) 
and s  ^E(A, Nan, s) as a percentage of the total number of 
sincere situations.
A3.5 The number of sincere situations s such that s e E(A, Plu, s) 
and s c E(A, Bor, s) as a percentage of the total number of 
sincere situations.
A3.6 The number of sincere situations s such that s e E^(A, Plu, s) 
and s e'E^(A, Bor, s) as a percentage of the total number of 
sincere situations.
A3.7 The number of sincere situations s such that s £ E^(A, Plu, s) 
and s i| e \ a , Bor, s) as a percentage of the total number of 
sincere situations.
A3.8 The number of sincere situations s such that s  ^ E(A, Plu, s) 
and s t| E(A, Bor, s) as a percentage of the total number of 
sincere situations.
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A3.9 The number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s s u c h  t h a t  s e E(A,  Nan,  s )  
and s e E(A,  B o r ,  s )  a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  number  o f  
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s .
A3.10 The number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s s u c h  t h a t  s £ E^ (A ,  Nan,  s )  
and s £ E^(A ,  B o r ,  s )  a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  number  o f  
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s .
A3. 11 The number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s s u c h  t h a t  s £ E^(A,  Nan,  s )  
and s £ E^(A,  B o r ,  s )  a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  number  o f  
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s .
A3.12 The number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s  s u c h  t h a t  s |  E(A,  Nan,  s )  
and s fj: E(A,  B or ,  s )  a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  number  o f  
s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s .
A3 .13 The number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s s u c h  t h a t  s £ E(A,  P l u ,  s )  
and s £ E(A, Nan,  s )  and s £ E(A, B o r ,  s )  a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  
t h e  t o t a l  num ber  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s .
A3.14 The number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s s u c h  t h a t  s e E^(A ,  P l u ,  s )
and s e E X(A, Nan,  s )  and  s £ E^(A,  B o r ,  s )  a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f
t h e  t o t a l  number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s .
A3. 15 The number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s s u c h  t h a t  s  ^ E^(A,  P l u ,  s )
and s fj: E^(A,  Nan,  s )  and s tj: E ^ (A ,  B o r ,  s )  a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f
th e  t o t a l  number  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s .
A3.16 The number o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s  s s u c h  t h a t  s £ E(A,  P l u ,  s )  
and s £ E(A, Nan,  s )  and s tf E(A,  B o r ,  s )  a s  a p e r c e n t a g e  o f
t h e  t o t a l  num ber  o f  s i n c e r e  s i t u a t i o n s .
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